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ABSTRACT
This study covers the period of conflict in the Deep 
South from 1850-1852 between radical and moderate forces over 
whether to accept the Compromise of 1850. Previous interpretations 
of this struggle, including excellent state studies, tend to 
emphasize political or economic forces as the primary causes of 
the conflict in this period. Although these older works give 
adequate coverage to the political-economic situation, they do 
not provide an adequate analysis of the values which dominated 
the Southern mind: white supremacy versus love for the Union.
The present work provides a synthesis of the political history 
along with a recvaluation of the motivating forces which 
dominated the Lower South.
Political elites in the conservative states appealed to 
the mass's love of the Union. Fixcellent conservative politicians 
like Howell Cobb of Georgia were able to effectively convince 
the electorate of the Empire state that the Compromise measures 
did not actually threaten white supremacy. In the conservative 
state of Louisiana the Whig press and Unionist politicians so 
dominated the modes of public opinion that the masses were 
constantly reminded of the practical and emotional value of the 
Union. Moderate forces in Alabama and Florida also emphasized
that the Compromise had brought sectional peace and had not 
threatened white supremacy.
Fire-eaters in each of the six states attempted to 
exploit the racial fears of the white population. Racism, which 
was common among all social classes in the South, was carefully 
appealed to by extremists who wanted to take their states out 
of the Union. Their arguments ranged from the need to protect 
the purity of the white race to rhetoric stressing the 
catastrophic future in which an emancipated black man would 
have social and political equality with the white man in the South. 
This vision of a post abolition society in which white and black 
Southerners were equal was the main tactic utilized by the 
radicals. It was especially used in Mississippi and South 
Carolina.
Love of the Union and political skill by moderate 
politicians were the determining factors in the South's 
acquiescence in the Compromise of 1850. The Unionist faction 
in most states were able to convince the white electorate that 
slavery was not really threatened. Their leaders, including 
William R. King and Robert Toombs, were able to conduct 
rigorous canvasses which enabled them to stop the drive for 
secession in all of the states. The Fire-eatersy outside of 
South Carolina, were unable to commit their states to disunion,
and South Carolinians had to wait another decade before 
precipitating the break up of the United States.
viii
CHAPTER I
THE LOWER SOUTH AND SECTIONALISM
In the decade prior to secession the Lower South began a two 
year debate on whether to accept the Compromise of 1850. Fire-eaters ' 
in South Carolina openly advocated secession while even conservative 
Unionists in Louisiana could not support all the Adjustment bills. 
National political ties were abandoned by radicals, and the moderates' 
love of the Uninn was seriously strained before decisions about Southern 
rights and national loyalties were reached. The Deep South had begun 
the process of calculating the value of the Union which ended in 
disunion ten years later.
The crisis of 1850 had its origins in the election of 1844.
In that year James K. Polk of Tennessee was elected President of the 
United States on the Democratic ticket. Polk, a former Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and Governor of the Volunteer State, would be 
chief executive at the beginning of the first major sectional crisis 
since 1820-1821.^ The dangerous issue of slavery was raised again as 
a moral issue across geographic lines. Manifest Destiny, a national 
phenomenon helped produce the Mexican War and the crisis over the ex­
pansion of slavery in the territories from 1848-1850. The Democrats 
had captured the Presidency from the Whigs but in turn were captured 
by the forces of sectionalism.
1 Charles Sellers, James K. Polk: Continentalist 1843-1846
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966),3-487, passim. Herein­
after cited as James K. Polk.
1
2Sectionalism was one of the strongest forces in America during 
the 1840's. American historians have Usually identified it as the 
decisive factor which slowly began to erode such national institutions 
as the Protestant churches and the two major political parties. The 
decade of the 1840's saw the beginning of the breakdown of the two- 
party system and a rise in animosity between the North and South. 
Sectional rather than national political loyalties thus became more 
important for many Southerners
In the Shrine of Party. Joel Silbey identified a strong two- 
party system in the Southern states which retained much of its vitality 
despite the slavery question. Between 1840 and 1852 fifty-three 
percent of the popular vote in the South went to the Democrats while 
Southern Whigs obtained approximately forty-seven percent of the 
electorate's support. Southerners were part of a two-party system, 
and like other Americans, they believed that there were significant 
differences between the two parties, especially on economic issues. 
Congressional voting behavior, which Silbey examined, was mainly deter­
mined by party membership rather than sectional loyalty.^
By the 1840's the Lower South had already developed its socio­
economic institutions and thought patterns. Staple crop agriculture
2 Avery 0. Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (New York;
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), 175-300; Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine
of Party; Congressional Voting Behavior. 1841-1852 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 10-109.
3 Silbey, The Shrine of Party. 19-34.
3was the dominant activity in the Deep South. Although South Carolin­
ians raised rice on the coast, and South Louisianians grew sugar cane, 
cotton was the predominant crop in that region.^ Black men and women 
labored in the fields, and in some places in the Deep South, outnumbered 
the white population.^ Manufacturing and trade were generally deni­
grated when compared with agriculture. The plantation was the Southern 
; ideal.6
Slavery had become the institution around which Southerners 
hoped to build a utopia. Eugene Genovese describes the peculiar insti­
tution as more than "a system of extra-economic compulsion designed to 
sweat a surplus out of black labor. . . .  It supported a plantation 
community that must be understood as an integrated social system, and 
it made this community the center of Southern life. It extruded a 
class of slaveholders with a special ideology and psychology and the 
political and economic power to impose their values on society as a 
w h o l e . o n e  need not agree with Genovese's picture of the South as 
a pre-.bourgeoise, non-capitalist society in order to concur with his
4 Clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1961), 25-74.
5 The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington, 
1853), 38-39, 447.
6 Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New 
York: Random House, 1961), 155-221. Clement Eaton states: "Though
trade did not rank in honor with planting, or the professions, there 
is a tendency to underestimate the spirit of business enterprise in 
the Old South and to exaggerate the disdain among the upper class for 
the pursuit of business." Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization. 
122.
7 Genovese, The Politica1 Economy of Slavery. 7-8.
conclusion that the planters dominated the South. Non-slaveholders 
were certainly not white serfs or vassals, but they accepted the 
leadership of the planter and hoped to join him at the top of the social
Q
pyramid.
Emancipation or any apparent threat to slavery was a challenge 
to the values and social mores of the Deep South. A slaveholder would 
support disunion if the system of black slavery was threatened: "To
these men slaves were a source of power, pride and prestige. . . .  
Slavery was the foundation of a special civilization imprinted with 
their own character. The defense of slavery, to them meant the 
defense of their honor and dignity. . . . They could never agree to 
renounce the foundation of their power and moral sensibility.
Planters and the common white folk had a definite stake in the peculiar 
institution whether out of overt economic investment, fear of race war, 
or the psychological comfort of a permanently inferior race. Southern 
men might disagree on economic and political questions, but by the 
1840's they generally defended slavery as a positive good. Any serious 
questioning of the system of Negro slavery was not to be tolerated in 
the Lower South.
8 Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 72-97.
9 Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery, 270.
10 Clement Eaton, The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old 
South (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 32-64, 89-118, 
144-162, 300-376; George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White 
Mind (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 42-71; William S. Jenkins, Pro-
Slavery Thought in the Old South (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1935), 1-381, passim.
5Slavery had been a moral and political issue in ante-bellum 
America since the 1820's. The first important struggle came in 1820- 
1821 over the admission of Missouri, a slave state, to the Union. In 
the most complete work on this crisis, Glover Moore demonstrated that 
the later rationales for or against the expansion of slavery were 
vigorously aired in Congressional d e b a t e . A  second crisis arose in 
the late 1820's when South Carolinians overtly protested against the 
tariff of 1828 and covertly protested against the growing abolition 
movement and possible emancipation.^ Politicians in the 1830's tried 
to keep this terrible issue from becoming a source of sectional con­
flict. Congressional leaders of both parties acquiesced in the 
Southern demand that a gag rule be passed to require mandatory tabling 
of anti-slavery petitions sent to the House or Senate.^ Andrew 
Jackson and Martin Van Buren avoided raising the issue of annexing
the Republic of Texas since it would involve the question of a new
14slave state and might precipitate war with Mexico. Despite their 
strenuous efforts, slavery as a moral and political issue had blossomed
11 Glover Moore, The Missouri Compromise. 1819-1821 (Lexington; 
University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 10-383, passim.
12 William W. Freehling, Prelude to the Civil War; The Nulli­
fication Crisis in South Carolina. 1816-1836 (New York; Harper &
Row, 1963), 89-301.
13 Glyndon G. Van Duesen, The Jacksonian Era. 1828-1848 (New 
York; Harper & Row, 1959), 108.
14 Charles Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 321-22; Van
Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 109.
6fully with the annexation of Texas and the beginning of the war with 
Mexico in 1846. Southerners were determined to protect the right of 
slavery to expand into the West while many Northerners wanted to 
restrict the boundaries of the peculiar institution.*'*
John Caldwell Calhoun of South Carolina wanted to protect
Southern interests by creating an alliance with the old Northwest which
would tie the two sections politically and economically together.*^ A.
0. Craven concludes: "These regions had long been tied together both
physically and socially. . . .  In spirit and temper too the Lower
South was strictly Western. . . . Even with the building of canals
and railroads, which linked the Northwest with eastern seaboard cities,
17
trade still flourished with the South." A concrete effort at 
sectional unity was made in 1845 at the Memphis Convention on internal 
improvements. Calhoun proposed that a railroad be constructed between 
Charleston, South Carolina, and Memphis, Tennessee. The aging 
Carolinian returned to a position, which he had earlier held in his 
nationalistic phase, of advocating federally-financed internal improve­
ments, for example, on the Mississippi River. Six hundred delegates 
from both the South and Middle West attended but nothing positive came 
from the meeting. And although Calhoun chaired a Senate committee
15 Ray A. Billington, Westward Expansion (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1967), 501-505; Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era. 
208-45.
16 Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist 1840-1850
(New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), 234. Hereinafter
cited as John C. Calhoun.
17 Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 21-25.
7which considered the Memphis resolutions, the idea of federally- 
financed internal improvements was repudiated by other Southerners 
such as Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina.*®
A possible sectional alliance might have been achieved through 
the Democratic party. There were strong branches of the party in the 
Northwest and South which could have been the basis for an intraparty 
sectional alignment. The 1844 Democratic platform had attempted to 
appeal to the Manifest Destiny spirit in the nation during the 1840's. 
The platform called for the "re-annexation" of Texas and the "re­
occupation" of Oregon. Southerners were recompensed with total annexa­
tion of Texas, but Northern men felt cheated when Polk compromised on 
the Oregon territory. In Polk's first two years the low Walker Tariff 
was passed by Congress, but a rivers and harbors bill wanted by the 
Northwest was vetoed. Northern Democrats began to speak of Southern 
control of the party. They began to believe in an aggressive 
slavocracy which endangered their sectional interests.*^ An alliance
was never consummated, however, and Silbey could find no evidence of
2 nsectional cooperation in Congressional voting.
18 Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1966), 310-11; Thelma Jennings, "A Reappraisal
of the Nashville Convention," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Tennessee, 1968), 30-33; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun. 235-46.
19 Avery 0. Craven, "Democracy a Trial? A Failure of Tech­
nique," Marvin Myers and T. R. Pole (eds.) The Meanings of American 
History: Interpretations of Events, Ideas and Institutions (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman & Company, 1971), 449.
20 Silbey, The Shrine of party. 10-66.
8After the beginning of the Mexican War in May 1846 sectionalism 
and slavery really emerged as potent political issues. The question 
of slavery was raised at the end of the 1846 Congressional session. 
James Thompson, a Pennsylvania Democrat, offered an amendment to ex­
clude slavery from Oregon. It was passed in the House, but the Senate 
did not act upon it.^l
In early August 1846 the Polk administration made a special 
request for an appropriation of two million dollars to use in negotia­
tions for a boundary treaty with Mexico. Four Northern Democrats, 
including David Wilmot (who had supported the Walker Tariff which was 
unpopular in Pennsylvania) wanted to pass a prohibition similar to
the Thompson amendment but applied to any territory acquired from 
9 9Mexico. A debate was taking place on August 6 when Wilmot intro­
duced his famous amendment: "Provided that as an express and funda­
mental condition to any acquisition of any territory from the 
Republic of Mexico by the United States . . . neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said terri- 
9 ^tory. . It was adopted in the House of Representatives by a vote
of 83 to 64 with no slave state Democrat supporting it. When the two 
million dollar appropriation and the Proviso reached the Senate, it
21 Sellers, James K. Polk. 474-84; Elbert B. Smith, The Death 
of Slavery: The United States. 1837-1865 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1967), 83-84. Hereinafter cited as. The Death of Slavery.
22 Sellers, James K. Polk. 476-83.
23 Ibid., 481.
was filibustered to death.^
There was little immediate reaction to the Proviso in either 
section during the fall of 1846. Politicians in the South generally 
regarded the Wilmot Proviso as a political maneuver rather than a 
sectional threat; Northern Democrats wanted to postpone any discussion 
of slavery in the West so that the Whig party would not be strength­
ened by it. However, Preston King, a New York Barnburner, reintro­
duced the Wilmot Proviso in an amendment to an appropriation bill on 
January 4, 1847. King was answered by a Calhounite, Armistead Burt 
of South Carolina, in a debate on Oregon. Representative Burt pro­
posed that the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30' be extended to 
any conquered territory; this proposal was rejected and the House 
again passed the Wilmot Proviso on February 15, 1847.^
A direct answer to Northern Free Soilers was provided by 
Calhoun in a series of Senate resolutions: "That Congress as the
joint agent and representative of the States of the Union, has no 
right to make any law, or do any act, whatever that shall directly 
or by its effects, make any discriminations between the States of the 
Union . . . that the enactment of any law, which should directly or by 
its effects deprive the citizen of any of the states of this Union 
from emigrating with their property into any of the territories of the
24 Ibid., 481-84.
25 Chaplain W. Morison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: 
The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1967), 21-34. Hereinafter cited as Democratic Politics 
and Sectionalism.
10
United States . . . would be a violation of the Constitution . .
Even though these resolutions were not adopted by the Senate, Calhoun's 
position eventually became the basis of arguments which Southern 
politicians supported in the sectional crisis.^
Calhoun hoped to unite the entire South by using the Wilmot 
Proviso as the impetus for destroying national party loyalty. In 
Charleston he made a speech on the growing dangers to Southern civili­
zation and institutions. Political strength in the North was evenly 
divided between the two main parties which had to bid for abolitionist 
support in order to win elections. The South must unite and demand 
that the national political parties abandon the emancipation program. 
There was some Southern support for Calhoun's idea, but the Southern 
Whigs would not abandon their party. A majority of Southern Democrats 
did not like the idea either since the disruption of their party would 
leave the South politically isolated. They also suspected that the 
Carolina Calvinist was manipulating the slavery question to further his 
drive for the Presidency. And though most Southern newspapers opposed 
the Wilmot Proviso, they were also suspicious of Calhoun's ideas of 
Southern unity.
On the state level in 1847, the Virginia legislature enacted 
a series of resolutions which condemned the Wilmot Proviso and
26 Ibid., 35.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 38-42.
11
promised resistance to its passage. These same resolutions were 
adopted by South Carolinians in Charleston who had gathered to welcome 
Calhoun back from Washington. Alabama Democrats in their state conven­
tion in May 1847 gave full approval to the Virginia resolutions; the 
Alabama legislature adopted the Calhoun-Virginia position in December 
1847 and decided that Congress had the responsibility to protect a 
slave owner's black property in any territories. If Southern inter­
ests were threatened, the people of Alabama would cooperate with other 
Southerners to protect slavery.^9
Another issue that caused sectional tensions was the question 
of territorial government for Oregon and the former Mexican areas.
The Treaty with Mexico had brought the vast region of the Southwest 
and California under American control.-*® One historian has written: 
"There was peace with Mexico but a new conflict in Washington."-**
An anti-slavery Senator, John P. Hale of New Hampshire, proposed a 
bill which would prohibit the introduction of slavery into Oregon.-*^
The answer to Hale's bill came from Calhoun who described what this 
bill meant to militant Southerners: "The degradation of nearly one-
half the states of the Union, who claim to be equal here and who
29 Jennings, "A Reappraisal of the Nashville Convention,"
36-38.
30 Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 239-45.
31 Smith, The Death of Slavery. 94.
32 Ibid.
intend never to yield that fully equality."^3 jn a series of violent 
debates, Senator Henry S. Foote of Mississippi vigorously attacked 
Hale as having violated the constitutional rights of the entire South. 
Foote invited Hale to come to Mississippi and said "that he (Hale) 
could not go ten miles into the interior before he would grace one of 
the tallest trees of the forest, with a rope around his neck, with the 
approbation of every virtuous and patriotic citizen; and that if 
necessary I should assist in the o p e r a t i o n . H a l e  replied that if 
Senator Foote came to New Hampshire he would receive the respect due 
a member of the United States Senate.35
Most Senators generally agreed that the peculiar institution 
had no chance of surviving in Oregon. Acrimonious debate continued 
through July as a Senate committee, chaired by John Clayton of 
Delaware, worked on a compromise. A package of three bills was 
presented which would have allowed Oregon to be organized as a terri­
tory with its own constitution which outlawed slavery; New Mexico and 
California, carved from the Mexican cession, were to be set up as 
territories but their legislatures would be prohibited by Congress 
from passing any laws regarding slavery. If any questions were raised 
about the status of slavery in these areas, a final decision would be 
reached in the Federal courts. The Clayton Compromise, passed by the
33 Ibid., 95.
34 John E. Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote, 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1957), 
47.
35 Smith, The Death of Slavery. 95.
13
Senate, was a solution which "ultra" Southerners like Calhoun sup­
ported.^
The Clayton Compromise did not become law, however; the House 
of Representatives, dominated by a pro-Wilmot Proviso majority, voted 
to table it. After several additional days of savage debate the 
Senate passed a bill which included the extension of the Missouri Com­
promise line to the Pacific. This proposal was also rejected by a 
majority of the House of Representatives. The Senate then began its 
final debate on the Oregon territory; a change of votes by two 
Senators, Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and Sam Houston of Texas, 
resulted in the passage of the Oregon Territorial Bill with its 
provision excluding black slavery.^ Calhoun spoke for concerned 
Southerners: "The separation of the North and South is completed . . .
This is not a question of territorial government but a question
qg
involving the continuance of the Union." Although these words did 
not produce an immediate effect in the Lower South, Calhoun's ideas 
were being well publicized among radical politicians.
The issue of slavery in the territories was the paramount one 
in 1848, but it was not the only matter of interest in the Deep South. 
An election for President of the United States would occur in 1848, 
and Southerners had a consuming interest in its outcome. Southerners
36 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 461; Smith, 
The Death of Slavery, 96.
37 Smith, The Death of Slavery. 95.
38 Ibid., 96.
had dominated the office since the beginning of the republic. The 
Virginia dynasty had ruled with only one interruption until 1824. In 
this year the Southern succession was broken, but it returned with 
the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and 1832. Jackson was 
succeeded by a New Yorker, his lieutenant, Martin Van Buren. In 1840 
William Henry Harrison won the office but, dying almost immediately, 
was succeeded by John Tyler of Virginia. Then in 1844, with the 
election of Polk, the South again placed a man in the White House. 
Actually, there had never been any direct threat to slavery from the
O Q
Executive branch. 7
Politically oriented Americans had begun to speculate about 
the Presidential election of 1848 when Polk had decided not to seek a 
second term. In the Whig camp the name of Henry Clay immediately 
came to mind. Would the Southern man with Northern principles, as 
some viewed him, attempt another race? It was a possibility, but 
even among some of his most devoted followers there was doubt that 
Harry of the West could win the 1848 election. Politicians began to 
mention possible Whig candidates; the most prominent name talked about 
was General Zachary Taylor.^® John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and 
Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, leading Whigs, pushed the Louisiana 
general's candidacy. Stephens, a Georgia Congressman, represented 
the wing of Southern Whiggery which went home in the summer of 1846
39 Eaton, A History of the Old South, 141-60, 185-206, 261-92.
40 Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of llcnry Clay (Boston; 
Little Brown & Company, 1937), 383-84.
15
hoping to safeguard the South by selecting as the Whig presidential 
candidate a Southern slaveholder who would defend the South's 
interests. Later this sectionslly conscious group began to create a 
Taylor boom in Congress.
During the December 1846 session of Congress the Young Indians, 
a pro-Taylor machine, was formed in Congress.^ Taylor also began to 
receive support in the Lower South from newspapers like the New 
Orleans National; "We consider General Taylor's civil qualifications 
far outshone those connected with his military c a r e e r . T h e  Florida 
Sentinel editorialized: "We are for a Southern man and a slaveholder
for the Presidency."^ Support for General Taylor also existed among 
important members of the Calhoun Camp, including Beverly Tucker and 
John A. Campbell of Alabama.
By late 1847 the Wilmot Proviso was for alert Southerners one 
of the vital issues in the Presidential campaign. The Savannah 
Georgian declared: "the Bank is dead, [and all other party issues]
. . . the only question before the country therefore is the Wilmot
A A
Proviso." ° Southern Democrats were becoming aware of the Alabama
41 Joseph P. Rayback, Free Soil: The Election of 1848 (Lexing­
ton; The University of Kentucky Press, 1971), 36-38, hereinafter cited 
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platform which William Lowndes Yancey introduced at the Democratic 
State Convention in March 1847. The platform's basic plank was that 
there existed a "natural and indefensible right of each citizen of 
every state of the confederacy to reside with his property of every 
description in any t e r r i t o r y A l a b a m a ' s  Democratic leaders agreed 
not to support any man for the presidency who did not oppose the ex­
clusion of slavery in the territories. Georgia Democrats, meeting at 
Millegeville in July 1847, gave a resounding second to these ideas.48
The national Democratic leaders realized that there had to be 
alternatives to the Alabama platform and the Wilmot Proviso. Elec­
tions were not won by a party split over controversial issues. 
Alternatives were proposed, including an extension of the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific or popular sovereignty as outlined by 
Lewis Cass of Michigan in the Nicholson letter. Cass would allow 
white male settlers in a new territory to decide for themselves the 
status of slavery within their territorial boundaries
In early 1848 Alabama Democratic delegates affirmed the 1847 
platform which supported equal rights for the South in the West. An 
Alabama Democratic convention considered James Buchanan, George M. 
Dallas, Lewis Cass and Levi Woodbury as possible presidential candi­
dates. Yancey, favoring Woodbury, denounced the first three of these
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Morison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism. 110.
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men as unacceptable since they did not conform to the Alabama plat­
form. Woodbury, a Northern Democrat, also gained support in Georgia, 
Florida, and South Carolina. However, in the two former states he 
had direct opposition from Lewis Cass.^®
Although General Taylor's candidacy was gaining favor, he 
still had openly to declare that he was a good Whig. In the Allison 
letter Taylor wrote: "I am a Whig but not an ultra Whig."^ Taylor's
support was strongest in the Lower South while Henry Clay was most 
popular in the Northeast and the border states. At the Whig Conven­
tion Taylor had the advantage of an organization which had been 
operating since 1846, and he won the nomination handily. Southern 
men like Stephens and Crittenden had helped nominate the old
Genera 1.52
At the Democratic Convention in 1848 Yancey and other Southern 
Fire-eaters attempted to force the adoption of their views. Yancey 
rose in the convention with a minority report which claimed that any 
Southern man had a right to move with his slave property into the 
territories. He added that there was danger that South Carolina, 
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama would bolt. The Yancey pro-extension 
plan was rejected by a vote of 216 to 36, and the Alabama Fire-eater 
left the convention hall. But the departure of one Southern radical
50 Ibid., 115; Rayback, Free Soil. 129-42.
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did not prevent the nomination of Lewis Cass on his popular sover­
eignty platform.53
The campaign in the South revolved primarily around the issue 
of slavery. Southern Whigs charged that the Democratic candidate 
hated slavery but that Zachary Taylor would protect the institution: 
"He is a southern man and a slaveholder, one of o u r s e l v e s . A l ­
though Cass was defended by Southern Democrats, Taylor had special 
appeal for the Southern electorate since he was a military leader as 
well as a large plantation owner. Taylor carried the extreme pro­
slavery areas in the South, and his supporters led Southern voters to 
believe that their man would be an ardent pro-slavery P r e s i d e n t .55
When Congress convened in December 1848, it had to deal again 
with the problem of slavery. Resolutions were offered in the House 
of Representatives to eliminate the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia. Immediate Southern reaction came when Daniel Gott, a New 
York Whig representative, proposed: "That the committee for the
District of Columbia be instructed to report a bill as soon as prac­
ticable, prohibiting the slave trade in the said District."^
Southern Senators from ten states had formed a committee of five
53 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 48; Morison, 
Democratic Politics and Sectionalism. 121-26; Rayback, Free Soil. 
187-94.
54 Rayback, Free Soil. 242.
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which called for a meeting of Southern Congressmen on December 22,
1848, in the Senate chamber. It was attended by eighteen Southern
>•¥
Senators and fifty-one Congressmen. A special committee of fifteen 
was established, with Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia as chairman, 
to consider the sectional issues. Members from the Lower South in­
cluded John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Edward C. Cabell of Florida, 
William R. King of Alabama, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and Solomon 
W. Downs of Louisiana.^7
This Committee met the next day and chose a subcommittee, 
including Calhoun and King, to write an Address to the People of the 
Southern States. The Address, mainly the work of Calhoun, was dis­
cussed by the Committee during the first two weeks of January 1849 
amidst agitation over anti-slavery attacks. When the threat to the 
slave trade in the District of Columbia declined, Whigs like Alexander 
Stephens wanted to protect their new leader, Zachary Taylor. President 
Polk advised Southern Democrats to go to the meeting but to prevent any 
action on the Address. Robert Toombs and Stephens went to the meeting
CO
specifically to modify any radicalism in it.
Calhoun's Address, although characterized as "not an inflamma­
tory document or one designed to stir unduly the antagonism of the 
section," was a strong indictment of Northern aggression against his 
beloved South.^9 These attacks included interference with the
57 Ibid., 378-81.
58 Ibid., 381-83.
59 Ibid.. 383.
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recovery of escaped slaves, refusal to grant equality to the South in 
the territories, and efforts to check the peculiar institution in 
Washington itself.^0 According to Calhoun, these actions threatened 
"with destruction the greatest and most vital of all the interests 
and institutions of the South [slavery] Debate on the report
began on January 15 and included an alternative report by the Georgia 
Whig Senator, John M. Berrien, presented on January 22, 1849. Berrien's 
Address was defeated by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-seven after 
many Southern Whigs withdrew from the meeting. Calhoun's Address was 
adopted, but it received the signatures of only forty-eight Southern 
Congressmen out of a total of one hundred and twenty-one from the 
slave states. Despite this setback, it was signed by prominent Sena­
tors from the Deep South.^
At this juncture the new Whig President seemed to be under the 
influence of William H. Seward of New York. Southern Whigs either 
defended Taylor as inexperienced or opposed his abandonment of the 
rights of the South. In contrast, Southern Democrats, who had always 
questioned the real value of Taylor to the South, were the most out­
spoken backers of the Calhoun Address.^ The only two states which 
moved directly toward a Southern rights position were South Carolina
60 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 55; Wiltse,
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and Mississippi. South Carolinians established a central state Com­
mittee of Vigilance and Safety. However, the Palmetto State did not 
act since there were many Southerners suspicious of her leadership. 
Mississippians, at a meeting in Jackson in October 1849, acted openly, 
calling for a general convention of the Southern states at Nashville, 
Tennessee, in June 1850, to consider Northern abuses against the 
South.64
The cold weather in December 1849 did not affect the heat of 
sectional tension. Members of the House of Representatives had to 
select a speaker. Robert Winthrop, a Massachusetts Whig, was opposed 
by the Georgia Democrat, Howell Cobb.6-* Robert Toombs and Alexander 
Stephens, both of Georgia, wanted to prevent passage of the Wilmot Pro­
viso. ^  Therefore Toombs "was unwilling to surrender the great power of 
the Speaker's chair without obtaining security for the future [of the 
South]."6  ^ A warning was also issued by Stephens: "I tell this House
. . . that the day in which aggression is consummated upon any 
section of the country much and deeply as I regret it, this Union is 
dissolved." The House balloted over sixty times before it decided 
to accept a resolution to allow the Speaker to be chosen by a
64 Ibid., 62-64.
65 Ibid.. 66.
66 Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union; Fruits of Manifest 
Destiny. 1847-1852 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 251.
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plurality. Cobb was elected, but the mood of the Senate was re­
vealed in a statement by Jeremiah Clemens of Alabama**"The Union is 
valuable only for the privileges it confers and the rights it secures."^® 
This crisis was further exacerbated in the winter of 1849-1850 
by President Taylor's message to Congress. The President described 
the events in California which made her admission to the Union vital, 
and also indicated that New Mexico would shortly apply for statehood. 
Taylor had given impetus to the calling of constitutional conventions 
in this area; California had decided upon a free state status, and it 
appeared to many Americans that Mexican law made New Mexico a free 
territory. Some Southerners resented the plan since they wanted com­
pensation for the South if California was admitted. Additional issues 
between the major sections involved the boundary disputes between New 
Mexico and Texas, the need for a strong fugitive slave law, and the 
status of the peculiar institution and slave trade in Washington, D.C. 
Taylor's plan did not take into account these additional problems.71 
On January 29, 1850, Henry Clay drew together a number of 
proposals to solve the crisis. The Kentucky Senator "was motivated
69 Nevins, The Ordea1 of the Union. 252-53; Hamilton, Zachary 
Taylor, 247-52.
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the Union. 256-68; James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1897), V, 18-19.
by a patriotic desire to terminate the sectional c r i s i s . " ^  If a 
Compromise could be achieved, the Union would be maintained and the 
power of Clay's party could be preserved. Clay proposed that: 1)
California should be admitted into the Union with her free soil con­
stitution; 2) territorial governments should be established in the 
rest of the Mexican cession without any provision or limitations con­
cerning slavery; 3) the border of west Texas should not include New 
Mexico; 4) the debt of the Republic of Texas should be assumed by the 
Federal government; 5) slave trade within the capital should be for­
bidden; 6) slavery in Washington should not be ended without the 
permission of white citizens of Maryland or the capital; 7) provi­
sions should be made for the more effective rendition of fugitive 
slaves; and 8) Congress should declare that it had no constitutional 
power to interdict interstate trade in slaves.^
Reaction by militant Southerners was immediate. A Mississip- 
pian stated: "The North must choose between respect for southern
rights and dissolution."^ Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi 
rejected the idea of compromising the constitutional right of planters 
to migrate with black property into the Mexican cession. Davis 
thought that an answer to the problem of sectional power would be to 
have each section dominate one House of Congress. The only sectional
72 Nevins, The Ordea1 of the Union. 265.
73 Ibid., 265 -66 .
74 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 71.
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adjustment possible, Davis stated, was the extension of the 36° 30* 
line to the Pacific.^
The extreme Southern opinion was stated by Calhoun to a packed 
Senate chamber on March 3, 1850. Calhoun had "a long mane of thick 
gray hair swept back from his leonine features . . . was emaciated 
. . . and death seemed plainly written on his brow. But his wild, 
deep glowing eyes . . . his iron jaw and his massive forehead made him 
as impressive as one Hebrew prophet . . Because of illness, he
asked Senator James M. Mason of Virginia to read his speech: "I
have, Senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the 
subject of slavery would if not prevented by some timely and effec­
tive measure end in d i s u n i o n , h e  began. The Southern region of 
the United States had fallen behind the Northern section in power and 
population because of political measures like the Missouri Compromise. 
Clay's proposals were futile, and the Union would not be preserved 
unless there was sectional equality in the territories, effective re­
turn of fugitive slaves, an end of agitation on the slavery question,
78and constitutional amendments that would restore power to the South.
Moderate men in both sections were appalled by Calhoun's 
speech. A majority of Southern Senators could not agree to the
75 Ibid.. 72-73.
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Carolinian's call for constitutional c h a n g e . ^9 They also repudiated 
his idea of secession. Calhoun replied: "As things now stand, the
Southern states cannot with safety remain in the Union."®® Henry S. 
Foote of Mississippi answered: "I think she [the South] may . . ."81
Northern moderate opinion was voiced by Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts who spoke for the Compromise out of "love of the
op
Union." Webster noted that both sections had grievances but peace­
ful secession was not possible. The Union had to be preserved.
Webster was praised in Georgia, Louisiana, and generally by Southern 
Whig papers, but he was condemned by radical Southerners and free- 
soilers. It is possible that Webster's speech quieted sectional ten­
sions, but the speech did not change any Senatorial votes.
In the South opinion on the sectional crisis was divided or 
confused in the winter of 1849-1850. Georgians of both parties in 
the legislature had adopted fairly radical resolutions in November
1849. But the Georgia citizenry failed to show much interest in the 
election of delegates to the Nashville Convention.®^ Alabama and 
Louisiana displayed a generally conservative attitude. The young
79 Nevins, The Ordea1 of the Union. 283.
80 Ibid.. 284-85.
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state of Florida had two radical Senators, David Yulee and Jackson 
Morton, who urged support for the Nashville Convention, but Governor 
Thomas Brown questioned the constitutionality of the Southern Conven­
tion. Local committees in Florida, however, choose delegates.®-*
In June 1850 the Nashville Convention opened. The best known 
delegates came from South Carolina; Langdon Cheves, James Hammond and 
Robert Barnwell Rhett. Judge William Sharkey of Mississippi was chosen 
President of the Convention on June 3, 1850. Sharkey's speech to the 
Nashville delegates was an appeal for careful, conservative resolu- 
tions. He made it clear that the preservation of the Union should be 
the goal of the Convention. Moderation dominated the Convention because: 
(1) delegates feared that radicalism would alienate the border states, 
and (2) they could not rely on a unified Southern opinion. Convention 
members in resolutions indicated that they would settle for an exten­
sion of the 36° 30' line to the Pacific coast. A more radical position 
was taken in an address written by Robert Barnwell Rhett, but neither 
document gained widespread approval in the South:®^ "If before the 
radicals had been checkmated, they had been given an opportunity to 
clasp hands, to exchange opinion and to fortify each other."®®
Southern radicals were not able to use the Nashville
85 Ibid., 86-88.
86 Ibid., 94-96.
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The Ordea1 of the Union, 316.
88 Ibid.. 317.
27
Convention to achieve Southern unity or secession.
Earlier in 1850 Congressmen had started to work for passage of 
the Compromise. Efforts to design a Compromise had begun in February 
when the sectional divisions appeared most critical. On February 
18-19, 1850, there was a meeting at Howell Cobb's home of Toombs, 
Stephens, Linn Boyd of Kentucky, John McClernand, and William A. 
Richardson of Illinois, and John K. Miller of Ohio. These men, along 
with Senator Stephen Douglas, agreed to the admission of California 
if New Mexico and Utah were organized as territories without Congress 
prohibiting slavery. They also agreed that people in the territories 
should settle the status of slavery themselves; and any effort to 
abolish slavery in Washington, D. C. must be defeated. Representa­
tive McClernand and Senator Douglas introduced bills which embodied
Q Q
the sense of the meetings.
The Compromise proposals confronted strong opposition by the 
Taylor administration and by radical men in all sections. Clay's 
supporters (approximately fourteen to fifteen men) tried to convince 
the Congress that compromise was possible and that radicals were
Q A
dangerous. u Tensions continued, however, and there was a fight 
between two Southern Senators, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and 
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri. Both men were Unionists, but Foote 
had associated himself with Calhoun's Address, which Benton considered
89 Ibid.. 303-305.
90 Ibid., 305-308.
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treasonous. Foote defended slavery while Benton hoped for its eventual 
demise. The Mississippi Senator was pressing for a committee of thir­
teen to consider compromise bills when Benton interrupted with direct 
criticism of the Southern Address as the cause of sectional excite­
ment. Foote defended Calhoun and used the term "Calumniators" to
describe the South Carolinian's critics. Benton then charged Foote
91who drew a pistol which he pointed at the Missourian. Although
Senators restrained the men, Benton cried: "let the assassin fire."9^
This was good evidence of the personal and sectional tensions which
were created by the vigorous Senate debate.
Foote's proposal to create a committee of thirteen was adopted
by a vote of thirty to twenty-two on April 18, 1850. Henry Clay was
chosen chairman of the committee which consisted of men from both
parties and sections. The committee's report, called the Omnibus
Bill, was presented to the Senate on May 8, 1850:9^
First whenever any new State or States formed out of Texas 
applied for admission, Congress was to redeem its compact 
with the Texan people by granting the request. Second,
California was to be admitted immediately. . . . Third, 
territorial governments were to be established for New Mexico 
and Utah without any stipulations for or against slavery.
Fourth, the provisions respecting California, Utah and New 
Mexico . . . were to be bound up in the bill. . . . Fifth,
Texas was to be paid for surrendering her jurisdiction over 
the lands she claimed within the old boundaries of New Mexico 
. . . .  Sixth, a fugitive law was to be passed. Seventh, the
91 Ibid., 309-10.
92 Ibld•> 31°*
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slave trade was to be abolished within the District of 
Columbia, slavery was to continue therein.94
Men like Senator Solomon W. Downs of Louisiana objected to parts of
the resolutions, but the Compromise forces appeared hopeful.95
During the early summer of 1850 Southern Congressmen worked
actively on the Compromise. An amendment by Senator Berrien, which
was adopted, "empowered territorial legislatures to protect slave
property (if the Federal Courts) . . . should favor the existence of
Q(L
slavery there."70 Pierre Soule of Louisiana presented an amendment 
that a state formed from the Mexican cession could enter the Union 
whether it was free or slave. These amendments were adopted as a 
collision appeared possible between the state of Texas and the national 
government over the New Mexico boundary.^
Federal forces, stationed in New Mexico under the command of 
Military Governor John Monroe, seemed poised to defend her. A New 
Mexican constitutional convention had outlawed slavery, and the con­
stitution had been adopted by a vote of eight thousand to thirty-nine. 
The Governor of Texas, supporting Texas claims to jurisdiction over 
the area around Sante Fe-Albuquerque asked the Texas legislature for 
power to send a state militia force to the disputed land. President
94 Ibid.. 311-12.
95 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 948-50.
96 Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, 98-99.
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Taylor wanted New Mexico admitted as a state and indicated that the 
Federal government would control the area until the question was 
settled. Southern radicals rallied to the Texas cause, and Southern 
moderates were alarmed when Taylor proposed to send reinforcements to
go
New Mexico. Representatives Stephens and Toombs visited the Presi­
dent in early July 1850 but had no effect on him. Stephens exclaimed 
after this visit that if Federal troops were sent to New Mexico
QQ
Taylor would be impeached. 7 He wrote the National Intelligencer:
"The first federal gun illegally fired against the people of Texas . . 
would signal freemen from the Delaware to the Rio Grande to rally to 
the r e s c u e . T a y l o r  denounced these men as traitors and was still 
opposed to the Compromise when he died on July 9, 1850.^*
His successor, Millard Fillmore was eager to support adjust­
ment measures. But even with a friendly President in the White House 
the Omnibus Bill was having rough going. Its foes, employing a series 
of skillful parliamentary maneuvers, defeated it on July 31. Clay 
lost support from the Whigs, and the "Omnibus" could not be passed as 
a package.
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An Illinois Senator and a financial leader helped rescue the 
Compromise. Clay, in need of rest, retired from the battle in August, 
and Compromise leadership in the Senate was assumed by Stephen 
Douglas. Douglas worked for the passage of the Compromise package as 
separate bills. Texas bondholders, who wanted the national govern­
ment to assume the Texas bond debt, worked for the Compromise.
Prominent Southerners like James Hamilton of South Carolina, a former 
nullificationist, also labored for the acceptance of the Compromise 
and Texas debt by Congress. Thomas Corcoran, a speculator in the
bonds, supported lobbyists like Hamilton who wanted the Compromise's 
103passage.
The success of Compromise was assured at the end of September 
when the Omnibus Bill passed the House of Representatives. By using 
the tactic of voting on individual bills, pro-compromise leaders 
were able to combine different Senate and House blocs to secure the 
passage of the Compromise en toto. The Compromise was successfully 
enacted because of Democratic support in both houses of Congress.104- 
Congress had passed the Compromise, but if the Union was to 
be maintained the measure would have to be accepted in the Lower South. 
Militant Southerners looked with hostility at proposals which admitted 
California as a free state and provided for the territorial organiza­
tion of Utah and New Mexico without respect to slavery. Although the
103 Ibid.. 118-50.
104 Ibid.. 133-50.
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boundary arrangements between Texas and New Mexico were adjusted as 
the Federal government assumed the Texas state debt of ten million 
dollars, it was still a great loss of territory to slavery. The 
right to recover slaves was considered by many Southerners as a con­
stitutional guarantee and hence its inclusion in the Compromise 
represented no great concession. Also irritating to many Southerners 
was the abolition of the slave trade in the nation's capital, which 
seemed to place another stigma on the section. Pro-Compromise men 
celebrated in late September 1850, but the struggles within the 
states of the Lower South to obtain acceptance for the Compromise of 
1850 had just begun.
105 Eaton, A History of the Old South. 474-76.
CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA: THE BASTION OF CONSERVATISM
During the crisis years between 1840 and 1860 Louisiana was 
regarded as the most moderate of the Deep Southern states. One of 
the observers of Southern politics H. W. Conner, a Calhounite, wrote 
in 1849: "I fear for Louisiana . . . Louisiana will be the last if
at all to strike for the defense of the South."* The state’s conserva­
tism was evident in its reaction to the Adjustment bills passed by the 
Thirty-First Congress that were designed to quiet sectional animosities.
Reaction in Louisiana to issues dividing North from South was 
largely determined by its ruling class, "the minority of merchants and 
large planters."^ This elite ruled with little direct opposition 
since "race or caste, not class, was the only recognized fissure in
O
society."-' Its members, who had grown affluent through the sale of 
their agricultural produce and their access to the transatlantic trade 
out of New Orleans determined largely the conservative path which 
Louisiana would follow in 1850-1851.
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The agricultural parishes of Louisiana produced 246,000 hogs­
heads of sugar cane and 178,000 bales of cotton in 1850. The large 
planters made a profit which Professor Joe Gray Taylor has estimated 
at seven percent on cotton and nine percent on sugar, depending, of 
course, on crop prices, which averaged twelve and six cents a pound, 
respectively in 1850. Slavery in these parishes was obviously a 
paying institution, and the plantation owners had good reason to 
desire calm on the political scene.^
Wealthy sugar planters were also subject to economic pres­
sures that inclined them to acquiesce in the Compromise of 1850. The 
price which a sugar planter received for his crop was partially depen­
dent on the import duties on sugar. Members of the sugar industry 
sought tariff protection by trying to prove that their industry was 
beneficial to the entire nation. Planters in Louisiana believed that 
a tariff was vital to their economic welfare and in fact maintained 
"that protection was indispensable to their very economic survival."'* 
The contest over the tariff continued throughout the entire period,
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1840-1860: "Rates set at an average of 1.1 cents per pound were sub­
stantially below the figures prevailing during most of the previous 
thirty y e a r s . S u g a r  planters were thus concerned with the passage 
of national tariff legislation which may have contributed to their 
interest in protecting the Union. A change of the average one cent 
duty per pound might have resulted in serious economic problems for 
the industry.^
Despite some economic readjustments in the decade before the 
Civil War, New Orleans enjoyed economic growth. One historian has 
stated: "To cite one index of many available the value of up river
receipts at New Orleans almost doubled every decade, rising from 
twelve and one half million in 1820 to over one hundred and eighty-five
Q
million in 1860." New Orleans1 prosperity was partially dependent 
on trade with areas outside the Deep South--though still within the 
boundaries of the United States. There was steamboat service between 
St. Louis and New Orleans, together with regularly scheduled runs by 
American ships between the Crescent City and New York. Shipping firms 
also had connections with other Southern ports and C a l i f o r n i a .^ The 
flatboat trade with the Northwest was important and had not yet
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vention]' 39-40.
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declined to an insignificant level in 1850.*^ Professor Clark has
written: "New Orleans does not seem to have suffered perceptibly as
of 1850, from the dynamic growth of the Great Lakes Grain Trade."I1
Any decline in this trade, even a temporary one, was likely to cause
concern in New Orleans' mercantile community which had more trading
ties with the non-slave states than any other seaport in the South.
Therefore her economic leaders had important economic motivations
which encouraged moderation in order to preserve the Union.^
Although Louisiana's elite were disposed to moderation, they
had typically pro-Southern reactions to the issue of slavery expansion
which rose in the 1840's. Thus Louisiana was not exempt from the
13debate over the annexation of the Lone Star Republic. There were
differences of opinion on the annexation question between the Whig
Senators, Alexander Barrow and Henry Johnson, with Johnson's opinion
14probably being closer to the views of the Louisiana electorate.
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In a letter published in the Baton Rouge Gazette on June 15, 1844,
Barrow stated that he opposed annexation since it would be harmful to
Louisiana financially. Furthermore, it would not protect Southern
political equality, or benefit the institution of Negro slavery. He
also tried to dispel the fear that the diplomatic efforts of England
and France in Texas might lead to their domination of the region.^
Senator Johnson favored annexation, but not enthusiastically so until
16after the Presidential elections of 1844. Johnson, as a loyal 
Whig, had muted his advocacy of annexation because of the equivocal 
position which the Whig Presidential nominee, Henry Clay, took on 
this important issue.
The majority of state political leaders, however, openly sup­
ported annexation. In a message to the legislature Governor Alexander 
Mouton favored annexation of Texas, not primarily for Southern finan­
cial advantage, but to "add to our safety and tranquility"^--probably 
meaning it would ensure the South's political equality with the North. 
The message was referred to a committee chaired by D. E. Burthe, a 
Whig who did not want to act on the issue. Goaded by Charles Gayarre, 
a Democrat, the minority on the committee pushed for action on the 
Governor's message. A resolution offered January 14, 1845, announced
15 Baton Rouge Gazette, June 15, 1844; Norton, "A History of 
the Whig Party in Louisiana," 227.
16 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 227.
17 Louisiana Senate Journal (1845) 17 Leg, 1, Sess., 3.
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Louisiana's support for annexation, provided that Texas had the same 
territorial rights as territories within the boundary of the 
Louisiana Purchase. The Whigs had an eight-vote majority in the 
House of Representatives and gave overwhelming support to the reso­
lution in the Senate. The final vote was 32 to 16 in the House; in 
the Senate, only John Harmanson, a Democratic Senator from Rapides
Parish, voted no. Senator Henry Johnson presented these resolutions
18to the United States Senate. Alexander Barrow's refusal to support 
the admission of Texas to the Union was obviously a minority view.
The discussion about the resolution indicated that Louisi­
anians not only supported the annexation of Texas, but were interested 
in the acquisition of additional western territories. The protection 
of slavery was an issue in the Presidential campaign of 1844.
Louisiana newspapers were bitter in their diatribes against aboli­
tionists, who were condemned as fanatics. Louisiana Whigs attempted 
to associate James K. Polk, the Democratic nominee, with the Presiden­
tial aspirations of James G. Bimey of the Liberty party in order to 
discredit Polk in southern eyes. But the strong stand of the national 
Democratic party on annexation enabled Polk to carry Louisiana.^
By 1846 the elite in Louisiana were becoming increasingly 
alarmed about the problem of slavery in the West. The acquisition of
18 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana,"
228-29.
19 Ibid.
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the Mexican cession produced discussion about the rights of the South 
in the territories. Although most Louisiana leaders favored the acqui­
sition of the Mexican territory, a minority expressed concern about
whether the institution of chattel slavery could survive in the 
2 nSouthwest. u The Daily Delta believed that this area might not be
valuable to the South since it was "already peopled with a numerous
21class of laborers who can work cheaper than slaves." There was also
the suggestion that the status of slavery in the Mexican lands be
9 9settled before the land was annexed.
David Wilmot's Proviso gave further impetus for the discus­
sion of slavery and the Mexican territory. Leaders in Louisiana 
condemned the Proviso as the work of Northern fanatics who were 
attempting to drive wedges between the sections. Most Louisianians 
continued to favor annexation of the territory as an inevitable result 
of the war. The Mexican territories should be acquired on an equal 
basis with the North in order to protect the South. Leaders like 
Solomon Downs saw the Proviso as the crux of the problem between the 
North and South.^
The issue of slavery in the territories did not divide the
20 Bertha Kennedy, "Louisiana and the Mexican War," (unpub­
lished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1930), 87-90; Norton, 
"A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 271-96.
21 Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 3.
22 Kennedy, "Louisiana in the Mexican War," 90.
23 Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 3-9.
parties in Louisiana until the 1848 Presidential elections. Both 
political parties adopted platforms which condemned the Proviso, 
although the Democratic statement was more radical. Most of the 
discussion in the campaign involved the position of the two Presiden­
tial candidates on the issue of abolition and the equal rights of the
o /
South in the former Mexican lands. A part of the Whig press screamed
that the Democratic candidate Lewis Cass "was an abolitionist of the
deepest dye" who was opposed to the expansion of the South's peculiar 
2 Sinstitution. J The Baton Rouge Gazette carried on its masthead: "Re­
member that you cannot vote for William 0. Butler, [Democratic Vice- 
presidential nominee] without voting for Cass the Abolitionist."26 
The New Orleans Courier replied for the Democrats: "And yet the
gentleman of the South received Fillmore [Whig Vice-presidential 
nominee] as their candidate for Vice President although they are aware 
that for virulence and fanaticism of hatred toward the southern insti­
tution of slavery, he is not exceeded by anyone of the abolition 
gang . . ,"27
Whig political speakers charged that their Democratic opponents
24 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 295-300 
Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 10-11.
25 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 295-96.
26 Thomas W. Fife, "Presidential Election of 1848 in Louisiana' 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1956), 77.
27 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 298.
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were actually fanatical abolitionists. At various political gatherings 
throughout the state, Cass was accused of being an opportunist who 
devised squatter sovereignty in order to fool the S o u t h . J u d a h  P. 
Benjamin charged: "Could any southern gentleman tolerate for an
instant the Cass doctrine that the ignorant Mexican, the degraded Negro, 
or the savage Indian who form 'the people' of our new territories, 
possess the power to exclude us, their conquerors and masters. from 
entering with our slaves into the country which is ours?"^ Despite 
counter charges by Democrats at political gatherings, Zachary Taylor's 
Southern origins, and vague statements about the expansion of slavery 
reassured Louisianians and enabled him to carry the state.^0
By 1848 the issue of slavery in the territories had been 
thoroughly explored by the press and in political discussions. 
Louisianians did not view the entire North as opposed to their inter­
ests, but believed the Northern attacks came from small groups of 
anti-slavery fanatics. Some politicians were willing to compromise 
the question of slavery in the territories. Senator Downs proposed 
the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific; he also 
accepted the idea of popular sovereignty. Few major politicians in 
Louisiana endorsed John Calhoun's program for obliterating party lines 
and creating a sectionally-based Southern party. Louisiana's leaders
28 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 299-303.
29 Fife, "Presidential Election of 1848 in Louisiana," 78.
30 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 299-303.
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and electorate had been agitated by the slavery issue, but prosperity 
and moderate voices were responsible for Louisiana's basic conserva­
tism.
The reaction of the Louisiana delegation "in Washington during 
1848-1849 foreshadowed possible problems in 1850. Louisiana politi­
cians gave direct support to the idea of a meeting of a Southern caucus 
during the winter of 1848-1849 to consider sectional grievances. 
Representative Isaac Morse delivered an "earnest speech" about the 
sectional crisis at one meeting, and the strong address issued by 
the caucus was signed by Representatives Morse, Emile LaSere, John 
Harmanson, and Senator Downs. Although this caucus was ridiculed in 
Louisiana papers, the signing of the Southern Address did indicate 
some strong Southern feelings among Louisiana leaders.^
The Louisiana delegation which represented the state in the 
Thirty-First Congress was composed of Isaac Morse, John Harmanson,
Emile LaSere, and Charles Conrad in the House and in the Senate by 
Solomon Downs and Pierre Soule. It was a typical Southern delegation, 
but the House members do not appear to have played a significant politi­
cal role in the electorate's response ort the state level. Representative 
Harmanson died in office in 1850 without accomplishing anything 
meaningful. Charles Conrad, although moderately in favor of the Com­
promise, resigned to become Secretary of War in Millard Fillmore's
31 Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 21-24.
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cabinet. Emile LaSere's position on the Compromise was hostile and 
Morse was identified with the extreme Southern faction.^ These men 
voiced their opinions in Congress but were apparently not crucial in 
deciding whether Louisiana would acquiesce or resist the Compromise of
1850.
The two United States Senators from Louisiana played signifi­
cant roles in 1850. In order to evaluate their political careers, 
it is necessary to examine their backgrounds. Downs was born in 
Montgomery County, Tennessee, in 1801 and moved to Louisiana when he
was a young man. He was educated at Transylvania University,
33Lexington, Kentucky, and admitted to the bar in 1826. By the
1830's he had established himself in Monroe: ". . .In this North
Louisiana section of comparatively small and poor farms, his
[property] must have been one of the most prosperous of the day."^
He practiced law in Monroe, and was elected a state senator in 1838.
This led to resistance against the North and his appointment to the
35
United States Senate in 1846. He was a defender of his region when
32 Ibid., 49. An analysis of Representative LaSere's voting 
pattern indicates that despite M.S. Prichard's evaluation of LaSere 
as being "pro-compromise" he voted against the Compromise on recorded 
roll call votes in the House of Representatives.
33 Russell L. Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon 
Weathersbee Downs," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State Univer­
sity, 1935), 1-24.
34 Ibid., 8.
35 Ibid., 24-45.
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the slavery issue erupted but was definitely more moderate in his 
actions than Pierre Soule.^
Pierre Soule was a French-born immigrant. He arrived in New 
Orleans during the late 1820's and gradually established himself as a 
prominent lawyer. Soule's political participation began in the 1840's 
when he rapidly rose as a leader in the Louisiana Democracy. While 
serving as a member of the upper house of the Louisiana legislature, 
he gained enough support to be elected to the United States Senate in 
1848. During his senatorial career he was identified with John C. 
Calhoun's political position; he ably defended slavery and states 
rights and was not in accord with the conservative political mood in 
Louisiana during 1850-1851.^
Even though Louisiana's Senators were divided on this issue, 
the vast majority of newspapers in the state supported the Whig 
party and took a moderate position on the Compromise of 1850. Within 
New Orleans, the Bee, Commercial Bulletin, Picayune, and Crescent 
were pro-Union and adopted a concilatory attitude toward the Compromise 
in their editorials. The Daily Delta was more radical, but it coun­
seled acquiescence to the Compromise by 1852. In the interior of the
36 Downs never aligned himself with the states right wing of 
the Democracy in the South and acted as a concilatory force in the 
sectional crisis of 1850-1852.
37 Amos Aschback Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soule 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 101-28; Arthur Freeman,
"The Early Career of Pierre Soule" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 1936), 56-144.
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state, the Baton Rouge Gazette gave additional support to the Compro­
mise and the Alexandria Red River Republican concurred.-*®
In early January 1850 the Louisiana Congressional delegation 
sent a letter to the state legislature. This communication reminded 
the legislators about the long history of Northern attacks against the 
South, and emphasized that they should not remain silent on the subject 
of slavery. Although the Assembly should not act rashly, it should 
consider the dangers to the Union. Governor Isaac Johnson was asked 
to give a copy of the letter to both legislative houses along with any 
remarks which he considered appropriate.**^
In his last message to the legislature, Governor Johnson called 
for Louisiana to cooperate with the other slaveholding states in 
protecting the rights of the South. He defended the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty and stated that "if this right [national legisla­
tion on slavery] is recognised [sic], Congress may permit or forbid 
the institution of slavery at discretion."^® The Governor did not 
believe that the "aggressions of anti-slavery" would stop and wanted 
Louisiana to join in any defense recommended by the proposed Nashville 
Convention.^*-
38 Samples of newspaper support may be found by examining the 
Alexandria Red River Republican. September 1, 1850; Baton Rouge 
Gazette. June 22, 1850; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. November 14, 
1850; New Orleans Daily Crescent. June 6, 1850; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. August 7, 1850.
39 Baton Rouge Gazette. November 16, 1850.
40 Louisiana House Journal (1850), 3 leg., 1 Sess., 11. Here­
inafter cited as Louisiana House Journa1 (1850).
41 Ibid.
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Johnson's position was reaffirmed by Joseph Walker who took 
office on January 28, 1850.^ Walker was a veteran politician and 
spoke before a divided legislature— the Democrats controlled the Senate 
while the Whigs dominated the House.^ In his speech he stated: "The 
anti-slavery agitation in the Northern states . . . has, within the 
last two years taken such a shape, that fears are entertained by some 
that it is about to reach a crisis unfavorable to the stability of 
the Union. We are prepared to make common cause with our neighbors of 
the slave holding states."44 Therefore he agreed with Governor 
Johnson's recommendation that delegates be sent to the June meeting 
of the Nashville Convention.
The press either urged Louisiana's leadership to act cautiously
or expressed hostility to the idea of a convention. The New Orleans
Crescent stated: "We regret that he deemed it necessary to advise the
legislature to send delegates to the Nashville C o n v e n t i o n . T h e
Crescent considered the proposal premature and believed that the state
46should only react to detrimental laws. The editor of the Commercial 
Bulletin agreed with some of the Governor's ideas but not with the
42 Ibid.
43 Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 50; White, 
"Louisiana and the Secession Movement of the Early Fifties," 283.
44 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 27; Louisiana Senate 
Journal, (1850), 3 leg., 1 Sess., 24. Hereinafter cited as Louisiana 
Senate Journal (1850).
45 New Orleans Daily Crescent, February 2, 1850.
46 Ibid.
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proposal for a Southern Convention.^ In contrast to these voices of 
moderation, the Daily Delta hoped that Louisiana would be represented 
at the Convention. It would speak for the South against the hostile 
actions of the N o r t h . T h e  Delta was opposed by the Whig papers in 
New Orleans and in the interior by the Alexandria Red River Republican 
[Whig] which was against public money being spent to send delegates to 
the Convention.^ It must be emphasized, however, that most of these 
papers were Whig in sympathy and reflected the opinion of only a part 
of the state's citizens.
At the beginning of the 1850 legislative session committees 
were formed in both houses to consider Governor Walker's recommendation 
about the Nashville Convention. Resolutions offered by various House 
and Senate members were also considered by a joint conference com­
mittee of both houses. The resolutions proposing that Louisiana send 
delegates to the Nashville Convention were taken up in the Senate 
between February 14 and February 20, 1850. The resolutions, which were 
finally adopted, were a partially modified version of a set proposed 
in a minority report by members of the conference committee. A 
majority of the conference committee did not support the Convention, 
but their resolutions were rejected. Senator Stephen Duncan of St.
47 New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. January 31, 1850.
48 New Orleans Daily Delta. January 30, 1850.
49 Alexandria Red River Republican, February 16, 1850.
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Mary was opposed to Louisiana delegates participating in the Conven­
tion.^ He denied that the senate possessed the power to vote for 
delegates to the Nashville Convention, calling such an exercise: "an
unwarranted usurpation of power under the state constitution."^ 
Attempts were made to soften the language of the resolutions in amend­
ments offered by senators Duncan and Dufour. The resolutions were 
finally adopted February 20, 1850, after extensive debate, by a vote 
of twenty-six to one.^ The significance of the vote is that members
of both parties favored vigorous action by the state to support the
53Southern Convention in Nashville.
50 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 63-64; Louisiana Senate
Journal, (1850), 10-55, 69.
51 New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. April 11, 1850.
52 Louisiana Senate Journal, (1850), 68.
53 Ibid., 69. The resolutions read: "1st Be it Resolved by
the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened,
That the powerw not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
or prohibited by it to the States are referred to the States respec­
tively, or the people. 2nd Resolved, That all territory acquired by
the Confederacy, is the common property of all the States. 3rd Resolved, 
That Louisiana cherishes a warm and devoted attachment to the American 
Union, and would deprecate its dissolution as a national calamity; but 
if, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and in dis­
regard of the spirit of concession and compromise in which it was framed, 
Congress should ingraft in its legislation, provision inhibiting slavery 
in the territories, or should abolish it in the District of Columbia, 
or restrict its intercourse between the States, she will resist it to 
the last extremity. 4th Resolved, That to effect a Union of purpose, 
unanimity of feeling and concert of action amongst the people of the 
Southern States, entertaining similar views, by a free and full discus­
sion and interchange of opinion on the subject, we recommend to the 
people of each Parish in this State to send a delegate for each member 
to which they are respectively entitled in the House of Representatives
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The House of Representatives refused to concur with the Senate 
resolutions to send delegates to Nashville. The legislative history 
of the resolutions in the House is obscure, but several facts emerge.
A majority of the representatives of both parties on the joint con­
ference committee favored a strong set of resolutions proposing that 
Louisiana be represented at Nashville. However, there was strong 
opposition to them which caused extended debate.^
Action in the House began on February 5, 1850, when Representa­
tive J. G. Sever proposed a resolution requesting Governor Walker to 
send all relevant information that he had to the House to aid in their 
consideration of the proposal. The Governor sent an uninformative 
answer to the request and debate began February 13. John White of 
the conference committee presented the majority plan which stated that 
Louisiana did not agree with the other Southern states that a Southern 
Convention was necessary. The minority report favored Louisiana's 
participation at Nashville.
Debate extended into late March 1850, and several viewpoints
of the State Legislature, to the Nashville Convention to be holden in 
June next. 5th Resolved, That, in the event of the enactment of the 
Wilmot Proviso, the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, 
or a restriction of it between the States, it shall be, and is 
hereby made the duty of the Governor to convene the Legislature of 
the State, for the purpose of determining what action shall be taken 
in the contemplated emergency."
54 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 54, 63, 84, 120-123, 127, 
142-157; Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 53-54.
M. S. Prichard believed that it was a minority filibuster which 
delayed discussion.
55 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 43-65.
were expressed by House members. Representative Douglas Rivers voiced 
reluctant support for the Nashville Convention because he did not want 
to harm the South by voting against the minority report. A negative 
vote might undermine the position of the South in trying to solve its 
problems with the North. His reluctant acquiescence to the minority 
resolutions was countered by representative Larue, who declared that 
it was unconstitutional for Louisiana to be represented at the Conven­
tion. No vote was taken on the Nashville resolutions, but in early 
March representative Larue, a leading opponent of the bill, was able 
to obtain its consideration by the Committee of the Whole; the 
majority on this issue indicates that approximately half of the mem­
bers of the House were opposed to Louisiana's attendance at the 
Southern Convention; despite efforts to work out a suitable compro­
mise, a vote was never taken in the House because of the press of 
state business and strong opposition by men like Larue.^
On the national level in early 1850 Senator Downs questioned 
the benefits which the South would receive from the proposals made by 
Henry Clay. Downs rose in the Senate in late January to attack the 
"concessions" which Henry Clay has purportedly given to the South.^ 
After briefly reviewing the Compromise measures Downs bluntly rejected 
the idea that the South would accept the Clay bills:
56 Baton Rouge Gazette, March 23, 1850; Louisiana House 
Journal, (1850), 150-77; New Orleans Daily Crescent. March 23, 1850.
57 Congressional Clobe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 251.
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Can Che gentleman suppose that we of the South are so tame 
that we will accept as a boon that which gives nothing to 
the South whatever? What will be the effect of these 
resolutions. . . .  In the first place then, it will 
certainly admit another free state into the Union. . . .  In 
the next place, it is to be decided by the high authorities 
of the Senate that slavery is not tolerated by law in New 
Mexico and California. What concession then is made to us?^®
In a speech in mid-February Downs spoke about the Compromise and 
declared again his belief that the South was receiving no real bene­
fits from it. The bill to end the slave depots in Washington was 
accompanied by an indirect admission that the constitutional power to 
abolish slavery actually existed. This "concession" was accompanied 
by accusations that the South was traitorous which Downs denied; he
did not like the policy toward California, whose admission as a state
59the President desired. Taylor's agents had presented Californians 
with an ultimatum which they had adopted in their free-soil constitu­
tion: "One of the views to be impressed upon the people of
California was that they should adopt such a provision as would suit 
the strongest party here, and, therefore, that they should prohibit 
slavery, . . ,"60 There had not been any real expression of opinion 
about whether slavery should enter California. In concluding Downs 
discussed Clay's contention that the South would suffer by disunion. 
He believed that the end of the Union would not be along the lines
58 Ibid.
59 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 165-67.
60 Ibid.. 167.
52
of the free versus slave states but that the division would occur 
along the Mississippi Valley; a state like Pennsylvania would probably 
join the South in a new confederacy which would not be confronted with 
war from New England/** Downs, who was fairly militant at this point 
believed that he was acting as a responsible Congressman: "I con­
sider that 1 am pursuing the policy that ought to be pursued by a 
Representative of Louisiana on a question of this kind, . . ."62
A more moderate speech was delivered by the only Whig Repre­
sentative from Louisiana, Charles Conrad, on February 28. Speaking in 
a calm manner, he declared that the unsuitable geographic conditions 
of the Southwest meant that it "would be about as easy to introduce 
the culture of the cotton and sugar plants on the parched plains and 
the snowcovered mountains of this country, as permanently to establish 
slavery there."0'' Congress had no power to legislate on the question 
of slavery, which like other domestic institutions in the West should 
be determined by the white inhabitants in a territory. Although 
Conrad defended the President's actions in California, he announced 
that he could not vote for her admission, unless it was part of a 
settlement which would solve the problem of California's Congressional 
representatives. He was not willing to calculate the financial value
of the Union and would preserve it unless Southern honor had to be 
sacrificed.64
61 Ibid., 168-72.
62 Ibid., 171.
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Isaac Morse, one of Louisiana's Democratic radicals, echoed
Downs doubts about the Compromise in early March. In a strong speech
Morse denied that the institution of chattel slavery was a moral evil.**'*
Even though men like Jefferson had questioned the justification of
black bondage, Southerners by 1850 had accepted it as a necessity:
"Whatever may have been the sentiment of the people of the South then
[early nineteenth century], it has undergone a great change. We have
seen our country flourish under this system--a tropical climate and
soil (where the white man cannot cultivate the earth, without incurring
more or less risk of health or life) converted into a terrestrial 
66paradise." Sectional differences, which had begun with the Missouri 
Compromise in 1820, would not be allowed to threaten the peculiar 
institution which was guaranteed by constitutional provisions. 
Southerners must have the same guarantees of property rights as their 
forefathers to insure their rights and to preserve the Union.^
By mid-spring 1850, the moderate leadership in Washington was 
convinced that a compromise must be obtained. To break the impasse 
created by Clay's original proposals, Congress formed a Committee of 
Thirteen, originally proposed by Senator Henry S. Foote of Missis­
sippi. Downs was appointed to the Committee, which consisted of six 
Democrats and seven Whigs. Chairman Clay did most of the actual
65 Ibid.. 327.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 327-29.
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writing of the comnittee proposals which he delivered to the Senate 
on May 8. The Committee recommended a package called the Omnibus bill 
which would cover all the various proposals that Clay had included in 
his February speech. The major changes were a six-word phrase "nor in 
respect to African slavery" which stopped Utah and New Mexico from 
adopting any legislation regarding slavery.**® He eliminated references 
to the geographic impossibilities of slavery expansion, was vague on 
the Texas boundary dispute, and "proposed a guarantee of trial by jury 
in the state where the Negro had allegedly fled."69
Before Downs was appointed to the Committee of Thirteen, he had 
expressed opposition to the Clay resolutions. However, he was influ­
enced by Henry Clay and what seemed to be growing public opinion in 
Louisiana in favor of the Omnibus bill.^® No minority report was 
issued by the Committee, but Downs expressed some minor reservations.
He was in general agreement with the bill, although he still wanted to 
limit the size of California. And despite his support for a settlement 
of the Texas boundary question, he felt that the territory taken from 
Texas should be allowed to have slavery. These mild objections did 
not however prevent his approval of the total Compromise. On May 22, 
he defended the Omnibus bill in a Senate speech in which he empha­
sized that the South should accept the Clay proposals. Property 
in black slaves would be protected by the right of the territorial
68 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict : The Crisis and Com­
promise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964) 85-95.
69 Ibid., 92-95.
70 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 569;
Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon Weathersbcc Downs," 73.
legislature to enact general laws providing for security for all 
property— whether ox or slave. The Wilmot Proviso was not included 
in the report of the Committee of Thirteen, and two-thirds of the 
potentially valuable Mexican cession was still open to the South.
Downs also reminded Southerners that men below the Mason-Dixon line 
were united in 1850 and had the support of Democrats in the North who 
would not combine with them again if the Adjustment bills were re­
jected: "Let this opportunity pass and the South are left in the
minority— a hopeless, a helpless, an unavailing minority. We have now 
a chance which will never occur again . . .  If there is anything in 
these bills which we do not like, let us endeavor to amend them; let 
us perfect them as far as we may be able, . . . But let us not set 
ourselves up to control the opinions and feelings of others; let us 
not attempt to dictate measures to the majority, . . . This spirit 
of realism prevailed in his attitude toward sectional compromise in 
1850.
The conciliation which was evident in Downs' speeches by May 
1850 was countered by the vigorous opposition of Pierre Soule. Soule 
had achieved an important place in the Louisiana Democracy by 1850.
He had defeated John Slidell in the 1847 election for the Senate and 
was emerging as a strong Democratic leader. Soule remained silent 
until May when he gave his initial speech on the Compromise in the
71 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 949; Appendix,
636-39.
72 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 639.
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Senate. The speech received favorable commentary from Martin Van 
73Buren, Jr.:' "Mr. Soule of Louisiana made today rather an imposing 
speech as to manner and matter, to which his French accent and command 
of voice gave additional interest. It was an agreeable contrast to 
the previous southern twaddle and brought Mr. Clay to his feet in 
reply. The Louisiana Senator prepared a vigorous attack on the 
Compromise which centered on the rights of the South in the terri­
tories. Soule was concerned that Southern rights were being lost in 
Texas where slave land would be converted into free-soil.^ The 
Fugitive Slave law actually placed obstacles in the way of the 
recovery of escaped Negroes while anyone admitting the right of slaves 
to be emancipated under the District Slave Trade bill would find it 
difficult to "dispute thereafter either the power or breach of good 
faith involved in making it free territory altogether."^ The confu­
sion caused by the different opinions about whether Mexican anti-slavery 
law still applied to the Southwest made any compromise very tenuous.^
In concluding Soule stated: "Sir, I wish it was a compromise--a real
compromise--containing mutual concessions, . . . But, Mr. President,
I must say, in all candor, that I do not see in these measures any such
73 Amos Aschback Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre
Soule, 108-15.
74 Ibid., 116.
75 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 630-31.
76 Ibid., 631.
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compromise, nor indeed any compromise at all. Concessions, and many 
of them I see, but all of them are concessions from the South; and this 
being so, where is the compromise? Will honorable Senators point out 
to me a single concession from the North to the South which these 
bills contain? I ask but for ONE, Sir, there is none; no not ONE."^®
During the early summer Soule engaged in debate with Clay,
Downs and Foote on specific provisions of the Compromise. He advocated 
the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Coast.
This proposal was a Southern idea and Soule simply applied it to the 
California question with thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes to serve 
as the southern boundary of the state. The area below the compromise 
line in southern California would be covered by the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty. Although he was not successful in getting passage of this 
proposal, he worked diligently with other Southern leaders to amend 
the Omnibus bill. Soule's amendment was one of four successful attempts 
to modify the territorial bills.^ It "provided that a future state 
formed from a western territory would be granted admission into the 
Union regardless of its free or slave status."®® This amendment was 
the only successful change which Soule obtained.
Press reaction to the Compromise measures was generally 
moderate and pro-Union during the first half of 1850. The Commercial
78 Ibid., 635.
79 Ibid., 902, 911, 961-68; Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict.
98-99.
80 Ibid., 99.
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Bulletin, which supported the Omnibus bills, had praised Zachary Taylor 
as a strong President who would protect the Union against Southern 
extremists. Louisiana, according to the paper, would fully support 
him if the bonds of national unity were actually threatened. Edito­
rial comments in the Daily Picayune indicated an acceptance of the 
Compromise and a rejection of Pierre Soule's idea of extending the 
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific coast; this action would 
result in the creation of two new free-soil states by the division of 
California. The editor of the Baton Rouge Gazette called upon Soule
to listen to the conservative opinion of the Louisiana electorate
81which favored Clay's proposals. Furthermore, the Daily Crescent criti­
cized the "representative" nature of the Nashville Convention while 
questioning Soule's motivation in introducing the 36* 30’ line:
"What object is sought to be obtained besides the defeat of the Com­
promise bill, by bringing forward and strenuous advocacy at this time,
QO
of the Missouri Compromise, . . ."° Thus, the conservative opinion 
makers within the state sought to solidify moderate feelings while 
denouncing attempts to frustrate sectional reconciliation.
A public meeting, held in Baton Rouge on June 22, also ex­
pressed approval of the Compromise despite minority opposition. After
81 Baton Rouge Gazette. June 16, 1850; New Orleans Commercial 
Bulletin. March 2, May 21, 1850; New Orleans Daily Crescent. May 20, 
22, 27, June 6, 12, 14, 1850; New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 18, 22, 
June 1, 6, 13, 1850.
82 New Orleans Daily Crescent. June 14, 1850.
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Daniel Avery was selected chairman, Colonel Cole of Lafourche Parish
QO
spoke in favor of the Adjustment bills. Resolutions which were sup­
ported by a majority, stressed their love for the Union and willing­
ness "to sacrifice our pride of opinion upon the consecrated altars of 
our country to ensure her perpetuity."®^ They wanted Louisiana's 
Congressional delegation to support the Omnibus bills unless the pro­
posals violated any important "constitutional" rights. A minority 
platform, submitted by A. S. Herron, stated that both the Texas 
boundary and District State Trade bills were unconstitutional while 
California's admission as free-soil state would be unjust because men
in the southern part of the territory did not want chattel slavery
outlawed. Although Herron's resolutions were defeated, their introduc­
tion and a speech in favor of Soule were signs of local dissatisfaction
85with Clay's Compromise.
Events in the last week of July 1850 showed that the Compromise 
leaders did not have complete control of the situation. The critical 
votes on the Omnibus bill came on the question of New Mexico, Texas, 
and Utah in the Senate. Downs supported the Compromise with two nega­
tive votes on amendments to alter the committee's plans on New Mexico 
and Texas. Soule, in contrast, supported the efforts by those opposed 
to the Compromise by two "yea" votes. The Omnibus bill was defeated.®**
83 Baton Rouge Gazette, June 22, 29, 1850.
84 Ibid., June 29.
85 Ibid.
86 Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, 109-10; 193-94.
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As Thomas Hart Benten said, "We.have but Utah left— all gone but 
Utah."®^ The two Senators were polarized on these Issues and illus­
trate the division within the party. Since Downs was a political 
power in northern Louisiana, his vote may have represented support for 
the Compromise in that area. However, the position of Pierre Soule was 
more representative of Louisiana Democrats generally.
After the defeat of the Omnibus bill, Stephen Douglas of 
Illinois began to steer the various measures through Congress as sepa­
rate items. The voting of Louisiana Congressmen between mid-August 
and the'end "of September indicates an interesting pattern. On the 
question of Utah, the Louisiana delegation favored its organization as 
a territory without provision regarding slavery. The question of 
territorial government for Mexico, considered in a separate vote in 
the Senate, won support from Downs while Soule was recorded as not 
voting. In the House all members opposed the "little Omnibus" [New 
Mexico government-Texas boundary settlement], Soule had opposed the 
Texas boundary-debt settlement in the Senate. The entire delegation 
opposed the admission of California and the ending of the slave trade 
in the District of Columbia while favoring the passage of the Fugitive 
Slave Law. The voting indicated no substantial difference between the 
Soule and Downs wings of the party even though they would adopt dif­
ferent positions on the Compromise during the winter of 1850-1851. 
Democrats in Louisiana accepted the pro-Southern rendition law and the
87 Ibid., 110.
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idea of popular sovereignty for the territories. They rejected the 
more pro-Northern features of the bills but did not condemn all of the 
Compromise.®®
The only elections in 1850 were to fill the seats of Congress­
man Charles Conrad, who had been appointed Secretary of War, and J. H. 
Harmonson who had died. In the second Congressional district, the Whig 
party meeting at Donaldsonville in September 1850, nominated H. A. 
Bullard to replace Conrad. Their platform praised the Compromise and 
the work of men like Daniel Webster. The Democrats did not present a 
regular candidate for this Congressional seat although they had met in 
New Orleans. Jacob Barker presented resolutions favoring compromise 
which were tables. Although some Democrats favored ex-Governor Johnson, 
a Whig, he was not officially nominated as the Democratic candidate.
The vote in the race was 669 for Bullard to 301 for Johnson. The 
electorate followed party lines to support the Compromise. In the 
third district race Democrat Alexander G. Penn was elected over Colonel 
W. R. Steward, a Whig who ran without official party endorsement.
Local issues, rather than any serious debate over the Compromise, 
probably dominated the race which did not arouse much Whig opposition.®^
88 Ibid., 192-98, Downs was willing to accept the Compromise 
as a package, but felt free to oppose individual bills once the Omnibus 
was defeated on July 31.
89 William Harris Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1961), 268-69; 
James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," LHQ. (October, 1929), 
582-83; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. September 11, 1850.
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From August to late November the divergent opinions about the 
Compromise were debated in the press. Senator Downs had received a 
stern letter from men in Bienville Parish who were extremely critical 
about his views on the Adjustment bills. His reply, which was charac­
terized as excellent irony by one historian, was a masterful attack 
upon these Fire-eaters.^ He held that a minority of Southerners—  
including Louisianians— supported the Omnibus bills: "No Southern
legislature has condemned the measures in terms. There have been 
approvals of it given by distinguished men, and public meetings. . . . 
These expressions have been more unanimous in Louisiana, than ever 
known on any other s u b j e c t . D o w n s  also received praise from the 
conservative press which believed that he had acted responsibly during 
the Congressional session^ the Baton Rouge Gazette, for example, was 
glad that he had supported the settlement offered by Henry Clay:
"Mr. Downs is a Democrat--and although it is likely we will disagree 
in political topics, yet we honor and have honored him for his patrio­
tic course in the last session."^
The Unionist press, which gave editorial support to the Compro­
mise, gives insight into the moderate spirit which existed in Louisiana.
90 New Orleans Daily Crescent. August 9, 1850; Terry, ’’The 
Political Career of Solomon Weathersbee Downs," 70-81.
91 New Orleans Daily Crescent. August 9, 1850.
92 Baton Rouge Gazette. October 26, 1850.
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An editorial in the Commercial Bulletin may explain part of the state's 
reaction to the question of slavery in the western territories. The 
editor stated that there was an expanding world market for cotton 
which could only be grown profitably by the use of slave labor. There 
was a danger that the Negro slaves might be drained from the South and 
thus reduce the labor supply which would be needed to increase cotton 
production and the wealth of the entire South. This concern for 
economic growth, and fear of loss of labor reinforced the belief that
OA
the Compromise was just and settled sectional differences. There were 
radicals who might try to disturb the existing peace but they could not 
triumph over moderation: "Our excellent institutions are in no
danger from such men. The people of this great nation have too long 
enjoyed the benefits of the Union, and too well understand the impor­
tance of preserving it, to be led away by the schemes of demagogues and 
factionists
Although Pierre Soule represented the feelings of many 
Louisiana Democrats, he did not have the support of a majority of the 
state's electorate. In order to increase the popularity of his posi­
tion, the French-born Senator spoke out strongly after returning to 
Louisiana. He delivered several speeches during mid-fall, and declared 
that he had fought for the principles which Louisianians considered
94 New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. October 25, 1850; New 
Orleans Daily Crescent. October 1, 1850.
95 New Orleans Daily Crescent. October 1, 1850.
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vital. Since he had defended the state's fundamental values, he had 
been severely criticized by the press which had not presented an 
accurate picture of the issues involved in the sectional crisis. His 
opposition was based on a true understanding that the passage of the 
Compromise was a betrayal of the South.^
The Senator and his ally the Daily Delta were also involved in 
debate on the sectional question. The paper noted that the Omnibus 
bills had not produced peace between the sections, while Soule 
engaged in further public debate. He was first questioned by C. W. 
Stanton who stated that he personally favored the course which Soule 
had adopted toward the Adjustment bills. However, Stanton asked, 
whether the Senator favored disunion and the creation of a new Southern 
Republic. Soule did not like being singled out for attack from among 
the Louisiana delegation. This response was apparently not satis­
factory, however, because seventy-nine Democrats wanted to know 
whether he favored an end to the Union. Since Soule did not consider 
his questioners as representative of the Democratic party or people 
in Louisiana, he refused to answer them. His only defense, besides
the Daily Delta, came from A. B. Splane who denied charges that Soule
97was an obvious disunionist.
96 New Orleans Daily Crescent. October 18, 1850.
97 Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," LHQ, XII 
(October, 1929), 577-79; New Orleans Daily Delta. October 25, November 
3, 20, 1850; Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 81; 
Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon Weathersbee Downs," 82-83.
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While Soule was on the defensive friends of the Union in New
Orleans began to organize Union support. A Union meeting was held on
November 27, at the Saint Charles Theatre. Possibly as many as five to
98ten thousand people were waiting outside an impressive setting: "The
stage was beautifully ornamented . . . [with] . . .  a very large drop 
curtain, containing the American eagle on either side, a semi-circle 
extending below of elegantly drawn and gilded medallions, the names 
of the several states;--in the centre were two gold hands clasping each 
other, emerging from golden rays with the inscription above of Liberty 
and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable."^ After Doctor 
Isaac Labatut was chosen chairman, he announced that the meeting was 
open to both major parties, and that when "Whigs and Democrats . . . 
are united they form a rampart against which enemies of the Union can 
never prevail."*®® Judah P. Benjamin introduced the resolutions which 
stressed Louisiana's love for the Union and her devotion to the 
sectional peace which was reaffirmed in the Adjustment bills. 
Louisianians would not tolerate anyone who tampered with the Compromise 
and they stated their belief that the North would enforce the Omnibus
i*ii 101bills.
After the resolutions were unanimously passed, Senator Downs
98 New Orleans Daily Crescent, November 28, 1850.
99 New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 28, 1850.
100 New Orleans Daily Crescent, November 28, 1850.
101 Ibid.
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spoke to the gathering. He was saddened by criticism o£ the meeting
and yet appreciated the applause from both political parties.10^
This approbation for his career "came from a deeper source— from their
love and reverence for the Union— "which he was fortunate enough to
serve. There could be no real objection to the admission of a free-
soil California which was created with the support of Southerners in
their constitutional convention. The end of the slave trade in the
District of Columbia was not sufficient justification to end the Union,
and the hateful Wilmot Proviso had not been applied to the remainder of
i fnthe Mexican cession. In fact, Downs stated; "slaves might now be
taken to either of these Territories, as well as to Mississippi or
Texas.”10^ Settlement of the Texas boundary question was financially
beneficial to that state, and he assured the people that conservatives
in the North would enforce the Fugitive Slave Law.1 "^*
Meanwhile Louisiana radicals organized a Southern Rights meeting
for December 1 at the Saint Louis Exchange to counter the Unionist
106
gathering's influence. A crowd, estimated at between two hundred to 
seven hundred people, displayed a banner emblazoned with the slogan; 
"PATRIOTS OF THE SOUTH STAND FIRM."107 After Joseph Genois was chosen
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.; New Orleans Daily Picayune. November 28, 1850.
106 New Orleans Daily Delta. December 1, 1850.
107 Ibid.
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to chair the meeting, Soule spoke explaining his course of action and
opposition to the Compromise,*-®® The South had gained nothing from the
Omnibus bills which had stripped her of territories won in the
Mexican war and converted parts of Texas into free-soil: "It was
in vain we demanded your rights; Congress would not protect them--
you were asking only an equal share in the territories acquired,— and
instead of listening to you, or giving you an inch, they proceeded to
deprive the South of 83,000 acres cut from the State of Texas. . ."109
The law abolishing the slave trade in Washington was dangerous because
it was a "wedge" which might act as a precedent for Congressional
interference with slavery within the states.^He had acted in accord
with the spirit of resistance expressed by Louisianians in early 1850
and tried to identify himself with the military heroism of Mississippi
radicals like John Quitman:
But oh! The violence of some of those denouncers who stand 
by the rights of the South--where will it end, when it
seeks to trample such men as Quitman and Davis in the dust?
These men . . . led your country to victory on the fields 
of Monterey, Buena Vista . . . these men are now denounced as 
traitors by those very men who during the war invited the 
Mexicans to welcome them with bloody hands and hospitable 
graves--the latter are patriots--the former traitors. . . .
In such classification I beg to be included with the traitors.
Members of the meeting also passed a series of resolutions which
108 Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," LHQ. XII (October, 
1929), 579-80; Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 78-79.
109 New Orleans Daily Delta, December 1, 1850.
110 Ibid.
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announced their intention to protect black slavery from any Northern
112
attacks.
Interest in debating the Compromise seemed to wane at the end 
of the year. Moderates like Downs were willing to acquiesce in the 
Compromise's passage while the position of Soule Democrats was accu­
rately characterized by H. B. Tibbetts; "There is a faction in the 
state who are dissatisfied with the legislation of the recent sessions 
of Congress. They endorse and commend the course of Mr. Soule, one 
of our Senators. . . .  He opposed the compromise bills, and since 
his return from Washington, has made several inflammatory noncommit­
tal speeches. He will not openly avow whether he is in favor of
I I O
disunion or not." Soule, of course, denied that he was a dis- 
unionist, and claimed that his wing of the party was not unalterably 
opposed to all of the Compromise measures.
The only discussion of the Compromise came in the pages of the 
Daily Delta which sought to agitate the sectional questions in the 
winter of 1850-1851. Most leaders and newspapers appeared content to 
acquiesce in the decision of Congress. The Delta might advocate 
resistance to the North for boycott of Northern goods, or warn of the 
danger of national party ties, but few members of the political elite 
appeared interested in discussing the question.
112 Ibid.
113 H. B. Tibbetts to John Tibbetts, November, 1850, John 
Tibbetts Correspondence, (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
114 New Orleans Daily Delta, December 1850-June, 1851, passim.
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Not until the summer of 1851 did debate over the Compromise
resume, incited by the Congressional elections which were to be held
in November 1851. It was reported in the Delta that General Robert
Barrow might run from the Third Congressional district as a Whig; the
paper praised his credentials as a true defender of Southern rights
who "would send the Whig or Democratic party to the devil before he
would surrender one iota of the rights of institutions of the South,
or yield an inch to the aggressions of the Free-soilers
General Downs and the Ouachita Register were critical of the Delta1s
11 f%position on the Compromise.
In the Whig camp there was an exciting contest in the Second 
Congressional district where Theodore Hunt and I. N. Marks sought the 
seat. Neither man was successful, but when Colonel Hunt withdrew he 
wanted the nominating committee to pick a Whig "devoted, above all 
things, to the maintenance of the Union . . . and . . .  a friend of 
the Compromise as constitutional, honorable, and advantageous to every 
portion of the country."*-^ The final selection for delegates to the 
convention came on August 11 at Donaldsonville where the Whigs of the 
Second Congressional district met. Resolutions were passed declaring
115 Ibid., June 6, 1851.
116 Ibid., June 19, 1851.
H 7  Ibid.. July 18, 1851.
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118the Compromise as "honorable, constitutional, and expedient . .
In addition, they resolved that "this convention holds the advocate of
disunion to be an enemy of his country and a foe to Union-liberty
The nomination went to J. Aristide Landry who recognized that there
was a crisis over slavery but stated; "I enter the field, not as a
defender of the South or of the North, but as an upholder of both . . .
of our common country . . . as a supporter of that wise measure of
conciliation and mutual concession--the Compromise, which impressed
a conservative seal on our glorious Union.”120
The races for nomination in the other Congressional districts
except the fourth, were not as exciting for either political party.
In the first Congressional district Louis St. Martin, accused of being
a disunionist, announced his acceptance of the Compromise as "a final
settlement of the slavery question in Congress;"*^ he would oppose all
122
efforts "to repeal or change" the Adjustment bills. This attitude 
was shared by Democrat A. G. Penn, the third district incumbent, who 
accepted the Compromise despite his pro-Compromise opponent, Whig R. A. 
Upton's attempt to portray himself as the only Union candidate. In
118 Ibid.. August 13, 1851.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 13, 1851.
122 Ibid.
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the second district Democrats did not organize to oppose pro-Compromise 
123
J. A. Landry.
In the fourth district, John Moore,a Union Whig, competed 
against Isaac Morse who ran on a platform which stated:12^ "Resolved, 
That while forebearing to take . . . any measures of violence or active 
resistance to the laws of 1850, called the Compromise, we are neither 
content with their provisions, nor satisfied with the spirit in which 
they were adopted."125 ^he platform did not consider it expedient for 
any Southern state to secede, but it could not agree to the coercion 
of any state by the Federal government. I2** The Daily Crescent, 
commenting on Morse’s selection as the Democratic nominee, stated:
"If Mr. Morse gets back to Congress, Union men must be few in that 
district, or they must have precious little respect for their prin­
ciples."^2^
During most of the fall campaign, local issues such as free 
banking and internal improvements dominated the political campaign 
debates in New Orleans and Baton Rouge. The only real discussion which
123 Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party," 281-82; Plaquemine 
Southern Sentinel, August 23, September 6, 12, 20, 27, 1851.
Professor Adams mistakenly used the propaganda conclusions of the 
Whig Southern Sentinel to label A. G. Penn as an opponent of the 
Compromise. Penn made no recorded speeches in Congress during 1851 
and his clear statement in the Courier indicates his acceptance of the 
Compromise as a permanent settlement. New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 
October 6, 1851.
124 Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party," 280-81.
125 New Orleans Daily Delta. August 28, 1851.
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dealt with the Compromise grew out of a speech made by Pierre Soule and 
the candidacy of Isaac Morse in the fourth Congressional district. 
Louisiana Democrats had not adopted a pro-Compromise platform but had 
largely acquiesced in the passage of the Compromise. Therefore the 
concentration on popular local issues was apparently the major factor 
in this rather apathetic Congressional campaign.
Soule interjected a note of controversy in a speech on 
September 6. In it, he declared that the South as a minority section 
should have united to defeat the Compromise which had weakened 
dangerously the influence of the South in the Union. He could not 
understand that men like Senator Downs could accept a Compromise which 
benefited a hostile N o r t h . S o u l e  stated that he would continue to 
fight for the Southern cause, rather than remaining mute and subserv­
ient like a "Russian serf." The Compromise was a wrong— not an 
"immutable" pact between the sections which could not be repealed. Re
appealed to the crowd's emotion by stating that although he did not 
advocate secession and would endure past wrongs he wanted to act as
the state's watchdog: "to keep you on the watch . . . and point to,
130the abyss that yawns before you."
Soule then proceeded to defend the right of secession. He
129 Mr. Soule's Speech, at Opelousas. Louisiana, delivered on 
the 6th of September 1851, (New Orleans: J. L. Soller, 1851), 1-19.
Hereinafter cited as Mr. Soule*s Speech.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., 12-15.
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considered that it was "a main attribute of sovereignty, inherent to
it, inseparable from it."131 Each state had a right to withdraw from
the Union and "resume her independent and separate action as a sover- 
132eign." The state, forming a compact with the others had a right to 
determine when the compact was violated and secede. And if South 
Carolina seceded, which course he did not advocate, the Federal govern­
ment should not force her back into the Union.*33
Controversy also erupted in the campaign of Isaac Morse.
Morse, running on a platform openly critical of the Compromise, was 
the target of severe criticism. The Alexandria Red River Republican 
(Whig Union) constantly attacked him and declared that the Democratic 
convention had advocated secession. Morse was branded as a "dis- 
unionist" of the same stripe as the firebrand from Mississippi, John
1 V
A. Quitman. jn one editorial the editor stated: "If Colonel Morse
is elected to Congress in this district, it will be hailed as a
135'Glorious Secession Victory in the Fourth District of Louisiana.1"
0. N. Ogden, speaking for Judge John Moore at Opelousas, attacked 
Morse's hostility to the Compromise of 1850 and the Democratic plat­
form of the fourth district. Ogden asked rhetorically: "What does
131 Ibid.. 16.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.. 16-19.
134 Alexandria Red River Republican. September 20, 1851.
135 Ibid.
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the gentleman [Morse] want? What does he propose to do? If the condi­
tion of things be as bad as he represents . . . Why not fight like 
men for our rights, instead of weeping like women over our wrongs? Or 
is it that gentlemen hope by continued agitation, so to unsettle the 
foundations of this government, that after awhile the superstructure 
will topple to the ground?"^6 This contest was the strongest and 
most publicized in the rather lackluster campaign of 1851.
The voting in November 1851 produced an overwhelming victory 
for the Compromise. The two parties were no longer as divided, since 
all but one of the Congressional candidates accepted the Compromise 
as a final settlement to the sectional crisis. Louis St. Martin, a 
Democratic candidate, won in the first district, and was pledged to 
accept the Compromise.137 The Whigs won in the second and fourth 
districts, electing, respectively, J. A. Landry and Judge John H.
Moore, whose victory was considered evidence "that the Whigs of the 
District have made manifest of their firm determination of sustaining 
the integrity of the Union, and all its Compromises."^® The only 
district in which issues were confused was the third in which contempo- - 
raries and historians had trouble identifying the position of A. G.
136 Ibid., October 11, 1851.
137 Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party," 280-83.
138 j. H. Diwkgrall to John Moore, November 28, 1851,
David Weeks and Family Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
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Penn, who submitted to the passage of the Adjustment bills and de­
feated R. A. Upton.
After the election the most critical issue for the Union wing
of the Democrary was the fate of Senator Downs in a Whig-dominated 
140
legislature. Louisiana newspapers had speculated that he would be 
replaced: "If the Whigs have a majority, no man of common sense can
doubt that their vote will be cast for a Whig,— a Union and Compro­
mise man, like Downs but thoroughly a Whig."^* The Red River Repub- 
lican advocated that Downs be replaced as Senator by a good Whig.
They charged this "Union Democrat" had entered into a bargain with 
Morse rather than loose votes for his own re-election. Although 
Downs received all the Democratic votes and three Whig votes in 
January 1852 he lost to Judah P. Benjamin because of the Whig victory 
in the November elections. Party politics, despite praise for the 
Union Democrat, ruled Louisiana.
Democrats completed the process of fully accepting the Com­
promise in 1852. Governor Walker, originally a supporter of the 
Nashville movement, announced his submission to the Compromise during 
a legislative message in January. Although Walker did not believe
139 Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party," 281.
140 New Orleans Daily Crescent. October 16, 1851.
141 Alexandria Red River Republican. November 20, 1851.
142 Ibid.: Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon Weathersbee 
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that the South had obtained justice from Congress, he emphasized:
. .we are bound by every consideration that should have weight
with us, to acquiesce cheerfully in the federal award [Compromise which
144are now the solemn form of law." Passage of the Adjustment bills
did not justify secession, but Walker emphasized that the Fugitive
Slave Law must be enforced or a second crisis between the sections
would be precipitated.^''*
During the remainder of 1852 the Louisiana Democracy concen-
146trated on presidential politics. John Slidell, a leading Louisiana 
Democrat, had recognized as early as the winter of 1850 that there 
were serious divisions in the party: "the course of Mr. Soule has
been such as to produce fatal dissensions in our party. I have no 
hope of our carrying a majority in the Legislature at the next elec­
tion and almost as little of giving the vote of the state at the
presidential election to a democrat if there be a Whig union candidate 
147in the field." Therefore he supported the candidacy of James E. 
Buchanan of Pennsylvania who, he believed, could carry the South. 
Pierre Soule, the most outspoken opponent of the Compromise, moved 
toward a moderate position during 1851-52. During the fall of 1851
143 Louisiana House Journal. (1852), 3.
144 Ibid., 3-4.
145 Ibid.
146 John Slidell to James Buchanan, December 10, 1850, John 
Slidell Papers (Xerox copies in Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
147 Ibid.
he had not advocated secession, and his actions were increasingly 
characterized by opportunism rather than devotion to Southern prin­
ciples. By the spring of 1852 leading figures in the Democracy were 
more concerned with Presidential politics than sectional issues.
Slidell continued to back Buchanan, while Downs had moved into the 
camp of Lewis Cass who was still popular in the state. Soule supported 
Stephen Douglas of Illinois whose candidacy was blocked at Baton Rouge
by the Slidell men who finally decided to support Cass as the Demo- 
148
cratic nominee. After Franklin Pierce's nomination as the Democratic 
candidate at Baltimore on a pro-Compromise platform, Slidell wrote 
Buchanan: "I am as well satisfied with the choice of the conven­
tion and I shall heartily support Pierce and King without feeling any 
particular enthusiasm."^® Members of a mass meeting of the Democracy 
which was held during June 1852 endorsed the Pierce-King ticket and 
the Compromise as a permanent settlement to the slavery crisis. Thus 
the major divisions over the Compromise in the Louisiana Democracy 
were temporarily submerged in the drive to win the Presidency.
The Whigs in 1852 supported the candidacy of Millard Fillmore
14® Baton Rouge Gazette. March 13, 20, 1852; Ettinger, The 
Mission of Pierre Soule to Spain. 120; John Slidell to James Buchanan, 
December 10, 1850, May 9, 1851, February 26, March 19, June 23, 1852, 
John Slidell Papers; Mr. Soule's Speech, passim.
149 John Slidell to James Buchanan, June 23, 1852, John 
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150 New Orleans Daily Delta, June 30, 1852.
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and the Compromise of 1850. A Louisiana Whig stated his reasons for
supporting Fillmore:
My reasons for believing that Mr. Fillmore should be the candi­
date are, as I think, sound reasons. I have no doubt that 
had General Taylor lived, the Compromise would have never 
received the executive sanction. . . . The success of that 
great measure which has had the happy effect of allaying preju­
dices of reconciling dissensions, and of repressing unreasonable 
and sectional demands, is due mainly to Mr. Clay and next,
Millard Fillmore. . . .  It was a Whig measure and carried 
through by Whig influence. . . . The President then, by this 
act, and by his honest and constant policy of carrying into 
faithful execution the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, 
has secured the attachment and confidence of the Whigs of the 
South, and a large portion of the Southern Democrats also. ^
To the disappointment of Louisiana Whigs, General Winfield 
Scott was nominated on the Whig national ticket.
During the 1852 campaign Pierce had several major advantages 
over Scott. He was relatively unknown nationally, and a leading Whig
stated: "I have already heard many Whigs express a preference for
152Pierce." The suspicion of Scott among Whigs was recognized by
Congressman Moore's nephew who wrote that he was satisfied that Scott
was sound on Southern rights: "I am sorry, however, that others in
our community have been unable to satisfy themselves that the charges
153(abolition tendencies of Scott] are unfounded . . . "  This suspi­
cion hindered Scott's campaign against a Democratic party whose
151 Adams, "The Whig Party in Louisiana," 299-300.
152 William F. Weeks to John Moore, June 17, 1852, David 
Weeks and Family Papers.
153 Thomas M. Moore to John Moore, September 5, 1852, David 
Weeks and Family Papers.
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154moderate and radical wings were reunited. Furthermore, Soule 
announced publicly that Pierce was pro-Southern as early as June 1852: 
"I am sure that in the whole South, we could not have found one more 
determined than he to see our rights respected, . . This view
was seconded by the Louisiana Courier which emphasized that Pierce had 
enthusiastically endorsed the Compromise while Scott appeared reluc­
tant to accept it.^-*6 These factors helped carry the state for the man 
from New Hampshire and achieve a final victory for the Compromise of 
1850.
154 New Orleans The Louisiana Courier. August 6, October 29,
1852.
155 Ibid.. July 25, 1852.
156 Ibid., August 6, 1852. The attempts by the Whigs to 
counter the reluctance of the Louisiana electorate to support Winfield 
Scott were feeble since even the published letters mentioned Whig 
preference for Millard Fillmore. See the public letter from Congress­
man John Moore and J. Aristide Landry in the New Orleans Bee. September 
6, 1852.
CHAPTER III
GEORGIA: THE TRIUMPH OF CONDITIONAL UNIONISM
Georgia, one of the oldest Southern states, was economically 
prosperous and politically moderate between 1850-1852. Proud slave­
holders in the Empire state boasted about their affluence and deep 
attachment to the Union. These conservatives ruled a state which was 
potentially important in determining whether the Compromise of 1850 
was reluctantly accepted or violently rejected in the South. Conse­
quently, radicals, recognizing Georgia as the key to any cooperative 
resistance by the cotton South, maintained cooperation with her 
extremist elements.
Georgians were very proud of their state's economic growth-- 
especially in agriculture. This South Atlantic state, which had been 
founded as a colony for philanthropic and military purposes, had grown 
into a prosperous community by 1850. Plantation agriculture, which 
originated with the growing of rice in counties along the Savannah 
River and Atlantic coast, had rapidly expanded with the introduction 
of cotton and slaves in the mid-eighteenth century. By the mid­
nineteenth century, plantations and slaves concentrated in central 
Georgia and in counties along the Atlantic coast were the backbone of 
Georgia's wealth.^-
1 James C. Bonner, A History of Georgia Agriculture (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1964), 3-5; E. Merton Coulter, Georgia:
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Georgia planters experienced most of the same economic trends 
which influenced the other cotton states in the nineteenth century.
They had benefitted from the introduction of the cotton gin after 1795, 
but were constantly threatened by the problems of other plantation 
areas. Cotton prices had fluctuated greatly during the 1830's, and 
soil exhaustion had become a significant problem for this older 
Southern state. The depression of the 1840's had been economically 
harmful to Georgia planters, who had to sell their white staple for 
as low as six cents a pound. However, just as in Louisiana, prices 
had revived in 1850 and a renewed prosperity was one factor in Georgia's 
political conservatism.
Agriculture, though the dominant source of wealth, was not 
the only economic activity in which Georgians were significantly 
involved. Since the 1830's there had been a great interest in expand­
ing transportation facilities--railroads, canals and turnpikes-- 
throughout Georgia. Construction had begun on railroads, and the state 
also experienced a boom in the exploitation of timber. Georgians had 
even entered the area of textile manufacturing which was developing as 
a significant economic activity by 1850; there were forty textile
A Short History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1960), 3-9, 66, hereinafter cited as Georgia; Ralph Betts 
Flanders, Plantation Agriculture in Georgia (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1933), 86; Richard Harrison 
Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850 (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1926), 10-15.
2 Bonner, A History of Georgia Agriculture. 52-53, 56, 61-71; 
Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 21.
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mills in the state and a growing investment in this industry.^ One 
scholar, in describing this growth, concluded: "she [Georgia] made
in the decade from 1840 to 1850 more progress in cotton manufacturing 
than any other state which did a significant amount, and her absolute 
increase was greater than any other state excepting Massachusetts and 
New H a m p s h i r e T h u s  by 1850 there were a number of economic factors 
in Georgia which encouraged a desire for sectional harmony.5
The actual fact of prosperity in 1850 was reinforced by the 
popularly held belief that Georgia was a prosperous state. One 
writer concluded that his state was the most affluent in the South 
because she had "more cotton and corn-- . . . more railroads--more 
manufacturing-- . . . more diversified wealth . . ."** Professor 
Shryock also noted that Georgia may not have looked prosperous when 
compared with the North, but to many Georgians "the apparent economic 
superiority of even northern states was illusory."^
Georgia's history was characterized by personal rather than 
issue-oriented politics until the 1830's. After the death of the 
first party system, new political groups began to form around two
3 Coulter, Georgia, 191-206, 249-64, 281.
4 Ibid., 282-83.
5 Ibid., 191-283.
6 Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 27-28.
7 Ibid., 28.
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Q
prominent men, John Clark and George M. Troup. These new factions 
had no significant differences on issues. Hezekiah Niles of Baltimore 
exclaimed in perplexity: "We know not what they differ about, but
Q
they do violently differ." However, contests based purely on strug­
gles for power began to decline in 1829, partly because in that year 
Clark left Georgia and went to Florida to live.1® Issues emerged as 
significant factors, however, when Georgians were faced with decisions 
about federal-state relations during the nullification crisis. The 
Troup faction defended South Carolina during the tariff struggle while 
the Clark faction, following the lead of John Forsyth, helped stop 
Georgia from adopting a pro-nullification position.11
Political parties in Georgia began the process of establishing 
national political ties in the 1830's. George Troup's faction, which 
did not like the strong stand which Andrew Jackson had taken toward 
South Carolina, was now called the States Rights party while the 
Clark faction, identifying itself with Jackson, was known as the 
Union party. Neither of these political positions was permenent, how­
ever, and both factions by 1840 had established national political 
ties. The States Rights party aligned itself with the Whigs while the
8 Coulter, Georgia. 238-40; Paul Murray, The Whig Party in 
Georgia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1948),
1-59, passim.
9 Coulter, Georgia. 240-41.
10 Ibid.. 241.
11 Ibid., 244-46; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 31-38.
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Union party remained in the Jacksonian camp. And while Georgia Whigs 
became more nationalistic in their outlook, Georgia Democrats, influ­
enced by Calhoun's Southern rights philosophy, wanted a sectional
12rather than a national political alliance.
Unity within the new Whig party was threatened by the drive to 
annex Texas as a slave state. John M. Berrien, a Whig Senator, did 
not favor Texas' entrance into the Union. Statehood for Texas would 
be harmful to the South which could no longer rely on its own voting 
power in Congress to protect slavery; the South would have to main­
tain positive relations with the free states in order to protect her 
1 ^way of life:iJ "An immediate, aggressive annexation of Texas and the 
unavoidable resulting war with Mexico would damage, if not destroy, 
this good will and respect."^ This position was openly opposed by 
Alexander H. Stephens, a Whig Congressman, who wanted to annex Texas 
and assume Berrien's position as leader of the Georgia Whigs. Texas 
thus caused a division within the Whig party which had not healed by 
1850.15
In contrast, Georgia Democrats welcomed Texas into the Union. 
There was support for annexation from Democratic Senator W. F.
12 Coulter, Georgia . 246-47; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia.
59-111.
13 Royce Coggins McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), 284; 
Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 123-24.
14 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 284.
15 Ibid., 296-97; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 123-24.
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Colquitt, and in the House of Representatives Howell Cobb and H. A. 
Haralson claimed that all Georgians favored annexation.**’ Democrat 
Herschel V. Johnson wrote in 1848: "It seems to me that at the time
of annexation, Texas was de jure and de facto an independent, sover­
eign state, that she had a perfect right to enter, and we to receive 
her into the Union."*^
The war with Mexico and the problem of slavery in the West 
caused further problems for Georgia Whigs. They adopted a position, 
first advocated by Robert Toombs, of denouncing the war while voting 
for military appropriations.*® Furthermore, Toombs "followed the 
Southern Whig line, which for the sake of party and national unity 
sought to repress the issue of territorial extension, intertwined as 
it was with the disruptive question of slavery e x p a n s i o n ."*9 Senator 
Berrien was impressed with this position because he believed "that if 
Mexican territory was acquired, the bonds of Union would be stretched 
to the breaking point."^0 However, there was an important difference 
between Berrien's and Toombs' position. Berrien was opposed to actual 
acquisition of territory while Toombs was hostile only to the method
16 Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 130.
17 Percy Scott Flippin, Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia; 
States Rights Unionist (Richmond: Press of the Dietz Printing Co.,
1931), 7.
18 William Y. Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 41-42.
19 Ibid., 42.
20 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 322.
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of expansion--not the acquisition of Mexican land itself. Thus, sig­
nificant tension still existed within the party.
By 1848 Georgia Democrats had advanced a strong case for the 
rights of the South in the territories. Nationally-oriented Democrat 
Howell Cobb discussed the problem of the Mexican cession in debate 
about the Wilmot Proviso. He emphasized that Northerners argued that 
they could exclude slavery from the West despite the fact that the 
South had participated fully in the Mexican war. In a spirit of 
conciliation this moderate stressed that there must be a compromise 
rather than demands that all the territories become free-soil.
Instead of banning black bondage, the North should not be afraid to
22compete with the South in the West: "You have much greater
strength; your population far exceeds ours; you say your people are 
more happy, prosperous, . . . that the South has lost her energy and 
enterprise. . . . Throw open the territory and let the weak, enervated 
South (as you call her) come forward and meet you in all your strength;
and the palm shall be yielded to the victor."^ But the most equitable
solution to the problem might be to extend the Missouri Compromise 
line to the Pacific coast so that sectional conflict over the place of 
the peculiar institution in the former Mexican lands might be perma-
O /
nently settled. H Radical Herschel V. Johnson in a debate on the
21 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 127; Shryock, Georgia and 
the Union in 1850. 134-35; Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 41-42.
22 Congressional Globe. 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 360-63.
23 Ibid., 362.
24 Ibid., 262-63.
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Oregon question stated that neither Congress nor the legislature of a
territory could pass laws which would stop slavery from expanding in
the West; it was thus impossible for inhabitants of a new area to block
25the peculiar institution's expansion: "The institution of slavery
is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States; . . . therefore 
Congress would be as bound to veto an act of territorial legislation 
prohibiting it."26 Therefore, both a moderate and conservative 
Democrats had proposed different but strong solutions to the question 
of slavery in the territories.
Prior to the Presidential election of 1848, Georgia Democrats 
were in turmoil over the slavery crisis. Cobb returned to Georgia in 
1847 to discover that his party was divided on the sectional issues. 
There was a wing of the Democracy, represented by Herschel V. Johnson, 
which leaned toward Calhounism rather than toward the intersectional 
alliance. In order to stop this radicalism, Cobb worked to get the 
state Democratic convention in 1847 to endorse his position of 
extending the Missouri Compromise line rather than a more radical 
formula.^
During the 1848 campaign the rights of the South in the terri­
tories was an important issue. The Whig party in Georgia, which had 
nominated Taylor on an anti-Proviso platform, made this one of the key
25 Congressional Globe. 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 887-92.
26 Ibid., 892.
27 John Eddins Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), 112, 115-16.
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campaign issues. Representative Cobb, however, charged that Taylor
was an opportunist on this question: "Is General Taylor for or
against the Proviso? Nobody knows! But we know this much, that he
is Proviso in the East and West and anti-Proviso in the South.
Toombs, in an indirect reply, characterized Lewis Cass's popular
sovereignty as a doctrine which would allow slavery to be excluded
from the West by undesirables: "Mexicans, Indians, negroes, and
30
mixed races whom we have conquered." General Taylor carried Georgia,
Ol
but each party won four Congressional seats. L
Calhoun and Georgia Whigs clashed over the Southern Address
during the winter of 1848-49. Robert Toombs described the Carolinians'
activities to John Crittenden, a Kentucky Whig:
This Southern movement is a bold strike to disorganize 
the Southern Whigs and either destroy Genl. Taylor in advance 
or compel him to throw himself in the hands of a large 
section of the democracy of the South. The Southern Demo­
cracy are perfectly desperate. Their northern allies, they 
clearly see will unite with the Free-soilers; and even now 
the peace is broken between them forever. Almost every man 
of the Southern Democrats have joined Calhoun's movement.
After mature consideration we concluded to go into the 
meeting [Southern caucus] in order to crush it.^2
28 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 127-28; Simpson, "A 
Biography of Howell Cobb," 123.
29 Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb of Georgia," 123.
30 Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 49.
31 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 137.
32 Robert Toombs to John J. Crittenden, January 3, 1849,
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs,
Alexander H. Stephens, and Howe11 Cobb in Annua 1 Report of the
American Historical Association for the Year 1911 (Washington, 1913), 
II, 139. Hereinafter cited as Correspondence.
This view was shared by Berrien, who helped Toombs and Alexander H.
Stephens frustrate Calhoun's goal of Southern unity. Berrien issued a
substitute address which urged moderate men in both sections to help
suppress the abolition attacks. Neither Toombs nor Stephens endorsed
Berrien's nationally slanted message, but it helped to defeat 
33Calhoun. Toombs later confided to Crittenden: "We have completely
foiled Calhoun in his miserable attempt to form a Southern party
. . . .  I told him that the Union of the South was neither possible
34nor desirable until we were ready to dissolve the Union."
Democrats from Georgia, however, were divided over the issues
raised in the Southern Address. Howell Cobb and John Lumpkin, both
nationally inclined Democrats, had helped defeat Calhoun while
Democratic Senator H. V. Johnson and Representatives Alfred Iverson
and H. A. Haralson had supported his position. Thus, the Georgia
Democracy was again split, and Cobb wrote his wife that he expected
3 5to be attacked by both party presses.
In order to defend his position, Cobb wrote an address which 
was signed by four other Southern Democrats including John Lumpkin.
33 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 334-49; 
Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 141; Thompson, Robert Toombs of 
Georgia. 53.
34 Robert Toombs to John J. Crittenden, January 22, 1849, 
Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 141.
35 Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 185Q . 185-90; Simpson, 
"A Biography of Howell Cobb," 126-31; Howell Cobb to his wife, 
February 1, 1849, Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 145.
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This statement recounted Northern attacks upon the South but blamed
Whigs and abolitionists for causing most of the sectional problems.
The Democratic party, which was still largely a responsible, national
organization would insure that the South's institutions and way of
life were protected: "We yet believe, that the only true and reliable
friends of the South at the North are to be found in the Democratic
party and that the protection of our rights so far as the same is
dependent upon the legislative bonds with those who have given us
these evidences of the sincerity of their friendship, . . ^he
Southern Address, would merely create a sectional party, which was not
necessary as long as the South's "peculiar interests" were not
threatened. Popular sovereignty should be applied to the Mexican
cession and California as the best means of settling the question of
slavery in the West:^® "If the measure should be passed, it will be
like oil poured upon the troubled waters, peace and harmony and good
39feeling will again be restored to our country."
Southern rights in the West was also a campaign issue during 
the 1849 race for governor. Both wings of the Georgia Democracy 
united behind Governor George W. Towns on the moderate platform
36 Howell Cobb, Lynn Boyd, Beverly Clarke, and John Lumpkin
to Their Constituents, February 26, 1849, R. P. Brooks (ed.),
"Howell Cobb Papers," The Georgia Historical Quarterly, V (June, 1921), 
39-44. Hereinafter cited as GHQ.
37 Ibid., 44.
38 Ibid., 44-51.
39 Ibid., 51.
rather than on the Southern Address. T h e  Whigs nominated Judge 
Edward Y. Hill who was an inept politician. Hill refused to answer 
questions about the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso, his posi­
tion on the Clayton bill, and the course the South should follow if
41
Congress passes the Proviso. Towns, however, stated that the Proviso 
was unconstitutional, that he was a supporter of the Clayton Compromise, 
and that if the Wilmot Proviso was enacted by Congress, the South must
/  O
offer "resistance at every hazard." Professor Murray has concluded: 
"Hill's avoidance of those national issues and Town's popular admini­
stration gave Towns the largest majority since the Whig redemption 
[major victory] in 1843."^ ^he margin of victory also enabled the 
Democrats to control both legislative houses.^
By the winter of 1849-1850, Georgia's political leaders had 
begun to terminate their old party allegiances. Men like Cobb and 
Stephens, who favored national political alliances, began to cooperate 
with each other on the local level. The trend also caused Herschel V. 
Johnson and John M. Berrien to break with their parties and form a 
states rights alliance. To understand these new political alignments,
40 Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb," 132-33.
41 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 142; Shryock, Georgia 
and the Union in 1850, 200.
42 Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850, 200.
43 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 143.
44 Ibid., Alfred Iverson to Howell Cobb, October 6, 1849, 
Phillips (ed . ) , Correspondence, 175.
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it is necessary to realize the political background and philosophies 
of the particular leaders.
Unionist forces in the Empire state were led by the ’’Georgia 
Triumvirate"--Cobb, Toombs and Stephens. This combination was pre­
dominantly Whig in make up, but the man who profited most from it was 
the Union Democrat, Howell Cobb. Cobb, who was elected Speaker of the
House in December 1849, came from a wealthy family which had "a long
45tradition of public service." He entered politics in the 1830's
as solicitor general in northeast Georgia, and was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1842. This rotund Representative was a
national Democrat who had loyally defended his party during the 
461840’s. Although he supported Southern rights, he had a deep 
loyalty and love for the Union. This allegiance to the country as a 
whole came from his conscious effort to model himself after nationalists 
like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.^ His loyalty to the Union caused 
him to favor a national rather than a sectional party.
Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs were the Whig components 
of the alliance. Stephens came from a middle-class background, had 
been educated at the University of Georgia, and was admitted to the
45 R. P. Brooks, "Howell Cobb" in Allen Johnson and Dumas 
Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols., New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-58), II, Pt. 1, 241-42. Hereinafter 
cited as DAB.
46 Ibid., 242-43.
47 Interview with Professor Horace Montgomery, University of 
Georgia, January 18, 1973.
bar in 1834. Although Stephens suffered from severe depression, he was
a successful politician. He won a seat in the state legislature in
1841 and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1843. By the
mid-1840's he was challenging John M. Berrien for leadership and was
willing to unite with conservative Democrats in 1850. Toombs, in
contrast, was born into a planter family and entered the state legisla- 
48
ture in 1837. After his election to the House in 1844, he maintained 
the image of "a conservative Whig rather than a champion of the 
South."^ jn 1850 both men, detecting a danger to the Union and a 
growing anti-slavery feeling among Northern Whigs, were ready to lead 
their party in Georgia into a new alliance to protect the South and 
save the Union.
Extremists drew one of their potential leaders from the ranks 
of the Whig party, John MacPherson Berrien. This conservative had been 
a prominent lawyer in the early nineteenth century, found himself in 
opposition to Andrew Jackson by 1829, and became a leader of the States 
Rights party in Georgia. By 1840, however, he had emerged as a 
national Whig who was more Union than sectionally inclined. He 
represented a moderate opinion in the 1840's and only broke with the 
national party in 1850 when he saw moderation as futile. However, his 
most recent biographer emphasizes that he retained a residual sympathy
48 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 300-350; 
Ulrich B. Phillips, "Alexander Hamilton Stephens," DAB. IX, Pt. 1, 
569-70; Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia. 1-40.
49 Ulrich B. Phillips, "Robert Augustus Toombs," DAB. IX, 
Pt. 2, 590.
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for the Union and was an isolated man rather than a party leader in 
1850.50
The leaders of the Southern rights forces in Georgia were 
Governor George W. Towns, H. V. Johnson and ex-Governor Charles 
McDonald. None of these men had the stature or capability of the 
Georgia Triumvirate. Towns's political career began in the 1820's 
when he had denounced nullification. During his career he had opposed 
most of the Whig economic measures and by 1849 was regarded as a 
militant defender of Southern rights. H. V. Johnson, a planter-lawyer, 
had served one year in the United States Senate and acted mainly as a 
propagandist for states rights. Charles McDonald's political career 
had involved successful service as governor of Georgia in the early 
1840's when he had defeated an extreme Southern rights advocate. He 
re-emerged in 1850 as one of the local leaders of the Southern Rights 
party and Nashville movement.^
In November 1849, Governor Towns opened the debate on the
50 Robert Preston Brooks, "John MacPherson Berrien," DAB. 
I, Pt. 2, 225-26; McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 
300-362, passim.
51 Flippin, Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia. 1-30; Fletcher 
M. Greene, "George Washington Bonaporte Towns," DAB. IX, Pt. 2,
615; Horace Montgomery (ed.), Georgians in Profile: Historical
Essays in Honor of Ellis Merton Coulter (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1958), 168-91; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 
passim; Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. Ill, 124, 151.
sectional crisis with his message to the state legislature.^ jn this 
address he decried the growth of anti-slavery parties which were 
determined "that slavery shall never exist in the present or future 
territories of the United States."^-* Claiming that Southerners had 
suffered numerous "wrongs," Towns declared that "future aggression is 
not to be endured, and if attempted by the Federal Government, must 
be repelled, all amicable means being first exhausted, . . ."54 
order to prepare Georgia to resist Northern hostilities against 
slavery he asked the legislature to pass a bill permitting the 
Governor to call a state convention in case the Wilmot Proviso or 
other objectionable laws passed Congress.
Debate on the Governor's request and on resolutions introduced 
by state legislators lasted for several months. The Governor's 
message was referred to an appropriate committee in each house which 
considered various proposals introduced by legislative members on the 
state convention and sectional matters. A joint legislative committee 
considered these propositions and made its report before Christmas
52 Journal of House of Representatives of the State of 
Georgia at a Biennia 1 Session of the General Assembly, Began and Held 
in Milledgeville, The Seat of Government, in 1849 and 1850 (Milledge- 
ville: Richard M. Orme, State Printer, 1849), 34-37. Hereinafter 
cited as House Journal (1849-1850).
53 Ibid., 34.
54 Ibid., 37.
55 Ibid.; The speech is also recorded in Journal of the 
Senate of the State of Georgia, at a Biennial Session of the Genera 1 
Assembly, Begun and Held in Milledgeville, the Seat of Government in 
1849 & 1850 (Milledgeville: Richard M. Orme, State Printer, 1849), 
9-37. Hereinafter cited as Senate Journal (1849-1850).
1849. The report contained a rambling preamble listing Northern aggres­
sions and a clause including statehood for California as one of the 
justifications for calling a state convention. Moderate legislators, 
who tried to amend the resolutions calling for a state convention, 
were unsuccessful. The Georgia legislature, despite stubborn opposi­
tion led by Whig conservative Charles Jenkins, provided for a state 
convention, and called for elections for delegates to the Nashville 
convention during April 1850.^
Both Southern rights and Union forces had trouble arousing an 
apathetic Georgia public. Southern righters held a meeting in 
Hamilton County on March 12, 1850, at which Henry L. Benning and 
Colonel Martin J. Crawford spoke. Benning, a secessionist, recounted 
Southern grievances while Crawford defended the idea of the Nashville 
Convention. A similar meeting held in Floyd County expressed approval 
of the Southern Convention and the idea of extending the Missouri 
Compromise line.^ The Federal Union, to counteract any fears about 
the Convention, editorialized: "The idea seems to exist in the minds
of some that this Convention must necessarily result in disunion.
Its design is directly the reverse: to preserve not to dissolve the
58
Union." Despite these states right's efforts, it was apparently
56 House Journal (1849-1850), 49-50, 309-14, 485-520, 656-58; 
Senate Journal (1849-1850), 63-64, 274-83, 489-95, 524, 648.
57 Macon Georgia Telegraph, March 26, 1850; Milledgeville 
Federal Union, February 26, 1850.
58 Milledgeville Federal Union. February 26, 1850.
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impossible to interest Georgians in the issues raised by the crisis of
1850.
The indifference in Georgia worked to the advantage of anti-
Nashville Convention forces. Unionists had not been at all successful
in organizing public opinion or encouraging conservatives to attend the
meeting. There was a meeting in Cass county on March 5, 1850, which
expressed disapproval of the Convention but encouraged conservative
delegates to attend so that a moderating influence would be present;
conservative efforts were not very productive, however and the average
voter was not influenced by thera.^
On election dsiy in early April 1850, apathy ruled at the polls.
There were less than 4000 votes cast for convention delegates through-
60out all of Georgia. The most honest reaction to the election results 
was an editorial comment in the Southern Recorder: "The election for
delegates to the Nashville Convention has proven an abortion."^ The 
Macon Telegraph declared: "It is almost impossible to get our people
out to vote, no matter how important the elections, when there is no 
opposition."^ However, the Federal Union blamed the Whigs for the 
electorate's indifference; the Whig party, which had faith in President
59 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, March 12, 19, 1850.
60 Ibid., April 30, 1850.
61 Ibid., April 9, 1850.
62 Macon Georgia Telegraph. April 9, 1850.
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Taylor, created false impressions about the purpose of the Nashville
63meeting in the public mind.
Public reaction to the Nashville Convention may also be gauged
by an indirect debate between a Georgia jurist and a secessionist
editor. Judge James S. Scartgrough of Twiggs County stated: "I shall
never refuse to respond to the call of any portion of my fellow
citizens, when made in harmony and concert for the common weal of the
State or the South. But to be made an instrument to excite to the
dissolution of this glorious Union by the employment of unconstitutional
64means I will never lend my name." The editor of the Columbus Times 
was happy that the Judge had decided not to go to Nashville; Georgia 
should be represented by delegates who would not "libel its character 
and o b j e c t s . F u r t h e r m o r e  Scarbgrough1s charges were absurd since 
they would make any action which did not involve submission to injus­
tice an unconstitutional act.^ Georgia's elite was thus still 
divided about the objects of the Southern Convention even though the 
mass of people had rejected it.
Nationally, Howell Cobb was trying to further sectional harmony 
while protecting Southern rights; Speaker Cobb wrote in early January
that Southerners must not reject California's admission simply because
63 Milledgeville Federal Union. April 9, 1850.
64 Ibid., May 7, 1850, quoting Columbus Times.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.; see Horace Montgomery, Cracker Parties (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 23, for his interpretation of 
the Scarbgrough resignation.
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she had a free-soil constitution; "it will be in violation of the 
doctrines of all southern statesmen on that subject and will be found 
indefensible."**^ Furthermore, he wanted the South to react cautiously 
during the crisis: "The danger to be guarded against at the South is
the fear of going too far and making false issues."**®
The course of Toombs and Stephens puzzled many observers in 
early 1850. They had broken with the Whig party when the caucus re­
fused to endorse Toomb's resolution which stated; "Congress ought not
to pass any laws prohibiting slavery in the territories of California 
69or New Mexico." They attended the meeting of moderates at Cobb's 
home in February, however, and Toombs wrote Governor Towns that "as a 
citizen of the state I shall oppose the action proposed by the legis­
lature even if California shall be admitted against my vote."^
These moderate actions were countered by acts and speeches 
which placed Toombs and Stephens at the forefront of the Southern 
Rights movement. Toombs spoke out strongly in May 1850 for Southern 
rights:
I claim the right for her to enter them [territories] all with 
her property and securely to enjoy it. She will divide with 
you if you wish it, but the right to enter all or divide I
67 Howell Cobb to Joseph Henry Lumpkin, January 11, 1850, 
John Henry Lumpkin Papers (University of Georgia Libraries, Athens, 
Georgia).
68 Ibid.
69 Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 56.
70 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, March 26, 1850; Thompson, 
Robert Toombs of Georgia, 61-64.
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shall never surrender. In my judgement, this right involving, 
as it does political equality, is worth a thousand such 
Unions. . . . Deprive us of this right and appropriate this 
common property to yourselves, it is then your government, not 
mine. Then I am its enemy, and I will then, if I can, bring 
my children and my constituents to the altar of liberty, and 
like Hamilcar, I would swear them to eternal hostility to your 
foul damnation.
This "Hamilcar speech," which was not in accord with Toombs' basic con­
servatism, may have been the result of a temporary burst of emotion or 
perhaps was designed to block a bill asking for immediate statehood 
for California. Stephens had a similar lapse from conservatism when 
he thought that Federal troops might be sent to fight the Texas 
militia. Neither man, however, allied himself with Southern radi-
Berrien strongly supported Southern rights in a speech deliv­
ered in the Senate during February 1850. It was an extended discus­
sion of the "constitutional rights" of the South to take black 
property into the Southwestern territory acquired from Mexico. He 
stated succinctly the position of many Southerners:
Well, now, Sir, the South, as I have said before, asserts the 
right of any citizen of the United States to participate in 
the benefits of all public property, and in the territories of
71 Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 65.
72 James Z. Rabun, "Alexander H. Stephens, 1812-61" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1948), 265. Rabun 
maintains that the speech was part of a filibuster to kill a 
particular bill for immediate statehood for California and that it 
influenced the committee of the whole to bury the bill for six weeks; 
William Y. Thompson, also stated: "The whole episode furnished an
interesting insight into Toombs' character. Basically a man of 
conservative instincts, he could in moments of commotion explode in 
any direction, after which he would assemble the pieces and resume his 
former character." Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 66.
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the Union. It asserts this in relation to the citizens of the 
slaveholding states, as well as in relation to those of the 
free states. That assertion necessarily includes the denial 
of the right and power of Congress to pass any law prohibiting 
them from emigrating into those territories, and taking with 
them their property of whatever sort, or to interpose any 
legislative obstacle in their w a y . 73
Since the states were equal partners in the Union they could not have 
their rights in the Southwest denied. Berrien proposed that an 
equitable compromise might be to submit the question of sectional 
rights to the proper courts. But he stressed in a lengthy discourse 
that Congress did not have the power to restrict the expansion of 
slavery and that Mexican anti-slavery laws were not operative. He 
thought that there was no real danger that the North would abolish 
slavery in the states, but he stressed that he would stand by his 
state--even to the point of disunion--if she choose to resist when 
laws violating her rights were enacted. Berrien did state, however,
"7 /
his abhorrence of that course: "For myself, I do not hesitate to
say, that disunion is an idea which even in imagination I cannot fully 
realize. In moments of despondency, it floats before my mind, as a 
shapeless vision, to which I can give no distinct form, dimly exposing 
to my view in the background the horrors of anarchy and civil commo­
tion."^^
By May 1850 Senator Berrien had formulated his opinions on the
73 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 203.
74 Ibid., 203-210.
75 Ibid., 210. See McCrary, "John MacPhersen Berrien of Georgia," 
362 for a psychological evaluation of his state of mind.
102
Clay bills. After stating his approval of the proposal to pay Texas 
for the disputed land, Berrien emphasized that he could not support 
California's admission as a state unless her boundaries were adjusted 
and unless her representation in the House was limited to one Congress­
man. He favored the idea of granting territorial governments in Utah 
and New Mexico without the Wilmot Proviso but criticized the Committee 
of Thirteen's report on this section:
I concurred most cheerfully in the omission of the Wilmot 
Proviso, but I regretted that that had not been a simple act, 
unaccompanied by the reason which took from it the healing 
influences upon the public mind it would otherwise have had.
It left the inference . . ., that, in the opinion of the 
comnittee, a power existed to impose that restriction, and 
that it might be exercised whenever a case should arise 
rendering it necessary to do so. I believed that this ex­
pression of the reasons which induced the withholding of that 
proviso was calculated to diminish the beneficial influence 
it would have in producing harmony among the people of the 
United States, . .
Although he did not mention the remaining bills, Berrien stressed
that the Compromise could not receive his support unless it was
modified.^
By mid-1850 Georgians were fully aware of the Southern rights
position. Georgia radicals like ex-Governor Charles J. McDonald
attended the Nashville Convention and denounced the Compromise as un- 
7 8constitutional. The Federal Union constantly criticized the
76 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 949-50.
77 Ibid., 950.
78 Milledgeville Federal Union. June 18, 1850; Macon 
Georgia Telegraph, July 9, 16, 1850.
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Omnibus bills while the Augusta Republic boldly defended the Southern 
"ultras" while condemning Southern moderates who "go for the Compromise, 
which not only gives up, all the territory to the Free States, but 
proposes to cut OFF SLAVE TERRITORY from Texas.
Herschel V. Johnson wrote a lengthy critique of the Compromise 
in mid-1850. He reviewed the acquisition of the Mexican cession and 
declared that the South "ought to be satisfied with no adjustment, 
which does not secure to her beyond dispute, a portion of the terri­
tories in question and give finality to this painful and perilous 
80c o n t e s t The Clay bills did not meet this criterion and actually 
violated Southern rights. Adventurers in California and the actions 
of the national government had prevented Southern settlement on the 
Pacific coast. The free-soilers in California did not represent the 
wishes of all the population--especially not the opinion of settlers 
living south of the 36° 30' line.®* He concluded: "The admission of
California, as she is, is the grand desideratum with the free-soilers 
. . . [once] . . . the whole Pacific coast . . . are secured to the 
grasping appetite of Northern cupidity. They know full well that, 
flanked by Oregon on the North,' and California on the West--both 
boundless fields for the operation of abolition fanaticism and rascal­
ity. Utah and Mexico will fall as easy prey to their
79 Milledgeville Federal Union, June 18, 1850, quoting 
Augusta Georgia Republic.
80 Ibid., July 9, 1850.
81 Ibid.
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machinations."®^ Hence, these areas, in addition to the disputed land
83in west Texas would be lost to the free-soilers.
The Slave Trade and Fugitive Slave bills would not end sec­
tional tensions, Johnson continued. Eliminating the slave pens in 
Washington would be acceptable if it quieted sectionalism, but this 
would merely give impetus to further abolitionism. The Fugitive Slave 
bill could not be enforced in the North, and Johnson predicted that it 
would be amended or repealed within five years after its passage.®^ 
After reviewing the "weaknesses" of the Clay Compromise,
Johnson predicted dire consequences if it became law: "But let Mr.
Clay's bill become a law and by its operation all the territory of the 
United States appropriated to free soil; and the child is now born who
will see the day when the South has to choose between dissolution and
85
abolition in the States." Johnson favored the Missouri Compromise
line which would allow slave labor to be used in California's gold
mines and in staple crop agriculture.®® The South must unite behind
this proposal and force the North to accept it "as the only means of
87perpetuating the Union."
82 Ibid.
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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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Radical objections to the Compromise were accompanied by the
organization of Southern Rights associations. Various meetings were
held in July 1850 approving the Nashville Resolutions and extension of
the Missouri Compromise line. The Columbus Times advocated abandonment
of old party ties in order to protect the South, and by August the
Federal Union reported that there were twenty-four counties in which
88
Southern Rights associations had been organized.
The most important Southern Rights meeting was held in Macon 
on August 22. Important Southern righters attended the meeting and 
heard speeches by local radicals and Robert B. Rhett. The delegates 
adopted resolutions which endorsed the Nashville proposals-- 
especially the extention of the Missouri Compromise line.®^ They 
strongly opposed admission of California to the Union and expressed 
hostility to the national government, which through its ’’territorial 
policy" was trying "to prevent the admission of another slave state 
into the Union, subvert the rights of the South in the public terri­
tories eventually and to abolish slavery in States. Thus converting 
a Government which was established for the protection of all into an 
engine of attack and spoliation of a portion of its members."^®
Members also supported calling a state convention to protect Georgia's 
"rights" while giving impetus to further efforts for the protection of
88 Milledgeville Federal Union, July 23, 1850, quoting 
Columbus Times; Montgomery, Cracker Parties. 25.
89 Macon Georgia Telegraph. August 27, 1850.
90 Ibid.
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black slavery.
Although the Southern Rights forces were prominent during the
summer months, Georgia Unionists were not dormant. Union meetings were
organized to give expression to Georgia's deeply felt loyalty to the
Union. A typical meeting, presided over by Thomas J. Burney, met in
Morgan County on July 20. A committee of fourteen from both political
parties stated that the only practical measures before Congress to
settle the sectional problem was the Omnibus bills. In Americus,
moderates resolved that Southern fanatics and Northern abolitionists
were working to defeat the C o m p r o m i s e . ^  They wanted Congressman M. J.
Wellborn to vote for the Adjustment package which would "restore peace
and harmony to the country, and be approved by a large and over-
93whelming majority of the people . . ." These meetings, and one 
held in Lee County are indications of the loyalty to the Union and 
belief that the Clay's bills were a potentially just settlement.^
A competent defense of the Compromise proposals, written by 
Howell Cobb, appeared in mid-July 1850. Cobb, who had been encouraged 
by Absalom Chappell, produced an address which defended the efforts of 
the Compromise forces. He reemphasized that the sectional crisis had 
arisen out of the conflict over the Wilmot Proviso and that there were
91 Ibid.
92 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. July 30, 1850.
93 Ibid., August 6, 1850.
94 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. August 14, 1850.
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two plans to settle the crisis which he could accept: the Missouri
Compromise line and Clay's Omnibus. Cobb then proceeded to defend 
the Omnibus bills as part of a general plan of settlement. He could 
accept California's admission as a free-soil state because it was the 
wish of her people. The territorial bill repudiated the Wilmot Proviso
and actually opened more territory to the South than would adoption of
the Missouri Compromise line.9  ^ Texas' title to the disputed land was 
valid, but Southerners should have no difficulty in accepting the right 
of a state and the Federal government to settle a question in a manner 
which was beneficial to Texas: "The pecuniary equivalent which she
would receive from the Government for the cession . . . would enable 
her to throw off a heavy debt which now hangs like an incubus over 
her. . ."96
Cobb also worked actively for the Union cause in Congress. His
position as Speaker of the House enabled him to judge the temper of
the Congress and helped him pass the Compromise. He cooperated with 
Northern moderates, wanted a settlement based on Clay's proposals and 
was the dynamic counterpart to Stephen Douglas in the House of 
Representatives.9^
Toombs and Stephens played a marginal role in obtaining
95 Absalom Chappell to Howell Cobb, July 10, 1850; Phillips 
(ed.), Correspondence, 193-94; Howell Cobb to William Hope Hull, July 
17, 1850, ibid., 196-205.
96 Howell Cobb to William Hope Hull, July 17, 1850, ibid., 205.
97 Howell Cobb to wife, August 10, 1850, ibid., 210; Holman 
Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: the Crisis and Compromise of 1850
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), 150-66.
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acceptance of the Compromise. They had been actively opposed to
Taylor's plan of settlement and had visited the President before his
death to protest possible Federal aggression against T e x a s . T o o m b s
participated in Congressional debate during August-September, and
stated: "From the first day of this session to this hour, I have had
but one ultimatum. That was--hostile legislation by Congress against
our property. That I have been, now am, and shall ever be ready to
resist. No man is more rejoiced than I am that this alternative is not
99presented to me by these bills."
On August 9 Stephens delivered a strong speech in the House 
criticizing President Fillmore's proclamation on Texas. In shrill 
language, he denied the power of the President to use force to stop 
Texas from extending her boundaries over the disputed t e r r i t o r y .  ^ 0  
Although he declared that he wanted a settlement of the sectional dif­
ferences, Stephens also stated: "If you, gentlemen of the North, then,
intend to ingraft upon the policy of this common Government your anti­
slavery views, and make its action conform to your sectional purposes, 
it is useless to say anything more of compromise settlement, adjust­
ment or union . . . and whenever this Government is brought in hostile 
array against me and mine, I am for disunion . . The North
98 Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 68-71.
99 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 1775; Thompson, 
Robert Toombs of Georgia. 71.
100 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 1080-84.
101 Ibid., 1083.
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must make concessions on the sectional questions to preserve the peace,
and agitation had to be kept out of the halls of Congress or the
102future of the Union would be in doubt.
John M. Berrien's course in the Compromise was erratic and 
indicated great mental strain. His speeches were often vague, and his 
only success was an amendment permitting the Federal courts, rather 
than Congress or settlers, to decide the fate of slavery in the terri­
tories. In mid-July he proposed economic retaliation against the North 
as an alternative to secession. The South should place a heavy tax on 
Northern products after they entered Southern ports. This position, 
known as the Berrien Platform, was completely constitutional in the 
Senator's opinion, but as a practical solution it was seriously flawed. 
It was offered too late in the Congressional session to receive any
support and it would have only alienated the Northern mercantile com- 
103munity.
The voting patterns by the Congressional delegation did not 
indicate the position which these men would adopt in the fall of 1850. 
Both Senators and all the Representatives were recorded as voting 
against statehood for California while approving the bills for terri­
torial government in Utah-New Mexico and the Fugitive Slave Law. The 
pattern ended, however, as Senators Berrien and William Dawson, along
102 Ibid., 1084. Stephens had returned to Georgia by late 
August and did not participate in Congressional voting until mid- 
September 1850. Rabun, "Alexander H. Stephens," 275-76.
103 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 336-70.
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with Representatives Toombs and Allen Owen, favored settlement of the
Texas boundary question which Representatives H. A. Haralson and James
W. Jackson opposed. Both Senators opposed the abolition of the slave
trade in Washington, which every House member recorded as voting 
104also opposed.
From September to December 1850, radicals in the Deep South
watched the state of Georgia. Men from the radical states of South
Carolina and Mississippi were concerned about the course which Georgia
would adopt. Would this basically conservative state reject or submit
to the Adjustment bills?^®^
In late September Governor Towns issued a proclamation calling
for a state convention. Since the goal of the Northern free-soilers
was abolition, elections should be held on November 25 so that
Georgians could meet in a special session to find a method to protect
106
the peculiar institution.
Immediate support for the Governor's call came from the 
Federal Union which declared that the major question, before the Con­
vention would be: "THE CONTINUANCE OR ABOLITION OF THE INSTITUTION
OF S L A V E R Y . T h e  Macon Telegraph stated that the South had to
104 Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict. 191-200.
105 This is based on a perusal of newspapers such as the 
Charleston Mercury. Jackson Mississippian. Montgomery Advertiser and 
State Gazette.
106 Milledgeville Federa1 Union.September 24, 1850;
Milledgeville Southern Recorder. September 24, 1850.
107 Ibid.. September 23, 1850.
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decide whether to resist or submit to Northern oppression: "The eyes
of the whole country is [sic] upon Georgia— she now stands in the van
of her southern sisters . . .  If we advance, all is well with the
108South. If we recede all is lost."
Practical politicians in the newly formed Southern Rights 
party immediately organized for the November elections. On the local 
level meetings were held to express opposition to the Compromise, to 
organize resistance, and to gain public support. On September 30 a 
meeting was held at the Methodist Church in Thomasville. The members 
resolved that the admission of California "is a gross wrong upon the 
southern people."^09 They further declared: "the tendency of the
action of the general government is gradually to abolish slavery in 
the Southern states. The result of which would be, in short, the 
utter destruction of our prosperity as a country and the degradation 
to the level of the slave of the honest hard working portion of our 
fellow citizens
A nominating convention gathered in early October to select 
Southern Rights candidates to the December convention. A committee of 
twenty-four drew up resolutions which declared that the South intended 
to live as equals with the North under the Constitution. A list of 
Northern aggressions beginning with passage of the Ordinance of 1787
108 Macon Georgia Telegraph. September 17, 1850.
109 Milledgeville Federal Union, October 1, 1850.
110 Ibid.
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and ending with California's admission as a state was drawn up.*** The
Compromise measures were harmful to the South since there might be a
danger of emancipation which "is in our judgement a question of life
112
and death to the white race of the South." They wanted men who 
were opposed to the Compromise elected to the convention, but the 
resistance must still be within the Union.**^
Several messages by Southern Rights men encouraged the popu­
lace to resist the dangers to slavery. Two Southern Rights candidates 
for the December convention called upon Georgians to stand firmly for 
their "rights": "It cannot be possible that the people of Georgia
will submit to wear the yoke of oppression. . . .  If we are free, let 
us maintain that freedom. If we are equals with the North, let us 
maintain that equality. If the property we hold be ours, let us assert 
our right to it, and resist at every hazard, every act of Congress,
which seeks to destroy our property, or render it valueless in our 
114
hands." Similar sentiments were echoed by radical Governor Towns 
in a letter mid-way in the campaign. Towns maintained that the entire 
North was anti-slavery and that it was organized for sectional purposes. 
The aggressive feelings of the free-soilers "rests upon a hatred of the 
South, a feeling of jealousy at Southern prosperity, . . . and an
111 Macon Georgia Telegraph. October 8, 1850.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
11.4 Ibid.. October 29, 1850.
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universally aggressive disposition to tear down and demolish whatever 
they cannot fully monopolize and enjoy."*^ He believed that the 
North was strengthening the abolition forces by the admission of 
California and that the border slave states would probably abolish 
slavery in the future. Therefore, the South had to act in 1850 to 
protect slavery while there were still parts of the Northern population 
who opposed the peculiar institution, but respected the guarantees 
which it had in the United States Constitution.^^
Conservatives welcomed the return of the Triumvirate in the 
fall of 1850. They recognized that these three men could help lead 
the state in a peaceful rather than a radical course. Governor Towns 
of Georgia, along with other Fire-eaters, wanted the state to stand 
firm against the Compromise. Moderates, in contrast, emphasized the 
deep Union feeling of the masses of Georgia and encouraged Cobb to 
campaign vigorously against d i s u n i o n i s t s ; o n e  moderate wrote: "you
have had a most laborious session, and ought to have some leisure. . . 
But it is important that you should mingle with the people and make
I I O
speeches." Another man noted that the "stock" of the radicals "has 
fallen" when it became apparent that the Stephens and Toombs would
115 Ibid., November 6, 1850.
116 Ibid.
117 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. October 9, 16, 1850; 
William Wood to Howell Cobb, September 15, 1850, Phillips (ed.), 
Correspondence, 212-13.
t
118 John Henry Lumpkin to Howell Cobb, October 5, 1850, 
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support the Union rather than the Southern Rights cause within the
- - 119state.
Unionists began organizing throughout the state to influence 
the rural electorate. Alexander Stephens spoke in Macon where he 
declared that there were situations in which disunion might be neces­
sary; however, resistance was not justified by the passage of the 
territorial bills--which did not contain the Wilmot Proviso--or
California's admission to the Union. Primary meetings were held
120throughout the state which expressed conservative sentiment. A 
meeting in Monroe county in early October expressed the sentiments of 
Georgia moderates: "The true issue then in the election of Delegates
to the Convention is, Union or Disunion. We hesitate not to avow our­
selves in favor of the former, and the uncompromising enemies of the
lO 1
latter--we are not yet tired of the Union.n14-1 a similar feeling was
expressed in a gathering at Lumpkin on October 4 which was chaired by
Judge James Clark. The purpose of the meeting, in the Judge's opinion,
was to preserve the Union. It had brought prosperity and growth to
122
the United States; resolutions were adopted which stated that the 
convention which Towns had called would result in resistance which 
"necessarily lead to a Revolution and revolution to Disunion. The
119 Luther J. Glenn to Howell Cobb, September 21, 1850, Ibid.,
213.
120 Macon Georgia Journa1 and Messenger. August 29, 1850; 
Milledgeville Southern Recorder, September 10, 1850.
121 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. October 9, 1850.
122 Ibid., October 16, 1850.
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issue is therefore a plain one. It is UNION or DISUNION."*^ If the 
United States was divided, it would become "balkanized" without any
power. These men were therefore willing to acquiesce in the Compro-
, , 124mise s passage.
A persuasive discussion of the Compromise appeared in a letter 
which Toombs wrote to his constituents in early October. Toombs 
stated that he had established three grounds for resistance in the 
1850 session of Congress: 1. abolition of the peculiar institution in
Washington; 2. prohibition of slavery in the western territories; and 
3. refusal by Congress to enact a "fair measure" for the rendition of 
escaped slaves. These standards were not violated by Congressional 
legislation, and the South had the right to expand into the Southwest 
with its institutions. The land transferred to New Mexico from Texas 
came under the provision which allowed it to enter the Union without 
regard to the status of slavery. Furthermore, Texas municipal law 
still applied to the area, and the laws of the United States were ex­
tended to the Southwest. Toombs did want a direct repeal of Mexican 
(probably anti-slavery) law in Utah-New Mexico along with positive 
laws to protect slavery. However, he recognized that many people 
still clung to the doctrine of non-intervention. Although he had 
voted against California's admission to the Union, Toombs stressed 
that his objections were not sectional and that statehood for
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
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California was entirely within the boundaries of Congressional preroga- 
125
tive.
Other conservative viewpoints were voiced by Charles Jenkins, 
a leading Whig and Judge M. J. Wellborn. Jenkins, a former ally of 
Senator Berrien, defended California's admission to the Union. 
California, whose statehood he might have opposed on grounds of 
expediency, had a legitimate right to regulate her own domestic insti­
tutions. She could not be constitutionally denied statehood simply 
because her citizens had adopted a free-soil constitution. In a 
public letter to voters in Georgia's second Congressional district, 
Wellborn expressed a definite spirit of conciliation. The Utah-New 
Mexico bills allowed slaves to be brought into the territories so that 
the institution might be established in the Southwest. Four slave 
states might be carved out of Texas, and the Slave Trade Law for the 
District of Columbia was a police regulation which the slaveholders 
in the capital seemed to favor. The irregularities in California's 
admission to the Union were not justifications for secession in this 
moderate Georgian's opinion.126 In concluding, Wellborn stated: 
"Gentlemen, there is no dishonor done the South in the late measures.
None had been intended. Nor has the North triumphed. There exists no
127such unworthy feeling among them."
125 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. October 16, 1850.
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The most isolated figure in the fall of 1850 was Senator
Berrien. He was alienated from his conservative Whig supporters, who
had broken with him on the issue of slavery. In order to gain support,
he was forced into a loose alliance with Fire-eaters like James Y.
Smythe, editor of the Augusta Republic. His brother, with a letter
from the Senator, traveled throughout the state advocating economic
128retaliation against the North rather than secession. Berrien him­
self hoped to form "fusion tickets . . . pledged to his Berrien 
Platform."129 since this did not prove feasible, his ideas made no 
real impression on the electorate.
Georgians overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of acquiescence to 
the Compromise on November 25, 1850. Union delegates were victorious 
in ninety percent of the counties and thus won a tremendous victory 
over their Southern Rights opponents. Conservative delegates like 
Charles Jenkins and Thomas Spalding were overwhelmingly supported by
the electorates in their districts. The Whig-dominated Union party
130
was completely victorious.
The Federal Union provided a cogent if somewhat inaccurate 
evaluation of the triumph: "The Unionist victory was primarily the
result of the Southern Rights men being universally denounced as
128 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 372-75.
129 Ibid.. 375.
130 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. December 3, 17, 1850.
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1"disunionists.ni Unionists had support from local office holders and
132"demagogues who were enlisted in the Union cause." However, the
paper was most bitter at the mercantile community and planter class:
A portion, too of the commercial interest— an interest to a 
considerable extent under the control of northern men, many 
of whom are mere birds of passage, more identified with the 
North than the South, lent their aid to the prostration of 
Southern Rights. And it cannot be disguised, that there are 
large cotton planters who have acted upon the principle openly 
acknowledged by one . . . give me my negroes for ten years, 
and cotton at thirteen cents, and then I shall be rich 
enough, and the negroes may go the d 1. ^
The editorial correctly emphasized several of the important 
factors in the Unionist victory. Conservatives in Georgia had 
apparently succeeded in creating an image of the Southern Rights party 
as composed of dangerous plotters seeking an end to the Union. Pros­
perity had also reinforced the natural moderation in the state, but 
the Union coalition was led by extremely competent men--not mere party 
hacks and demagogues. The factor which the paper did not mention was 
the emotional loyalty to the Union that existed in Georgia and which 
made most Georgians reluctant to adopt any radical course. This 
Unionism was conditional, however, as Luther Glenn noted in a letter to 
Howell Cobb:
But the North must not take this election as evidence of an 
unconditional submission by Georgia to any and all encroach­
ments upon the rights of the South. The fugitive slave bill
131 Milledgeville Federal Union. December 3, 1850.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
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must not be Interfered with. It must be faithfully executed 
and carried out. Slavery must not be abolished in the 
District. The Wilmot Proviso must 'sleep the sleep of death.'
In short, Georgia is willing to abide by the settlement of the 
question made by the last Congress, and the North must and I 
have no doubt will carry out in good faith her part of it. If 
so the country is safe and the ultras dead.^^
The state convention in Milledgeville opened on December 10, 
1850, with the selection of Thomas Spalding as chairman. Spalding, a 
staunch Unionist, stated that rather than see the Union broken;
"I should prefer to see myself and mine slumbering under the load of
136
monumental clay." He actively aided the Union cause by appointing
Union men to the Committee of Thirty-Three which was created to draft
137a report of the convention's position.
The Committee of Thirty-Three, which drew up what came to be
138known as the Georgia Platform, was chaired by Charles Jenkins.
Jenkins was characterized by a contemporary as the "Madison" of the 
convention: "He stood like a great towering and impossible statue by
the paths that seemed to lead to degradation and humility, on the one
134 Luther H. Glenn to Howell Cobb, November 28, 1850, R. P. 
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side, or to disorder and strife on the other.“139 ^his eulogy, though
overdrawn, does emphasize the important role which Jenkins played as
140the actual author of the Georgia Platform.
The Georgia Platform was a clear statement of the mood in the 
state in 1850. It announced that although no one in Georgia totally 
supported the Adjustment bills, the people were willing to submit to 
them with definite reservations. There were certain violations of the 
institution of black slavery which even moderates in the state would 
not tolerate:
Fourthly Resolved that the state of Georgia, in the opinion 
of this convention, will and ought to resist even (as a last 
resort) to a disruption of every tie that binds her to the 
Union, any action of Congress upon the subject of slavery in 
the District of Columbia, or in places subject to the juris­
diction of Congress, incompatible with the safety and domestic 
tranquility, the rights and honor of the slaveholding states; 
or any act suppressing the slave trade between the slave- 
holding states, or in any refusal to admit as a state any 
territory hereafter applying, because of the existence of 
slavery therein; or any act, prohibiting the introduction of 
slaves into the territories of Utah and New Mexico, or any 
act repealing or materially modifying the laws now in force 
for the recovery of fugitive slaves.
Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law was so vital that the preserva­
tion of the Union was dependent on it. Thus, Unionists had estab­
lished a platform which acquiesced to the adjustment bills of 1850
139 Montgomery, Georgians in Profile. 228.
140 Ibid., 227.
141 Herman V. Ames, (ed.) State Documents cn Federal Relations 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 272.
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but threatened secession if there were further encroachments upon the
■ 142South's most vital domestic institution.
The Union party of Georgia was formed in Milledgeville while 
the convention was in session. Unionists gathered in the House of 
Representatives on December 11 and selected General John W. Sanford 
as their chairman. Eloquent speeches by Toombs and Stephens set the 
tone of the meeting. Toombs began by declaring the United States had 
just passed through a crisis which had tested the political system.
The people had made a peaceful decision at the polls about the vexa­
tious sectional problems which had risen with the acquisition of the
143Mexican cession and the anti-slavery feelings in the North. He had 
supported resistance when there were strong attacks upon slavery, but 
believed that the bitter struggle in the Thirty First Congress demon­
strated the depth of nationalism in all sections: "After reviewing
the events of the last 6 or 8 months, before God I believe that there 
is no act of justice which the people of all portions of the Union 
will not render whenever the Union is in danger. The national heart
may slumber, but when aroused, its devotion to the Union is stronger
144than fanaticism, stronger than faction." Toombs emphasized that 
although there were still hostile groups in the North Southern 
Unionists must not cut themselves off from an alliance with
142 Ibid.
143 Milledgeville Federa1 Union. December 17, 1850; Milledge­
ville Southern Recorder. December 17, 1850.
144 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. December 17, 1850.
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145conservatives north of the Mason Dixon line. Slavery, which had 
been "swept away" in other parts of the Americas was secure under the 
national Constitution: "The greatest security to this institution,
is found in the Constitution of the United States. This is the aegis 
which will protect you and your property, as long as you can preserve 
it. It is now the strongest legal bulwark for property in slaves.
He was ready to unite with Northern men, and emphasized that he was 
proud to be both a Georgian and an American.
Alexander Stephens spoke next about Georgia's desire to pre­
serve the Union. Since it was still endangered by men from both 
sections, it was necessary for conservatives to unite:
I say to you frankly, my opinion is, that the friends of the 
Union, North and South, must rally together. They must stand 
shoulder to shoulder, hand to hand, and meet in open opposition, 
those whose objects or policy will lead to its destruction.
This must be done irrespective of past party association or 
organization. When the country is in danger, all these minor 
questions must be buried.^®
He did not believe that the continuance of the Union was incompatible 
with the preservation of Southern rights. The Wilmot Proviso had been 
eliminated from national political discussion while the principle was 
established that a territory could enter the Union regardless of the 
status of slavery. He wanted to protect his section's interests in
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid. 
1.47 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.
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the Union, and called for the formation of a national conservative 
party:
To the friends of the Union then I say, that we should organize 
. . . upon a platform as broad and as wide as this Republic.
We should meet those men at the North who cherish sentiments 
in common with us, and . . . Let them with us then link our 
destinies, and form one great national party under the name and 
style, if you please, of the Union Constitutional Party.
With the formation of the Union party old party ties were terminated 
and men who had been political enemies tried to work together on the 
basis of the Georgia Platform.
In the winter of 1850-1851 Howell Cobb was prominently men­
tioned as a possible gubernatorial candidate. He was acceptable to 
the Union coalition with its strong political base across North 
Georgia. Although his most recent biographer stresses Cobb's ambition 
for office--possibly even a desire for the Presidency--he seems to 
have rather reluctantly accepted it as a public duty:*"** "I do not 
want to run for governor and if they would fall upon another candidate
it would suit me exactly . . . but . . .  I have determined to run the
152
race if it is desired by my friends." Therefore this practical man 
began to seek the nomination of the new party during the spring of 1851
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb," 148-49.
152 Howell Cobb to Mary Ann Cobb, February 25, 1851, Howell 
Cobb Papers (University of Georgia LibrariestAthens, Georgia).
153 SJmpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb" 148-51.
153
124
The Union party attempted to reinforce its coalition at a 
large Union meeting in Macon on February 22, 1851. Local Unionists 
had corresponded widely with Georgia and national Union men to obtain 
their opinions on this occasion. Prominent Georgia Unionists who 
attended the meeting were A. A. Chappell, James A. Nesbit, and J. H. R. 
Washington, Mayor of Savannah. At a banquet, toasts were made to the 
new Union party which stood firmly on the Georgia Platform. Letters 
from leading Unionists, including Howell Cobb, were read at the meeting 
and later circulated throughout Georgia as endorsements for the Com­
promise and support for the party's conservatism.
In his letter, Cobb discussed the dangers to sectional harmony. 
Tensions between the sections still existed because Northern abolition­
ists and Southern rights men continued their agitation. He noted 
especially the dangerously parochial attitude of the Southern rights 
movement: "All the sympathies of the Southern Rights Party of Georgia
are with sectional men, sectional issues and sectional associations."^^ 
These radical men, like their counterparts in South Carolina, were in 
favor of secession. Moderates, in contrast, had worked out an adjust­
ment with the North which had defeated the Wilmot Proviso and which
157would enforce the Fugitive Slave Law. He concluded by stating:
154 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. February 26, 1851.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
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Your organization [Constitutional Union party] has laid down 
a sound and patriotic principle— a faithful adherence to the 
compromise measures of the last Congress. It is your platform--^^8
In the winter of 1851 Southern Rights men tried to influence 
the Georgia electorate. Editorial statements were constantly issued by 
the Federal Union which emphasized that there was no real danger to the 
Union. The Southern Rights party accepted the Georgia Platfora but was 
denounced by Unionists who wanted only to preserve their own party:
"their rickety, consumptive, dead and buried, constitutional Union 
party, to which they cling with a death like tenacity, as their only 
hope for power and spoils, is without excuse or apology, unless they 
make believe, that their [sic] is a party opposed to the Union . .
The party had to die since it was only a Whig trick to obtain power.
The Augusta Republic claimed that the Southern Rights principles had
158 Ibid.; Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb," 148, believes 
that even at this early date that Cobb wanted to return to the national 
Democracy but that he had to consider practical political problems.
These problems were amplified in a letter from John Lamar to Cobb:
"The Democratic party in Georgia is given over to "fire-eating" and 
Disunion. For us to go back among them would be to offer ourselves 
willing victims to their vengeance. I for one never will. The Whigs 
as far as I know are eager for the organization and consolidation of 
the Union party and are willing to give up their tariff notions. . . .
My opinion is that there will be very little difficulty in organizing 
in Ga. a Union party that will adopt Democratic principles." John 
Lamar to Howell Cobb, January 11, 1851, Howell Cobb Papers.
159 Milledgeville Federal Union. January 28, 1851.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., February 18, 1851.
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triumphed in the December convention, and that radicals would also beat 
"the opposition of demagogues and office seekers."1**2 These statements 
criticized the Constitutional Union party as a coalition based on a 
desire for power and patronage rather than on loyalty to any great 
principle.
The Southern Rights party also began to prepare for the 1851 
elections. Meetings were held throughout the state in the spring of 
1851 to select delegates to the state convention which was planned for 
May. Leaders in the party had to create unity among various state
163associations which held divergent views on the Compromise of 1850.
Southern Rights men meeting at Irwinton agreed to support the Georgia
164Platform as "the expressed will of the people." However, a Southern 
Rights meeting in Crawford was more radical: "Resolved that we do not
acquiesce in the Platform of the Georgia State Convention . . ., sus­
taining as it does, those measures of abomination, miscalled the Com-
163promise Bill, . . ." Therefore party unity had to be created so 
that victory could be achieved in the 1851 political races.
The state convention, which was held on May 28-29, 1851, was 
apparently unable to work out a compromise between the radical and 
moderate wings of the Southern Rights party. The faction did not heed
162 Ibid., January 14, 1851, quoting the Augusta Republic.
163 Ibid., April 8, 1851.
164 Macon Georgia Telegraph. April 22, 1851.
165 Ibid., May 6, 1851.
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the advice of the Federal Union which wanted the party to resist the
Constitutional Unionists but also "to act cautiously, prudently and
wisely."166 party members instead adopted a fairly radical platform
which stated that the rights of the South had been violated in the
Compromise of 1850; secession was upheld as the right of sovereign
states, and convention members announced that the only just settlement
to the question of slavery in the territories was the extension of the
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific. These bold statements were
the platform upon which the Southern Rights nominee, Charles J.
16 7McDonald, ran for governor.
At its convention the Union party endorsed the principles of the 
Georgia Platform and nominated Cobb by acclamation. John J. Floyd, 
appointed President of the Convention, selected a committee of Thirty- 
three which announced its devotion to the resolutions passed by the 
Georgia Convention, while stating their regrets that the Southern 
Rights party stood in opposition to them: ". . . we have witnessed
with profound regret the opposition to these principles by the Conven­
tion of our opponents . . . that opposition is calculated to destroy the 
moral force of the position which our state has taken . . .  to create 
divisions and dissensions . . . thus weakening us, to invite a renewal 
of aggressions upon Southern rights, which may end in the overthrow of
166 Milledgeville Federal Union, May 27, 1851.
167 Ibid., June 3, 1851.
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our Union, . . ." This sentiment, which seemed to unite the party, 
was threatened by Cobb's proposal to base his campaign on the idea 
that secession was unconstitutional; Georgia Unionists, represented 
by Robert Toombs, were opposed to this plan, and a temporary rift was 
opened between the former Democrat and Whig.^^ Alexander Stephens, 
expressing the views of pragmatic politicians, wanted the gubernatorial 
candidate to concentrate on campaigning rather than a discussion of 
secession: "You must be wide awake with all your wits at command
from the word go. No time is to be lost. You have an adroit and wily 
competitor. Take the stump and keep it on all suitable occasions."^® 
Cobb finally admitted that "Secession or revolution" might be justi­
fied under the most severe conditions of oppression, but not in 
1851:^* "If the people of Georgia are prepared to reverse a deci­
sion so recently made and rush the ship of state into the gulf of 
disunion, in obedience to the summons of a neighboring state [South 
Carolina], then it is manifest that I am not the man to select for 
their chief magistrate."172
During the 1851 campaign Cobb conducted an extensive canvass
168 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. June 3, 1851.
169 Alexander H. Stephens to Howell Cobb, June 23, 1851, 
Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 237-38; Simpson, "A Biography of 
Howell Cobb," 151-52; Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia. 79.
170 Alexander H. Stephens to Howell Cobb, June 23, 1851, 
Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 237.
171 Howell Cobb to James A. Meriwether and Others, June 24, 
1851, ibid.. 238-41.
172 Ibid., 240.
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throughout Georgia. He had been advised to treat the Southern Rights
party as formidable opposition: "Thus entering the lists we shall
yield no inch of ground without a struggle feeling all the while that
each particular blow dealt the aversary [sic] is absolutely essential 
•,173
to our success. The former speaker apparently followed the recom­
mendation because he was engaged in a lengthy speaking tour during the 
summer. He was urged by correspondents to visit Cherokee because the 
Southern Rights men had been active in the area. At Thomasville Cobb 
declared that the various Compromise bills did not violate the prin­
ciples which Georgia established on slavery in the territories. 
Radicals, who had originally submitted to the Adjustment by accepting
the Georgia Platform would resist it if they ever gained majority
174support in the Empire state; the Union had to be maintained as 
"the friend and protector of the people."175 gy September Cobb pre­
dicted that Georgia would go Unionist "by an overwhelming torrent."176 
Strong Unionists sentiments were expressed by the conservative 
candidates for the Constitutional Union party. Robert Toombs empha­
sized that party lines had broken down in 1850, and that the
173 Thomas P. Harris to Howell Cobb, June 15, 1851, Howell 
Cobb Papers.
174 John H. Lumpkin to Howell Cobb, August 11, 1851, Howell 
Cobb Papers; Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. June 25, July 16, 
1851; Milledgeville Southern Recorder. July 29, 1851, quoting Florida 
Sentinel.
175 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. July 29, 1851, quoting 
Florida Sentinel.
176 Howell Cobb to Mary Ann Cobb, September 7, 1851, Howell 
Cobb Papers.
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Constitutional Union party supported the Georgia platform; he defended
most of the Compromise of 1850— especially the territorial bills for
Utah-New Mexico— as consistent with Southern principles. Although he
was very critical of the disunionist tendencies of the McDonald Southern
Rights' party, Toombs declared that the ultimate danger to the Union
came from anti-slavery elements in the North; the national political
parties should "purge themselves" of this radical group or the
Unionists would have to create a new political organizagion.
Absalom Chappell, another Unionist candidate for Congress, declared
that if the Adjustment bills "had been finally lost in the last Con-
178gress, their failure would have been the knell of the Union." But
secessionists had still tried to destroy the Union after the passage
of the bills. Even though Georgians had decided on a more moderate
course in the convention of 1850, it had not ended the efforts of
Georgia extremists:
Its effect [Union victory in 1850] was not so much to put an 
end to the formidable and organized warfare against the 
Union in Georgia, as to drive the routed disunion forces of 
this state from the post of honor, the van of battle, where 
they figured in the campaign of last year--into their more 
natural position of auxiliary subordination to the movements 
of South Carolina. The great struggle going on in Georgia is, 
really, to seduce the people from their allegiance to her and 
the noble platform on which she has planted herself, and to 
prepare their minds for abetting and sustaining South 
Carolina . . .179
177 Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, July 30, 1851.
178 Ibid., July 22, 1851.
179 Ibid.
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Chappell asked Georgians if they were thus willing to abandon the course
of action decided upon in 1850 to adopt a more radical one which might
threaten the Union.18®
The Union press was able effectively to brand the Southern
Rights party as a threat to the Union. Hopkins Holsey, editor of the
pro-Union Southern Banner, wrote that Charles McDonald's election would
be "THE FUNERAL KNELL OF THE AMERICAN UNION."181 The Southern Recorder
also took this viewpoint in discussing the choice of candidates:
Those who are for uniting with Carolina in resistance to the 
Compromise, by secession alone, or by the creation of a 
Southern Congress and a southern confederacy, will doubtless 
vote for the Resistance candidate [MacDonald], who will, of 
course, give the whole influence of the state government to the 
promotion of his views. But those who are in favor of abiding 
by the Compromise, who go for the integrity of the Union upon 
that Compromise, will vote for Mr. Cobb. . . .18^
But the Macon Journal and Messenger stated that the Union position most
succinctly: "The only question now before the people is: will they
support McDonald and disunion in disguise, or Cobb and the action of
the Georgia convention?"188
The Southern Rights campaign was based primarily upon letters
which their gubernatorial candidate wrote. Ex-Governor McDonald made
two main statements during the summer which emphasized the race
180 Ibid.
181 Joseph Luther Bunting, "Hopkins Holsey: Spokesman for
Georgia’s Constitutional Union Party" (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of Georgia, 1951), 55.
182 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, July 1, 1851.
183 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. July 2, 1851.
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question. In his acceptance letter, the gubernatorial candidate 
denounced the Compromise of 1850 which would not permit the Southern 
black population to go West; "The rapidly increasing slave population 
are to remain here, and the work of the abolitionists is to be accom­
plished, either through the vast multiplication of the race, or by the
change of the Constitution to be effected by the early formation and
184admission of free states into the Union." Emancipation, according
to McDonald would turn loose poor blacks who would reduce the value of
185the labor of lower class whites. Furthermore, if abolition was
achieved the black man might possibly be granted rights which would
lend to race war:
Those who, acting under the control of soft consciences, had 
abrogated the condition of slavery, might feel constrained, 
by a powerful morality to provide by law for the support of 
those who had been reduced by their humane policy to a state 
threatening starvation. Again their notion of the equality of 
the African might prompt them to the enactment of laws to 
confer on them the rights of citizenship, the rights of suffrage, 
and the power to hold office. A deadly rivalry between two 
distinct races, the one claiming superiority from nature would 
immediately spring up. °
Thus the Southern Rights candidate attempted to portray vividly for
the Georgia electorate the "ghastly" problems of a post-abolition 
1 8 7society. '
By fall the Southern Rights forces were obviously going to be
184 Milledgeville Federal Union, June 17, 1851.
185 Ibid., July 22, 1851.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
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defeated in the election. Unionist leaders throughout the state
accurately predicted the extent of the party’s victory. McDonald, whom
one contemporary historian has characterized as an ineffective speaker,
evidently began to debate Cobb in the late fall after numerous invita-
188tions had been issued during the campaign. The Speaker was so 
enthusiastic about this opportunity that he wrote his wife: "McDonald
is again with me, and I believe that it is his intention to remain
189with me during the remainder of the campaign. At least I hope so."
The Unionists campaign was also aided by Stephens who defended both the 
Compromise and the Georgia Convention. His speech at Macon, for ex­
ample, was highlighted with pro-Union sentiment and stressed the fact 
that the Union had brought freedom and prosperity to Americans. These 
appeals to Georgia conservatism enabled the Unionists to win a decisive
17,868 vote margin for Cobb in the gubernatorial race, and to carry
190most of the congressional districts in Georgia. Georgia was thus 
firmly entrenched in the moderate camp and unlikely to support con­
tinued agitation throughout the South on the sLavery question.
After the Unionists' victory in the fall of 1851, the key 
question was whether the new party structures would be maintained or
188 Augusta Chronical and Sentinel, July 27, 1851; Robert 
Martin to Howell Cobb, September 23, 1851, Howell Cobb Papers; Simpson, 
"A Biography of Howell Cobb," 158-59.
189 Howell Cobb to Mary Ann Cobb, September 23, 1851, Howell 
Cobb Papers.
190 Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. September 24, 1851; 
Macon Georgia Telegraph, October 21, 1851; Milledgeville Southern 
Recorder, October 14, 1851.
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whether there would be reunification with the national parties. Toombs 
and Stephens, who had isolated themselves from the national Whig party, 
had a definite stake in the new Constitutional Union party and fought 
for its survival. Howell Cobb, in contrast, wanted to reunite with a 
national Democratic party based on pro-Union principles; the Southern 
Rights faction within Georgia's Democracy also began to reestablish 
ties with the national party and hoped to control the state.
The decline of the Constitutional Union party in Georgia began 
during the early months of 1852. A meeting of Unionist legislators on 
January 20, 1852, resulted in a declaration in favor of the Constitu­
tional Union party sending representatives to the Democratic convention 
at Baltimore. Alexander Stephens, in a public letter, stated that he
could not accept the resolution which called for Democratic reunifica-
191 192
tion: "I am unqualifiedly opposed to it." believed
personally that the national parties had to adopt conservative prin­
ciples and that the Constitutional Union party would have a more
positive influence on them if they remained outside the national 
193organizations. "Our policy is to hold our positions. We should
unite with no party that fails as a condition precedent to incorporate
in its creed those principles which we consider as essential to the
194maintenance of our rights and the preservation of the Union."
191 Milledgeville Southern Recorder. January 17, February 24,
1852.
192 Ibid., February 24, 1852.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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Spokesmen for the Union in Georgia expressed their viewpoints in
Congress during March 1852. Junius Hillyer, a Union Democrat aligned
with Cobb, stated that he favored the action of the Constitutional
Union legislators in calling for a convention in April to consider
sending delegates to the Democratic national convention. His colleague
E. W. Chastain defended the party against charges that it had abandoned
195the national Democratic party and its principles. He criticized the
States Righters in Georgia and stated:
Were we, in your iudgement. deserters from the Democratic 
faith in giving our support and countenance to those measures 
of the compromise which have received the votes of a majority 
of the party. . . .  We were deserters from the Democratic 
party in refusing our assent to the doctrines of the Nashville 
Convention, . . .  in refusing to unite in the recommendations 
of that convention not to go into any National Convention under 
any party name whatever, . . .  in resisting the doctrine of 
peaceable secession . . .  If these acts constitute desertion 
from the Democratic party, then, sir we have abandoned a party 
whose principles we never held, and to whose organization we 
shall never return; but with us you excommunicate every 
national Democrat in the land, . . .196
These appeals by the Cobb faction of the Union Democracy were designed
to recreate national party alliances rather than maintain the existence
197
of the new parties formed in the winter of 1850-1851.
During the late spring and summer the process of unification 
continued in Georgia. At the April Constitutional Union Convention,
195 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 255-58,
319-22.
196 Ibid.. 257.
197 Ibid.
the Whigs blocked an attempt to bring the entire party into the Demo­
cratic fold, and forced the Union Democrats to meet separately to 
select delegates to the National Democratic convention. Southern 
Rights Democrats, who had met earlier in the month, had also nominated 
representatives to the Baltimore meeting. In June, both groups were 
seated at Baltimore, but they were unable to achieve a reconciliation 
of their political differences. During July the position of the 
Toombs-Stephens faction continued to be equivocal, and Union Democrats 
were hopeful that Toombs would support the national Democratic ticket. 
This goal proved illusory, however, and the Constitutional Union party 
disbanded in mid-August with statements from Union Democrats in favor 
of a Pierce-King ticket. Herschel V. Johnson, a radical Democrat, 
responded favorably to the possibility of Democratic unity by offering
to resign as an elector on the Southern Rights ticket (Pierce-King) so
1QRthat a Union Democrat could assume his position. y He wanted the 
Southern Rights Democrats to meet with the Unionists in Atlanta so 
that a compromise could be secured: "I trust that . . . we will respond
cordially and promptly to the call for the proposed meeting and that 
the result will be a total oblivion of past differences and . . . the
198 Address of a Portion of the Executive Committee to the 
Union Democracy and Union Whigs, friends of Pierce and King. [August, 
1852], R. P. Brooks (ed.), "Howell Cobb Papers," GHQ. V (December, 
1921), 56-58; Congressional Globe. 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 
816-20; Federal Union, April 16, 1852; Herschel V. Johnson to the 
Democratic Executive Committee, August 24, 1852, Herschel V. Johnson 
Papers (Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina); 
Milledgeville Southern Recorder. April 16, 27, 1852; Montgomery 
Cracker Parties, 70-90; Robert Toombs to Howell Cobb, June 10, 1852; 
R. P. Brooks (ed.), "Howell Cobb Papers," GHQ. V (December, 1921), 
53-54.
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re-establishment of that fraternal union of our party."199
Political anarchy characterized the remaining months of the 
presidential campaign of 1852. Since the Stephens-Toombs wing of 
Georgia Whiggery was not able to unite with the Winfield Scott faction, 
they fielded a ticket with Daniel Webster for President. Although com­
promise was expected at the meeting in Atlanta, the Southern Rights 
Democrats were not willing to be conciliatory despite Herschel V. 
Johnson's call for unity. Union Democrats therefore endorsed the 
Southern Rights ticket which precipitated a further secession by ultra- 
Union Democrats led by Hopkins Holsey. These four political factions 
competed with each other for electoral support in the election which 
saw Pierce carry the state by 34,000 votes to 16,000 for Scott, 5,700 
for Union Democrats, 5,200 for Webster and 1,000 for the minority 
Southern Rights extremists Georgia, which had been one of the
first states to accept the Adjustment bills, had voted for a Presiden­
tial candidate in 1852 whom most Southerners recognized as pro- 
Compromise. Thus they re-affirmed the state's basic conservatism and 
hope for harmony on the question of black slavery.
199 Herschel V. Johnson to the Democratic Executive Committee, 
August 24, 1852, Herschel V. Johnson Papers.
200 Milledgeville Federal Union, September 28, 1852; Montgomery, 
Cracker Parties, 80-91, passim.
CHAPTER IV
ALABAMA AND FLORIDA: SEATS OF FRUSTRATED RADICALISM
Alabama and Florida, neighbors in the Deep South, had similar 
reactions to the Compromise of 1850. In both states the Southern 
Rights forces, though led by outstanding individuals were not able to 
overcome the conservatism of the electorates or the relative moderation 
of the governors. Consequently each state displayed the spectacle of 
radicals who could see their goals but could not achieve them and had 
finally to subside in frustration.
Florida, largely a pioneer state in the nineteenth century, 
was not admitted to the Union until 1845. She was definitely under­
populated in 1850 since the census recorded only 47,000 whites and 
39,000 slaves living on a land mass stretching from Key West to 
Jacksonville. The largest city, Key West, had only 1,900 people, and 
the state was divided into three pronounced political-economic units:
1) West Florida, consisting of the seven counties nearest the Alabama 
border; 2) Middle Florida, consisting of the six counties between the 
Apalachicola and Suwanee Rivers; and 3) East Florida, consisting of the 
remaining underpopulated counties. Middle Florida, the oldest and most 
prosperous of the three regions was the only part of the state which 
was not a frontier. It was a rich sugar and cotton producing area,
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populated by slaves and well-established plantation owners.*
The party system in Florida was fully developed by the mid- 
1840's. It had emerged out of the maze of local economic issues and 
personal factions which were grouped around prominent men like Richard 
Keith Call and David Yulee. The Democrats became the major party as a 
result of the depression of the late 1830’s, and succeeded in electing 
Yulee as a territorial delegate to Congress in 1842. He held this
post for three years during which time Florida made applications for
2
statehood.
Parties in Florida developed along definite class and geo­
graphic lines. Whigs drew their main support from eleven counties 
centered in Middle Florida which had a total property value of $4,100,000
as compared with $1,400,000 for the Democratic counties in southeast 
3
Florida. Professor Doherty has noted: "It is also interesting that
the value of land in one Whig stronghold, Leon County, was $1,751,759, 
or slightly more than one-third of the value of land in all eleven Whig 
counties, and more than the value of all the ten Democratic counties
1 Herbert J. Doherty Jr., The Whigs of Florida 1845-1854 
(University of Florida Monographs: Social Sciences, No. 1, Gainesville,
Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959), 63-72; The Seventh Census
of the United States 1850 (Washington, 1853) 400-401, 407. Herein­
after cited as The Seventh Census.
2 Herbert Doherty, Richard Keith Call; Southern Unionist 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961), 1-135; Arthur W.
Thompson, "David Yulee; A Study of Nineteenth Century Thought and 
Enterprise," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1954), 11-51.
3 Doherty, The Whigs of Florida, 64.
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reporting."4 The Whig counties were also characterized by high con­
centrations of black slaves and their commerical ties with the outside 
world through ports like Jacksonville and Pensacola. The Democratic 
counties, in contrast, were largely white and isolated from the type 
of outside economic ties which existed in north Florida.^ Although 
there were exceptions to this general pattern, Professor Doherty's 
conclusion is probably correct: -"The Whigs were primarily the party
of the rich, earlier settled, plantation areas of Middle Florida, 
while the Democrats were primarily the party of the new, frontier, 
small farmer regions of East and South Florida."**
The patterns of political-economic development in Alabama were 
similar to those in Florida. There were six geographic regions in 
Alabama running from the Tennessee Valley in the North to the coastal 
areas along the Gulf. A Black Belt, which extended across the north 
central part of the state, contained cotton plantations which were 
established in the 1830's. The plantation system was extended into 
northeast Alabama's Coosa Valley during the 1840's as the production 
of cotton reached a half million bales.^
The rural population of Alabama enjoyed prosperity during
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 65-72.
6 Ibid., 72.
7 Charles S. Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama (Montgomery: 
Alabama State Department of Archives and History, 1939), 1-146, 169-91; 
James Bensom Sellers, Slavery in Alabama (University: University of
Alabama Press, 1950), 1-43.
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1850-52. Although the greatest profits in the growing of cotton were 
made in the 1820's and late 1850's, planters estimated that cotton 
could be profitably grown if prices averaged eight cents a pound. This 
price was exceeded by three cents in 1850, and although some planta­
tion areas may have suffered economically, the agricultural popula­
tion was generally affluent.®
Parties in Alabama had developed slowly and chaotically. There 
had been no really strong party organization until the election of 
1840 when both parties had campaigned vigorously and had attracted 
ninety percent of the voters to the polls. Whig and Democratic 
strength tended to concentrate in certain geographic areas.® The 
Democratic party had its "greatest strength in the eastern counties 
of the Tennessee Valley and in the mountainous and hilly counties of 
central Alabama. The greatest strength of the Whigs was in the Black 
Belt and in the western counties of the Tennessee Valley."*® Political 
contests between the two parties were fairly balanced during the 1840's 
since they had equal influence in counties on the northern edge of the 
Black Belt and in the eastern counties along the Gulf coast.**
8 Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama. 169-89; Sellers, 
Slavery in Alabama, 1-43. Davis noted that slavery may not have been 
profitable in Alabama--except during the 1820's and late 1850's.
9 Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System: 
Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1966), 287-94.
10 Lewy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama from 1850 Through 
1860 (Wetumpka: Wetumpka Printing Company, 1935), 13.
11 Ibid.
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When Florida applied for admission to the Union in the 1840's,
sectionalism was at a high point. Ante-bellum politicians had tried
to maintain political equality between the sections in the United
States Senate; this goal had been achieved by balancing the admission
of a free state with a slave state so that the South would not become
a political minority. Both Florida and Iowa applied for statehood at
the same time and were caught in the struggle for political supremacy
between the North and South. The "Florida Compromise," unofficially
reached in 1845, provided the solution by a joint admission of the
states. This experience familiarized Floridians with the growing
12dangers of sectional politics.
"Mr. Polk's" War, which Floridians generally supported
caused a Congressional struggle over Southern rights in the West.
Democrats were especially angered by the attempts to exclude the South
1 1from the territories,J their most militant spokesman, David Yulee, 
offered a resolution in 1848 which denied both Congress and the terri­
torial legislatures the right to pass laws "by which the equal rights 
of all citizens of the United States to acquire and enjoy part of the 
common property may be impaired or embarrassed."^ Yulee's strong 
demand was not shared by Whigs whose 1848 statement on the question of
12 Franklin A. Doty, "Florida, Iowa and the National Balance 
of Power, 1845," The Florida Historical Quarterly. XXXV (July, 1956), 
30-59.
13 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal 1846-48, passim.
14 Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 302.
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Southern rights in the territories was vague and ambiguous; ^  slavery
in the states and territories "was a purely local affair over which
the Constitution gave Congress no jurisdiction."1® This statement was
never explained and was probably a political device to maintain planter
support for the Whig party.1^
During 1848 Floridians were active in presidential and state
politics. Florida Whigs worked for their ticket headed by Zachary
Taylor for President and Thomas Brown for Governor. Taylor's Southern
origins pleased the electorate, and the Whigs defeated a divided
Democratic party in both the presidential and gubernatorial races.
Brown became Governor and the State Assembly picked James Morton, a
States Right Whig, to replace James Westcott as United States 
18Senator.
In 1849 the sectional debate was revived by politicians in 
Florida. Governor Brown warned that the Union was endangered by 
fanatics in both sections. The state legislature passed resolutions 
which stated that the bonds of the Union were being weakened by Northern 
attacks on slavery in the territories or in the District of Columbia; 
Southerners had a right to take slaves into the Mexican cession-- 
especially below the Missouri Compromise line. Legislators also
15 Edwin L. Williams, "Florida in the Union," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1951), 490-99.
16 Ibid., 492.
17 Ibid., 490-93; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, 1848, passim.
18 D o h e r t y ,  The. Whins of Florida. 25-32.
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stressed that attacks on black bondage in Washington threatened the
peculiar institution in the South
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, invol­
ving, as it does, an exercise of power not granted by the 
Constitution, and designed, as it is, as a means of 
affecting the institution of slavery in the States, against 
which it is aimed as a blow, should be resisted on the part 
of the South, by whatever means are best adapted to the 
protection of the Constitution, the defense of herself, and 
the preservation of the Union.20
The General Assembly thus announced its support for resistance as a
21means of maintaining Southern rights.
Controversy also erupted about Calhoun's Southern Address.
Yulee, as a radical Democrat, readily signed the document, but
Representative Edward Cabell and Senator James Westcott refused to
support it. A meeting was held in Gadsden.County on February 17,
1849 in support of Calhoun's position. There was praise for Yulee who
supposedly represented public opinion in Florida but criticism of
Cabell and Westcott
Resolved that we desire respectfully to inquire of the Hon.
James D. Westcott and the Hon. Edward C. Cabell, a statement of 
their objections to the said address, and why (holding to this 
constituency the relative positions which they do) they have 
thought proper to withhold from the said address the sanction 
of their names, and thereby, in our opinion, greatly weakened 
and measurably destroyed the beneficial effect which united
19 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, January 16, 1849; Tallahassee 
Floridian and Journal, January 20, 1849.
20 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, January 20, 1849.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., February 24, 1849.
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action on the part of Southern Representatives, was calculated 
to produce. 3
Members also stressed their loyalty to the Union while emphasizing 
that it had to be based on state equality.^
In Alabama the question of the status of slavery in the terri­
tories produced a strong defense of Southern rights. Both political
parties denounced the Wilmot Proviso in political speeches and in
2 Stheir party presses. An editorial in the Mobile Advertiser expressed
a popular viewpoint;
We never did believe that the abolitionists ever would be 
satisfied with anything short of total emancipation. We felt 
convinced all along that the slavery agitation at the North, 
once in the hands of politicians, had become a contest for 
power, and like all such contests, never will cease short of 
absolute submission, unless met with stern, determined resis­
tance.^
Representative Edmund Dargan defended Southern rights in the terri­
tories and declared that the North seemed determined to stop the expan­
sion of the peculiar institution. A just solution to the problem of 
territory acquired from Mexico would be to apply the Missouri Com­
promise to it in order to prevent disunion.^
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 William Warren Roger, "Alabama and the Compromise of 1850," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1951), 1-15.
26 Carlton Jackson, "The Alabama Delegation and the Compro­
mise of 1850," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Birmingham Southern College, 
1959), 9-10.
27 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 135-36.
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In 1847 the Chivalry, the militant, pro-slavery wing of the 
Democratic party in Alabama, began to plan for the presidential 
campaign of 1848. Its leaders, Senator Lewis Dixon and William 
Lowndes Yancey, prepared to struggle against the conservative branch 
of the party which was dominated by William R. King. Yancey and 
Dixon's goals were to aid the presidential aspirations of Levi Woodbury 
of New Hampshire, a "doughface," and to force the national Democracy 
to endorse a position satisfactory to radical Southerners--by adop­
tion of the Alabama platform. This document, co-authored by Yancey 
and John A. Campbell, included two major planks: 1) the Alabama
delegation to the Democratic national convention would not support a 
presidential nominee who did not oppose both the Wilmot Proviso and 
popular sovereignty, and 2) the Federal government must protect 
slavery in the territories. Yancey and Dixon had designed the plat­
form so that the entire delegation from Alabama would be committed to 
Woodbury who had indicated through private correspondence that he 
could support the positions set forth in the platform. It was also 
an attempt to eliminate Lewis Cass' political ambitions since he was 
closely associated with squatter sovereignty in the public mind.^®
During 1847 Whigs in Alabama also prepared for the presiden­
tial election. They took a stand in Congress in support of Southern
28 Levy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama. 1-42; Ralph B. 
Draughon, "William Lowndes Yancey: From Unionist to Secessionist
1814-1852," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North 
Carolina, 1968), 176-95.
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equality in the territories, and Henry Hilliard worked with other 
Southern Whigs to further General Taylor's candidacy. Party members 
hoped that Taylor's status as a Southern military hero would enable 
their party to carry the state.^
The election of 1848 was frustrating for all political groups 
in Alabama. Yancey's Alabama platform, which conservative Democrats 
opposed and which radicals like John Campbell abandoned, was rejected 
by the Baltimore convention. Yancey, angered by this defeat, walked 
out of the convention and returned to face a hostile public in Alabama. 
Conservative Democrats, supporting Lewis Cass incorrectly maintained 
that popular sovereignty meant that slavery could be excluded only 
when a territory drew up a state constitution and applied for admission 
to the Union. This interpretation tended to weaken Yancey's opposition, 
and also frustrated the Whig party in Alabama which pictured Taylor as 
a pro-slavery man. Cass, because of the massive apathy of the Alabama 
electorate, carried the state by less than one thousand votes. The 
margin of support for the Democratic candidate in traditional party 
strongholds was reduced, and Yancey succeeded in publicizing his idea 
that the Federal government had a positive duty to protect slavery in 
the Mexican cession. w
29 Carlton Jackson, "A History of the Whig Party in Alabama 
1828-1860," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia,
1962), 109-20; Evans C. Johnson, "A Political Life of Henry W. Hilliard," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1947), 40-50.
30 Draughon, "William Lowndes Yancey," 175-205; Jackson,"A 
History of the Whig Party in Alabama," 109-40.
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During 1849 there was renewed debate over the slavery question 
in Alabama. Two conservative Congressmen, Whig Henry Hilliard and 
George Houston of the Democracy, refused to sign Calhoun's Southern 
Address. Their actions were not popular with Alabama radicals;^1 
Hilliard M. Judge, an Alabama Calhounite, wrote that Houston justi­
fied his action "by stating that the slavery question is agitated 
alone for party purposes and party effect."32 South Alabamians were 
supporting the ideas expressed in the Address, and Judge expected 
public support to grow in the northern part of the State. A "favor­
able omen" of popular sentiment in north Alabama was Houston's deci­
sion not to run for another term in Congress. Judge also stressed 
that radicals had to educate the yeoman about the dangers to
OO
slavery: J "The great difficulty is to make the Masses see beyond 
their noses--they do not see and feel that the necessary consequence 
of allowing the outposts of slavery to be carried, involves a certain 
destruction of the Citadel itself."^ He felt that Alabama was being 
rapidly prepared for disunion and that she was almost as prepared for 
resistance as was South Carolina.33
31 Hilliard M. Judge to John C. Calhoun, April 29, 1849.
J. F. Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun. in Annual 
Report of the Anerican Historical Association for the Year 1899 
(Washington, 1900), II, 1195-97.
32 Ibid.. 1195.
33 Ibid., 1196.
34 Ibid.
35 I b i d . .  1195 -97 .
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Elections in mid-1849 were held for both state and national 
political offices. Democrats, after a brief intraparty struggle 
between the Yancey and conservative forces, agreed to support Henry 
W. Collier of north Alabama as their gubernatorial nominee and to work 
for the election of William R. King, the Union Democrat, to the 
United States Senate. Since Collier ran unopposed, the main focus of 
the elections was on the Congressional and legislative races.^
The most exciting Congressional contest took place in the 
Montgomery district where Hilliard was opposed by a States Rights 
Whig, James L. Pugh. Yancey, joining an anti-Hilliard coalition, 
campaigned vigorously against the Whig congressman. Hilliard, while 
posing as a defender of the rights of the South, was critical of 
radicals
They (the Democrats of the Calhoun school) compass sea and 
land to make proselytes to their cause which has neither 
sincerity to apologize for its extravagances nor principle 
to dignify its excesses. They hope to overthrow the friends of 
General Taylor in this District, to carry the House of Represen­
tatives against him, to rob us of the fruits of our late 
glorious victory . . .3®
The Democratic state convention condemned anyone refusing to sign the
36 Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama, 32-36.
37 Austin L. Venable, "Alabamas War of the Roses," The 
Alabama Review. VIII (October, 1955), 243-59. Hereinafter cited as 
the AR.
38 John W. Dubose, The Life and Time of William Lowndes Yancey; 
A History of Political Parties in the United States, from 1834 to 1864; 
Especially as to the Origins of the Confederate States (Birmingham: 
Roberts & Son, 1892), 235-36. Hereinafter cited as The Life and Time
of William Lowndes Yancey.
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Southern Address; George Houston emphasized: "It was first and mainly
Intended to kill off Hilliard, . . Southern rights newspapers
also entered the partisan campaign with strong editorials condemning 
Hilliard: "Let the Southern Whigs and Southern Democrats vote for Mr.
Pugh, and the Northern abolitionists comply with the mandates given 
them by the abolition organ the New York Tribune . . . and vote for 
Mr. Hilliard, who will not represent the South, upon this question, 
but the N o r t h . D e s p i t e  these attacks, Hilliard carried the dis­
trict by six hundred votes, "taking the Black Belt counties in the 
upper part of the district by large majorities. Black Belt planters 
were the bone and sinew of the Whig party in Alabama and these were 
the men who supported Hilliard."^l
In the remaining election contests, the Democracy was more 
successful. Henry Collier, running unopposed, was victorious in the 
gubernatorial race, and the Democracy carried five of the remaining 
Congressional districts. Alabama Democrats also won a majority in 
the lower house of the state legislature while the Senate came under 
Whig domination. Although several radicals were elected to the House,
39 George S. Houston to Howell Cobb, June 26, 1849, Ulrich 
Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs. Alexander 
H. Stephens. and Howell Cobb in Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association for the year 1911 (Washington, 1913), II, 166. Herein­
after cited as Correspondence.
40 Johnson, "A Political Life of Henry W. Hilliard," 60.
41 Ibid., 61; Venable, "Alabama's War of the Roses," AR,
VIII (October, 1955), 259; "The Var of the Roses' in Alabama is 
significant because it was one of the first efforts of the southern 
people to follow Calhoun's advice to unite irrespective of party, 
against the advancing tide of the northern radicals."
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the legislature chose a conservative Democrat, William R. King, to 
replace the militant Dixon H. Lewis.^
By late 1849 the men in Florida and Alabama who would provide 
leadership during 1850 had emerged. Radicals in both states usually 
belonged to the Democratic party and were capable exponents of the 
Southern rights. However, the conservative forces were led by ex­
perienced politicians who were ready to join together in order to 
protect the Union. The background of both types of men is important 
in understanding the course of events in 1850-1851.
The key figure in the states rights movement in Florida was 
David Yulee, a Fire-eater. Yulee, a leader of the Democratic party, 
had played a significant role in its growth during the 1830's. After 
his election to the United States Senate in 1845, he had gradually 
moved toward an extreme Southern rights position.^ ne had originally 
argued for cooperation with the North in a letter to Franklin H.
Elmore of South Carolina: ". . . b y  resting our organization upon the
base of the slaveholding interests, we impress a character upon the 
struggle which must drive from us all northern cooperation, . .
42 Thomas P. Abernethy, "Henry Watkins Collier" in Allen 
Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11 
vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), II, Pt. 2, 
302-303. Hereinafter cited as DAB; Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama. 
32-42.
43 Thompson, "David Yulee," 11-51. It should be emphasized 
that Yulee had a Jewish background and was still able to achieve an
important office in the South.
44 I b i d . ,  275 .
This statement indicated that Yulee obviously wanted political ties 
with Northern Democrats based on a common state's rights philosophy—  
rather than creation of a new Southern alliance. This political 
attitude had completely changed by 1849 when he allied himself with 
the most militant Southern Democrats. After signing the Southern 
Address in the spring of 1849, he wrote John Calhoun about the in­
creasing cooperation between Northern free-soilers and Democrats. 
Slavery, endangered in the territories and District of Columbia, 
needed the protection of constitutional guarantees "against the aggres­
sions of the more powerful northern section of the s t a t e s . I f  
necessary amendments were not adopted, the Union would have to be 
dissolved
Conservatives in Florida were led by Whig Governor Thomas 
Brown and Congressman Edward Cabell. Brown, elected in 1849, had been 
a sugar planter, hotel proprietor and "in territorial Florida politics 
he had been associated with the pro-bank conservative p a r t y . "49 
Cabell, a popular young Congressman, was often criticized for his 
moderation. After his election in 1846, the St. Augustine News was
45 Ibid., 275-79.
46 Ibid.. 46-47, 289-93.
47 Ibid.. 292.
48 Ibid.. 289-92. The latter part of Thompson's dissertation 
is primary sources taken from the David Yulee papers at the University 
of Florida.
49 Herbert J. Doherty Jr., "Florida and the Crisis of 1850," 
The Journal of Southern History. XIX (February, 1953), 32-33.
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critical of his ties with the Northern wing of the Whig p a r t y " T h e  
abolition Whigs now claim him as their own, and struggle as he will, 
he is bound to them head and foot by the ties of p a r t y ."51 Cabell, for 
his part, emphasized the broad umbrella of his party which "embraced in 
its comprehensive view the whole country. It is not influenced by a 
narrow contracted sectional p o l i c y . A l t h o u g h  he was more militant 
than Brown, Cabell refused to adopt Calhoun's philosophy as expressed
in the Southern Address.1 1 ' 111 ' - ■ 1
Alabama's most prominent radical was W. L. Yancey of Montgomery. 
Yancey, a South Carolinian by birth, had been "reared in Troy, New 
York, and educated in New England . . ."54 jje returned to South 
Carolina as a Unionist in the 1830's but turned increasingly toward a 
pro-slavery position.^5 one writer has contended that he shifted in 
order to meet his psychological needs;-*** "His need to reject an
anti-slavery stepfather he had come to hate was paralleled by a deeper 
commitment to slave society."57 He moved to Alabama in the 1840's where
50 Doherty, The Whigs of Florida. 23-35. The entire state of 
Florida was considered as one Congressional district; candidates ran- 
at-large.
51 Ibid., 23.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 35.
54 William L. Barney, The Road to Secession; A New Perspective 
on the Solid South (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972), 86.
55 Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old South (Baton Rouge; 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 270.
56 Barney, The Road to Secession. 86-87.
57 I b i d . , 87 .
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he had a brief career as a state legislator and Congressman. Essen­
tially a non-officeholder, he enjoyed the role of agitator and orator 
as he tried to move his "white" South toward secession.-*®
Union forces, in contrast, were led by outstanding, practical 
politicians in Alabama. Their most important leaders were Henry W. 
Hilliard in the House of Representatives and Senators Jeremiah Clemens 
and William R. King. Each of these men became identified with 
moderate politics and were important in the Union victory in Alabama.
Hilliard, a moderate Whig, had a background as a Methodist 
preacher before being elected to the House of Representatives in the 
1840's. He combined strong denunciations of "Mr. Polk's War" with an 
ardent desire for American expansion. All new territory acquired by 
the United States had to be open to people of both s e c t i o n s . H e  
favored the idea of extending the Missouri Compromise line, and had 
opposed the Clayton Compromise in 1848 because he believed that 
"slavery was . . .  a political rather than a judicial question . . ."60 
But he had refused to sign the Southern Address, and instead was one of 
few Southerners who openly endorsed Berrien's alternate proposals.®^ 
Alabama's two United States Senators although coming from
58 Eaton, The Mind of the Old South. 267-87.
59 Johnson, "A Political Biography of Henry W. Hilliard,"
43-49.
60 Ibid.. 49. The clayton Bill would have allowed the question 
of slavery in the territories to be settled by the Supreme Court.
61 Ibid., 52-53.
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different backgrounds, were powerful forces for moderation in 1850. 
Clemens had been an attorney and a soldier in the Mexican War. Al­
though lacking political experience, he had been elevated to the Senate 
in 1848 over popular ex-Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick. King, born in 
1786, had a long political and diplomatic career. He was first 
elected to Congress in 1810 and later to the United States Senate where 
he served several terms. In 1844 King left the Senate to become envoy 
to France but was reelected to the Senate in 1849. Although he was a 
nationally oriented Democrat, he wanted to protect the South and feared 
for her future in 1849-1850.^
The most cautious leader in Alabama was Henry W. Collier from 
north Alabama. He was a Virginian who moved to Alabama in 1818 and 
entered a law practice in Huntsville. By the 1830's he was a well 
known Democrat and served as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 
until 1849 when he was elected governor by a large majority.^ Collier 
held the office of governor with "the placid dignity which had charac­
terized him as a judge," and would not adopt an extreme position in 
1850.64
Discussion of the sectional crisis began in earnest during the
62 Virgil Lee Bledsoe, "The Life of Jeremiah Clemens," (unpub­
lished M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1931), 1-30; Jackson, "The 
Alabama Delegation and the Compromise of 1850," 15-16.
63 Thomas P. Abernethy, "Henry Watkins Collier," DAB. II, Pt. 2,
3 02-303 .
64 I b i d . ,  303 .
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winter of 1849-1850. After the Alabama legislature convened on November 
12, 1849, retiring Governor Reuben Chapman delivered a lengthy presenta­
tion about the rights of the South in the territories. Alabama had 
entered the Union as an equal, and her citizens had an equal right to 
take slave property into the Southwest. Although the Wilmot Proviso 
was unconstitutional, it was not the real source of danger to the 
South. Southerners were being excluded from California by the "miser­
able chicanery" of the Federal government which kept Mexican anti­
slavery law in force in California and directed the Bear Flag republic 
to form a state constitution without Congressional approval; therefore, 
California should not be admitted to the U n i o n . I n  concluding 
Chapman stated:
I recommend that provision be made by the Legislature at once 
for the calling of a convention of the people of the State 
immediately upon the passage of the Wilmot Proviso in Congress, 
or any similar measure having a tendency to exclude slavery 
from the territories, or abolish it in the District of Columbia, 
or interfere with the removal of slaves from one state to 
another
He also wanted Alabama to consult with other Southern states in case 
Congress enacted additional dangerous legislation.^^
Coincidentally with Collier taking office in December 1849, the 
legislature received a communication from six members of the House of 
Representatives and Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick about the
65 Alabama House Journal (1849-1850), 39-44.
66 Ibid., 43.
67 Ibid.
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difficulties involved in choosing a Speaker.**® They blamed the obstruc­
tion tactics on a minority of Free-Soilers who wanted to obtain pledges 
from a new Speaker
to appoint committees to aid them in the purpose of directing 
the legislation of Congress against the interest and honor of 
the slaveholding states in such manner as to abolish slavery 
in the District of Columbia and to deprive the slaveholding 
states of the cononon enjoyment of the territory acquired in the 
recent war with Mexico.
A resolution was passed by the Alabama Senate which called for her 
Congressman not to allow Congress to organize if such pledges were 
obtained from a specific Speaker.^ The senators outlined the 
action it should take if Congress excluded slavery from the terri­
tories: "we call upon the people of the slaveholding states to meet
in convention for the purpose of taking such action as our rights may 
d e m a n d . A l t h o u g h  other resolutions were considered in the House, 
no joint resolutions were passed because the House wanted a state 
rather than Southern Convention.^
The suggestion that Alabama be represented at the Nashville Con­
vention caused controversy within the state. Whigs generally opposed 
the idea of the Convention, their views being voiced forcefully by
68 Alabama Senate Journal (1849-50), 209, 214-17.
69 Ibid., 45.
70 Ibid., 216.
71 Ibid.
72 Alabama House Journal (1849-50), passim; Clarence P. Denman, 
The Secession Movement in Alabama (Montgomery: State Department of 
Archives and History, 1933), 23-24.
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Henry Hilliard in the spring of 1850: "As to the Nashville Con­
vention, my opinion, as things now stand, is against it. I adhere to 
the position taken by me last summer— that no convention ought to be
held in advance of some act of aggression on the part of the govern- 
73
ment." Hilliard's idea was not acceptable to the majority of the 
Alabama Assemble which met in early February for the purpose of ap­
pointing delegates to the Southern Convention. Eight men were to be 
appointed from the state at large and four convention members were to 
be selected from each Congressional district. The delegates from the 
Congressional districts were to be balanced equally between the two 
major political parties. Men who were selected included such out­
standing leaders as former Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick and radical 
John A. Campbell of Mobile.^
Debate continued throughout the spring on the merits of the 
Southern meeting. Colonel T. B. Bethea, a Nashville delegate, did not 
feel that he could participate in the gathering if it was going to be 
more than an advisory body. It if became necessary for the South to 
act seriously, her delegates should have been appointed by a state con­
vention. Bethea's concern was not shared by radicals in north Alabama 
who declared that the Federal government had no power under the Consti­
tution to abolish slavery; these men wanted the delegates at Nashville
73 Dallas T. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention of 1850," 
Thomas A. Owen (ed.), in Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society 
(Montgomery, 1906), V, 213.
74 Mobile Alabama Planter. February 18, 1850.
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to embody Southern sentiment, draw up a protest, create a Southern 
party, and present a solution to the sectional crisis. They declared 
their devotion to the Union was second only to the reason for calling 
the Convention— to protect Southern " r i g h t s ."75 On May 13 a public 
gathering was held in Montgomery to discuss the Nashville Convention. 
Judge Williams and John A. Elmore were appointed co-chairman of the 
meeting which appointed Yancey as head of a committee to draw up reso­
lutions embodying the feelings of the gathering. Yancey's committee 
favored the Nashville Convention because of the anti-slavery feeling 
which had the effect "of keeping slaveholders from emigrating to the 
territory of California, and has thus enabled the non-slaveholding 
interest exclusively to predominate in the set[t]lenient of that 
territory, . .. ."76 All men who were agitating for the end of slavery 
in the District of Columbia or for passage of the Wilmot Proviso were 
declared enemies of the United States. However, the statement con­
tained no reference to secession, an indication that radicals realized 
they would have difficulty in moving to an extreme position.77
A definite division of opinion on the Nashville Convention had 
also occurred in Florida during early 1850. The Congressional delega­
tion believed that an aggressive North would use the powers of the 
Constitution to harm the South. Since there was no way to stop this
75 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette. March 2, April 
13, 1850.
76 Montgomery Alabama Journa1, May 15, 1850.
77 Ibid.
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movement on the national level, the South had to oppose Federal aggres­
sion by meeting in Nashville. Representative Cabell also wrote the
Governor that he was no longer opposed to Florida's participation in
78
the Southern meeting: "It is to be an advisory body . . . not to
threaten but to warn the people of the North of the consequences of the
measures by many and most of their Representatives."^ Governor Brown
was not persuaded by these arguments, and refused to name delegates to
the Convention. He feared that it might emerge as a revolutionary body
or be an ineffective means of presenting the Southern viewpoint.®®
Senator Jackson Morton sent the Governor a caustic letter which
expressed the opinion of Florida radicals. The North would continue to
use the power of the Federal government for its own purposes until it
was positive that the South would use any means to resist further 
81aggressions.0i The Southern Congress must meet to provide ways "to
preserve the Union if it can be preserved, and to preserve the South--if 
82it cannot be." Morton savagely criticized Brown for not acting to 
stop the dangers to the South and for declaring that the Nashville Con­
vention might become a revolutionary body which would promote agitation 
on the sectional question.®® In a devasting passage the Senator asked:
78 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. February 28, 1850.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, March 30, 1850.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
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Can you tell me what manner of oppression would make you an 
’’agitator?" Would the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, the 
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, in the forts, 
dockyards, and arsenals, and the prohibition of the transporta­
tion of slaves from one slave state to another? Would either 
of them or all, make you an "agitator?" If not would the 
abolition of slavery in the States by Congress make you an 
"agitator?" Would any or all of these wicked measures make 
you, as a Southern man, calculate the value of the U n i o n ? 8 4
The people of Florida wanted to be represented at Nashville, and Morton 
declared that he would fight for Southern "rights" in the halls of 
Congress.®^
Unofficial meetings were held throughout the state to select 
delegates to the Nashville Convention. One of these gatherings in 
Gadsden County gave an elaborate justification for the necessity of 
finding a remedy to the forces which were gradually destroying the 
bonds of Union. Southern rights had to be protected under the Consti­
tution. They could only be secured by united public opinion which 
would be fostered at the Nashville Convention. District meetings 
should be organized in the major sections of Florida to choose dele­
gates to the Southern Convention in order to protect the South against 
emancipation:®®
That in the openly avowed purposes of a large majority of the 
Representatives of the non-slaveholding States, to pass 
through Congress bills containing the principle of the 
"Wilmot Proviso," we recognize an increasing spirit of 
fanaticism, which in total disregard of our Constitutional
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. March 2, 1850.
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rights, aims at the abolition of slavery in the States. 
ultimately; as it now avowedly does in the Territories.®^
Similar meetings were held in other parts of Florida which resulted in 
larger sectional meetings which appointed delegates to go to Nashville.®® 
The apparent militance of the Florida electorate was reflected 
in David Yulee's rejection of Clay's proposal to admit California as a 
state. Yulee countered with a bill which would have established the 
southern boundary of California at the 36° 30' line.®^ Inhabitants 
north of the old Missouri Compromise line could apply for statehood 
while the area south of the line would be organized as a territory "with 
a provision for the equal protection of all property recognized by the 
Constitution of the United States."^® The bill was designed to rectify 
the injustice to Southerners who had not settled in California because 
of lack of time and the debate over the Wilmot Proviso. Yulee also 
hoped that passage of his bill would prevent recognition of "illegal" 
action by the Executive branch which had given impetus to California's
Q1
application for statehood. i
Yulee was also worried about the maintenance of political 
equality between the North and South. There had always been a balance
87 Ibid.
88 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, March 5,19,26,April 2, 1850; 
Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. March 23, 1850, April 6, 1850.
89 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 1158.
90 Ibid., 1159.
91 I b i d . ,  1158 -59 .
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of power between the sections in the Senate but this would be destroyed 
if California was admitted to the Union as a free state. Yulee proposed 
that sectional equality be maintained by allowing the South to dominate 
one of the House of Congress— preferably the S e n a t e . C o n t r o l  of the 
Senate would protect the South against the " . . .  unchecked power of 
the Government" which was dominated by a hostile Northern majority.^3
The maintenance of a sectional balance of power was also neces­
sary to protect the South's dominance over the black man. She
had a growing slave population which made expansion into the West 
94mandatory:
Their South population is composed of two races of utterly 
opposite and irreconcilable aptitudes and nature-’-races 
incapable of fusion in social mass, or partners in social or 
civil community. . . . If, then, they are confined to fixed 
limits, and without vacant territory to colonize, whenever 
the population of the slaveholding section becomes too great 
for subsistence or comfort, one of the two results must 
follow; either the black race must be sent out free as emi­
grants, at the cost of their value and an entire subversion 
of the structure or habits of our society, or the whites must, 
by an equally sure and progressive process, emigrate, leaving 
in the end the graves of their sires to be trodden under the 
heal of the African.95
The latter result could be avoided only by freeing the blacks and
colonizing them, a process which Yulee considered financially ruinous
and impractical, or by allowing the South to expand so that the
92 Ibid., 1159-62.
93 Ibid., 1162.
94 Ibid.. 1162-67.
95 Ibid*. n 67.
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future growth of population would be manageable.^
Yulee's apprehension about the North was apparently shared by
moderate Edward Cabell during the spring of 1850. He expressed his
concern about thw growth of abolitionism in the North: "I believe that
the sentiment or hostility to slavery, is common to all parties, and
that there is a determination to invoke all the powers of the Federal
Government to break down that institution, and thus to destroy more
than fifteen hundred millions of the property of the South. The
South demanded an equal right to take slaves into the territory, and
Cabell noted that, although Northerners demanded freedom for the black
man they were determined that he remain south of the Mason-Dixon 
98line. Abolition would require expensive compensation of slaveowners, 
and if blacks were confined to the South "we should have no alternative 
but to abandon our homes or exterminate the s l a v e s . C a b e l l  warned 
that disunion might be the inevitable result of the sectional conflict 
and that the South could maintain herself in a conflict with the 
North. But he wanted a just compromise worked out and declared emo­
tionally:100 "May THIS UNION be perpetual." 101 Thus this moderate
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 239.
98 Ibid.. 239-41.
99 Ibid., 241.
100 Ibid., 241-42.
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displayed the tension which existed in the conservative Southern mind 
between love for the Union and concern about the economic and racial 
future of white society.
Several members of the Alabama delegation agreed with the Con­
gressmen from Florida that the North was hostile and aggressive. David 
Hubbard, a Democratic representative from the Florence district, wrote 
his constituents that the North was determined to abolish slavery.
The peculiar institution could not stand if exposed to anti-slavery
102attacks for a prolonged period of time: "I give it to you my firm
conviction, that the institutions of the South cannot long stand under
this state of things; and that the Southern people ought not to let
them continue exposed to this constant and dangerous agitation.
Samuel Inge stated in the House of Representatives that the "California
Proviso" had replaced Hilmot's method of excluding the South from the 
104West: "No argument is necessary to show the identity of these two
measures. The Wilmot Proviso excludes the citizens of the South, with 
their property, from emigrating to the Territories of the Union . . . 
The California proviso is the same thing, . . ."105 slavery was pro­
tected by the Constitution and it had helped made the United States a 
wealthy nation. The "California Proviso" would be resisted by the
102 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette. February 6, 1850.
103 Ibid.
104 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 102-105.
105 Ibid., 102.
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South, and Inge warned that, despite the South's love for the Union, 
sectionalism might destroy it. The South would stand firm against 
statehood for California which would destroy the balance of power be­
tween the North and South:
Will the representatives of the North attempt, by the power of 
numbers, to outrage the Constitution and degrade the South by 
the admission of this Territory as a state, without the offer 
of some equivalent? . . .  The attempted consummation of such 
an act would be the overthrow of the Constitution which the 
people we represent would resist to the last e x t r e m i t y . 107
In the Senate a formidable critic of the Compromise proposals 
was Jeremiah Clemens. He attacked the continual agitation on the slave 
question which had discouraged Southerners from migrating to California 
with their black p r o p e r t y . *08 jn May he announced his intention to 
oppose the Report of the Committee of Thirteen, and was especially 
critical of the proposal to grant statehood to California. She had no 
more right to be admitted to the Union than did the territories of 
Utah and New Mexico.
Two Alabama Congressmen, one moderate and one a radical, offered 
detailed defenses of the institution of slavery. Representative 
William J. Alston delivered a lengthy justification of slavery based
106 Ibid.. 102-105.
107 Ibid., 105.
108 Bledsoe, "The Life of Jeremiah Clemens," 33-37; Carlton 
Jackson, "The Alabama Delegation and the Compromise of 1850," 66.
109 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 950-51.
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on Biblical grounds. He also argued that slaves were treated well and
that slavery was not an evil:**-®
You tell us that slavery is a great evil. Why so, Sir? Was 
it an evil to the slave to be brought from the barbarous 
cruelty of infantacide and cannibalism in his native wilds, 
to the mild treatment and personal security of a Christian 
land?— from heathern worship to Christianity? Is he injured 
by being better feed, better clothed, and less worked than 
the labor classes of other l a nds?m
Alston also emphasized that the peculiar institution benefitted the
North by providing it with inexpensive agricultural products and a
market for many of its goods.
David Hubbard, a radical Southerner, joined Alston in uphold­
ing. chattel slavery. While admitting that African slavery had been 
considered an evil by prominent Southerners when it was first estab­
lished, Hubbard maintained that it had proven itself beneficial to the 
nation:
The negro has improved tenfold since then. He is now a kind, 
useful domestic servant, and is the only labor that can bear 
the southern climate, and be employed to advantage in the 
cultivation of those valuable products of the South which have 
enriched the whole Union, built up your manufactures, extended 
your commerce, and given the country an amount of prosperity 
and power unequalled in the growth of nations.*^
While slavery had improved the African, it had also protected the white
110 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 464-67.
H I  Ibid.. 466.
112 Ibid., 467.
113 Ibid.. 947.
114 Ibid.
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man o£ the South who would never be degraded to the level of the Negro.
All Southerners would defend this institution if it was attacked by the
» 115North:
All enjoy political equality who are white and upright citizens 
and no act that you could pass would be permitted to change 
these relations, by putting black and white upon an equal 
footing. The very threat and attempt to do so have nearly torn 
asunder every ligament which binds us together . . .
These bold manifestos in defense of slavery indicate the con­
sensus which existed in Alabama on slavery. Both Alston and Hubbard, 
who would adopt opposite positions on the Compromise, defended the 
peculiar institution as beneficial to the South, the Negro and the 
nation. But Alston's speech was the most detailed defense of slavery 
by a Unionist recorded in the Congressional Globe. It indicates that 
both Unionists and fire-eaters like Hubbard were concerned about a 
post-emancipation society and the need to maintain chattel slavery in 
the South. The key difference in their thinking would be the degree 
of danger they saw to white supremacy by the end of 1850, and the depth 
of their love for the Union.
115 Ibid.. 948.
116 Ibid.
117 It must also be noted that Alston represented the Mobile 
district which was one of the centers of radicalism in Alabama and a 
city in which radical leaders utilized the racial appeal. The editor 
of the Huntsville Southern Advocate praised Alston's speech: "There is
an ability and research displayed in it--a pungency and a directness 
which enlist and sustain the attention. He discusses the morality of 
slavery, the relative condition of the North and South, the political 
bearings of the question; and his explosure of the hypocritical conduct 
of the abolitionists is thorough and complete--wholesome truths are 
enforced in regard to the effects flowing from emancipation in the West
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Although the two delegations had expressed hostility to the 
Omnibus bill, expressions of moderation were voiced by the summer of 
1850. Representative Edward Cabell of Florida wrote his constituents: 
"I can only say here that I want a SETTLEMENT. I want peace, quiet and 
repose for my country. I want to get rid of the agitation on the 
slavery question, which too many are fomenting for selfish purposes.
To effect this object, I am willing to sacrifice every thing [sic] but 
the honor of the S o u t h . ^  similar sentiment was expressed by 
Alabama's W. R. W. Cobb before the House of Representatives on June 3, 
1850:
One word as to the bills reported by the Senate committee of 
thirteen. There are several features in those bills to which, 
apart from a compromise and a desire to get rid of the slavery 
question . . . .  I never, no, never would agree: But as it
holds out a light of hope . . .  I for one will not stand in the 
way of its passage.
Whig Henry Hilliard, while speaking strongly for Southern rights,
stated:
Mr. Speaker, I have never permitted myself to look to a 
destruction of the Government, as a remedy for existing evils.
Indies, which, if they can find entrance into Northern minds, will 
cause reaction in our favor," Montgomery Alabama Journal. May 17,
1850, quoting Huntsville Southern Advocate. The paper believed that 
Whigs like Alston were truly defending the South while Democrats like 
Inge were using the agitation over the slavery question for party 
purposes. Abolition was a danger which all white Southerners feared, 
but it was the degree which they perceived it as present in the spring 
of 1850 which may help explain Alston's speech which broke a pattern 
for Unionists in the entire Deep South.
118 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. September 17, 1850.
119 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 647.
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I have not sought to explore the dark and perilous future 
which lies beyond the hour of separation between these States, 
bound together by so many ties. I have a sincere desire to 
preserve the UNION. Its disruption would involve the North 
and South in common r u i n . 1 2 0
Although these statements were hardly commitments to nationalism they
did show a desire to work out a Compromise and preserve the Union.
In the Senate, William R. King spoke in favor of Compromise
during late July 1850. He could support the idea of ending the slave
depots in Washington and Clay's proposals for a more stringent Fugitive
Slave Law. The Texas boundary proposal was more complicated, but King
believed that Congress could equitably solve that problem. Territorial
governments for the Utah and New Mexico territories were based on the
"principle of non-intervention" supported by the South. He believed
that slave property was protected in the southwest under the proposed 
121
laws: "Are we not protected in our property if we choose to go
there? I hold that we are, and that the Territorial Legislature had 
no power whatever to pass any law which destroys that description of 
property in the Territory."122 However, King was opposed to California's 
admission to the Union because her boundaries were too large. He pro­
posed an amendment to reduce her boundaries and thus eliminate one 
major objection to her admission.12*1
120 Ibid.. 1193.
121 Ibid., 1395-96.
122 Ibid.. 1396.
123 Ibid.
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Voting on the Omnibus bill reflected only partially divisions 
which had appeared in speeches by the end of August 1850. No member 
from Alabama or Florida favored statehood for California or the aboli­
tion of the slave trade in the District of Columbia; all favored 
passage of the Fugitive Slave bill. Senators King and Clemens and 
Representatives Cobb, Hilliard, Alston, and Cabell supported the Texas- 
debt boundary settlement which both Florida Senators and the rest of 
the House delegation from Alabama opposed. Three Alabama Representa­
tives opposed territorial government for Utah which had secured even 
David Yulee's support. King voted in favor of territorial government 
in New Mexico, which the four moderates in the House had approved with 
their votes on the Texas boundary bill. Neither delegation was in 
favor of the Compromise en toto, but they accepted the Fugitive Slave 
bill, and a majority supported territorial governments from the south­
west. Conservatives were also willing to accept the Texas boundary 
settlement which radicals rejected.
During the summer and fall of 1850 the radicals in Florida ex­
pressed their desire for resistance to the Compromise. John Beard was 
nominated as the Democratic candidate for Congress on June 17 at
1 <y c
Suwannee Springs in Columbia c o u n t y . H e  opposed the Compromise 
proposals unless they "shall be so amended as to recognize the right 
of Southern people to occupy, with their property, any portion of the
124 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Com­
promise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966) 191-200.
125 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, June 22, 1850.
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territory acquired from Mexico lying South of the Missouri line. . ."126 
These sentiments were similar to those expressed at a meeting 
in Gadsden County which approved the proceedings of the Nashville Con­
vention. Men attending the meeting stated that acquiescence to 
Northern attacks by the South was impossible:127
Resolved, that in times like the present, when our rights, 
lives, and property have become the sport of insatiable, un­
scrupulous, and reckless party, who scorn to regard the obli­
gations of a written Constitution, which they have sworn to 
support, and boldly announced that we are forever excluded 
from our rightful possessions, and that our utter and final 
ruin is only a question of -time, it becomes us solemnly to 
speak out and avow our deliberate purpose no longer to submit
to such aggression.128
At a public meeting in Madison County which also endorsed the 
Nashville resolutions, it was resolved that any Congressional compro­
mise not based on the Missouri Compromise line "is oppressive and 
degrading to the slaveholding states as equals with the North in the 
Confederacy, and as binding one portion of the Confederacy to a date 
[state] of abject dependence upon the other."129
A detailed account of Beard's ideas was presented in his 
address "To the Freemen of Florida." The concepts expressed in the 
preamble to the United States Constitution were not being met by the 
exclusion of the South for the territories or by helping escaped slaves,
126 Ibid.. July 13, 1850
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., August 10, 1850.
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the document began. The Southern states themselves would never have
entered the Union If they had been able to forecast passage of the
various compromises and provisos. Even though Southerners were willing
to settle for an extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the
Pacific, the free-soil men were not willing to accept it even though
the South would only be able to take slaves into twenty-five percent
i inof the Mexican cession;
But 'no' say the free-soilers, 'we can never consent to give you 
another chance to have a slave state.1 We don't care about the 
"Wilmot Proviso" any longer, because the laws of Mexico are a 
sufficient proviso against slavery; these laws are still in 
force in California, and New Mexico and we will not repeal them; 
but if we choose to enter into such an arrangement we will do
this; we will take California and New Mexico; we will buy
enough of Texas to make two more free-soil states, (if you, of
the South will help us to pay for it,) and we will pass a law
requiring runaway negroes into the free states to be given up, 
if their masters will convince a jury of abolitionists that 
slavery is consistent with the laws of God, and that negroes 
are slaves, and that the claimants are the real owners.131
This was a "compromise" which Beard could not accept, and he stressed 
that it was a common problem for the entire South. He loved the Union 
for the benefits it gave to the county, but the attacks against the 
South had to be stopped or the Union would be destroyed.
The Whig party nominated Edward Cabell, a safe Union-loving
I O O
man, to oppose the radical Beard. Although Cabell had opposed parts
130 Ibid., August 31, 1850.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid-
133 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, August 13, 1850.
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of the Compromise, he emphasized that he was not "going to war because
134
of their passage." In contrast, this conservative Whig depicted 
Beard as a secessionist who favored disunion because of passage of the 
Compromise. Although the Democrats denied the charges, Cabell won by 
over four hundred votes out of eight thousand which were cast. *-35 
In November 1850 there was a call for the formation of a 
statewide Southern Rights Association in Florida. A meeting of the 
Southern Rights Association of Jefferson issued an "Address to the 
People" of Florida which reminded the states' white citizens that the 
North had been trying to abolish slavery for thirty years. Thousands 
of fugitive slaves had been "inveigled or stolen" from the South, and 
the hostile Northern public encouraged slaves to revolt or even murder 
to escape bondage. It was useless to protest against the North's goal
of emancipation:336
In vain do we remonstrate that these institutions are a part 
of our social organization— that we have the moral and 
political right to choose between slave labor and free labor, 
to prefer the one or the other— that the emancipation of the 
African race in our midst, would be attended with such an 
increase of pauperism and crime as to doom that people, now 
amply provided for, to inevitable extirpation . . .*-’7
134 Letter to Doctor G. P. Fisher by E. C. Cabell. (1850) 
(Xerox copy of pamphlet in Library of Congress in author's possession), 
2.
135 Ibid.; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. November 19, 1850; 
Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. Sept. 21, Oct. 5, 1850.
136 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. Nov. 23, 1850.
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The South, moreover, was endangered by men who had long tried to foment
slave rebellions and who believed that the South would accept any
oppressive Federal law. Therefore the Jefferson Association called for
the creation of a state Southern Rights Association.
The state legislature was also involved in sectional politics
in late November. Governor Brown tried to justify his action in regard
to the Nashville Convention, and stated that the Compromise of 1850 was
already threatened by Northern hostility. Repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Law would be positive evidence that the North no longer intended to be
bound by the Constitution. Therefore Brown stated:
I invite you, if you think proper, to authorize the Executive, 
by law or resolution in the event of the repeal of the 
Fugitive Slave Bill, or the consummation of any other aggres­
sive measure, at his discretion to proclaim and convoke a 
convention of the People of this State, at such time as may 
comport with harmonious action with our sister states of the 
South, for the purpose of devising a remedy.140
The call for a Southern Congress, issued by the Nashville Convention, 
was also presented to the legislature. Although a number of proposi­
tions on the question of slavery were introduced in the lower chamber,
there apparently was little interest in the topic in the Senate despite
141a narrow Democratic control of each house of the legislature.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.. Nov. 30, 1850.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., Nov. 30, 1850; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. Jan. 
7, 28, 1851. The Sentinel1s editor noted with apparent exasperation 
that the Democrats had not acted to make the Nashville convention 
"legitimate" by any positive step despite their earlier criticism of
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The most important question was the selection of a United 
States Senator. Most observers had believed that David Yulee would 
easily regain his seat, but he was opposed by a number of important 
factions. The moderate forces in Florida were alienated by his radi­
calism, and the important railroad interests were repeled by his plan 
to control a cross-Florida railroad. These forces combined with 
shippers and citizens of south Florida to defeat Yulee's bid for re- 
election. Ironically, this coalition of commercial interests and con­
servative politicians elected Stephen R. Mallory of Key West, an opponent
I/O
of the Compromise of 1850, to replace Florida’s leading "Fire-eater."
Radicals in Alabama began to organize in the summer of 1850 to 
gain approval of the Nashville convention and to express their desire 
to protect slavery. A large meeting was organized by the Fire-eaters 
in Montgomery during early July to approve the proceedings of the 
Southern convention. George Goldwhaite, a delegate to the Nashville 
Convention, gave a report on its activities and declared that the 
offer to extend the Missouri Compromise line was a great concession by 
the South which had been rejected by the United States Congress. A
Governor Brown. They did have so narrow a margin of support that they 
may not have wanted to risk a vote. But, there is no available evidence 
on why the Governor's request was not acted upon by either legislative 
house. Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. January 28, February 4, 1851.
142 Doherty, The Whigs of Florida. 47-49; Thompson, "David 
Yulee," 5. See Stephen Mallory's letter reprinted in the Tallahassee 
Floridian and Journal. Feb. 8, 1851 in which he recognized Northern 
hostility to the South's rights and the need for Southern unity.
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majority report was offered which praised the Nashville Convention, 
but did not discuss the Clay proposals— except for Texas. Judge Mays 
presented a "minority" report which denied Congress the power to exclude 
slavery from the territories and condemned the Omnibus bill. Extension 
of the Missouri Compromise was "a last concession" by the South which 
wanted guarantees that territorial legislatures would not be permitted 
to pass laws abridging property (slaves) rights until they were ready 
to enter the Union. Economic connections with the North should be 
severed, a state convention should be called, and Alabama's congressmen 
should withdraw from Washington if California entered as a free state 
or if a satisfactory compromise was not achieved. Yancey offered amend­
ments to the minority report which called for defense of Texas' rights
143to the disputed land with New Mexico. The refusal of the Senate to 
accept the 36° 30' line also led inevitably "to the conclusion that the 
North will not do justice to the South, and that the time has now come 
in which all must admit it to be her duty to look to herself alone for 
safety and protection, to set her house in order--not to die but to 
live."144
Debate on the various proposals finally resulted in a compro­
mise. R. P. Ware was opposed to calling of a state convention, economic 
retaliation, and withdrawal from Congress "because he thought them pro­
ductive of no practical benefit at the present time."14^ Yancey's
143 Montgomery Alabama Journal. July 17, 1850.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
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resolutions on the Texas boundary dispute were accepted in the final
draft passed by the meeting which approved the Nashville resolutions
while declaring ’’that justice to the South is a necessary preliminary
to the perpetuating of the Union, and that we do not hesitate between
146them to choose justice to the South."
Other meetings throughout the state expressed the radical senti­
ment of many Alabamians. A meeting in Eufaula on July 4 received the 
Nashville resolutions favorably while declaring that the Omnibus bill 
was unacceptable unless it was amended to conform to the proposals 
passed by the Southern C o n v e n t i o n . j n Talladega "ultras" resolved 
that their political equality, autonomy and freedom were so valuable 
that they would
not sacrifice them for the sake of continuing any Union which 
is controlled by and [sic] abolition majority (reckless alike 
of the constitution which favored that Union and our feelings, 
rights peace and honor), and wielded by such majority for the 
destruction of sixteen hundred millions of slave property, 
and the degradation of the white people of the South to a level 
with the negro race.*^®
At Wetumpka, ex-Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Arthur Bagby spoke
about the slavery crisis. Fitzpatrick emphasized that the dispute
over slavery had a long history. The North was responsible for the
aggressions against the peculiar institution and Northern economic
groups must be made to see that attacks upon slavery hurt their own
146 Ibid.
147 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, July 10, 1850.
148 Ibid.
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affluence. Bagby was opposed to California's exclusion of slavery from
her boundaries. Debate over whether Mexican anti-slavery laws were still
valid in Utah— New Mexico had discouraged Southerners from settling in 
149
the territories. The Clay and Taylor plans of adjustment were synony­
mous because "both virtually exclude the Southern people from all the 
territory acquired from Mexico."150 ^ »C0mpr0mise" solution was a 
division of the Mexican lands along the 36° 30' line, but it was the 
last such settlement that the South should agree to accept.I-’*
A measure of the degree of nervousness about "abolition" came 
from a report in the Wetumpka Guard. A meeting had been held in 
Wetumpka about the dissemination of abolitionist propaganda among black 
slaves by three white men. The "accused" abolitionists were forced to 
leave the area and a vigilance committee was founded. The editor of
the Advertiser was critical of this action:^ 2
We think we have a right to complain of our Wetumpka friends in 
not making a more [illegible] mark of their displeasure upon 
these abolitionists. The ring leader should have been hung as 
high as haman and the others treated to a genteel coat of tar 
and feathers— first having received the "cats" well laid on.
We have great veneration for the laws of the land as a general 
thing, but when we see a man putting a torch to our dwelling, and
enacting means for the butchery of our wives and children, it is
criminal to wait for the slow, uncertain process of the law.^3
149 Ibid., August 7, 14, 1850.
150 Ibid., August 14, 1850.
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Dissatisfaction with the radical Nashville Address was evident 
in the private correspondence of Thaddeus Sanford. Sanford, a leading 
newspaper editor in Alabama, stated that he did not personally accept 
the idea that the entrance of a free-soil state in the Union was equiva­
lent to Congressional passage of the Wilmot Proviso;
X disapproved privately, and would not say it in the paper, of 
that part of the Nashville address that assumed the ground that 
for Congress to admit a state into this Union whose constitu­
tion prohibited slavery, was the establishment of the Wilmot 
Proviso by the direct legislation of that body. It is not a 
true fact. If there is any political proposition to which the 
Southern Democracy is committed, it is to the doctrine that 
slavery is exclusively a State Institution, and that the people 
of a State have a right to establish or abolish it, at their 
discretion. ^ 5
Objections to California's admission should have been based on stronger 
grounds which "could not have been cavilled at."^^-
Union sentiment was expressed by William R. King in a letter 
during August; "I will not say that madness rules the hour, but this 
I will say that as it seems to me passion has seized the nation and 
for the time being the sound sense and patriotic devotion to country 
which has heretofore characterized people is permitted to slumber.
King's private concern about the "madness" of sectionalism was shared 
by other conservatives in Alabama.
154 Thaddeus Sanford to W. P. Browne, July 10, 1850, W. P. 
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Beginning in September 1850, meetings were held throughout the
state to encourage moderation and devotion to the Union. One held in
early September at Gadsden, warmly endorsed the idea of loyalty to the 
158Union. A resolution was passed which declared: ", . .we have no
sympathy with those who would overturn the constitution and destroy the
Union, and we regard attempts at either wild, chimerical and destructive
to our best interest .'*159 These Unionists were also willing to support
the Texas boundary settlement if it was acceptable to the Lone Star
State. They protested against irregularities in the formation of
California's constitution, but did not regard her admission as a state
as "sufficient cause for dissolving the Union."160
The issues were clearly presented at a debate in Patton's
Springs in Lauderdale county. There three hundred people heard a sharp
debate on the Nashville proceedings and the Omnibus bill.^* A local
radical, General Walker, attacked the Compromise of 1850 and asserted
"that the Union was not worth the sacrifices which the friends of the
162Compromise required of the southern people." His arguments were 
countered by Richard W. Walker who defended the Omnibus bill; this 
conservative tried to prove that "the Compromise had been grossly
158 Huntsville Southern Advocate, September 25, 1850.
159 Ibid.
160 IkM-
161 Ibid., September 11, 1850.
162 Ibid.
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misrepresented by its enemies and by designing men who were striving
to force the South into a false position for the purpose of bringing
about a dissolution of the Union.u1^  ^his appeal was apparently so
convincing that the Southern Rights men did not attempt to gain approval
for the Nashville resolutions at the meeting.
During October Senator King, who did not participate actively in
the Unionist campaign, expressed his hopes for moderation in Alabama.
The Senator was worried about the efforts being made in Alabama to
equate the Democratic Party with s e c e s s i o n : " j n the present state
of things it is calculated to destroy us and if persevered in will
inevitably place our State in the hands of the Whigs. The majority of
the Democracy of Alabama is not prepared from what has already taken
place much as they feel its injustice to resort to such an extreme 
166measure." His main goals were to insure the success of the Democracy 
while also preserving the Union. King stressed, however, that the 
South must not tolerate any future aggressions by the North which had 
to "understand that we will bear no more--that another step taken by 
her to endanger our safety must and will snap the cord which binds us 
together."167 i h i s  moderate Democrat believed that the awareness by
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the North of the future probability of disunion would cause her to end 
attacks on the South.
Senator Jeremiah Clemens began an extensive canvass in support 
of the Compromise. He had been converted to a moderate position by 
September 1850 and wanted Alabama to acquiese to the passage of the 
Adjustment bills. On November 4, 1850, Clemens delivered an important 
speech on the Compromise of 1850 in Huntsville. He believed that 
California's admission to the Union was unjust, and yet he emphasized 
that she had been granted statehood only by the support of Southern 
Congressmen. The Slave Trade Law was also dangerous since it estab­
lished a precedent for future abolition of slavery in the District of 
Columbia.^9 was a »serious aggression," but did not "justify 
resistance by secession and civil war— the supreme court is the proper 
tribunial to determine the question" [of Congress' power to abolish 
slavery in Washington].*^® He defended the Texas boundary settlement
since Texas's title to the disputed land was doubtful and since no
171coercion was involved: "The Senate bill does not settle the boundary
of Texas— it simply makes a proposition to her [Texas] for settle­
ment Southerners had obtained definite advantages in the
168 Ibid.
169 Huntsville Southern Advocate, November 13, 1850.
170 Ibid.
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territorial bills which opened land north of the Missouri Compromise
line to slavery. *-7^
In concluding, Clemens stated his strong opposition to secession.
He did not believe that there was any middle ground "between secession
and acquiescence in the measures."17^ The idea of economic retaliation
against the North, which he favored, still involved acquiescence in
the Adjustment bills. Secession was not a practical solution since
it would not result in any expansion of slavery.*-7-* He concluded:
If then any man asks me if I am in favor of disunion, I answer,
No— Nothing has been done that disunion can remedy, and I am 
not mad enough to rush into civil war from idle fear that 
something may be done hereafter. There are grievance[s] I 
would not bear. There are oppressions which ought to be 
resisted by every means that God and Nature have put into
our hands, but they have not yet come upon us, . . . *76
Southern Rights men, embittered by the passage of the Compro­
mise of 1850, were also active in the fall of 1850. Sampson W. Harris, 
a Congressional Fire-eater, wrote that the South was being restricted 
because of the peculiar institution:*-77
She walks in prison bounds--because the leprosy of slavery is 
about her, and she must not come too near the untainted 
immaculateness of Northern puritanism— The North may expand 
but we must stop— Her institutions are to be made the peculiar
173 Ibid.
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objects,— the protegees of Government patronage, while its 
very energy is to be restricted in every possible way, to th[e]
destruction of ours, [way of life] . . . *'®
The desires of the Northern majority rather than the Constitution con­
trolled the national government which had already excluded the South 
from the territories and yet was preparing further "aggressions." The
South was not united and was thus in grave danger :*^9 njf the south
falters in this crisis— she is gone forever."*®®
The sense of outrage which radical Alabamians felt was ex­
pressed in primary meetings throughout the state. Fire-eaters within 
central Alabama, who were especially enraged by the passage of the 
Compromise bills called for a protest meeting in Montgomery in early 
September to discuss the sectional crisis. After the usual statement 
about the limited powers of government, these "ultras" stated that 
the escape of black slaves to the North cost the South millions of 
dollars and would have caused war between the sections if they had been 
foreign nations.*®* The South "should require forthwith of the North, 
a convention of all the states so to amend the constitution as to add
more checks for their future rights, or else they will secede from
1 82the Confederacy." Texas was encouraged to resist Northern designs
178 Ibid.
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on her land, but even if she acquiesed the rest of the South had to 
continue to resist. There was strong disapproval of the idea of 
admitting California into the Union, and these extremists wanted the 
legislature convened in a special secession so that a state convention 
might decide on a way to end the sectional problems or to create a plan
for cooperation with other slave states. They also encouraged Alabam­
ians to patronize merchants loyal to the South while encouraging them 
not to vote for any candidate who adopted a position against the 
rights of the South.
Division on the course of action which the state should adopt 
was evident at a meeting of the citizens of Lowndes and Dallas Counties 
on September 27. Local firebrands introduced a resolution which pro­
tested the exclusion of the South from the Mexican cession and a 
declaration that the end of the slave trade in Washington was a prece­
dent for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia as well 
as in federally controlled areas throughout the S o u t h . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
they resolved:
that the action of the North for many years past, and especially
a series of measures enacted by the present Congress, envince
a settled determination on the part of the North to deprive the 
South of equality in the Government, and are such as will 
steadily and surely lead to an alteration of the constitution, 
to the abolition of negro slavery, and to the final ruin of the
South.185
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A Southern Rights Association was formed to promote the cause, but 
differences of opinion appeared on the question of the proper means of 
resistance. Extremists had declared that there were evils worse than 
disunion, but Colonel E. F. Byrd wanted resolutions passed which would 
have stated that the Compromise of 1850 was not unconstitutional or a 
sufficient justification for secession. This resolution was postponed 
and two speeches in favor of secession were delivered; many Alabama 
Fire-eaters, however, were not yet ready to leave the Union.
A major address, issued in pamphlet form, was delivered before 
the Mobile Southern Rights Association on December 14, 1850, by Josiah 
C. Nott. The association, which had been formed in November, included 
John A. Campbell, a true extremist and Nott, one of the earliest 
scientific racists in the United States. Nott's speech dealt with the 
origins of races, the impossibility of racial equality or emancipation, 
and the conflict between the North and South. He stressed the fact that 
there were three distinct races in the world which did not have a 
common origin as had been described in the Bible. The South owned three 
million black slaves in 1850 which could not be emancipated; slavery 
was an institution which was necessary to the South's wealthy and poli­
tical p o w e r . B l a c k s  were biologically and physically inferior, and
186 Ibid.
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it was an error to believe "that cultivation, through a series of gen­
erations, can expand the defective brains, develope [sic] the intellec­
tual faculties of the negro race, and thus raise them by degrees to the
full standard of excellence which belongs to the Caucasian Races 
188
• • •" In addition to the black man's "supposed" inferiority, there 
was a problem in the rapidly increasing slave population which could 
not be educated successfully and which could not be shipped out of the 
South into the Northern states or colonized in Liberia. After discus­
sing the growing spirit of abolition which endangered slave property, 
Nott's summarized his "factual" conclusions about black people and the 
peculiar institution
1st. It is conceded on all hands, that the Negroes have existed, 
with their present physical types for at least four thousand 
years; that there is no evidence that they have anywhere during 
this time achieved civilization; that they have always shown 
inferior intelligence; and occupied the lowest grade in the scale 
of nations; . . 2nd. There is no example on record, to prove 
that climate, or any combination of known external agencies, can 
change a White Race into Negroes, or vice versa. . . . 3rd.
Though often asserted, there is not an atom of proof in the 
world's history to show that a Race can be changed by cultiva­
tion, and raised in intelligence, from the lowest to the 
highest grade. . . . 4th. From the past history of the 
negroes, not a single fact or argument can be drawn to encourage 
the belief that the slaves of the United States can be colonized 
in Africa, or elsewhere, with a prospect of improving their 
condition; . . . 5th. That the slaves now in our Southern 
States must continue, with all their increase, to exist here as 
slaves, or be driven off to die of want and misery elsewhere.
188 Ibid.. 15.
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A cordon of free-soil states was encircling the South which was also 
condemned by world opinion. If the Northern states continued their
attacks on the South, she would have to expand militarily and establish
191control over lands to provide "an outlet for her negroes. .
Nott supported the idea of secession and believed that a violent con­
flict was the probable result of the increasing sectionalism. There­
fore, he concluded that the South must be prepared to defend h e r s e l f : 192 
"The spirit of Liberty, the spirit of Philanthropy, the spirit of 
Christianity, aye, and the ghosts of the murdered Whites of St. Domingo 
rise up— shake their gray locks at you--and bid you, 'sleep no m o r e .'"193 
The Southern Rights press also contributed editorials which 
criticized the submissionists and predicted white resistance against 
threatened emancipation. The Hayneville Chronicle was very critical of 
the Unionists in Alabama who were responsible for continued Northern 
attacks against the South. Their submission to the North encouraged 
her aggressions which could only be stopped by united resistance by the 
entire South.*94 in order to encourage support for the peculiar insti­
tution, the Huntsville Democrat stressed that the North was trying 
gradually to achieve the abolition of slavery in the South. The emanci­
pation of three million black slaves would be disastrous for the
191 Ibid., 24.
192 Ibid., 24-26.
193 Ibid.. 26.
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lower-class white man who would be reduced to the degraded level of the
black man. Negroes would compete with poor whites for employment, and
white families might be forced to have social contacts with Negroes.*95
The paper, emphasizing white solidarity, asked:
what man would willingly bring about a state of things, that
would inevitably bring him down to a level with the negro?
Abolitionists would bring about white slavery as it exists 
in the North, in the place of negro slavery which now exists 
here . . . who can believe that any poor man at the South is 
anxious to take the place now occupied by negro slaves. None
but a fool or a fanatic.196
This appeal to non-slaveholders was based on both racial and status
considerations which might cause the yeoman to rise to the defense of
slavery.
A concerted attempt was made during the fall of 1850 to get
Governor Collier to take action on the sectional question. A set of
resolutions was passed which encouraged the governor or the state 
legislature to call a convention of the people of Alabama. Collier was 
also contacted by radicals who wanted him to convene the legislature 
to meet the threat of the Omnibus bills. The South had a choice between
using force against the North or quietly acquiescing to aggressions
which included abolition and consolidation of political power in the 
hands of the Federal government:*97 "Let us not disguise the fact that,
195 Ibid., November 2, 1850, quoting Huntsville Democrat.
196 Ibid.
197 "Proceedings of Public meeting in Coosa County," October 18, 
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the question for the Southern States is--life or death: we shall then
clearly comprehend our duty and [illegible] go forward to discharge 
it."198
Collier, however, refused to act. He recognized that Alabamians 
wanted to resist the attacks on slavery, but believed that public opin­
ion had not yet reached a decision on the proper course of action to 
adopt. If the state legislature met early, it would merely reflect the 
current differences in viewpoints in Alabama. The state legislature 
should be called into session after the second Nashville Convention; 
Collier announced his disapproval of the Omnibus bills which strength­
ened the free states. But he emphasized that Alabama was not ready to
1 QQsupport disunion:*77 "I believe that a large majority of them [people
of Alabama] are strongly disinclined to withdraw from the Confederacy,
until other measures have been unsuccessfully tried to resist further
aggression."^^ The South should end her economic dependence on the
North and prevent abolition which would be more harmful to lower-class
whites who would have to stay "in the country with the races placed
upon a footing of equality without an adequate protection of their
2 mpersons or the earnings of their industry." Collier had not acted 
with the Fire-eaters, but was still concerned about the dangers of
198 Thomas B. Woodsard to Henry W. Collier, September 25, 1850, 
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emancipation.
Historians have generally noted that public opinion in Alabama 
was divided into three different segments by late 1850. One position 
was held by a minority within the state which apparently accepted the 
Compromise of 1850 as an equitable adjustment of the slavery problem.
A second group, the Southern Rights men who saw dangers to the "rights" 
of the South in the Compromise which had to be resisted by measures 
ranging from secession to economic retaliation against the North.202 
A third group, the Southern Rights Unionists acquiesced in the Com­
promisers passage but "their cup of forbearance was full; and if the 
Northerners caused it to run over, they would be driven to ally them­
selves with the s e c e s s i o n i s t ."^03 ^ careful perusal of the available
primary sources indicates that there was actually no clear cut position 
on the Compromise or the slavery question. There were men who were 
more radical than William L. Yancey, and there was a broad spectrum of 
opinion in the category of Southern Rights Unionists which Denman 
defined. There were men who adopted the Georgia platform verbatim, 
while others looked to economic resistance along the lines suggested 
by Senator John M. Berrien of Georgia. These broad categories will be 
used even though they do not actually reflect the state of chaos in 
the public mind in 1851. The only area on which Unionists and radicals 
agreed was that Alabama was not ready for secession unless the attacks
202 Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 39-40.
203 Ibid., 41-42.
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against slavery were intensified.
Unionists organized officially in Montgomery on January 19, 
1851, at a convention called by conservative members of the legisla­
ture. They announced their support for the Compromise of 1850 and 
opposition to s e c e s s i o n . H ow ev er , reflecting the division of 
opinion within the state, they admitted the right of revolution "which 
belongs to every free people to overthrow their government when it
20fifails to answer the ends for which it was established." w
In mid-January there was a report about a slave conspiracy 
from "many planters" in the Mobile area. A note addressed "TO THE 
PLANTERS OF ALABAMA" described an alleged attempt to incite a slave 
insurrection in South Alabama. Two white men had reportedly told the 
slaves that an election was going to be held to free them and that 
when it occurred there would be support for "throat-cutting" by the 
black population. The authors of the announcement called for a
204 W. H. Crenshaw to Bolling Hall, January 11, 1851, Bolling 
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Spirit of the South for February 18, 1851. This paper is no longer 
extant and a check of the Montgomery papers and the Mobile Advertiser 
(Whig Union) did not reveal any account of it. Therefore a meeting was 
probably held but its importance was obviously overemphasized.
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planters' convention in Mobile to stop such agitation. The Alabama
Journal was very critical of the report which would simply increase
fears among the white population and in a tone designed to reassure the
citizens of Montgomery, the editor declared that a slave revolt could 
2 0 7never succeed. u/
In February 1851 the Yancey forces attempted to form a Southern 
Rights party. Yancey had said in a previous month that such a gathering 
could unite the radicals of the State. However, when the meeting opened 
in Montgomery only seventeen Southern Rights Associations were in 
attendance out of fifty-two of Alabama's counties; the vast majority of 
the ninety-seven delegates came from Montgomery, Lowndes and Dallas 
counties
Extremism and radical statements of purpose dominated the three- 
day convention. All the proposals for a potential preamble and reso­
lutions of the convention [Montgomery Platform] were similar in that 
they held that the crisis between the sections was based on the Northern
goal of abolition, and that secession was a right. A very radical set
2 0 9of resolutions introduced by one Gayle stated;
That although it is desirable that more States than one 
should secede together, yet we recommend to the good people of 
Alabama to meet in convention at as early a day as practical
207 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, January 15, 1851; 
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after the adjournment of the Southern Congress in November 
next [proposed by South Carolina], and secede alone from the 
Union, if the simultaneous action desired cannot be had.
These resolutions were too extreme for Yancey who suggested that aboli­
tion was the goal of the national government, but omitted a resolution 
favoring separate s e c e s s i o n . I n s t e a d  the Montgomery Fire-eater 
declared that "the rights, honor and interests of the people of this
state, and each of the Southern states, demands that they should at
212once" set their house in order "with a view to secession." Further­
more, Yancey held that the secession of Alabama was a matter "of time
21 o
and policy only." h6 approved the calling of a Southern Congress
while stating that Alabama should join any other states which might
actually secede. Voting on Yancey's resolutions changed one slightly
with the dropping of the word "policy" in a statement on secession
which then read that the question of disunion was "reduced to that of 
914
time only."
A plan for establishing a Southern Rights Organization through­
out the state was devised, and a Committee of Publication was created
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.. See Montgomery Alabama Journal, February 14, 1851 
for a complete copy of the final preamble and resolutions. Policy,
of course, implied action to achieve secession rather than waiting for 
it as an inevitable result of Northern action.
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to handle propaganda on the subject of s l a v e r y . 215 Yancey established
a Committee of Vigilance, to consist of five members, "who shall be
clothed with discretionary powers, for the purpose of protecting slave
property, . . ."216 Financing for these two important parts of the
association were to come from the Southern Rights clubs organized in
217the various counties. '
The radical mind in Alabama during 1851 can be understood by
closely examining the convention's "Address to the People of Alabama"
which was probably the work of Yancey. It was a militant manifesto in
favor of the Southern way of life. Attacks on the South, which had
begun with the Hartford convention in 1814, were increasing. The
organization of California by the Executive branch of the Federal
government was a serious threat to Southern rights. Congress itself
was responsible for this action since it could have rejected statehood
for the former Bear Flag Republic. Mexican anti-slavery laws should
have been declared null and void if they were in conflict with the 
218Constitution. Texas had been dismembered by the national government 
"and the vast tract yielded by her— larger than the State of Alabama-- 
was at once put under the free soil act incorporating the territorial 
government of New Mexico."219 jn a^w abolishing the slave trade
215 Montgomery Weekly Advertiser, February 26, 1851.
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in the District of Columbia, which gave Congress the power to manumit
slaves under certain conditions, a principle was established for the
220emancipation of other slaves.
The most dangerous act of the majority section was the restric­
tion on the expansion of slavery. After the peculiar institution was
confined to the slave states, the South would have the problem of a
991rapidly increasing black population;*-*--1-
We are surrounded by free soil. The outlets, provided by 
nature and the wise forecaste of statesmen, have been seized 
upon by our enemies and forever closed against its diffusion.
The institution is circumscribed. . . .  By reason of its being 
confined to its present limits (if indeed those limits shall 
be left undisturbed) the supply of slave labor will become so 
great and consequently so cheap, that it will gradually 
drive out from among us all free white labor of every 
description. From being confined almost entirely, as at 
present, to agriculture, the slaves will necessary become 
mechanics and artisans of every class. This will inevitably 
enlighten them and give them power and new and dangerous 
ideas. There being no outlet for them, they will in time 
overflow all the channels of labor. The whole country will 
become one vast African population, a land of the slave and 
his owner. And then, how far distant will be the day when 
the black and loathsome tide, in vain seeking for an outlet, 
will find it by an overthrow of the body politic, drowning 
all distinctions between the white and black man?222
Even if the North ended all future attacks upon the South, she could
patiently wait inevitable emancipation of the Negro and Northern
domination of the government. The only viable solution was secession
which Alabama was advised to prepare actually to proceed with if
220 Ibid.
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another Southern state chose the path of disunion.
An obvious division was displayed in the Southern Rights camps 
by their reactions to the Montgomery Platform. The Mobile Register 
declared that the convention in Montgomery was not representative of
O  A  I
the Southern Rights men: "it is obvious that such a body could not
utter the voice of the State; and we are sure that its proceedings will
225
meet with the overwhelming condemnation of the people. . . . "  The
Southern Rights Associations of Alabama were called upon to repudiate
the entire proceedings. ° In north Alabama the Huntsville Democrat
declared that it was not yet ready to declare for secession until the
North was given "an opportunity to recede from her present position of
227
hostility to the South." The South should develop her economic
resources, give the North time to redress past grievances, and provide
20Q
guarantees for the future, even if this action seemed hopeless.
Although the editor of the Hayneville Chronicle approved of the 
Montgomery resolutions, he emphasized that those men who disagreed with
223 Ibid. The latter quote was at the heart of this truly 
radical document and yet was not stressed in Ralph Draughons' dis­
sertation on Yancey who was the primary author of this important 
address.
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the Platform should not be thrown out of the party:32  ^ "Such men as 
these we would not have driven from our ranks but hail them as friends 
of our cause; and though we may be somewhat ahead of them in our mode of 
resistance, yet we condemn them not, . . ."230
In Mobile a meeting of the Southern Rights Association held in 
mid-spring challenged portions of the Montgomery Platform. These 
radicals, like all "ultras," believed that slavery was endangered, but 
they wanted to create a platform which was broad enough to include all 
men who opposed the Compromise of 1850:231 "We desire that all should 
stand together who are now for resistance, either moral or legal, of 
any kind or form; and if the time should arrive when the people of 
Alabama, in solemn convention should prescribe a form of resistance 
beyond this, we should regard as aliens those only who then refuse to
o oo
enlist under her banner." A policy of commercial non-intercourse 
had to be imposed against states hostile to the South and her own 
economic resources would be developed so that she would be ready to 
defend herself against the "triumph" of abolitionism which would deso­
late the South.233
During 1851 Floridians contented themselves with unofficial
229 Hayneville Chronicle. February 20, 1851.
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expressions of opinion on the Compromise. The States Rights forces in 
Florida voiced their opinion through local associations which were 
organized in at least four counties (Gadsden, Lee, Madison and Jeffer­
son). On May 31, a meeting, chaired by James Gibson, was held in 
Gadsden county to establish a local Southern Rights Association which 
would defend the principles established in the Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions. In September 1851 Brown wrote that Southern Whigs would 
be able to unite with Northerners who supported the Compromise in the 
1852 Presidential elections, but not with '•demagogues1' who would con-
234tinue to agitate the issue of slavery on the national political level. 
Brown favored a conservative political course: "a national Union con­
vention, disregarding old party lines, would be the course of wisdom; 
but if that cannot be affected, there ought to be a National Whig 
convention, and all the Southern States should send delegates to it."235 
The call for a National Union Party was seconded by conservatives like 
Richard Keith Call who wanted to save the Union.^36
Alabama, in contrast, saw massive political chaos and apparent 
public moderation in the struggle between the loose-knit Southern 
Rights and Union-oriented forces. There was competition in the races 
for the state legislature, Congress and the office of Governor.
234 Dorothy Dodd, "The Secession Movement in Florida 1850-
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Radicals like Yancey knew that these contests were vital to them since 
Georgia and Louisiana had already acquiesced to the Compromise of 1850. 
If they were to successfully resist the Adjustment bills, they would 
have to begin by winning at the polls.
Union forces had great difficulty in securing a suitable candi­
date to run for governor. No Union Whig was available, and the only
man who was willing to oppose Governor Collier was the Unionist,
237Benjamin G. Shields of Marengo. His candidacy was supported by the
Unionist editor of the Southern Advocate who announced that he could
no longer support Collier: "We look upon secession as a rank heresay
and cannot support Gov. Collier for reelection since he maintains that
a state has the right by an act or ordinance of secession" to leave
2 3ft
the Union peacefully. Shields, an uninspiring candidate, also 
received the support of the Alabama Journal which believed that he 
stood for the Georgia Platform as advocated by Southern Rights 
Unionists.^39
The races for Congress were the most significant contests in 
Alabama during 1851. These contests saw a confusing pattern of candi­
dates who reflected all shades of opinion on the compromise. John 
Bragg of Mobile was nominated as the Southern Rights candidate by the 
Association in Mobile. He believed that the Compromise was not just
237 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette. February 5, 1851, 
quoting Florence Gazette.
238 Huntsville Southern Advocate. March 14, 1851.
239 Montgomery Alabama Journal. May 19, 1851.
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and that it violated Southern Rights. States had the right to secede 
for just cause but the Compromise of 1850, in his opinion, did not 
provide sufficient justification for this action. However, he was 
opposed to the use of federal force to keep a state in the Union, and 
indicated that if coercion was used against a seceding state that other 
communities with common interests would support her action. His 
Unionist opponent, C. C. Langdon, was actually opposed to the admission 
of California and the abolition of the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia even though he accepted passage of the Compromise.
A particularly exciting electoral contest occurred in Montgo­
mery. Since Representative Henry Hilliard had declined to run for 
reelection in December 1850, and William Yancey refused to run for the 
Southern Rights party in the spring of 1851, these two antagonists 
were represented by stand-ins. The conservatives (Whigs) in Montgomery
nominated James Abercrombie who was a strong Unionist. In his accep-
241tance letter Abercrombie set forth his vifews: "I am a Union man--
ardently desiring and resolutely determined to devote all my energies
to its preservation, as long as honor and Constitutional protection can
be mine as a member of the Union. The South has a great and controlling
242
interest to protect, and it must be protected." The United States 
should not be "balkanized" by the secession of a couple of states which
240 Mobile The Alabama Planter, July 19, 1851; Montgomery 
Advertiser and State Gazette, June 4, 1851.
241 Montgomery Alabama Journal. May 19, 21, 1851.
242 Ibid., May 21, 1851.
would "hasten beyond any other possible contingency the destruction of
that peculiar property, . . ,"2^3 contrast the Southern Rights
Association meeting on June 9 selected fire-eater Colonel John Cochran.
He was recognized as an extremist and had stated that he opposed the
Omnibus bills and believed that the South must secede from the
o / /
"tyranical" Federal government: " . . .  How can the South submit to
remain a party to a government which this avows, both in word and deed,
its purpose to be its ruin and degradation? I think not— I hope not.
I PRAY GOD THAT THE SOUTH MAY TEAR HERSELF FROM THE POWER OF THE 
245
MONSTER." Although Cochran did not believe that secession would 
immediately occur he concluded that "A LEAVEN OF DISUNION" existed in 
Alabama ,2^6
The Congressional contests indicate that Alabamians were con­
cerned about the sectional crisis in 1851 but were not in favor of 
disunion. A prominent citizen described the feelings of many 
Alabamians during the summer of 1851:^^ "All we desire here is for 
the abolitionists and Free Soilers as they term themselves, to let us
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid., June 13, 1851.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 S. Forwood to W. F. Forwood, July 13, 1851, W. S. Forwood 
Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina 
Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
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alone and we are as happy a People as any under the Globe."248 since
this Southern Righter believed that disunion was probable in the future,
he declared that Southerners were ready to meet the crisis--except for
a few submissionists.249
Citizens throughout Alabama were exposed to a variety of
appeals during the races for governor and Congress. Governor Collier,
who had always adopted an ambiguous position, stated his views in a
letter published during May 1851; he stressed his horror at the idea of
2 SOa conflict between a state and the national government: •
My mind revolts from the contemplation of a warlike collision 
between the Government and anyone of the members of the 
Confederacy. No territorial limits could be prescribed to 
the belligerent operations; nor could the end of such a con­
troversy be foreseen. It would unsheath myriads of swords, 
and perhaps involve the members of the Union in the most bloody 
civil war known to modern times, if not to all history.251
He would not commit himself to any course of action in regard to requisi­
tions of troops for Alabama in case South Carolina seceded from the 
252Union. J Unionist Benjamin Shields, who withdrew from the race during 
the early summer, did not believe that the North would interfere "with 
our rights of slave property, or our sovereign and exclusive right of
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Montgomery Weekly Advertiser. June 18, 1851.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
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state legislation and state control over the subject, . . .'*253 shields 
thus stressed that slavery could be protected within the Union which 
itself was endangered by Southern secessionists.^^
Candidates and members of Alabama's Southern Rights Party 
campaigned actively in the sunsner. Yancey's point of view was expressed 
in a letter to a committee which had nominated him for governor. Al­
though he refused the position, Yancey stated his opinion of the party 
conflict
In the ranks of the advocates of submission will inevitably 
be gathered whatever there is of federal and abolition ten­
dencies in our midst; while beneath the banner of secession 
will, as inevitably, be rallied all.that are true to the 
institution of African slavery, as a part of the fundamental 
bases of the social and political policy of the South . . .256
Colonel Phillips, a Mobile extremist, spoke about the necessity 
of having new territories into which the rapidly expanding slave popu­
lation could be transferred. Blacks had to remain as slaves, be sent
out of the United States or "being the majority they must be the
257masters, and the present masters be the servants." The editor of 
the Alabama Planter wrote about the "impossibility" of emancipation:
253 Address of the Hon. Benjamin Shields to the People of 
Alabama (June 10, 1851), 7.
254 Ibid., 1-14.
255 W. L. Yancey to Messrs. Joel E. Matthews, et al., May 10, 
1851, typed copy of a letter appearing in the Dallas Gazette. May 27, 
1851, William L. Yancey Papers (Alabama State Department of Archives 
and History, Montgomery, Alabama).
256 Ibid.
257 Mobile The Alabama Planter. July 27, 1851.
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But suppose, (what we think no rational, enlightened man can 
suppose,) that we should be constrained to assert to the freedom 
of our serfs and be obliged to dwell among them. They being 
more numerous, would make our laws, and under such law what 
protection would there be for their ancient masters? What white 
man would stand up in competition with them? What mechanic 
would enjoy equal employment with them? Our cities they would 
occupy and the honors and profits of a social life would be in 
their hands. But this picture is not possible. The races cannot
dwell together.^58
The black man had to be kept in bondage so that white supremacy could 
be maintained.
The voices of the non-secessionist forces in Alabama were both
a reflection of and factors behind the States' moderation in the summer
of 1851. William R. King wrote a public letter in the mid-summer in
which he stressed his opposition to California's statehood and to the
abolition features in the bill which ended the slave trade in the
District of Columbia. The South was not excluded from the Southwest,
however, unless the inhabitants in applying for admission as a state
presented a free-soil constitution. King opposed the formation of a
Union coalition since he held that the Democracy was the true Union
party. Henry Hilliard, the long time foe of Yancey, was very critical
of Yancey's position on secession and defended the Compromise measures
259while campaigning for James Abercrombie in the Montgomery District.
In Huntsville, W. R. W. Cobb's opponent, Robert Murphy, held that 
session was acceptable if the national government encroached upon the
258 Ibid.
259 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, July 16, 1851; 
Montgomery Alabama Journal, July 17, 1851.
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rights of sovereign states. The Compromise was cause for complaint, 
but Murphy did not believe that it justified secession;260
therefore willing to abide by its provisions provided they are observed 
in good faith by the North; but that this will be done, I have reasons 
to doubt: for the Fugitive Slave Law has already been measurably
defeated in its objects, by the action of Northern Fanaticks [sic].'1^ ®^
The gubernatorial and Congressional election results indicate 
a victory for moderation. Collier was easily victorious in a race in 
which he had no competition from Benjamin Shields, who had withdrawn 
from the contest. Collier's majority, 37,460 to 5,747, was a definite 
signal that Alabama preferred the politics of evasion rather than 
Shield's staunch Unionism. In the Congressional races five men who may 
generally be classified as Unionists were victorious, along with one 
secessionist and one Southern Rights Unionist.^ 2  ^he state had 
endorsed the position of submitting to the Compromise of 1850: "The
election on Monday, as we anticipated, was a 'Waterloo' affair
horse, foot and dragoons, all swept at one clash from the field. The
people have been quiet and determined, and, aware of the nature of the
whole, they had no idea of dissolving the Union on account of the
Compromise acts."^^
260 Huntsville Southern Advocate, July 16, 1851.
261 Ibid.
262 Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 58-60; Dorman, 
Party Politics in Alabama, 57.
263 Montgomery Alabama Journal, August 6, 1851.
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An analysis of the results shows the "anarchy" which existed in 
Alabama politics during 1851. Despite much concern about "Northern 
aggressions" the people of Alabama were not committed to extremism in 
1851. The Southern rights camp was divided into several groups that 
feared that the Compromise was a step toward abolition, but which 
could never agree on one method of resistance. No prominent state or 
national officeholders were associated with the extreme wing of the 
States Rights forces. In contrast, the Unionists received capable 
leadership from men like William R. King and were aided by the public 
indifference to radicalism which was symbolized by the support for 
Henry W. Collier. Racial fears were evident in the appeals made in 
districts like Mobile and in the Montgomery platform. There were also 
incidents which indicated the tension in Southern society over the 
maintenance of white supremacy. However, there was no focus for this 
undercurrent of discontent since no prominent Fire-eater emerged to 
lead the extremist forces in either the gubernatorial or Congressional 
races.
Political parties in both Alabama and Florida went through 
different processes of reunification before the presidential election 
of 1852. Democrats in Florida demonstrated their interest in presi­
dential politics by their desire to be represented in the convention 
at Baltimore. At a state convention in Madison county in April 1852, 
Florida Democrats chose James E. Broome as their candidate for the 
office of governor while Augustus Maxwell was chosen to represent the 
party in the Congressional race against Whig Unionist Edward Cabell.
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A resolution was also passed which called for peace between the sec- 
264
tions: . .we deprecate the agitation of all questions growing
out of the domestic institutions of the country, or the revival of 
issue already passed, with a view to such agitation, as mischievous 
and unwise, and as calculated to introduce tensions among the people 
and weaken the bonds of our political fraternity."265 gr0ome, who had 
formerly been a determined opponent of the Omnibus bills, indicated 
his acceptance of it as a final settlement by the summer of 1852. How­
ever, he did state that he was opposed to any attempt to extend the 
abolition "principles" contained in the District of Columbia Slave
rp . 266Trade Law.
The Whig party's divisions during the election of 1852 led to 
a Democratic victory. Many members of the party had supported Millard 
Fillmore before the June convention in Baltimore as the most desirable 
candidate for President. Edward Cabell was a strong opponent of Scott 
and had to agree to support him before the Whig gubernatorial candidate 
George T. Ward agreed to run on the same ticket with him. This con­
tention within the party, coupled with losses in middle Florida, caused 
the defeat of the entire Whig ticket--including Cabell, who lost by 
twenty-two votes. Florida reentered the Democratic column but she
264 Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. April 3, 10, 24, 1852.
265 Ibid., April 24, 1852.
266 Ibid., May 22, June 19, 1852.
267 Congressional Globe. 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 682-85; 
Doherty, The Whigs of Florida. 55-56; Tallahussee Florida Sentinel. 
April 6, May 25, July 20, 1852.
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had accepted the Omnibus bills.
During the winter of 1851-52, Alabamians began the process of 
political reunification and "final" acceptance of the Compromise of 
1850. Governor Collier, in his annual message to the legislature, 
emphasized that there was still hostile forces in the North which 
regarded slavery as an evil.266 He favored "a discriminatory tax upon 
the products and manufactures of the states that have proved themselves 
recreant to the performance of constitutional duty, whenever they 
become subject to our revenue laws."269 This idea of economic retalia­
tion was more in accord with the spirit of resistance expressed by the 
Mobile Southern Rights Association than with the spirit of sectional 
reconciliation which Senator Clemens desired.2^
Reorganization of the political parties began during the winter 
of 1852. A call was issued for a meeting of the Democratic party in
January 1852 to appoint delegates to the National Democratic conven- 
271tion. 'L The statement included a plea for an end to sectional agita­
tion: "The people of the Southern states have decided to acquiesce in
the measures of compromise. And it becomes every true Democrat, with­
out regard to his individual opinions to cease opposition to the
268 Alabama House Journal (1851-52), 47-49.
269 Ibid.. 48.
270 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 93-96. 
Clemens did support economic resistance but strongly desired sectional 
peace.
271 Montgomery Weekly Advertiser, November 22, 1851.
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2 72popular decision." ' The meeting of the Democratic party of Alabama 
in Montgomery on January 19, 1851, selected delegates to the Demo­
cratic convention while declaring that Alabamians submitted to the
Compromise of 1850 as a final settlement of the divisions over 
27Tslavery.
Fire-eaters in Alabama maintained a separate identity during 
the spring of 1852. Fifty-two delegates from six counties met in con­
vention at Montgomery on March 4, 1852. Resolutions were passed that 
emphasized that racial inequality was an established fact and that 
slavery was beneficial to both races;2 74 "That this relation pro­
motes equality among the free by dispensing with grades and casts [sic] 
among them, and thereby preserves republican institutions; it presents 
the degradation of the whites consequent upon equality with an
inferior race, and affords the African his only efficient school of 
275progress." This succinct defense of slavery was included with a 
recommendation for Southern Rights party conventions on the state and 
regional level. Although Yancey was willing to accept the principles 
of the George platform as the best safeguard for black slavery in 1852, 
he was strongly opposed by local Fire-eaters who were not willing to
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid., January 27, 1852.
274 Montgomery Alabama Journa1, March 9, 1852.
275 Ibid.
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compromise even temporarily on the issue of secession.276
By the late spring of 1852 the Whigs were preparing to go to 
the Baltimore convention. A portion of the Whig party of Macon county 
met in Montgomery on April 12, 1852 with Colonel W. W. Battle as 
chairman. They favored Fillmore’s candidacy and called for a state 
convention in June 1852. Meetings were held throughout the state in 
Apri1-May to appoint delegates to the National convention while Henry 
Hilliard called for Whigs to attend in order to work for Millard 
Fillmore's candidacy.^77
Reaction to national politics and the presidential campaign 
dominated the remainder of 1852. Democrats generally accepted the 
candidacy of Franklin Pierce while the Whigs were divided on Scott's 
candidacy. Hilliard, who had originally supported Fillmore, called 
for party support of Scott who had accepted the national platform 
supporting the Compromise. Southern Rights men continued to maintain 
a separate existence as a party during the entire year although 
Yancey did announce that he could vote for Pierce in order to defeat 
Scott. The election results were 26,881 in favor of Pierce to 
16,038 for Scott and 2,174 for the Southern Rights candidate George
276 Ibid., March 8, 1852; Montgomery Weekly Advertiser. 
March 16, 1852.
277 Montgomery Alabama Journal. April 17, May 7, 11, 24,
1852.
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Troup of Georgia. Alabama, like her sister state Florida, had re­
entered national politics and accepted the C o m p r o m i s e  .^8
278 ? to John Bragg, June 17, 1852, John Bragg Papers
(Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina); Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama. 76-81; Dubose, 
The Life and Time of William Lowndes Yancey. 269-70, Huntsville 
Southern Advocate, September 22, 1852; Montgomery Alabama Journa1,
June 25, July 9, 12, 1852; Montgomery Weekly Advertiser. June 30,
July 21, 1852.
WINNING THE LOWER SOUTH TO THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
Volume II
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
m
The Department of History
by
John Cooper Gardner 
B.A., Stetson University, 1966 
M.A., Florida State University, 1967 
May, 1974
CHAPTER V
MISSISSIPPI: STATE'S RIGHTS VERSUS THE UNION
The Magnolia state was the second most militant state in the 
Lower South in the years 1850-1852. Beginning during the 1840's white 
citizens of Mississippi had reacted with marked bitterness to threats 
to the institution of chattel slavery or to their "constitutional 
rights." Emancipation of black people in Mississippi was viewed as 
a threat both to the white man's socio-economic and also to his 
political hegemony.
Economically Mississippi was a state dependent upon its produc­
tion of cotton. Cotton growing had been a relatively minor economic 
activity until the cotton gin was introduced into Natchez in 1795: 
"Whitney's gin placed the inhabited area of Mississippi upon a sounder 
economic footing than it had ever before enjoyed, for it reduced the 
cost of raising cotton to the point where the white staple soon became 
the standard crop of that section of the old Southwest."^ Plantation 
and small-farm agriculture expanded during the seventeen-year period 
from 1820-1837 as cotton sold for as much as sixteen cents a pound on
1 John Hebron Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi 
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), 13. The best account of
Mississippi slavery is Charles Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi (New 
York: D. A. Appleton Century Company, 1933).
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the New Orleans market. The slave population also grew rapidly as 
Mississippi farmers produced over three hundred thousand bales of 
cotton by 1836.^
From 1837-1850 Mississippi agriculture suffered from over­
expansion and depressed economic conditions. The farmer, in order to 
alleviate his poverty, produced larger quantities of cotton, which con­
flicted with the laws of supply and demand; cotton prices were gener­
ally depressed in this period and it sold for as little as five cents 
in 1845. Prosperity returned in 1849-1850 because crop shortages caused 
by severe weather had coincided with increased demand from cotton mills 
in the northeastern United States and the British Isles. Prices rose 
to eleven cents in 1849 and averaged nearly twelve cents on the New 
Orleans market in 1850-1851. The high prices which produced a tremen­
dous profit for the owners of the 484,292 bales of cotton may have 
reinforced conservatism in the planter areas.^
Also promoting conservatism in western Mississippi was the 
importance of the Mississippi River as a carrier of commerce. Trade 
up-river with the northwestern states increased in volume once the 
depression of the 1840's ended. Old river towns like Natchez had long 
maintained trading ties with the Northwest which their economic
2 Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi. 37-69.
3 Ibid., 69.
4 Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi, 70-92, 179; 
The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington, 1853),
447. Hereinafter cited as The Seventh Census.
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communities believed were valuable to the town's survival and growth.-* 
Professor James has noted that the actual amounts of the Northwest 
trade were at record levels in 1850 despite the fact that the growing 
economic ties between the Northwest and New England were channeling 
more trading goods from the former section to the East/* Thus, this 
Mississippi river city, like her sister New Orleans, had an economi­
cally significant interest in preserving the Union.
The eastern half of Mississippi was primarily populated by 
yeoman farmers and men classified as poor whites. In these counties 
property values were low and there were few slaveholders. The white 
farmer in these areas, however, were certainly not as destitute as 
the plantation myth has often depicted them. Many were middle-class 
farmers who owned their farms and also benefited from the growing 
prosperity of the 1850's.^
Black slaves, however, helped condition the political reactions 
of rural Mississippians during the slavery crisis. Negroes had served 
in bondage even before the state was admitted to the Union in 1817. 
Despite an unequal concentration of blacks in certain western Missis­
sippi counties, there was no significant division within the state on
5 D. Clayton James, Antebellum Natchez (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1965), 215; Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Be 1lum 
Mississippi. 182.
6 James, Antebellum Natchez, 215.
 ^ Seventh Census, 456; Herbert Weaver, Mississippi Farmers 
1850-1860 (Nashville: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1945), 63-126.
217
the question of slavery. Men living in the predominantly white eastern 
counties of Mississippi were also ardent defenders of a system which 
guaranteed their white supremacy.® In the 1840's the most radical 
leaders of the Southern Right's movement in Mississippi had been mem­
bers of the state Democratic party. The Mississippi Democracy had 
grown up in response to Andrew Jackson's political appeal. His policy 
of Indian removal forced the Mississippi tribes to vacate their lands 
and migrate west of the river into Indian territory. The opening of 
Indian territory in Mississippi to the land hungry white settlers
helped bring many white Mississippians permanently into the Democratic 
9fold.
Mississippi Whigs who lived in the districts around the affluent 
river towns of Natchez and Vicksburg were a definite minority in 
Mississippi politics. They had not been able to win many elections in 
the 1840's because of the political effectiveness of the Democracy.
Whigs were a politically isolated group who mainly attracted support in
8 Cleo Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850 
(Volume XIV of Mississippi Historical Society Publications. Univer­
sity Miss.: Mississippi Historical Society, 1914), 9-13; Seventh 
Census, 447. Race as a factor in Mississippi politics is complicated 
by the fact that the counties where blacks outnumbered whites were 
largely the areas which supported the Union in 1850-1852. Racial 
fears of lower class whites in eastern Mississippi were an important 
force in politics in this period.
9 Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 24-71.
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the areas of Mississippi which were rich in both cotton and enslaved
blacks.
Democrats were politically unified by the mid-1840's and were 
thus able to control most political offices in Mississippi. The party 
had been divided into two factions during the early 1830’s because of 
the nullification crisis in South Carolina. John Anthony Quitman 
headed a states rights, pro-nullification group which was opposed by 
a pro-Jackson, Unionist branch of the state Democratic party. These 
two wings of the party had finally united in 1839 as the predominantly 
white, eastern half of Mississippi moved permanently into the Democratic 
column. This new alliance resulted in a major change of. allegiance by 
white Democrats. One part of the Democratic party which had repudiated 
the right of nullification in the 1830's moved away from its strong, 
blind loyalty to the Union during the forties.**
Beginning in 1844 tension between the major sections over 
slavery caused a sharp rise in the defense of Southern rights in 
Mississippi. Both Whigs and Democrats supported the annexation of the 
Republic of Texas. They opposed the Wilmot Proviso while reacting 
very favorably to the pro-Southern Virginia Resolutions of 1847 which
10 Donald Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi 1850-1860," 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1964), 2-9; 
Seventh Census, 447-56; David Young, "The Mississippi Whigs, 1834- 
1860" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968), 
49-51.
11 Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, 70-171; 
Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 9-11, 17-19.
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condemned all attempts to exclude slavery in the territories.^  Albert
Gallatin Brown, a pro-Southern Mississippi leader, wrote Governor
William Smith of Virginia that the entire South was determined "first
to exhaust all the resources of reason and argument in exhorting our
northern bretheren to let us alone . . . then as deplorable as may be
the consequences we feel prepared having exhausted every fraternal
1 ^remedy to become enemies and defend our rights." J
In 1848 politicians in Mississippi prepared the populace for 
the Presidential campaign. Democrats in 1847 had agreed to support 
only a Presidential nominee who was opposed to the Wilmot Proviso while 
Mississippi Whigs were organizing behind Taylor. Lewis Cass's doctrine 
of popular sovereignty apparently soothed the Democratic electorate, 
since he carried the state after an extremely partisan Southern-oriented 
campaign; white Mississippians were thus prepared for their rights to 
be defended by both the Democracy and the new Whig President.^
The leadership of Mississippi played an important role in 
determining the fate of the Compromise of 1850. Politicians in Missis­
sippi had generally supported the Southern Address. and the entire Con­
gressional delegation had endorsed it by their signatures. The
12 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850. 14, 23; 
Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 20-27.
13 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850. 23.
14 Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 20-22.
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political elite, drawn mainly from the plantation society, enthusi­
astically supported Southern rights; however, there were differences 
in their political and personal backgrounds which determined the degree 
of loyalty to the Union and the solutions which they advocated in 
1850-1852.
Mississippi had two able defenders of the Southern way of life 
in the United States Senate. Both men, Henry Stuart Foote and 
Jefferson Davis, were from the rich river counties. These two power­
ful Democrats would provide leadership for opposing parties during 
1850-1852 as the state decided to accept or reject the Compromise of 
1850.
Senator Foote's political career extended back a decade into 
the 1830's before his elevation to the Senate in 1847.*"* Foote had had 
a checkered political career which Professor Miles thus describes:
"The volatile Henry S. Foote--'General Weathercock,' according to his 
detractors was a Democrat in 1834, a Whig in 1835, a Democrat in 1836, 
a Whig in 1837, and a Democrat in 1840.'"^ He did have a reputation 
as a Jacksonian but was probably influenced by the philosophical shift 
of the Democratic party into the states rights camp by the early 
1840's. By 1847 he had become Jefferson Davis's personal enemy and was 
a well-known exponent of Southern rights. He lent his support to the
15 Charles S. Sydnor, "Henry Stuart Foote," in Allen Jackson 
and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols., 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), III, Pt. 2, 500-501. 
Hereinafter cited as DAB.
16 Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi. 164.
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Clayton Compromise and had proposed that the Missouri Compromise line 
be extended to the Pacific coast. Although Foote wanted equality for 
the South in the territories, he was willing to work for Southern 
rights within the Union--rather than favoring secession.*^
Jefferson Davis, Foote's colleague in the Senate, was a repre­
sentative of the planter class in Mississippi's Democratic party. Davis 
had spent most of the early 1840's at his family plantation before 
entering the House of Representatives in 1845. After leaving this post, 
he served as a military leader during the Mexican War before being 
elected to the Senate in December 1847.*®
Although Davis was a leader in the Southern Rights Movement in 
Mississippi, his politics were not completely sectional in nature. He 
had a desire for national rather than sectional politics, but was 
always ready to defend the interests of his South against any attacks 
from the N o r t h . In the debate over the Oregon question in the Senate, 
Davis stated that Congress had no power to exclude a slaveholder's 
black property from the territories: "The fact that the slave is
17 John E. Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote, 
1804-1880," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North 
Carolina, 1957), 43-49; James Woodrow Parkerson, "Henry Stuart Foote of 
Mississippi: A Rhetorical Analysis of His Speeches in Behalf of the 
Union, 1849-1852," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, 1971), 201-204.
18 Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, "Jefferson Davis," DAB. Ill, 
Pt. 1, 123-126.
19 Kathleen Bailey Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi 
Gubernatorial Contest of 1851 with Selected Letters and Speeches Con­
cerning the Campaign," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Rice University,
1971), 4-5.
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property, which his owner may carry into any part of the Union was
what they were desirous to see recognized. . . . Congress had no
power to change the condition of slavery, or to strip the master of his
right in his property. Entering a territory with this property, the
citizen has a right to its protection."^® He was willing to agree to
the Missouri Compromise line but realized that dangers existed because
some Northerners insisted upon the total exclusion of slavery from the 
21West. But Northern Democrats were more likely to support the South 
than their Whig counterparts: ". . ., so far as fraternal feelings are
manifested by the nonslave holding states, it was found in the ranks of 
the democracy. Denounced and divided at home because of their support 
of the constitutional rights of the South shall, shall they be suspected
o o
and repulsed by us?
In contrast to Davis was Albert Gallatin Brown, the spokesman
of the lower-class, white population from the piney woods, of southern
Mississippi. Brown had been active in politics since 1839 when he was
elected to Congress from the state's fourth district. In 1843 he
became governor for a term before returning to the House of Representa- 
2 i
tives. His career as a sectional leader began when he condemned the
20 Dunbar H. Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist; 
His Letters, Papers, and Speeches (Jackson: Mississippi Department of
Archives and History, 1923), I, 211. Hereinafter cited as Jefferson 
Davis.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 216.
23 James B. Ranck, Albert Gal latin Brown: Radical Southern 
Nationalist (New York: D. A. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937),
1-60.
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Wilmot Proviso: "The vote by which this foul wrong is consumated will
unhinge the Constitution . . . Mississippi never will submit to a wrong 
24
like this." He was so completely identified in the public mind as a 
Southern right's advocate that a newspaper concluded that he was "more 
jealously devoted to the interest of the South and southern institutions 
than any man in the House of Representatives."^
On the state level in 1849-1850 John Anthony Quitman re-emerged 
as the most single minded exponent of the ultimate radical posit ion-- 
secession. Quitman, a Northerner who migrated into the South during 
the early 1820's, had become "impressed" with the planter elite in 
Mississippi. He used his skills as a lawyer to help him move into the 
planter class and politics by the 1830's. During this decade he had 
been a state rights leader and was an attractive political figure by the 
1840's. Since Quitman had served in the Mexican War, he was considered 
for a position in the Senate in 1847 and was mentioned as a possible 
Vice-Presidential candidate in 1848. His quest for an important 
political office was finally satisfied in 1849 when he was elected 
governor by a 11,000 margin over a weak Whig candidate, Luke Lea.^
John Quitman was now "the recognized leader of the State's Rights
24 Ibid., 55.
25 Ibid.. 60.
26 William L. Barney, The Road to Secession: A New Perspec­
tive on the Old South (New York: Praeger, 1972), 86-87; James H.
McLendon, "John A. Quitman," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer­
sity of Texas, 1949), 1-280; Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, 
63-69, 126, 134, 147, 152, 158.
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faction of the Mississippi Democracy . . ."27
Preparations for the defense of Mississippi in the crisis over
slavery had begun in 1849. The famous meeting in October 1849 which 
called for the Nashville Convention also established limits on Northern 
aggressions. Resolutions which the Convention adopted announced that 
Mississippians would not tolerate: 1) interference with slavery in the
South, 2) attempts to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, 3) 
interference with the interstate slave trade, and 4) passage of the 
Wilmot Proviso. Black slavery was so vital to Mississippians that the 
Convention members would not tolerate hostile laws passed by Congress 
on these subjects.28
During early 1850 retiring Governor Joseph Matthews gave his 
final speech before the state legislature. In this address Governor 
Matthews warned against the admission of California to the Union. 
Admittance of this former Mexican land was more appalling than passage 
of the odious Wilmot Proviso; California's statehood would be a victory 
for the Wilmot free-soil principle, but achieved by a subtle, hypo­
critical method rather than by a declaration of actual exclusion of 
2 Qslavery. 7
Governor John Quitman's inaugural address, delivered on January 
14, 1850, showed an acute awareness of the problems dividing the sections.
27 Barney, The Road to Secession, 87.
28 Jackson Mississippian, October 5, 1849.
29 Kawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 29.
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Although he did not comment directly on the problem of California, he 
dealt at length with the problem of slavery and a b o l i t i o n . H e  
declared: ‘'One half of the sovereign states of this glorious con­
federacy, in the exercise of the undoubted right of self government, 
have chosen to retain as part of their elementary social system, the 
institution of domestic slavery of an inferior race. This institution 
is entwined in our political system, and cannot be separated from it,
O I
without destruction to our social f a b r i c . Q u i t m a n  then proceeded to
defend the peculiar institution: "We do not regard it as an evil, on
the contrary, we think that our prosperity, our happiness, our very
political existence, is inseparably connected with it. We.have a right
to it and under the constitution of the United States. We cannot give
up that right. . . .  We will not yield it. We have a right to the
12quiet enjoyment of our slave property."-*^
Unfortunately, Quitman emphasized, the peculiar institution was
threatened by anti-slavery attacks. Northern politicians opposed it in
their state legislatures and in the halls of Congress. The Governor
feared that they were working progressively from exclusion of slave-
33holders in the territories toward eventual abolition. The motives
30 Inaugura1 Address of Governor John A. Quitman, delivered 
before both Houses of the Mississippi Legislature, January 10, 1850, 
(pamphlet) John A. Quitman and Family Papers (Department of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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of the fanatics were numerous but the people of Mississippi would not
A  /
be "robbed of their constitutional rights . . . The time for tame
35acceptance of Northern aggression had passed in Mississippi; there
could be only one fate for acceptance of injustice: "Dishonor,
36degradation and ruin . . . "Ja This forceful address, reprinted
throughout the state of Mississippi and the South, established
Quitman as a militant defender of his section and her institutions.
The issue of statehood for California which had receded
temporarily as a political question was raised again on January 21,
1850, when the entire Mississippi Congressional delegation addressed
a communication to Quitman. The delegation knew that California
had formed a state constitution and felt that she would be admitted
37as the Thirty-First state in the new session of Congress. Since
the Congressmen regarded the admission of California as equivalent
to the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, they wanted "to have such
expression of opinion by the legislature, the Governor, and if
practicable the people . . .  to indicate the position which
38Mississippi should adopt."
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Mississippi House Journal (1850), 509.
38 Ibid.. 509-10.
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Quitman on February 11, 1850, forwarded the Congressional
letter to the Assembly with his own explanation about the crisis
in California. He believed it had been precipitated by President
Taylor's actions in sending agents "to the unorganized community of
adventurers" on the Pacific coast. He declared that no one in
Mississippi would deny the right of people in a territory to form
a state constitution when they had gone through the necessary
stage of pupilage. But, California should be open to all citizens
39in order to give Southerners an opportunity to settle there.
In conclusion he asked: "Is it just that a handful of adventurers,
who shall first set foot upon any of our distant acquisitions,
shall be permitted virtually to exclude the citizens of one half
of the states of the Union from the privileges of settlement and 
40
occupation?"
A reply to the Governor's message was composed by a joint 
legislative committee. Congress, according to the report, had a 
duty to provide governments for the territories of California and 
the Mexican cession.^ Since governments did not exist, Southern 
citizens had been deterred from going into these areas with their 
slaves and ". . . the cherished object of the abolitionists . . ."
39 Ibid.. 508.
40 Ibid., 509.
41 Laws of the State of Mississippi (1850), 526.
An
was thus being achieved. The committee further recommended:
"That if our Senators and Representatives shall be satisfied, from
reliable evidence, that fraud has been practiced, or improper
influences used to stifle a full and fair expression of opinion
by the citizens of California, in reference to the formation of
their state constitution, they ought to oppose her admission.
The language in this report was stern, but the Committee did not
make a direct connection between California's admission and the
enactment of the Wilmot Proviso. A final determination on this
question was to be referred to the Nashville Convention.^
Further action was also taken during the legislative session
concerning the Nashville Convention. The legislature approved the
October Convention's resolutions and made an appropriation of
$220,000 to finance resistance to any future attacks by the North
upon the South's institutions. Twenty thousand dollars would be
utilized to defray the expenses of delegates appointed by the
legislature to attend the Southern Convention. These men were
to officially represent the state of Mississippi at this important 
45
Convention.
42 Ibid.. 527.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.. 527-28.
45 McLendon, "John A. Quitman," 310; Troy B. Walkins, "John 
A. Quitman Governor of Mississippi, 1850-1851," (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Mississippi, 1948), 98-107.
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Even while the legislature was preparing to send delegates
to Nashville in June 1850, questions were raised about the Southern
Convention. A neutral attitude toward the Nashville Convention was
expressed in a column of the Columbus [Mississippi] Whig: "We
regard it much less incapable of harm than its enemies apprehend,
46and far less powerful for good than its friends imagine." The
Vicksburg Whig opposed the Convention editorially, and one of the
leading conservatives in Mississippi had divided opinions about
the June meeting in Nashville. Judge William L. Sharkey, who
later emerged as a prominent Unionist, did not interpret the
Southern Convention as a meeting of men determined to force
secession upon the South; he viewed it rather as a gathering of
Southern men who wanted to preserve both the Union and Southern 
47rights. The future Chief Justice of Mississippi recognized,
however, the Convention's limitations: "It is powerless for evil,
48and I fear opposition to it has made it for good also."
On the national level in 1850 Senator Foote was the only 
member of Congress from Mississippi who favored the Compromise 
proposed by Henry Clay. Foote, who had always been willing to 
defend the South, had some specific objections to the Compromise:
1) Congress definitely had no power to legislate on slavery in the
46 Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 33-34.
47 Ibid.. 34-35.
48 Ibid.. 34.
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District of Columbia, 2) Mexican anti-slavery law was void, and 
3) Texas' title to the New Mexican land was completely valid.
However, he did approve of the Fugitive Slave proposal, abolition 
of the slave trade in Washington, creation of territorial governments 
for the remainder of the Mexican cession without restricting
A Q
slavery, and admission of California above 36* 30'.
By May 1850 Foote had committed himself further to the 
spirit of adjustment which emerged from the Committee of Thirteen.
In debate on the Senate floor he asked Southern Congressmen whether 
they were ready to consider the results of the defeat of the 
Compromise bills: "I beg them to bear in mind that they must vote
for this compromise, or they must sustain the policy on nonaction. 
They must agree to the admission of California, coupled with certain 
compensatory advantages of inestimable value, or they must prepare 
to see California come in alone; the territories without governments; 
the Texas and New Mexico boundary line unsettled; and the fugitive 
slave bill (the only truly efficient bill of that kind ever yet 
devised) subjected to defeat. Let me ask them if they are prepared 
to contribute to this direful result? Are they willing to mingle 
their energies with the worst enemies of the South in bringing about 
this state of things?"'*® He accepted the Compromise measures and 
proceeded to defend them during the summer of 1850.
49 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., I Suss., 247.
50 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 592.
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During the remainder of the Congressional session Foote 
worked for the passage of the Compromise. He engaged in debate with 
leading radicals, and was very critical about the temporary defeat 
of the Adjustment package on July 31. Although he loved the Union, 
he admitted, as did most Southern conservatives, that secession 
might be justified if the institution of chattel slavery was harmed 
by actions of the Federal government. But he always stressed that 
adjustments should be reached which would be acceptable to both 
sections and that would not compromise the honor of either. There­
fore, he supported positions which he hoped would bring an end to 
sectional strife.
Jefferson Davis expressed his. views on the subject of
slavery during mid-February. He warned that the Northern states
were conducting a war against slavery and emphasized that black
bondage was protected by the Federal government--including its right
to expand. Slavery was no longer forbidden by Mexican law which was
superseded by the Constitution, or barred by nature from entering
the West. Southerners insisted that Texas retain the title to her
western boundary which was disputed by the United States and New 
52Mexico. The South had furthermore been continually attacked by 
the Nortli in such a way that war would have resulted if they were 
foreign nations: "And, for what end, sir, is alL this aggression?
51 Ibid., 1492-93, 1573.
52 Ibid., 149-156.
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They see that the slaves in their present condition in the South
are comfortable and happy; they see them advancing in intelligence;
they see the kindest relations exist between them and their masters;
they see them provided for in age and sickness, . . . and . . . Let
them turn on the other hand, and they see the same race at the North
. . . with few exceptions, miserable, degraded, filling the
penitentiaries and poor-houses, . . .  Do they there [Jamaica and
St. Domingo] find anything to stimulate them to future exertion in
53the cause of abolition? Davis thus hoped that the anti-slavery 
agitation would end, and the sectional parties which he had always 
feared prevented from coming into existence.^4
Representatives Albert Brown and William Feathers ton, were 
also vitally concerned about the slavery question. Brown proudly 
announced: "For myself, 1 regard slavery as a great moral, social,
political and religious blessing . . . slavery, African slavery, 
was, as I religiously believe, planted in this country through the 
providence of God."^^ Feathers ton was extremely concerned about 
the agitation which had swept the nation over the question o£ the 
rights of the South. He could not support actions which were
53 Ibid.. 156.
54 Ibid., 156-57.
55 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 258.
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designed to overthrow slavery below the Mason-Dixon line.5  ^ And,
he asked why the South was being attacked:
"Why is this unending war, made upon the institutions 
of the South--this unholy crusade? What have been 
her shortcomings, her dereliction, her high offending?
She holds in bondage three millions of slaves, we are 
told, who should be free. . . . The free negroes of 
the northern states are in an infinitely worse 
condition than the slaves of the South. . . No part 
of the African race upon the face of the globe, 
enjoys freedom, is so well supplied with the 
necessaries and comforts of life, so happy, so 
intelligent as the slaves of the South. Why is this 
so, Sir? Because he is in his natural— his proper 
condition; one that is advantageous to his master, 
and a great blessing to him."57
Both men stated that South would suffer a great financial loss by 
emancipation and Featherston stressed that the Union had been 
created for the benefit of both the North and S o u t h . B r o w n ,  
however, recognized further "dangers" for Southerners in attacks 
upon slavery which might force them to leave their homes, "or what 
is ten thousand times worse than these, than all remain in a 
country more prosperous and happy and see ourselves and our wives 
and children, degraded to a social position with the black race."-^
56 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 258-59.
57 Ibid., 260.
58 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 260;
Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 259.
59 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 259.
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Brown, who would support disunion if Northern aggressions were not 
stopped, represented lower class whites, who did not fear the 
financial loss from possible emancipation, but more significantly 
the psychological loss of status in a section which was determined 
to remain a white man's country.^®
By the end of September 1850, despite protests by 
Mississippi Congressmen, the Adjustment bills became law. Both 
Davis and Foote opposed the California bill, but Foote supported 
the statehood bill during the next two years. On the remaining 
issues Davis supported the Fugitive Slave Act but voted negatively 
on the remainder of the Compromise. Foote supported the Texas 
boundary bill, the Fugitive Slave Law, but was not recorded as 
voting on the New Mexico or Slave Trade bills. However, his early 
acceptance of the idea of ending the slave depots in the District
fi 1of Columbia, indicates his support for this bill. 1
Members of the House of Representatives from Mississippi 
voted like Jefferson Davis on the Compromise. Representative Brown 
repeated Davis's pattern exactly and the other two Representatives 
adopted this position except on the Utah bill. Territorial 
government for Utah was evidently not considered vital by men in
60 Ibid.
61 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and
Compromise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966),
191-200.
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Mississippi who considered themselves soldiers of an aggrieved 
South. The entire Congressional membership had thus expressed 
overwhelming dissatisfaction with the bills which Clay intended to 
soothe sectional tensions.
By the fall of 1850, when Mississippians began their 
struggle over the Compromise measures, two basic propaganda tactics 
were used. The Union party in Mississippi, which was gradually 
forming, tried to create the impression that it was defending the 
state against crafty secessionists who wanted to destroy the bonds
of the Union. In contrast, the States Rights men emphasized that
Southern Unionists would actually endanger slavery by their action 
in acquiescing to the Adjustment bills. White supremacy would be 
threatened by submission which could only encourage the possibilities 
of abolition. Many Fire-eaters concluded that parts of the 
Compromise "would unite and encourage further aggression from them
[free-soilers and abolitionists], lead either to a speedy
dissolution of the Union, or the total destruction of slavery in 
the South, or to a result still more appalling--a servile war and
62 Ibid.
63 Jackson Flag of the Union. November 1850-January 1851; 
Jackson Mississippian, September 13, 1850; Natchez Free Trader. 
October 2, 1850; Natchez Semi-Weekly Courier, September 24, October 
1, 4, 1850; Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 43-46; 
Woodville Republican, September 17, 1850.
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extermination of the white or black race throughout the South. 
Therefore the non-rational images of "Unionism or white supremacy" 
influenced the predominately rural electorate of Mississippi in 
1850-1851.
During the summer of 1850 the Southern Rights movement 
formed in Mississippi. The study of local Southern Rights 
associations is extremely important since Southern historians have 
often concentrated on individual Fire-eaters rather than on groups. 
Associations created on the local level were the vehicles through 
which public opinion in Mississippi was organized. They also formed 
the base on which the new Democratic States Rights party was built.
A typical Southern Rights meeting was held in Clark county 
on August 5, in order to ratify the propositions offered by the 
Southern Convention. John J. McRae spoke to these citizens of 
southeast Mississippi about the aggressions which the North had 
committed against their beloved South. The members in attendance 
at the meeting, in addition to ratifying the Nashville proposals, 
declared that old party bonds had to be dissolved as long as the 
rights of the South were endangered. ^
Similar meetings, led by the local elite, were held through­
out the state until the more prominent radicals like John Quitman 
took over leadership in the movement. One of the earliest recorded
64 Jackson Mississippian. September 13, 1850.
65 Ibid.. August 23, 1850.
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meetings at which Quitman spoke was at Raymond in Hinds County on 
September 2. Radicals in the southwestern Mississippi county elected 
Colonel William Smith of Clinton to preside over the meetings; they 
resolved that friends of the South must be prepared to unite in a 
common defensive effort. Governor Quitman, the principal speaker, 
defended the benefits of the peculiar institution;^ all 
Mississippians were in debt to the institution of slavery "for the 
great blessing of actual equality and the noblest freedom, and 
above all, to exemption from white slavery and the anarchy it has 
brought to Europe and is bringing to the northern s e c t i o n . A f t e r  
the Governor's speech, resolutions were adopted which approved the 
Nashville Convention and which declared that the admission of 
California as a state was equivalent to the passage of the dreaded 
Wilmot Proviso. Additional resolutions were passed at the 
afternoon session which advocated economic retaliation against the
/' Q
North and the creation of new economic strength for the South.
The South must be more economically independent of the North so 
that it could "throw off its dependence upon a people who steal our 
property, flece [sic] us out of our money and brand us as
66 lb id., September 13, 1850.
67 Ibid. This emphasis on the benefits of black slavery
over the wage slavery of the North must have been appealing to the 
common white man.
68 Ibid.
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oppressors--who realize millions annually from the production 
of slave labor, while they disparage the morals and impugn the 
motive of slave o w n e r s . " ^
Newspapers connected with the Democratic party moulded 
public opinion in Mississippi. The Mississippian. the leading 
Democratic paper in the state, published materials on the dangers 
to the South. They reprinted a copy of Representative William 
McWillie's address to his constituents. In this letter McWillie 
had condemned the efforts to formulate a compromise and stated 
his own intention to oppose passage of the Omnibus bills which 
would be a "yoke . . . upon the neck of the proud S o u t h . T e r s e  
language was used, by the Natchez Free Trader which described the 
danger of Northern power: "The fruits of a dominant northern
majority will be to us worse than the doom of Jamaica and 
Martinique.Submission to this powerful majority would harm 
the South because "as the conviction is disseminated that a 
dominant northern majority has decreed the abolition of slaves, 
the distance between us and our slave will be immeasurably lessened, 
and that race, which has been content to serve a brave and gallant 
people, will begin to look to the North, and partake of the loathing 
and disgust which all men feel towards those who aspire to be
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.. August 9, 1850.
71 Natchez Free Trader. October 2, 1850.
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master and have not the courage to resist being s l a v e s . E m o t i o n a l
language such as this was designed to appeal to the racism of the
common white man.
A most revealing discussion about the question of slavery
appeared in the columns of the Monroe Democrat. This State Rights
paper recognized the danger to slavery from Northern attacks and the
need for white solidarity to preserve the peculiar institution.
Addressing his editorials to the planter class, the editor emphasized
that there was dissatisfaction among the mechanics in eastern
Mississippi which might cause them to become indifferent to the
future of slavery. The'white laborer was not being given enough
employment by the slaveholders who purchased their goods from the
North rather than from local craftsmen. These local laborers also
73had to compete with blacks for employment. After mentioning the
weakness of the slaveholding class the editor stated the problem:
"It is a singular fact that many of our work-shops are filled with
negroes, and what is stranger, we find them elbowing the white man
at the work bench, and taking from the white man those jobs no
negro has a right to contract from in the absence of his master or
74legal agent." This problem was caused by economic competition 
between both free blacks and slaves and the white laboring class.
72 Ibid.
73 Monroe Democrat. September 18, October 2, 16, 1850.
74 Ibid.., October 2, 1850.
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It was causing alienation from the institution of slavery at a 
time when it was under attack from those living above the Mason- 
Dixon line. Black mechanics should be kept on the plantations and 
patronage should be given to the white craftsmen in order to prevent 
internal dissension which could be fatal in a struggle against the 
North:^ "Should resistance to northern usurpation become necessary 
and the better opinion is that but a span of time intervenes 
between us and it, the slave owner may find that by useless 
oppression he has driven from him the strong arm and the brave 
heart, not only of the mechanic, but all others who have no interest 
in preserving an institution that has been used tc> make slaves of 
white men and their families beggars.
Governor Quitman, the most prominent state official opposed 
to the Compromise of 1850 gave impetus to the resistance movement.
He was apparently in a state of depression about conditions in the 
South, because he wrote his daughter that "whenever I indulge in a 
reverie, my mind unconsciously falls into reflections on the
77melancholy state of the [illegible], insulted and injured South." 
Quitman believed that secession might be the only answer to the
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 John Quitman to Louise Quitman, October 1, 1850, 
Quitman Family Papers, (Southern Historical Collection, University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
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crisis over black slavery, and therefore called the state
legislature into session for late November.^ in this proclamation,
he stated his reason for wanting methods to stop Northern "attacks
on the South": "the abolition, by Congress of the slave trade in
the District of Columbia, and other acts of the Federal government
done and threatened, leave no reasonable hope that the aggression
upon the rights of the people of the slave-holding states will
cease until, by direct or indirect means, their domestic institutions 
79
are overthrown." Although Quitman believed that secession was 
probably inevitable he also thought that a meeting of the state 
legislature might be able to provide other means of stopping
XT . u  8 0Northern aggressions.
Support for the Governor's proclamation immediately came 
from the Democratic press. The Vicksburg Weekly Sentinel stated 
that Quitman's message had startled the apathetic among the 
Mississippi electorate: "Let us then arouse, the listless to a
sense of their dangers, encourage the wavering; call the spirit of 
the resolute and brave; and join one and all in a united effort to
78 J. H. F. Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. 
Quitman, Ma jor-Gencral, USA and Governor of the State of Mississippi 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, I860), II, 37-43. Hereinafter
cited as Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman.
79 Jackson Mississippian, October 11, 1850.
80 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman,
44-45.
maintain the rights of the South, in the Union or out of the 
81Union." The Jackson Mississippian also approved the Governor's 
message since "nearly every measure contemplated by the last 
Legislature, as calculated to subvert the great objects of our 
Constitutional Union, have been directly or indirectly adopted by
OO
Congress. . . .  We cannot submit . .
The Governor was also supported by local leaders in the
States Right's movement. Charles D. Fontaine, a State Righter from
northern Mississippi, wrote a public letter which supported
Quitman's views. He agreed that Mississippi legislators should be
called into session so as to obtain an expression of the
electorate's feelings about Northern aggression. Fontaine hoped
that the long hostility of the North would make the legislature
81calculate the value of the Union to the South.
Fontaine argued that prevention of the expansion slavery by 
the North could produce cataclysmic results. There was a potential 
population explosion among black slaves which made expansion 
mandatory or slavery would become unprofitable. Any large increase 
in the Negro population would eventually cause lower-class whites 
to migrate from the South unless the trend was reversed. The only
81 Watson, "John A. Quitman, " 117.
82 Jackson Mississippian, October 4, 1850.
83 Ibid., October 25, 1850, quoting Pontotoc Sovercign, 
September 24, 1850.
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solution for this problem--westward expansion of the peculiar
84institution--however, was blocked by the North. Therefore,
Fontaine predicted dire results if the North successfully achieved
this goal: "If this cannot be done [slave expansion] the "sunny"
South . . . must surrender to the insensate Negro---or else
anticipating this sacrifice and harkening only to the instinct of
self protection and attatchment[sic] to birthright and country,
regardless of the claims of humanity, we shall extinguish all
contest for its occupancy in the indiscriminate massacre of the 
85African race." The slave population had to be allowed into the
territories or race war was the only alternative for the white 
86man in the South.
Fontaine did not believe that the remedy to the South's 
problems could be found within the boundaries of the Union.
Northern men would not aid the South in transporting the "natural 
increase" from the black population out of the restricted boundaries 
of the cotton states. Secession, in his opinion, was the only 
sensible alternative for the Southern white man to adopt. It was 
possible, that out of the Union, there might be better protection 
for slave property through treaties with the North, use of armed 
force, and "measures of reprisal" which were now forbidden to
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
244
Southerners. He concluded that the position of the South would 
be more secure if she formed a Southern Confederacy which would be 
prepared to defend itself against the hostility of the North. This 
new Southern nation could adopt free trade policies with Europe 
which might hurt the Northern economy and cause her to petition for 
the formation of a new Union; the South could then accept or reject
o 7
this proposition on terms favorable to herself.
Albert G. Brown, an important States Righter, represented a 
militant but less extreme point of view on the slavery crisis. The 
most important speech which Brown delivered was at Ellwood Spring 
near Port Gibson on November 2, 1850. In it he concentrated mainly 
on specific objections to the Compromise. He believed there had 
been a definite effort to exclude the South's black property from 
California by threat of emancipation and then by passage of the free-
Q O
soil constitution. Congress bore responsibilities for these
OQ
actions in California by a group of "mere sojouners. California's
admission was followed by Northern effort "to wrest from the
87 Ibid.
88 M. W. Cluskey (ed.), The Speeches. Messages and Other 
Writings of the Honorable Albert G. Brown, A Senator from the State 
of Mississippi (Philadelphia: J. B. Smith and Company, 1859),
247-55. Hereinafter cited as the Speeches of the Hon. Albert G. 
Brown.
89 Ibid., 250.
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slaveholding state of Texas, one third of her rightful property
[Texas boundary dispute]."^0 The only reason that there was any
dispute about Texas' title to the land was: "Slavery! Slavery!!
91Slavery!!!" Brown pointed out that the North was determined that
no new slave states would enter the Union and that it hoped by
attaching this area to New Mexico to make it free. He declared
further that Texas had no choice but to accept the ten million
92dollars as compensation: "The United States speaking through the
Executive and Congress says to Texas: 'We want this country, and we
mean to have it; you are weak, and we are strong. Give up the
country quietly, and we will pay you ten millions of dollars;
refuse, and here is the army, the navy and the militia;' . . . turn
your eyes toward Texas; see her feeble and weak, without money,
without arms; in debt, and without credit; and tell me if it is
left to her free choice to determine whether she will accept or
93refuse this proposition?"
Representative Brown was also critical of those parts of the 
Compromise which dealt directly with slave property. He objected 
particularly to the law abolishing the slave trade in the nation's
90 Ibid., 251.
91 Ibid.. 252.
92 Ibid., 251.
93 Ibid.. 254.
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capital since it contained provisions which could emancipate
slaves: "It was an act to punish the intentions of masters and to
emancipate their slaves. . . .  It is to all intents and purposes an
94
act of abolition." The Fugitive Slave Act, praised by Southern
Unionists, was not a real compromise since it merely enacted
95legislation to enforce "constitutional" guarantees.
Despite strong objections to the Compromise, and his
reputation as a secessionist, Brown was not a John Quitman. He was
not appalled by the cry of disunion, but he was still willing to
remain in the Union: ". . . but it must be a Union of equals. . . .
I will not consent that the South shall become the Ireland of the
country. Better far that we dissolve our political connection with
96the North than live connected with her as her slaves or vassals."
Thus Southerners must resist the North which "will inflict all that 
the South will bear even to a final emancipation of the negro 
race."97
Brown's concept of resistance was similar to that proposed by 
Jefferson Davis. The South should present specific demands to the 
North. These included: 1) the return of the disputed southwest
94 Ibid., 253.
95 Ibid., 255.
96 Ibid., 256.
97 Ibid.. 259.
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land to Texas; 2) the right of slave owners to travel with their
property into the territories with federal protection; 3) an end
to Congressional interference with slavery; 4) the enactment of an
effective slave rendition law; and 5) the right of a pro-slavery
98territory to be admitted to the Union. If these were not met, 
the South might be forced to secede but she would "be sustained by 
God, and our own consciences."^
Fontaine and Brown were representative of two segments of 
thought in the new party. Fontaine represented a smaller part of the 
States Rights party which believed, with Governor Quitman, that the 
only answer to the South's problem was to leave the Union immediately-- 
either separately or in cooperation with other Southern states. In 
contrast, Brown, like Jefferson Davis, was willing to remain within 
the Union if the South could obtain certain guarantees from the 
national government. If these demands were not met, then Brown 
believed that secession would inevitably follow. To put it 
colloquially, Fontaine's wing of the party ran joyously toward 
disunion while Brown's wing walked reluctantly.^*^
The Union forces had begun their campaign actively in 
September with a rally for the Union held at the courthouse in
98 Ibid., 259-60.
99 Ibid.
100 Cluskey, The Speeches of the Hon. Albert G. Brown, 
247-61; Jackson Mississippian, September-December, 1850; Rowland 
(ed.), Jefferson Davis, I, passim.
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Natchez. One B. Pendleton presided over the meeting which passed
resolutions declaring loyalty to the Union, support for the
Compromise of 1850 and condemnation of the Nashville Resolutions.
Various speakers at the meeting expressed approval of the
Compromise and opposition to secession. Judge James H. Veazie
stated: "The Senate bills have passed, and are now the law of the
land. If constitutional, as a law-abiding people, we are bound to 
102sustain them;" Colonel A. L. Bingaman declared his opposition
to disunion: "Gain by the dissolution of the Union? What and
103when? There are none more free, more happy than ourselves."
The consensus of the meeting was that the Compromise had brought
104peace to a troubled nation.
Judge William Sharkey, speaking at Vicksburg on October 8, 
1850, maintained that Congress, in passing the Adjustment bills, 
had not violated Mississippi r i g h t s . H e  also presented the 
alternative to submission: "Now the question is what is to be done.
Shall we submit or secede from the Union? There is no middle ground 
that I can see in the present. . . .  If there were, I might be
101 Natchez Courier, September 24, 1850.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., October lb, 1850.
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content to take it. . . .  To resist, is to dismember the Union.
He further held that he was willing to acquiesce on the issue of
California since "abridgement" of the interstate slave trade or
abolition itself had not o c c u r r e d . I n  concluding Sharkey stated
that he hoped "it would be a long time, ere a world was called
108upon to groan the funeral dirge of this Republic."
Another prominent Union speaker was John D. Freeman, a
former Attorney General of Mississippi. Speaking at Canton, on
November 6, 1850, he emphasized that Congress had not violated the
rights of Mississippi by passing the Adjustment bills. These
bills did not transgress the limitations established by the
October 1849 meeting in Jackson on the slavery question. This
meeting had not considered the admission of California to the Union
as sufficient cause for resistance by Mississippi. Other provisions
of the Compromise were also just or constitutional; division of the
Mexican cession, for example, was equitable since it allowed
Southerners to migrate to Utah and New Mexico with their chattel
property. Congress had sufficient police power to abolish the slave
trade in the District of Columbia just as Mississippi had done for 
109eleven years. Since the Compromise was legal, Mississippi would
106 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850, 173.
107 Natchez Courier. October 16, 1850.
108 Ibid.
109 Jackson Flag of the Union. November 22, 1850.
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submit to it "as the supreme law of the land . . . she will never 
be found in a state of rebellion against laws of this character. 
Mississippi is a Union loving, law-abiding s t a t e . H o w e v e r ,  
this moderate Mississippian did support economic retaliation against 
the North as the best method of securing Southern rights.
By mid-November 1850 the States Right forces in Mississippi 
supported the idea of a state convention. Governor Quitman took 
the lead when he addressed the state legislature which was 
dominated by men who wanted Mississippi to resist actively the 
Adjustment measures passed by the Thirty-First Congress. He began 
by stating that there was a natural conflict between the sections 
which was exacerbated by the fact that most Northern parties were 
anti-slavery. The Compromise of 1850 had resulted in the exclusion 
of the South from the West which hurt the financial value of slave 
labor that was closely tied to the expansion of the peculiar institu­
tion into new lands. Quitman dealt at length with California's 
admission which was virtually the same as passage of the Wilmot 
Proviso. The bill that ended the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia also established a precedent for the abolition of the 
peculiar institution itself. Northerners had triumphed in the 
sectional contest, and the Federal government was extremely hostile
11° Ibid. 
Ill Ibid.
112to black bondage. The "destruction of slavery" would not come 
immediately unless all white Southerners were "murdered", but 
Northerners were determined that slavery would perish even if the 
South was harmed: "The assumption by Congress of jurisdiction
over the subject of slavery, the constant evidences of growing 
hostility to it, and more than all the declaration sent abroad, and 
now received as inexorable law, that the area of slavery is never 
to be extended--that whatever may be the wants of the country, 
however the slavery district may be crowded with population, whatever 
vices and evils may result from redundant population, or labor 
unemployment, this doomed district is to be hedged in by a wall of 
fire, and the common, natural and national right of expansion 
to be denied to it, are startling f a c t s . I t  was mandatory 
that the South resist, and the Governor congratulated Mississippians 
for not being submissive.
He recommended that the legislature call for a primary 
meeting which would begin to combat violations of Southern rights.
The Northern majority would probably not provide for the division 
of California at the 36* 30' line or for the end of anti-slavery 
agitation, but he believed that an attempt at reconcilation with
112 Jackson Mississippian, November 22, 1850; Rowland, 
Jefferson Davis, I, 602-603.
113 Jackson Mississippian, November 22, 1850.
114 Ibid.
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the free-soil states had to be tried. gut concluded:
"[in] the event of refusal [to grant Southern demands], I do not
hesitate to express my decided opinion, that the only effectual
remedy to evils which must continue to grow from year to year, is
to be found in the prompt and peaceable secession of the aggrieved
s t a t e s . A l t h o u g h  there was no way to predict the course
Mississippi would adopt, he felt that secession either— cooperative
or separate--"should be kept in view."^^
In response to the Governor's message the state began to
debate the question of calling a state convention. The vast
majority of each legislative house favored the convention, but
there was opposition by individual members. Representative Griffin
of Chickasaw County did not believe the legislature possessed the
power to call a convention. There was also debate about whether
the holding of a convention itself should be submitted to a vote
of the people. Both houses of the legislature, however, followed
Quitman's lead and voted to call a state convention to meet on the
second Monday in November 1851. Elections for the convention would
118
be held on the first Monday in September 1851.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Jackson Flat* of the Union. December 6, 1850; Jackson 
Mississippian, January 17, 1851.
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Legislative members next expressed their hostility
towards Henry Stuart Foote and the Compromise of 1850. In debate
Foote was generally critized, but he did have a few defenders.
Senator Stark stated that he was opposed to censuring Foote while
there was a sectional crisis in Washington. It would only produce
"acrimonious feelings . . . "  between Foote's friends and opponents.
Further opposition to censure came from representative Nabors,
who favored the Compromise, and asked whether the legislators had
the support of their constituents in voting to censure the Senator.
Resolutions were then passed overwhelmingly which praised everyone,
except Foote, in the Congressional delegation for their bold
opposition to the Compromise of 1850. Foote was censored by the
legislature which declared that Mississippi's interests were not
120"safe in his keeping."
To counter the effects of the Southern Rights-dominated 
legislature, a Union meeting was held on November 18 in Jackson. 
Prominent Unionists from both political parties attended this 
meeting which was the decisive step in the formation of the Union 
party. Judge Sharkey was chosen president of the gathering and 
Foote was the principal speaker. These Union men praised Foote 
and resolved that the Compromise of 1850 was consistent with the
119 Jackson Flag of the Union. November 29, 1850; 
Jackson Mississippian, November 29, 1850; Rowland (ed.), 
Jefferson Davis. I, 602-603.
120 Rowland (cd.), Jefferson Davis. I, 603.
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121resolutions passed in October 1849. But they also believed 
that there were certain boundaries which must not be transgressed 
by the Federal government: "1. the interference by Congressional
legislation with the institution of slavery in the States;
2. interference in the trade in slaves between the States;
3. the abolition by Congress of slavery in the District of Columbia;
4. the refusal by Congress to admit a new State into the Union on
the grounds of her tolerating slavery. . .; 5. the passage of any
law by Congress prohibiting slavery in any of the territories; and
1226. the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law . . . "
A vigorous expression of States Right's opinion during the 
winter of 1850-1851 came from a group of radical legislators.
These men revised a document which was written by Alexander M.
Clayton of Marshall and published as the "Address of the Committee 
appointed by the Members of the Legislature Friendly to Southern 
Rights to the People of Mississippi." In the early years of the 
United States problems of foreign affairs had kept the issue of 
slavery dormant. However, after the 1820 crisis over the
121 Jackson Flag of the Union. November 22, 1850, May 23, 
1851. There was an address drawn up by a committee after the 
meeting which discussed the Compromise of 1850 and implied criticism 
of Quitman for calling the legislature into special session.
122 Ibid.„ November 22, 1850.
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admission of Missouri to the Union and the exclusion of the South 
from the Mexican cession, it was obvious that an anti-slavery 
war was being actively waged. Since political equilibrium between 
the sections had been destroyed in 1850, it was necessary that the 
state convention be convened to demand changes in the United States 
Constitution. These amendments would forbid unjust taxation, 
require the return of escaped slaves, end all agitation on the 
question of slavery in Congress, and extend the Missouri Compromise 
line to the Pacific where it would be the southern boundary of 
California. If Southern grievances were redressed by the North, 
the Union would survive. But a rejection of Mississippi's demands
.J
would be met by calling a Southern convention which might even
1 2 3recommend the creation of a new Southern nation. In concluding,
the authors discussed the problem of preserving the Union and the
impossibility of emancipation:
We have no desire for a severance of this Union. Long 
may it survive, if it can be brought back to its pristine 
purity. . . .  We are ready much to preserve it. But we 
could not get rid of slavery if we could. We have not
the means of selling them away, if we were willing to part
with them without compensation. And, let it be borne in 
mind, that if a payment to us of anything like the value 
of our slaves be made the condition of their removal, it 
is simply impracticable. As it is evident upon the least
reflection, that the appropriation of a sufficient amount
of capital to this object and its consequent abstraction
123 Jackson Mississippian, December 20, 1850. The analysis 
of this document was taken from the Mississippian although it was 
widely circulated through the state in papers like the Natchez Free 
Trader, January 8, 1851; Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 
53-58 discussed new evidence to establish the original authorship 
of the document.
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from the commerce of the world, would derange every 
branch of business, agricultural, commercial and 
manufactural throughout Christendom. There can be no 
equality of racees [sic]. They cannot live amongst us 
except as our slaves, or as our masters. The whole 
history of the past proves this. One or the other must 
have the ascendancy. We must maintain our superiority 
or surrender the lands of our fathers.*^4
Colonization and any type of racial equality were impossible goals
for these white men who stood ready to defend the subordination of
black people.
Although these Mississippi radicals spoke boldly in their 
manifesto, they were discouraged by the lack of militancy in the 
other Southern states. The upper South was apathetic, while all the 
states of the lower South were divided on the course of action. 
Georgians, though not totally happy about the Compromise, had 
acquiesced in its passage at their December Convention. Louisiana 
was considered a lost cause, and radicals in Florida and Alabama 
were struggling against strong pro-Union sentiments. The only 
state, in late 1850, which seemed to stand with the extremists of 
Mississippi was South Carolina which itself was divided along the 
lines of cooperation versus separate state action.
These outside forces were distressing to Southern Rights 
forces, which also faced the temporary loss of John Quitman as their 
leader. Quitman had been involved in discussions with Narciso 
Lopez over possible leadership of a filibustering expedition to
124 Jackson Mississippian, December 20, 1850.
Cuba in March 1850. Although the Governor had declined to serve
as a leader for the expedition, he did recommend officers and may
have "helped supply the expedition with arms from the state
arsenal."125 jje was indicted in June 1850 by the Federal
government but claimed that as the head of a sovereign state "he
was immune from prosecution" until the end of his term. A possible
confrontation between federal-state power was averted on
February 3, 1851 when Quitman resigned from office. All charges
were dropped against him in mid-March 1851 but his predicament had
made the State's Rights Associations anxious about the future of
126one of their most outspoken leaders.
Union men in Mississippi appeared confident during the winter 
of 1850-1851. One who was representative of them, D. J. Walworth of 
Natchez, carried on extensive correspondence with his son in New 
England. The father was a Unionist who believed that the North 
would "do us justice and carry out the Fugitive Slave bill and we 
will settle the troubles in Mississippi and leave Genl Quitman
127
with not much more than a corporals guard." In a letter in
125 Ray Broussard, "Governor John A. Quitman and the Lopez 
Expeditions of 1851-1852," The Journal of Mississippi History. 
XXVIII, (May, 1966), 112.
126 Ibid., 113-120.
127 D. J. Walworth to Son, Douglas, December 1, 1850, 
Douglas Walworth and Family Papers (Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana).
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December 1850 Walworth commented on Henry Foote: "Mr. Foote
is not a great man I believe. But he is a very quick sprightly
gentleman and we have no reason to doubt his patriotism or charge
improper motives to his conduct . . .  he for the good of his
country--advocated them [Compromise bills] and had more influence
in the Senate to pass them than any other save the gentlemen
[Cass, Clay, Webster] before named and by that act periled his office
128and high station to save his country . . . "
Mississippi Unionists continued to work actively to win
electoral support. In Jackson the editors of the Flag of the Union
kept up a barrage of criticism against the Quitman forces who
129appeared ready to move the state toward secession. Union men in
contrast were protecting Southern rights "without a threatened
130resort to disunion." The editors also argued that the problem
of an excess slave population would not be solved by secession that
would only force the South to expand by force of arms into areas
where she already had a legal right to migrate with her black 
131property.
Local Union associations also tried to influence public 
opinion. A meeting of the association of Holmes County on
128 D. J. Walworth to Son, Douglas, December 20, 1850, ibid.
129 Jackson Flag of the Union. January-June, 1851.
130 Ibid. , February 7, 1851.
131 Ibid. , February 14, 1851.
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January 8, 1851, was addressed by John J. Hooker who declared that
past wrongs did not justify a dissolution of the Union. The Union
Association of Natchez planned to meet on February 22, Washington's
birthday, to renew their allegiance to the Union and elect delegates
132to the nominating convention in May 1851. And a meeting held 
at Tullula on February 10 resolved: ". . . Secession, Disunion and
Revolution are, practically, the same thing; and whilst we assert 
the right of revolution, if our government should become a source 
of oppression . . . yet . . .  we hold ourselves bound . . .  to 
sustain our whole system of Government against the machinations of
1 O O
all malcontents, who seek its overthrow. .
On the national level Foote worked for the Union cause during
the winter of 1851. He arrived back in Washington for the interim
134session and presented his own censure resolutions. He engaged in 
speaking tours in the North, and called for sectional peace. In a 
speech on Washington's birthday in New York Foote stated: " . . .  a 
difficult and perilous crisis has arisen in our national affairs, . . . 
and. . . .  In spite of the solemn advice of Washington, in his
132 Ibid.. January 17, 1851; February 14, 1851, quoting 
the Natchez Courier.
133 Jackson Flag of the Union. February 21, 1851.
134 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 65-66. 
Jackson Flag of the Union. January 24, 1851 quoting Washington 
Union. March 14, 1851; Jackson Mississippian. March 21, 1851.
farewell address to his countrymen, parties characterized by
"geographic determinations" have of late sprung up among us.
Fanaticism, sectional jealousy, and lawless ambition, have, in the
last year or two, contrived most grieviously to inflame the public
mind of the nation, and to threaten the Union itself with sudden 
135disruption." He wanted to end the divisions between the North
and South, which was being threatened by charges that the Fugitive
Slave Law was not being enforced. Therefore Foote held that the
rendition law would be faithfully executed in the North even if
federal troops had to be utilized by President Fillmore. This
positive language was in accord with his degire that the Union be
1preserved and harmony between the sections restored.
At the end of the Senate session in March 1851 Foote 
returned home to lead the Union party. At Canton, Mississippi, 
Foote and John Freeman engaged in a debate with Representative 
William McWillie who represented the Southern Rights forces. Foote 
claimed that the entire South, except for South Carolina, was 
submitting to the Compromise and that Mississippi would follow this 
pattern. Further speaking engagements made Foote the obvious 
choice to lead the newly formed Union coalition. On May 5, 1851,
135 Jackson Flag of the Union. March 14, 1851.
136 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 579, 598-99.
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the Union party, meeting in the state House of Representatives,
1 3 7nominated Henry Stuart Foote' as their standard bearer.
States Right's forces were laboring to maintain their 
cohesiveness while the Unionists appeared unified. The editor of 
the Monroe Democrat, J. H. F. Caldwell, resigned from the paper and 
condemned the States Right camp as containing secessionists who 
wanted to destroy the Union. This former radical who had discussed 
the dire consequences of emancipation could not accept the 
extremism of the "ultras" like Quitman. His resignation 
demonstrates clearly the tension which always existed in the ante­
bellum Southern mind between love of the Union and fear of 
138emancipation.
Caldwell's defection was not the only problem for the States 
Rights forces. Representative Jacob Thompson wrote a long letter to 
the citizens of Mississippi in which he frankly admitted that 
efforts at resistance were not possible. Party leaders were also 
trying to change the image of the party from that of a group of 
extreme Fire-eaters to one of strong but responsible resistance men.
137 Jackson Flag of the Union, April 11, May 9, 1851.
138 Ibid ., February 14, 1851; Monroe Democrat, November 18,
1850. Caldwell had taken over the paper after the editorials and 
reports had been written on race-class tension.
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These practical leaders did not believe that a radical like John
Quitman would be able to attract sufficient electoral support.1"*^
In order to boost their political fortunes, the States
Righters discussed violations of Southern rights and the problem of
abolition. Representative William McWillie wrote his constituents
about the growing tendency toward emancipation especially among
Henry Clay's followers.^® Abolition, he emphasized, meant "the
141social and political equality of the negro and the white man."
His views were in accord with those expounded by Representative
Featherstone who denied that he was a disunionist while maintaining
that he was working to preserve the Union as it was created in 1787.
The Compromise bills, which were a "scheme of plunder," had been
resisted because slavery was not allowed in free-soil California.
The belief that the Mexican anti-slavery laws were still valid in
the southwest also kept Southerners from migrating with their black
142slaves into these territories. The conversion of Texas into 
free-soil would be paid for with Southern money while the 
emancipation features in the Slave Trade Law for the nation's capital
139 Columbus Southern Standard. April 5, May 3, 1851; 
Jackson Mississippian. March 21, 1851; Ranck, Albert Gallatin Brown. 
86, 88.
140 Jackson Mississippian. January 31, 1851.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.. February 7, 1851.
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was "the entering wedge to the assumption of jurisdiction over
slavery within the district, and to general abolition."143
Featherstone believed that resistance to the Compromise was
vital to the South. Submission would only convert the South into an
American Ireland. In order to prevent this calamity he wanted a
Southern convention to demand the right of slaveholders to take
144black property into Utah and New Mexico. California should be 
divided at the 36° 30' line and the Convention should insist that 
Northerners recognize their "rights" in any territories of the 
United States:
This latter demand is a point of vital importance to the 
institution of the South--If no more slave territory is 
to be acquired, and no more slave States admitted to the 
Union, the overthrow of the institution of slavery is not 
only certain in the States where it now exists, but the 
day is not very distant when it will be done. Localize 
it, confine it within its present boundaries, and the 
finale will be a war of extermination between the races 
of the South. They can never live on terms of social 
and political equality there. And I do not hesitate to 
say that I will prefer seeing the Union dissolve a 
thousand times over, or the South filling one common 
but honorable grave, rather than the whites and blacks 
living on terms of social and political equality in the 
Southern States.
Mississippi should also convene a state convention to consider means 
of preserving white supremacy; it should create a program of
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
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non-intercourse with the North that would strengthen the state's
economy in case secession became necessary.
The necessity of protecting the South against Northern
attacks was emphasized in an editorial in the Columbus Southern
Standard. There was an increasing tendency toward "centralism" in
the United States which was dangerous to the slaveholding minority
section. Northerners who had always sought to dominate the
Federal government, had achieved this purpose when the political
equilibrium between the sections was destroyed with California's
147admission as a state. The North would continue its drive for
power which had already stopped the expansion of slavery:
". . . the north is gradually walling the slave states in, and ____
in a few decades, will be able to harass the upholders of the
institution by the evils growing out of overpopulation to an extent
that may render them desirous of abolishing it,--or what is the
more probable,--wring from the slaveholder a TRIBUTE IN THE WAY OF
TAXATION FOR SUFFERING IT TO EXIST! The North do not desire the
abolition of slavery-- . . . she desires to make it more subservient
to her interests . . . with a hope of gaining a concession not for
148humanities sake, but her own gain in dollars and cents."
146 Ibid.. see the Columbus Southern Standard, May 3, 1851 
for a discussion of this suggestion.
147 Columbus Southern Standard. February 22, 1851.
148 Ibid.
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Overpopulation by the rapid increase in the slave community would
also cause the South to conquer an area in the Pacific west for
herself, which would end the Union. The editor wanted the South to
unite in order to stop the national government which was controlled
149by a Northern majority.
By March 1851 the States Rights forces in Mississippi were 
calling for a gubernatorial convention. The Mississippian praised 
the Southern Rights forces for not striving for political offices 
during the winter of 1850-51, but the editors felt it was time to 
begin preparing for the political canvass of 1851. Other States 
Right papers supported the call for a convention of the States 
Rights Democratic party which included both Southern Rights 
Democrats and their allies, the State Rights Whigs. These forces, 
according to the Mississippian had to resist the Union-Whig party 
which endangered the South's institutions: "Let meetings be held,
and let faithful and true men be appointed in all parts of the 
state to meet together . . . and select our standard bearers in the 
contest we are about to wage with Federal Whiggery with its 
deceptive guise of "Unionism." Let the North come forward in all 
the majority of her strength. Let the voice of the great east be 
heard. The game is up! The wolf of Whiggery, guant, famished
149 Ibid.
150 Jackson Mississippian. March 7, 28, 1851.
266
malignant, exterminating is on the walk. The demon of Abolition, 
too, which submission encourages, must be met. It now looks upon 
the South and meditates her destruction, . . . Let us, then 
press forward to the work before us, determined never to permit 
the strong-hold of Democracy to fall into the hands of the e n e m y . * 
Thus, the Southern Rights forces pressured for a campaign based on 
racism.and the traditional loyalty of the white masses to the 
state's Democratic party.
On June 15, 1851 two hundred and fifty Southern Rights
delegates assembled to choose their candidates in this critical
contest. The assemblage, nominated John A. Quitman as their
gubernatorial candidate despite some factionalism. Some convention
members apparently wanted Jefferson Davis as their nominee, but
152
he declined to seek the office. The party also adopted a
platform which reaffirmed state control over slavery:
"That the institution of slavery is left by 
the Constitution exclusively under the control 
of the State in which it exists, as a part of 
their domestic policy, which they, and they 
only, have the right to regulate, abolish or 
perpetuate, as they may severally judge expedient 
and that all attempts on the part of Congress 
or others, to interfere with the subject, either
151 Ibid., March 7, 1851.
152 Rueben Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and 
Mississippians (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 
315-17; McLendon, John A. Quitman, 348; Jackson Mississippian, 
June 20, 1851.
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directly or indirectly are in violation of the 
constitution, dangerous to the rights and safety 
of the South, and ought to be promptly resisted."153
There was a call for the legislature to encourage migration to the
Southwest and opposition to the Compromise of 1850; they upheld the
right of peaceful secession, but stated that it's "exercise by the
state of Mississippi, under existing circumstances, would be
inexpedient and is a proposition which does not meet the approbation
of this Convention.Unfortunately for the Southern Righters
in Mississippi, this somewhat moderate platform did not dispell
their image as a party of crafty secessionists lead by Fire-eater
Quitman.
On June 26, 1851 Quitman wrote Governor Whitemarsh B.
Seabrook about the problems of the radicals in Mississippi. He
recognized that Foote was a "wily and adroit opponent," and that
he would have to campaign vigorously in order to win the election;
the results of the gubernatorial contest would determine whether
Mississippi choose the path of submission or resistance to the
155Compromise of 1850. Mississippi was prepared to join a 
Southern Confederacy, but she did not have the military capacity, 
internal unity, or trading outlets to function as a separate
153 Jackson Mississippian, June 20, 1851.
154 Ibid. It is apparent that there was a division within 
the States Rights party between "true" secessionists and more 
practical politicians who wanted to win offices in the 1851 elections.
155 John A. Quitman to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 26, 1851 
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress).
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nation: "We can however prepare to take position promptly when
other states move. Thus far I think this state will go if the
Southern rights party succeed, of which there is scarcely a doubt."*'**’
Quitman stressed that he maintained the right of secession and had not
retreated from any of the previous positions which he had held.^--^
However, he believed that South Carolina would have to take the
initiative in awakening a sleepy, apathetic South: "Nowhere but in
this state is there any authoritative action proposed and here it
requires a mighty struggle to over come the [illegible] inertia of
a people living in comfort. Moral influences have never produced
158
revolutions without an exciting cause--." Southerners, he
concluded, were apathetic even though their equality was destroyed
159
and black slavery threatened.
During the remainder of the summer an exciting campaign 
was carried on for seats in the state convention and various 
political offices. The chief issue was the Compromise of 1850, with 
popular interest focusing on the canvass conducted by John Quitman 
and Henry Foote. It was generally conceded by knowledgeable 
politicians that Foote was a more attractive campaigner than
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
Quitman. He had a superior ability to communicate with the white 
yeoman of Mississippi. His vigorous debating style which was not 
particularly appropriate for the chamber of the United States Senate 
was most effective when campaigning.
The two candidates agreed to a joint canvass which was 
characterized by optimism and violence. In early July Foote gave 
a favorable evaluation of Unionism in Mississippi: "I have told
you that Mississippi was one of the most reliable Union states in 
the Confederacy. We will prove this to be literally true in 
September. Quitman and Quitmanism are dead in Mississippi."161 
This prediction was partially the result of Foote's tactics which 
identified Quitman with immediate secession. After Foote took to 
taunting the governor during his speeches, a fight finally broke 
out at Sledgeville which Quitman described: "While thus speaking
I was several times interrupted by Senator Foote, and at length I
160 Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians. 
315-17; Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote," 319; 
Parkerson, "Henry Stuart Foote of Mississippi," 177, 340; Rawson, 
Party Politics in Mississippi," 71. Parkerson concluded that Foote 
was a very effective campaigner in 1851: "In summary, Foote aroused 
strong emotional responses in his audiences, made up of a mixture
of Whigs and Democrats, who like him, and with generous assistance 
from him had come to fear for the Union. They applauded, loudly and 
vociferously. The crowds appeared to grow larger as the campaign 
drew to an end."
161 Henry S. Foote to Howell Cobb, July 9, 1851, Ulrich 
Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs. 
Alexander H. Stephens. and Howe11 Cobb in Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year 1911 (Washington, 1913), 
II, 242; Jackson Mississippian, July 18, August 1, 1851.
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heard his voice near me on my right, exclaim you are a liar, and
turning toward him I saw him advancing and aiming a blow at me,
which slightly grazed my person. Before I could turn upon him, he
quickly glided back out of the reach of my arm, and as I sprang
towards him a number of gentlemen rushed in and protected him from
merited chastisement, but not until I had dealt him a blow with my
fist, and one with my foote [sic] ."162 stopped the joint
canvass, and both men proceeded to justify their actions. Newspapers
defended their particular candidate, but the evaluation of the
Jackson Mississippian may be substantially correct; the paper concluded
that the fight was the result of Foote's love of conflict.
In this period of crisis for the radical forces, the
Mississippian. discussed the issues which might motivate the
electorate. The national government, in the editor's opinion, was
controlled by abolition forces which could turn the South into
164another "St. Domingo"— with all the horrors of emancipation.
Southerners were faced with a crisis that was the result of the 
passage of a Compromise that was the virtual enactment of the 
Wilmot Proviso:
162 "To the People of Mississippi," July 19, 1851
(broadside) John A. Quitman and Family Papers; See also Gonzalez, "The
Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote", 102-106 for a more detailed 
account of this event.
163 Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote," 106.
164 Jackson Mississippian. July 18, 1851.
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"The Wilmot Proviso is, in effect, the law of land.
The South has been excluded from the territories.
Abolition states are being formed all around us. 
and the extreme Southern States, which, but a few years 
ago, imagined themselves entirely secure will be 
sub j ected to the same border encroachments, and 
intrigues with their slaves, which have made 
Delaware an abolition State, depreciated the value 
of slaves in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, and 
are causing them to send that kind of property South 
that it may be disposed of before it is utterly 
valueless."i5?
Since slavery property could not expand westward it also meant that 
an increasing number of free-soil states would enter the Union; 
these "Northern states would gradually provide the necessary 
majority to amend the United States Constitution so that Congress 
would have "the power to abolish slavery.11 Therefore the 
editor called upon Mississippians who might be wavering in their 
support of the States Rights party to reject both the Compromise 
and submission to Northern aggressions: ". . . you can refrain
from lauding these measures as constitutional and just . . .
You can refrain from voting your approval of them at the ballot 
box. You can mark with deep and ineffaceable brand, the Southern 
traitors who assisted the Northern fanatics in palming them upon 
you. You can keep from licking the hand that smites you."^^
165 Ibid-
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
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The leaders of the States Rights party also tried to
influence the electorate by publicly expressing their opinions on
the issues. Quitman continued his speaking tour and Jefferson
Davis wrote a group of Mississippi radicals that the expanding
power of the Federal government had to be restrained:
"Usurpation has marked the history of all limited governments, and
unless the states have the capacity to restrain this tendency in our
federal government, its history must add another to the many
169instances in which power has trampled upon right, . . . "
Congressman Brown, speaking in Pascagoula in early August, stated 
the Compromise of 1850 had violated the "constitutional" rights of 
the South: ". . . it established precepts and principles dangerous
and destructive to the interests of the Southern people, and 
tending either to the ultimate overthrow of slavery, or the 
extinguishment of the white race."^^
Senator Davis also traveled to small towns like Aberdeen 
where he delivered detailed attacks on the Compromise. He
168 Jefferson Davis to J. H. Robinson and others, July 18, 
1851, Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 82; Jackson 
Mississippian, July 25, August 15, 1851.
169 Jefferson Davis to J. H. Robinson and others, July 18, 
1851, Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 82.
170 Jackson Mississippian, August 29, 1851.
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emphasized that he had voted against the Adjustment bills in
accordance with the state legislature's instructions, and because
he believed them harmful to the South's domestic institution. The
Senator also noted that reports were circulating that lower-class
white men, who did not own slaves, would support the Union party.
Poor whites, Davis believed, could not "be so blind to their own
interests, as to be thus cheated out of their privileges. . . .
That now they stand upon the broad level of equality with the rich
man. Equal to him in everything, save that they did not own so
much property . . .  no white man, in a slaveholding community, was
172the menial servant of any one." The white man's status as a
superior to the Negro was guaranteed because "the distinction
between the classes throughout the slaveholding states, is a
1 7 3
distinction of color."
Emancipation of the black man would directly harm the 
interests of yeoman in Mississippi. Their destiny would be the 
same as white men in the North where distinction between social 
classes was based on wealth--not c o l o r . T h e  lower class white
171 Rowland, Jefferson Davis. II, 70-73; Jackson 
Mississippian, July 25, 1851.
172 Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 73.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., 73-74.
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"would become a menial for the rich, and be by him reduced to an
equality with the free blacks.’'175 a  common white man would have
to compete with the black man on terms which would reduce his
chance of escaping poverty. Thus, the poor whites' position in
society was directly dependent "upon their superiority to the
blacks . . To prevent this destruction of their economic
interests, the yeoman farmers must not cooperate with the
177submissionists whose actions would harm the South.
In answering a series of questions Davis discussed the
problem of disunion. He did not support immediate secession by
South Carolina or Mississippi, but upheld the abstract right of a
178state to leave the Union. It was inexpedient for Mississippi
to secede in 1851, and the Senator stressed that "secession
should be looked to, only as a last resort, when all other remedies 
179fail, . . ." If South Carolina decided on a course of disunion,
however, Davis stated that Mississippi should support her militarily
180if the national government tried to force her back into the Union.
175 Ibid., 74.
176 Ibid., 74-75.
177 Ibid. Apparently Davis was telling the common whites 
that they should accept poverty as being preferable to emancipation.
178 Ibid.. 80-81.
179 Ibid., 80.
180 Ibid., 80-81.
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By September 1851 the Mississippi electorate had been
thoroughly exposed to the views of both parties. When they voted
in the elections for the state convention, the Unionists carried
two thirds of the counties. It seemed apparent that white
Mississippi had decided to acquiesce to the Compromise of 1850.
The total vote for Unionist candidates outnumbered that of their
State Rights opponents by seven thousand; States Righters received
their support mainly from the Fourth Congressional district in
southwest Mississippi. Unionists claimed that Mississippi was
181
firmly in the Union camp.
Editors supporting the States Rights party generally conceded
that Mississippi had submitted to the Adjustment bills. The Yazoo
Democrat, however, editorialized: "We affirm that, because the
people have decided to acquiesce in the Compromise, it does not
follow that they approve that compromise, or the conduct of those
who helped pass it. This proposition is clear. . . . The people
may well 'bear1 the ills they have, rather than flee to those
they know not of without endorsing the conduct of those who
1 82brought these ills upon them." The Jackson and Mississippi 
Gazette*s editor astutely concluded that the margin of victory of 
the Unionist party was approximately equal to the number of voters
181 Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi Gubernatorial 
Contest of 1851," 59-60; Jackson Mississippian. September 12, 19,
1851.
182 Yazoo Democrat. September 17, 1851.
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who did not participate in the delegate election.18  ^ There
evidently were many apathetic voters as Ethelbert Barksdale noted
in a letter to Jefferson Davis: "Thousands of Democrats not fully
understanding the object of the Convention, nor seeing the propriety
of holding it refused to go to the polls . . .18^
After the September elections, Jefferson Davis replaced
Quitman as the gubernatorial candidate of the States Rights party.
Quitman, believing that the overwhelming Union victory was a
repudiation of the positions he had advocated while governor,
185
submitted his resignation to the party. To replace him the
state convention felt, as did the Mississippi Palladium, that there
was only one choice: "COL JEFFERS(X) DAVIS."186 After Davis's
nomination, Barksdale urged that he start to campaign as quickly
as possible; he believed it would be successful because: "there
are many Democrats who voted the Union ticket, and would not
187sustain Gen. Quitman, but give you a hearty support."
183 Davis, "Jefferson Davis apd the Mississippi 
Gubernatorial Contest of 1851," 59-60.
184 Ethelbert Barksdale to Jefferson Davis, September 19, 
1851, Jefferson Davis Papers, General Correspondence (Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress).
185 Yazoo Democrat. September 17, 1851.
186 Holly Springs Mississippi Palladium. September 12, 1851.
187 Ethelbert Barksdale to Jefferson Davis, September 19, 
1851, Jefferson Davis Papers.
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Union elation after the convention was high. D. J.
Walworth, a Unionist in Natchez, wrote his son Douglas: "By the
Courier you will have seen and learned of the [illegible] overthrow
of the disunion party in this state such triumph of good principles
188I have never witnessed before." 00 This Unionist enthusiasm was 
common, but the Flag of the Union, warned that there was still the 
gubernatorial and Congressional elections to be fought in 
November.189
Senator Davis, beginning to campaign in mid-September, was
operating at a disadvantage. In his address to the Mississippi
public Senator Davis presented an able history of Northern
aggressions against the South; this Northern hostility which
resulted in California's admittance to the Union had upset the
political equality between the two sections. Furthermore he
emphasized the abolition features of the Compromise of 1850 which
190
would appeal to all white Mississippians.
During the fall Foote continued to promote himself as the 
safe, conservative candidate. In a speech in Natchez he declared 
that Union loving Mississippians were partially responsible for
188 D. J. Walworth to son Douglas, September 11, 1851, 
Douglas Walworth and Family Papers.
189 Jackson Flag of the Union. September 12, 1851.
190 Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 88-107.
saving the Union: "By the elections of September, this Union has
been saved. It was not the act of one man or the other, of one
party or the other, but of the people who dared to act in open
disregard of mere party tactics, and to devote themselves to the
191course of a common country." This strategy was accompanied by
his strong declaration that secession was not a constitutional
right, and that there was no need to adopt extreme measures since
the slave states were safe. Foote also defended the Compromise
measures while declaring that he was a good Democrat who had
followed the course of the national Democracy; the Union party in
Mississippi was a reaction to the activities of the disunionist
faction which might have caused secession and civil war. Therefore,
the Senator appealed to the masses love for the Union and party
192in his bid to be elected governor.
On November 3-4, 1851, the election was held, and Foote 
defeated Davis by the narrow margin of 999 votes. This victory 
was especially marginal when compared with the 7,000 vote lead the 
Unionists had amassed in September. Davis also carried several 
areas which had previously gone for the Unionists. However, the
191 Jackson Flag of the Union. October 3, 1851 quoting 
Natchez Courier.
192 Jackson Flag of the Union. September 17, October 3, 
1851, October 24, 1851 quoting New Orleans True Delta.
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Union party won a majority in the Mississippi House of 
Representatives and all but one of the Congressional seats--that 
held by Albert G. Brown.
The results of the election raised several important 
questions: 1. How were the States Rights forces able to close the
seven thousand vote gap between September and November 1851?
2. What characteristics did the counties have which voted for each 
party? 3. What factors may account for voter attraction to a 
particular party?
Union forces in Mississippi, as the Flag of the Union had 
warned in September 1851 would have to canvass diligently even 
after their overwhelming convention victory. Professor Gonzalez 
emphasizes that they were confronting a well-known Mississippian 
who had the ability to attract Whig support and won the confidence 
of portions of the electorate which would never support Quitman or 
Foote. The first point in his analysis is somewhat tenuous since 
the States Rights papers constantly branded the Whigs as Unionists 
and emphasized their own Democratic origins. However, Davis could, 
as delegate Reuben Davis had noted, pick up support which would not 
go to Quitman. In fact, this contemporary States Righter thought
193 Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi Gubernatorial 
Contest of 1851," 71-72; Jackson Flag of the Union. November 21,
1851; Mississippi House Journal (1852), 255-56; D. J. Walworth to 
Douglas Walworth, November 3, 1851, Douglas Walworth and Family 
Papers.
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that if Senator Davis had been nominated in June 1851 he would 
have carried the election. Nominated late in the campaign his 
bad health had kept him from waging a vigorous campaign which might 
conceivably have changed the results.
Union strength in Mississippi was centered in the 
traditionally Whig western half of the state— especially along the 
river. These counties were characterized by heavy concentrations 
of blacks and high property values. They voted for the Union party 
by a margin of four to one. In contrast the counties which 
supported the States Rights Democracy were located in the south 
and eastern parts of Mississippi. Counties in these areas had a 
tradition of voting Democratic, lower property values, and a lower 
proportion of Negroes in their population. Their ratio of support 
for the States Rights forces was also four to one. Certain 
counties, of course, did not follow this pattern, but there were
obvious differences between the centers of support for the two
195parties.
194 Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians, 
315, 317; John Edmund Gonzalez, "Flush Times, Depression, War and 
Compromise," in Richard A. McLemore (ed.) A History of Mississippi 
(Hattiesburg: University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), I,
306; Jackson Flag of the Union. September 12, 1851; Jackson 
Mississippian, July 25, August 29, November 14, 1851; Woodville 
Republican. June 24, 1851.
195 Seventh Census. 447-58; Young, "The Mississippi Whigs,"
49, 51.
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The wealthy river counties, bastions of Unionism, were an 
enigma. Men in this area were probably alarmed by the apparent 
threat of secession which John Quitman had represented and by the 
association of Davis with the radical wing of the Democratic States 
Rights party through Unionist propaganda. Even though loyalty to 
the Union was dependent upon a cessation of sectional aggressions, 
conservatives in Mississippi may have been alarmed by the 
discussions of secession which most conservatives labeled as a right 
of revolution--not an exercise of constitutional power. Moderates 
were also influenced by the relative affluence which existed in 
1850-1851. However, the most important factor may have been the 
past habit in the western part of the state of voting Whig which 
was reinforced by the Whig press which presented Foote as the 
safe, Union loving candidate .
People in eastern Mississippi were extremely loyal to the 
Democratic party and apparently followed established patterns in 
voting for the States Rights Democracy. Since early 1851 States 
Righters had called for all Democrats to support their party and 
had emphasized that they were not disunionists. Personality may 
have also been important since Albert G. Brown was a very popular 
politician in the southeast counties. He was viewed as a tribune 
of the lower classes and his image may have helped carry counties
196 Jackson Flag of the Union. 1850-1851; McLendon, "John
A. McLendon," passim; Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi. 
179; Natchez Courier, 1850-1851, passim.
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in his Congressional district for the States Rights forces.
Brown and Davis did not retain complete identification with the
extreme, pro-secessionist wing of the party and may have thus
197picked up doubtful Democratic support. The yeoman were also
influenced by the States Rights press. As Henry S. Foote noted
they "had been deceived by the most corrupt press that had ever
198cursed Christendom."
It is not possible to assess accurately the role of race 
in this election, but it was evidently a factor which favored the 
States Rights party. Accounts in the newspapers and political 
speeches emphasized the racial problems that would follow the 
emancipation that many white Mississippians believed was the 
inevitable result of the Compromise. Jefferson Davis utilized 
the tactic of appealing directly to the non-rational racial 
prejudice of lower class whites, and there is no reason to suppose 
that he would adopt an ineffective campaign tactic. Racial fears 
may have underlined the voting of many Democrats who were already 
conditioned by their party's history of strong defense of Southern 
"rights." Although racism was a significant factor in Mississippi
197 Jackson Mississippian, 1851, passim; Monroe Democrat, 
1851, passim; Ranck, Albert Gallatin Brown, 10-100; Woodville 
Republican, 1851, passim.
198 Jackson Flag of the Union, October 3, 1851.
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politics in 1850-1851, there was not the overwhelming
fear of emancipation which existed in South Carolina during the
199nullification crisis.
On November 10, 1851 the state convention convened with
an overwhelming pro-Union majority. Cornelius Cormack of
Tishomingo county was selected president of the convention, and a
committee of thirteen was appointed to consider suggestions offered
by the members of the convention. The committee report, with minor
amendments, was adopted as the preamble and resolutions of the
c o n v e n t i o n . T h e  preamble declared that, while the people of
Mississippi did not approve of all parts of the Compromise, they
would accept it "as a permanent adjustment of this sectional
controversy, so long as the same in all its features shall be
201adhered to and enforced." A declaration of loyalty to the
Union was then made and the constitutional right of secession 
202denied. But the convention also listed aggressions which
Mississippians would not tolerate:
199 Columbus Southern Standard, August 23, 1851; William 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South
Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), 49-
361, passim; Oxford Constitution, May 17, July 12, 1851.
200 Journal of the Convention of Mississippi and the Act 
Calling the Same (Jackson: Thomas Palmer, Convention Printer, 1851),
3-45. Hereinafter cited as Journal of the Convention.
201 Ibid., 47.
202 Ibid.
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1st. The interference by Congressional Legislation 
with the Institution of Slavery in the States.
2d. Interference with the trade in Slaves between 
the States. 3d. Any action of Congress on the subject 
of slavery in the District of Columbia . . . incompatible 
with the safety and domestic tranquility--the rights 
and honor of the slave-holding States. 4th. The 
refusal by Congress to admit a new State into the Union 
on the ground of her tolerating slavery within her 
limits. 5th. The passage of any law by Congress 
prohibiting slavery in any of the territories. 6th. The 
Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, and the neglect or 
refusal by the General Government, to enforce the 
Constitutional provisions for the reclamation of Fugitive 
Slaves.203
After these boundaries were established, the convention members
declared that the call of the convention itself "was an unwarranted
204
assumption of power by the Legislature."
Even though the resolutions were overwhelmingly adopted,
there was a minority report which represented the opinion of a
20Ssignificant number of Mississippians. The minority members 
recognized that Mississippi had acquiesced to the Compromise of 
1850 but could not regard the September vote as more than "a 
reluctant consent to them [Compromise bills] . . ,"200 This idea 
was embodied in resolutions which held that the people had adopted 
the Compromise rather than a course which might endanger the Union.20?
203 Ibid., 48.
204 Ibid.
205 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850, 213-28.
206 Journal of the Convention, 28.
207 Ibid., 30.
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After the Convention, the Mississippian called for a
meeting of both wings of the Mississippi Democracy. The Southern
Sentinel urged the Democratic party to reunite, and an official
call for a Democratic State Convention was issued on November 21, 
2081851. The Convention which met in Jackson on January 8, 1852, 
was addressed by President Powhatton Ellis: "Since the expression
of the will of the people of this state, through their late 
convention, in reference to what is generally known as the 
compromise bills, there seems to be no further cause for 
disagreement for separation among the Democrats of the State. We 
acquiesce in those laws, provided they are carried out in good 
faith."209
In the state legislature there was much division between
the States Rights-oriented Senate and the Unionist-dominated
House. House members wanted to meet in a joint session to select
men for the Senate vacancies left by the resignations of Foote
and Davis. They also hoped to select men to serve for the new
terms beginning in March 1853. This latter request was resisted
by the Senate since it was likely that the next legislature would
210be dominated by the Democracy.
208 Jackson Mississippian, November 14, 1851; Rawson, "Party 
Politics in Mississippi," 96-98; Woodville Republican, January 27,
1852.
209 Woodville Republican, January 27, 1852.
210 Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 99-105.
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By early 1852 many Democratic leaders were advocating
that the party must be reunified in this Presidential election
year. But some Unionists were adverse to extending the olive
branch. In Congress the issue of who was loyal to the national
Democracy was raised in sharp debate between Union Congressmen from
Mississippi and Albert Gallatin Brown. John D. Freeman, in a
speech in the House of Representatives on March 18, 1852, condemned
the State Righters in Mississippi for abandoning the principles of
the national Democracy by advocating extreme measures of resistance.
He maintained that radicals like Albert Gallatin Brown were trying
2 1 1
"to beg" their way back into the national party.
Freeman contended that Unionist Democrats had saved the
Compromise, and that these men held the key for success of the
Democracy in the Presidential election; such conservatives required
"the Baltimore Convention to give them nominees for President
and Vice President, free alike from the sin of secession and
abolition--men whose past lives and public services will personify
the great principle of the integrity of the Union, and the equal
212rights of the states." Freeman also warned that the Democratic
convention had to help establish peace on the slavery question or
213their "nominees will fail to be elected."
211 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix
336-39.
212 Ibid., 339.
213 Ibid.
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Brown, speaking for Democratic radicals in Mississippi,
replied on March 30, 1852. The fiery speaker defended his own
course of action in 1850-1851 and that of men connected with his
party. He emphasized his own ties with the Democratic party while
maintaining that the national party did not control the positions
0 1 /
a state should adopt on national affairs. The convention held 
in Mississippi "which appointed delegates to the Baltimore
Convention was called a Democratic convention and not as a so
215called Democratic States-Right Convention." These barbed 
exchanges in Congress were omens of the coming destruction of the 
temporary parties in 1852.
The Union party's death was de facto by mid-1852 as old 
party organizations were reestablished. A large meeting was held 
in Jackson on June 9, 1852 to ratify the nominations of Franklin 
Pierce as the Democratic candidate for president.^16 Judge C. S. 
Tarpley, who presided over the meeting, stated: "The unfortunate
divisions amongst ourselves, that have caused the banner of 
Democracy to trail in the dust, may now be healed; Union Democrats 
and State Rights Democrats may again . . . shake hands, and
214 Ibid., 355-59.
215 Ibid., 359.
216 Jackson Flag of the Union, April-May, 1852; Jackson 
Mississippian, June 11, 1852.
fraternize around the fires of the great Democratic party, . . ."217
The Whigs also recognized and supported their national candidate,
Winfield Scott, who had to struggle against charges that he was an
abolitionist. Both parties conducted vigorous campaigns, but the
Democracy carried the state for Pierce by nine thousand votes.
Henry Foote claimed that Pierce won because he had supported the
Compromise of 1850. Although the Unionist party died in 1852,
it had a significance beyond its brief life. It had been the
principal instrument that persuaded the people of Mississippi to
218accept Compromise and peace in the great crisis of mid-century.
217 Jackson Mississippian, June 11, 1852.
218 Jackson Flag of the Union, July 2, 1852; Jackson 
Mississippian, July 2, 1852; Rawson, "Party Politics in 
Mississippi," 100-18. Although both parties had endorsed the 
Compromise, the approval of the Democrats was voiced more strongly 
than that of the Whigs. Consequently Pierce was more closely 
associated in the popular mind with support of the Compromise than 
Scott was.
CHAPTER VI
SOUTH CAROLINA: HOME OF SEPARATE AND
COOPERATIVE SECESSIONISTS
By 1850 South Carolina had adopted secession as its main solu­
tion to the problem of sectional confrontation. In this militantly 
pro-Southern society, leading politicians were ready to begin a revo­
lution in order to maintain black slavery which they viewed as a 
necessary part of white psychological and economic dominance. Since 
there were few Unionists in the state, the main conflict was between 
cooperative and separate state secessionists.
Plantation agriculture, which had been established in the 1740's, 
was the basis for the state's wealth.* Its initial affluence was based 
on the growing of rice, which was the dominant crop by 1770, and was 
such as it gave the state the reputation of "being in wealth, and every 
other advantage, one of the most important provinces of America."
During the 1780's South Carolina encountered an economic decline but 
recovered during the next decade to begin a thirty-year period of pros­
perity; wealth was based partially on the commerce which flourished 
during the European war, and cotton prices which reached a postwar level
3
of thirty-seven cents a pound.
1 Marjorie S. Mendenhall, "A History of Agriculture in South 
Carolina 1790 to 1860: An Economic and Social Study" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1940), 1-16. Hereinafter 
cited as "A History of Agriculture in South Carolina."
2 Ibid., 2.
J Mendeniia 11, "A History of Agriculture in Soutli Carolina,"
1 — 166, passim; Al fred Glaze Smith, Economic Read justinenL of an 0 Id Cotton 
State (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1958), 1-19, 45-111, 
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Fanning in the Palmetto state was dominated by the growth of 
rice and sea island and short staple cotton. The first two crops grown 
along the Atlantic coast, were important to the state's wealth. How­
ever, the economic expansion which occurred between 1790-1826, was 
based primarily on the introduction of short staple cotton into the 
backcountry, the new staple bringing good prices during the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century. The state's economy was very depen­
dent on the prices which could be obtained in European and Northern
4
markets for these three agricultural products.
From 1820-1850 South Carolina planters and yeoman suffered a 
prolonged economic decline despite attempts at diversification. Although 
rice planting "was almost continuously profitable," the cotton planters 
had a number of serious problems. Evidence indicates that after 1826, 
agriculture suffered seriously from soil depletion, outward migration 
(of yeomen, planters, and blacks), and competition from new lands being 
opened in the Gulf South. However, South Carolina began to recover 
economically by the 1840's. Cotton prices, which had reached a low of 
six cents a pound in the mid-forties, climbed back to an acceptable 
minimum by 1850. Professor Smith suggests that any political radical­
ism caused by economic forces was not the result of "the fact that 
agriculture in South Carolina was a losing proposition but that it was
4 Mendenhall, "A History of Agriculture in South Carolina," 
17-166; Smith, Economic Readjustment of an Old Cotton State, 45-112.
5 Smith, Economic Readjustment of an Old Cotton State, 19-45, 
59-60, 69.
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not as profitable as it was in other parts of the country at that time, 
and had been in South Carolina in previous times.
Charleston, the Queen City, had also suffered from economic 
problems during the nineteenth century. Her decline as a port and 
center of trade was a fait accompli by the 1820's; she never again 
achieved the pre-eminence of earlier decades. A combination of forces, 
including plunging cotton prices and competition from trading cities in 
the interior of the state as well as along the Atlantic seaboard was 
responsible for her decline. Her leaders were naturally concerned 
about this change, and there were continued efforts to establish direct 
trading ties with Europe which ended in failure because the shipping 
connections through New York were less expensive. This economic 
reality, however, as Professor Van Deusen stresses, did not prevent 
the leaders of South Carolina from constantly complaining that the North 
was an economic octupus choking Charleston's growth. This belief, which 
was not actually rooted in fact, tended to exacerbate the state's 
reaction to sectional problems.^
The most important factor in conditioning South Carolina's 
response to sectional problems was the presence of large numbers of 
black slaves within the state. There were approximately 274,000 white 
citizens and 394,000 Negroes in 1850. In twenty districts blacks
6 Ibid., 105.
7 John G. Van Deusen, Economic Bases of Disunion in South 
Carolina (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 182-216;
Mendenhall, "A History of Agriculture in South Carolina," 7, 8 , 35; 
Snijlli, Economic Kead |ustment oI an Old Col ton State, 9-10.
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outnumbered whites, and in thirteen the slave population ranged from 
sixty to ninety percent of the total population. Concentrations of 
blacks in these districts— especially along the sea coast— was a fact 
with which all white men in the Palmetto state were familiar. South 
Carolinians wanted the peculiar institution maintained because of their 
economic investment in slavery and because of their fear about the 
problems in a post-abolition society. This attitude, which was, of 
course, present throughout the entire South, had been important in
O
South Carolina politics since the 1820's.
Economic grievances and racial fears were the most important
factors conditioning South Carolina politics from 1820-1836. The
state's elite was aware of the drop in cotton prices and blamed the
national protective tariffs for the decline. During the decade, the
hostility to the tariff was increased by planter guilt about the
peculiar institution and by concern over the servile insurrections
9
led by Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner. As Professor Freehling puts 
it; "In view of the fear and guilt which plagued slaveholders, there 
seemed substantial doubt in the 1820's whether the South could muster 
up a defense against anti-slavery onslaughts. Under the circumstances, 
the style of the proslavery response--proud, haughty, exploding at the
8 The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 
(Washington, 1853), 334-47. Hereinafter cited as The Seventh Census.
9 William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullifica­
tion Crisis in South Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1965), 7-381. Hereinafter cited as Prelude to Civil War.
293
slightest hint of outside meddling--was only to be expected."10
The aggressive spirit in South Carolina caused strong resis­
tance to the Tariff of Abominations passed in 1828. Some members of
South Carolina's elite, like Thomas Cooper, believed that the only
remedy to the situation was secession from the Union; John C. Calhoun 
proposed nullification as an alternative to Cooper's revolutionary 
idea. Even though the state remained in a period of crisis from 1828- 
1833, it found no formula on which to oppose the national government.
The Compromise Tariff of 1833 was enacted in Washington and Andrew 
Jackson stood firm as the defender of national unity. None of the 
other slave states joined South Carolina in testing nullification and 
Calhoun now preached that separate state resistance to the national 
government was f u t i l e " h e  [Calhoun] spent his remaining years in 
an effort to unite the whole South into a political bloc. . .
Calhoun and his quarreling apostles passed through several
alliances after the defeat of nullification in 1833. He first led his
followers into the newly formed Whig party which also included Jackson's 
inveterate enemies Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. This alignment 
proved only temporary, and by the late 1830's Calhoun had reentered the 
Democratic fold. He maintained ties with the national Democracy while
10 William W. Freehling (ed.) The Nullification Era: A
Documentary Record (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 12.
11 Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 89-307; Robert Remini, 
Andrew Jackson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), 106-40.
12 Gerald Capers, John C. Calhoun; Opportunist (Chicago: 
Quadrangle, 1969), L64. Hereinafter cited as John C. Calhoun.
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trying to keep enough autonomy to protect Southern interests and
further his own Presidential ambitions.1-^
At the same time political divisions within South Carolina were
healed as the previous factions drew together. There had been important
politicians in South Carolina who had been supporters of the Jackson
administration as well as firebrands during the nullification crisis.
These old antagonists were gradually reunited because of the Northern
14attacks against slavery. In 1839 Robert Barnwell Rhett and 
Franklin Elmore, two prominent Southern ultras, "engineered a recon­
ciliation movement backed by a large portion of the financial and
1 slanded wealth of the State." Despite strong objections from James 
Hammond, an important nullifier, they were able to secure the election 
of Unionist J. P. Richardson as governor in 1840. Calhoun thus had a
■I £
secure base at home from which he tried to build a Southern party.
In 1843 Calhoun decided to run again for the Presidency. His 
candidacy precipitated a struggle with the Van Buren forces which 
wanted to prevent his nomination. By the spring of 1844 Calhoun had 
temporarily abandoned his drive for the nomination; he was willing
13 Capers, John C. Calhoun, 169-209; Daniel Wallace, South 
Carolina: A Short History (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1961), 419-33; Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist 
1840-1850 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), 50-59. 
Hereinafter cited as John C. Calhoun.
14 Freehling, Prelude to the Civil War, 87-360, passim.
15 Wallace, South Carolina. 422.
16 Ibid.; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, 50-59.
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instead to accept Tennessee's James K. Polk as the Democratic 
standard bearer.*^
Even though Calhoun submitted to national political realities, 
Robert Barnwell Rhett, a leading Fire-eater, wanted strong resistance 
to the national government. This Southern "hotspur" was most con­
cerned about the proposed annexation of Texas and the passage of the 
Tariff of 1842 which he believed was harmful to South Carolina's 
economy. Calhoun encouraged Rhett's agitation on the Texas question 
but did not want any radical statements issued about the tariff. At 
the end of the 1844 Congressional session Rhett published an Address 
to his constituents in which he discussed the dangers of anti-slavery 
agitation, the annexation of Texas, and the Tariff of 1842. He called 
for a state convention to be convened in 1845 to nullify the tariff 
if the 1842 law was not repealed. By mid-July Rhett had assumed
leadership of the "Bluffton Movement" which advocated either nullifies-
1 fttion or secession as ways to resist the tariff.
During the remainder of 1844 the Calhoun forces had to contend 
with the "Bluffton Boys." Rhett received temporary support from the 
Charleston Mercury and from Langdon Cheves, an elder statesman, who 
wrote a letter advocating long-range preparation for a Southern
17 Capers, John C. Calhoun, 204-25; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun,
134-98.
18 Chauncey S. Boucher, "Annexation of Texas and the 
Bluffton Movement," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI (June, 
1919), 3-33; Laura White, Robert Barnwell Rhett; Father of 
Secession (New York: The Century Company, 1931), 51-84; Wiltse,
John C. Calhoun, 187-98.
Confederacy in order to ensure the protection of slavery. After Calhoun
returned home, he won back control of the Mercury while effectively
silencing the extremists. The contest was renewed, however, by
Governor James Hammond's call for South Carolina to vigorously resist
19the tariff in late 1844. Hammond also warned about the dangers of 
emancipation which made the protection of white supremacy necessary:
"See as we of the South do, the naked impossibility of emancipation, 
without the extermination of one race or the other, . . .--I cannot 
doubt that you will be justified by God and future generations, in 
adopting any measures, that will place your rights and property exclu­
sively under your own control, and . . .--I believe you will be equally
justified in taking these measures as early and decisively as in your
20judgement you may deem proper." Although extreme action was defeated
in the state legislature, Joel Poinsett correctly noted that the
Bluffton Movement had trained young Carolinians "to the work of 
21agitation."
The Mexican War heightened concern in South Carolina about 
Southern rights. Political leaders recognized that the Wilmot Proviso 
was a potential threat to Negro slavery. In the House of Representa­
tives Congressman Armistead Burt spoke for the Palmetto state when he
19 Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina 
1843-1845 (1844), 15-18; White, Robert Barnwell Rhett, 81-84; Wiltse, 
John C. Calhoun, 190-98.
20 Journa1 of the Senate of the State of South Carolina 
1843-1845 (1844), 19.
21 White, Robert Barnwell Rhett. 84.
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introduced an amendment to the territorial bill for Oregon which
22applied the Missouri Compromise line to the territory. He warned 
the South that no new slave territory would be admitted into the Union, 
and that the 36° 30' line would not be extended because of Northern 
opposition: "If with these facts before their eyes; if, with these
threats ringing in their ears, the Southern states do not break the 
spell that benumbs the spirit and paralyzes the energy of their 
people—  . . . they are destined to be the scenes of a conflict of the 
races, whose atrocities and horrors will find no parallel in the bloody 
and servile drama of St. Domingo." This awareness of the race prob­
lem, which was echoed by Robert Barnwell Rhett and other Carolinians, 
was also forcefully expressed in John Calhoun's resolutions against
the Wilmot Proviso. The Congressional elite from this South Atlantic
24state was prepared to preserve white supremacy.
In 1848 South Carolinians prepared for the Presidential elec­
tion. Although Calhoun favored Levi Woodbury, as the Democratic 
nominee, he would not commit himself to any particular man. But other 
state politicians leaned to Lewis Cass, and by the fall Fire-eaters 
like Rhett were endorsing the Michigan Senator's candidacy.^ The 
state legislature, in the Presidential balloting, supported Cass by a
22 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix. 116-19.
23 Ibid., 119.
24 Philip Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina 
1847-1852 (Allentown, Pa., H. R. Haas & Co., 1918), 1-30; Wiltse, John 
C. Calhoun, 293-300.
25 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 1-30, 
passim; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, 345-72.
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margin of 102 votes: "The Democracy had carried South Carolina without
aid or comfort from Calhoun.
During the winter of 1848-49 Calhoun gave impetus to South
Carolina’s militancy with the publication of the Southern Address.
He warned that the attacks on slavery would bring about emancipation
which would create an alliance between freed blacks and Northern
whites who would dominate and degrade the South:
We would, in a word, change conditions with them 
[Negroes]--a degradation greater than has ever yet 
fallen to the lot of a free and enlightened people, and 
from which we could not escape, should emancipation take 
place (which it certainly will if not prevented) but by 
fleeing the homes of ourselves and ancestors, and by 
abandoning our country to our former slaves, to become the 
permanent abode of disorder, anarchy, poverty, misery and 
wretchedness.^7
In May 1849 members of the newly formed Committee of Safety met in 
Columbia to consider a plan of action by the State. These delegates 
praised the Southern Address and requested the governor to call the 
legislature into special session if the Wilmot Proviso became law or 
if Congress threatened to harm the peculiar institution or the slave 
trade within the boundaries of the national capitol.^®
By the end of the summer, slavery had again emerged as the most 
important political issue in South Carolina. At a meeting in Bishop- 
ville, the local inhabitants demanded "constitutional" protection for
26 Wiltse, John C. Calhoun. 372.
27 Richard K. Cralle (ed.), The Works of John C. Calhoun
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864), VI, 311.
28 Wiltse, John C. Calhoun. 398-400.
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black slavery. Radicals condemned those Southern men who favored 
emancipation and expressed concern about future passage of Federal 
legislation which might end slavery in places which the national
O Q
government controlled. J They called for "strict vigilance to be
exercised over all among us whose principles are adverse to ours,
30. . . Representative Daniel Wallace, speaking at the courthouse in
Chester, warned about a "cordon of Free States" which might be created
around the slave South; there was even danger that the border states
would eventually abandon the peculiar institution which would further
31decrease the area where black people were held in bondage.
By the end of 1849 the men who would provide leadership in the 
Palmetto state during the crisis over slavery had emerged. Although 
there were a minority of Unionists within the state, most political 
leaders were committed to either cooperative or separate state 
resistance to Northern aggressions. Since their positions were not 
inflexible, it is necessary to survey the backgrounds of individual 
leaders in order to understand their roles during the sectional crisis 
of the following two years.
Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville provided leadership for the 
small Unionist faction in South Carolina. After preparing for a career 
in journalism and law, he became a well known opponent of nullification
29 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian, August 11, 1849.
30 Ibid.
31 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian, September 8 , 1849, 
quoting Chester Observer.
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during that first period of conflict with the national government.
From 1835-1850 he lived quietly in Greenville, engaging in the practice
of law, and was a member of the state legislature before being defeated
32by James L. Orr for a seat in Congress during 1848. Although Perry 
was a strong defender of the institution of slavery, he also sought 
to preserve the Union: "I love the Union of these states, and look
upon their dissolution with horror approaching despair. Nor have I 
much dread of a dissolution even on the subject of slavery--It will be 
settled like all great questions have since the organization of our 
government."33
Leadership in Congress was provided by Representatives 
Armistead Burt, James L. Orr, Daniel Weilace, John McQueen, C. F. 
Colcock and Senator Andrew P. Butler. Burt, elected to Congress from 
South Carolina's Edgefield District, had been a prominent spokesman for 
Southern rights since the 1830's. He had served in the Nullification 
Convention of 1832 and entered Congress in 1843. His younger colleague, 
James L. Orr, had served in the South Carolina legislature before being 
elected to Congress in 1848. Although he believed in the right of 
secession, he became a cooperationist leader by 1851. Daniel Wallace, 
a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives from 1844- 
1848, also entered Congress in the year of Taylor's election to the
32 Lillian Adele Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina
Unionist (Durham: Duke University Press, 1946), 3-239.
33 Ibid., 240.
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Presidency. Wallace supported separate secession by South Carolina and
was an extremist on the race question. John McQueen, who had been a
practicing attorney, was elected to the Thirtieth Congress and held
views similar to Wallace. He served with W. F. Colcock, an extremist
who was elected in 1849. Andrew P. Butler, a protege of Calhoun, had
risen quickly in the Upper Chamber of Congress after his election in 
341846. His political career extended back into the 1830's when "he
became recognized as a leader of the Calhoun faction and a champion
35
of nullification." During his career he served in the state legisla­
ture and as an appeals court judge. Although Butler was a proud 
defender of the "rights" of the South, he did not want the Palmetto 
state to adopt a position which would isolaLe her from the rest of the 
South . ^
Another prominent state politician was Robert Barnwell Rhett, 
a son of an aristocratic lowland family. After entering politics in 
the 1820's as an opponent of the Tariff of 1828, Rhett was always ready
34 Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men with Speeches 
and Addresses (Greenville: Shannon and Company, 1889), 5-12; Francis
Butler Simkins, "James Lawrence Orr," in Allen Johnson and Dumas 
Malone (eds.) Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols., New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-58), VII, Pt. 2, 59-60; hereinafter 
cited as DAB; Francis Pendleton Gaines, "Andrew Pickens Butler,"
Ibid., II, Pt. 1, 355; U. S. Congress, House, Biographical Directory
of the American Congress 1774-1961, (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), 635, 638, 718, 1314, 1410, 1763; hereinafter 
cited as BDAC.
35 Francis Pendleton Gaines, "Andrew Pickens Butler," DAB,
II, Pt. 1, 355.
36 Ibid., 355-56.
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to adopt a more radical position than C a l h o u n . B y  1848 he had lost 
faith in the Democratic party and emphasized his long standing opposi­
tion to federal power: "In 1828 I declared . . . that the General
Government must be driven back to its legitimate limitations in the 
Constitution. That if we yielded on the taxing power, the next 
stride would be against our slave institutions; and that I was for 
fighting on the Tariff the battle that must otherwise be fought on 
slavery. I said the same thing in 1844, after witnessing in Congress 
my anticipations but too truly realized. Now you have this great quesr
tion of Slavery upon you; and my counsel is, as of yore--meet the
38
question at once, and forever." He was at the forefront of the .
movement for separate secession even though he desired cooperation
39with the rest of the South if it could be obtained.
A number of the elite in 1850 wanted cooperation by the entire 
South in resisting the attacks on slavery. Two of the leaders of the 
cooperative movement were Christopher Memminger and Robert W. Barnwell. 
Memminger, a graduate of South Carolina College and an excellent 
lawyer, had been an opponent of nullification in the 1830 's;^® he 
had written "a satirical booklet in biblical style, called the Book of 
Nullification (1830) against the leaders of that m o v e m e n t . B y  the
37 White, Robert Barnwell Rhett, 3-102.
38 Ibid., 105.
39 Ibid.. 3-134, passim.
40 Charles W. Ramsdell, "Christopher Gustavus Memminger,"
DAB. VI, Pt. 2, 527.
41 Ibid.
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1840's Memminger was a member of the state legislature, and though 
against Northern attacks on slavery he opposed separate action on the 
part of his state as "dangerous and fruitless . . Another exponent
of practical resistance was Robert W. Barnwell, who had been a United 
States Representative in the twenties and had signed the nullification 
ordinance passed in 1832. After a long retirement in the 1840's, 
Barnwell reentered national politics to fill part of Calhoun's un­
expired term. His strong opposition to Northern aggressions was 
tempered by a belief in the necessity of united action by the South.^ 
Radicals on the state level were well represented by Maxcy 
Gregg, James Henry Hammond, Francis W. Pickens, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, 
and John H. Means. Gregg, a young man with little practical experience 
emerged as an exponent of separate state action. Hammond's political 
career, in contrast, extended back into the 1830's, when he had been 
an active participant in the military preparations that some South 
Carolinians made against the Federal government. He had served in the 
House of Representatives and as governor of the state in the 1840's. 
Although he had been an exponent of disunion for thirty years, Hammond 
was not an advocate of separate secession in 1850-1851. Francis W. 
Pickens, who was related to Calhoun by family ties, had been a sup­
porter of nullification in the thirties. By the 1840's he emerged as
42 Ibid.
43 Francis Pendleton Gaines, "Robert Woodward Barnwell," 
ibid., I, Pt. 1, 640.
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a leader in the South Carolina Senate and had become a separate state
secessionist by 1850. The last two men, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook and John
H. Means, were governors of the state during the crisis of 1850-1852
and were recognized by the state press as extremists who wanted the
44state to act in order to protect slavery.
Calhoun and Seabrook were important catalysts behind the move­
ment for a Southern Convention in 1849-1850. Calhoun corresponded 
with men in Mississippi who were working for a convention, and Seabrook 
apparently encouraged Southern governors that such a meeting was a 
necessity.  ^ Daniel Wallace, who was appointed the governor's special 
representative to the meeting at Jackson, Mississippi expressed his 
opinion in a letter to the governor: "I had the honor to receive
your confidential letter . . .  in which you assign to me the discharge 
of certain duties in relation to the aggressions upon the rights of the 
South by our Sister communities of the N o r t h . W a l l a c e ' s  enthusiasm 
for his task was muted by the resistance he met in Mississippi to the 
radicalism of the Palmetto State.  ^ He was able to talk privately
44 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian. December 18, 1850; 
Francis Butler Simkins, "Francis Wilkinson Pickens," DAB. VII, Pt. 2, 
559-61; J. G. de R. Hamilton, "James Henry Hammond," ibid.. Pt. 2, 
207-08; S. S. McKay, "Maxcy Gregg," ibid.. Pt. 1, 598-99; Whitemarsh
B. Seabrook Papers, 1849-51, (Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress).
45 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 39-42; 
Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 8, 1849, Whitemarsh B. 
Seabrook Papers.
46 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 8 , 1849, 
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
47 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 41-42.
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with Governor John Matthews about the problems of Southern rights, 
and with Quitman who he considered "a politician of the South Carolina
AQ
School."^0 Although there were limitations in his mission to Missis­
sippi, because of the hostility of the Whigs and the gubernatorial 
contest within the state, Wallace was optimistic that Mississippi 
would stand firm if the rights of the South were t h r e a t e n e d a l ­
though he did not obtain a written assurance from Matthews or Quitman 
about the slavery question, Wallace believed "that the action of the 
Convention was strong and decided--going perhaps farther than any 
other state has gone,--and the record of this action is public property, 
upon which you are at liberty to draw, . .
After the General Assembly of South Carolina convened in late 
November 1849, Governor Seabrook issued a strong statement about the 
sectional crisis. He emphasized that in the conflict between the 
sections that the South was finding less support from above the Mason- 
Dixon line for its struggle against the power of the national govern­
ment;"^ the Federal government's actions threatened Southern property 
and wealth: "If masters, in violation of the Federal Constitution and
48 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, October 20, 1849, 
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
49 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, October 20, 
November 7, 1849, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers; Hamer, The Secession 
Movement in South Carolina, 41-42.
50 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, November 7, 1849, 
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
51 Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina at Its 
Annua 1 Session, Commencing November 26, 1849 (Columbia: A. S. Johnson, 
Printer to the Senate, 1849), 11-14. Hereinafter cited as Journal of 
the Senate of the State of South Carolina.
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laws, may be prevented from recovering their fugitive or stolen slaves; 
if the transfer of persons and property, except under degrading circum­
stances be denied them; what protection for their rights will remain, 
when the Northern states by territorial aggrandizement, unwarrantably 
acquired, shall have secured an undisputed ascendancy in the councils 
of the n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e  he announced his support for the call for 
the Nashville Convention, and wanted power to call a convention or the
state legislature into session in case the Wilmot Proviso or other
53hostile legislation were enacted by the United States Congress.
Seabrook also emphasized the need for military preparations 
in South Carolina. After mentioning that the "martial ardor" of South 
Carolinians had declined, the Governor stated the rationale for mili­
tary preparedness in a slave c o m m u n i t y " I t  is perhaps unnecessary 
to assure you that South Carolina must, hereafter, exist as a military 
people. The history of our country for the past ten years affords 
abundant proof that, as long as the Union endures, there is to be no 
peace for the slaveholder. An eternal warfare against his rights of 
person and property, under the associated influence of the people and 
states of the North, and the central power, has been solemnly and 
deliberately decreed. For this reason, it is essential that the 
community of which he is a member should be prepared, at any moment,
52 Ibid., 12.
53 Ibid., 13.
54 Ibid., 22-24.
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for every e m e r g e n c y T h e r e f o r e  Seabrook called for specific mili­
tary legislation which was only partially implemented by the State 
Assembly
In response to this address the legislature endorsed the pro­
posed Nashville Convention and passed other legislation which the 
Governor had recommended. An unofficial meeting of the legislative 
members was held in December 1849 to call for South Carolina's par­
ticipation at the Southern Convention. It was decided that the 
citizens from each Congressional district in South Carolina should 
select two men to represent them in addition to the four men whom the 
legislature designated as delegates at large. This action was 
accompanied by a declaration agreeing to call a special session of 
the legislature in case the Wilmot Proviso became Jaw, and approval 
of the strong fight for Southern rights which South Carolina's dele­
gation was trying to protect.^
Reaction to the growing sectional crisis and demands for 
Southern action was expressed by South Carolinians in public meetings 
and private correspondence. One of the earliest recorded meetings to 
discuss the proposed Southern Convention was held by the citizens of
55 Ibid., 23.
56 Ibid., 23-24; Hamer, The Secession Movement in South 
Carolina, 45.
57 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian, December 4, 8 , II, 
1849; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of South 
Carolina; Being the Annual Session of 1849 (Columbia: J. C. Morgan, 
State Printer, 1849), 211. Hereinafter cited as Journal of the House 
of Representatives of the State of South Carolina; Journal of the 
Senate of the State of South Carolina. 107, 165, 167.
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Christ Church Parish on January 1, 1850. John Hamlin presided over the 
meeting which approved the action of the legislature in calling for 
South Carolina's attendance at Nashville. Members at a similar 
gathering held in the Darlington District in March 1850 resolved that 
Northern attacks on the South were straining the bonds of the Union.-*® 
Important meetings were also held at Orangesburg Court House 
and in the Barnwell District. The former group was addressed by L. M. 
Keith who argued that action must be taken by the South to protect 
herself against the North which would otherwise flank her with free-soil 
states;-*^ the danger of this action was expressed in a resolution which 
stated: "The object of our enemies is to surround the Slaveholding
States, and strangle slavery, by circumscribments[sic] its limits, or 
by increased political power, to amend the constitution and abolish the 
Institution. The accomplishment of either must seal our utter ruin;"®^ 
The benefits of the enslavement of black people was expressed clearly 
in a meeting held in Barnwell District on April 1, 1 8 5 0 . Members 
approved the selection of the four appointed delegates to Nashville and 
defended black bondages as a positive good: "That so far from slavery
being an evil, it has done much to ameliorate the condition of mankind 
than any other relation of life; it has advanced immeasurably the
58 Charleston Mercury, January 4, March 21, 1850.
59 Ibid., March 27, 1850.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., April 18, 1850.
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condition of the negro; rescued thousands, perhaps millions of white 
operatives from pauperism and starvation, and has proven itself to be 
the chief cornerstone of our Republican e d i f i c e . " ^  These meetings 
illustrate the central role which slavery played in the mind of white 
men in South Carolina.
Discussion about Southern rights and Henry Clay's proposals for 
adjustment were prominent in the press in the Palmetto state. The South 
Carolinian, in announcing its approval of the Southern Convention, 
emphasized that there was a national crisis over "States Rights . . . 
This, then, is the true question. It is not whether the institution 
of slavery is in the abstract right or wrong--the time for discussing 
that is past; it is whether fifteen states will yield their equality 
and rights of sovereignty."^ The Mercury was critical of the Omnibus 
bill which included a proposal to abolish the slave trade within 
Washington, D. C., that might give impetus to federal abolition of
f\LLslavery in other areas controlled by the national government. H The 
editors also discussed the problem of Texas and California: "On the
one hand, we have the north urging the dismemberment of a State of 
Union, for the sake of augmenting the Free Soil territory; and on the 
other, struggling to drag into the Union, against all usages and funda­
mental principles of the Government, a district nearly as large as
62 Ibid.
63 Columbia Triweekly South Carolinian, January 31, 1850.
64 Charleston Mercury. May 13, 1850.
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6 STexas, for the sake of increasing the Free-Soil power in Congress."
The Edgefield Advertiser believed that attendance at the Nashville
Convention might be a good method of preventing further Northern
hostilities: "Shall we not prepare our system of defense? Danger is
often best averted by preparing well to meet it."^^
South Carolina's elite also engaged in correspondence about
the sectional crisis. Edward Noble, apparently a business associate
of Representative Armistead Burt in Abbeville wrote that everyone was
very concerned about Calhoun's health.  ^ He was also worried that
sectional issues dominated the news. "I ardently hope there may be a
compromise effected that will not be to the South what all others have
been a surrender."^® Burt himself had earlier written to Unionist
Benjamin F. Perry about the sectional crisis which was giving impetus
to Southern resistance: • "Southern members, are unanimous, or so nearly
unanimous, as not to mar their moral force, in a determination to
resist all further aggression by the north, and my own opinion is,
that the north cannot and will not, either retrace their steps, or
69repair from further assaults." Therefore he believed that collision
65 Ibid.
66 Edgefield Advertiser. February 13, 1850.
67 Edward Noble to Armistead Burt, February 28, 1850 (Armistead 
Burt Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina).
68 Ibid.
69 Armistead Burt to Benjamin F. Perry, January 16, 1850, 
Benjamin F. Perry Papers (Alabama State Department of Archives and 
History, Montgomery, Alabama).
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between the two major sections was inevitable.^®
James Henry Hammond, a leading Fire-eater, was concerned about 
the future of the South. He carried on an extensive correspondence 
with other Southern "ultras" about the attacks upon his beloved South­
land. During the spring of 1850 he wrote Calhoun about the possible 
dangers of statehood for California which would begin the increase in 
the number of free s t a t e s t h e  North "will ride over us rough shod-- 
proclaiming freedom or something equivalent to it to our slaves and 
reduce us to the [illegible] condition of Hayti. . . .  If we do not
act now we deliberately consign our children, not our posterity, but
72
our children to the flames."
Calhoun's own pessimism in 1850 was expressed in his famous 
speech in which he demanded that Northern assaults against the South 
be terminated; there had to be specific amendments to the United States 
Constitution which would ensure Southern political equality with the
70
North and West. J The dying statesman, who still loved the Union, 
stated: "I have now Senators done my duty in expressing my opinions
fully, freely, and candidly, on this solemn occasion. In doing so, I 
have been governed by the motives which have governed me in all stages 
of the slavery question since its commencement. I have exerted myself
70 Ibid.
71 James Hammond to John C. Calhoun, March 5, 1850, James 
Henry Hammond Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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73 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 451-54.
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during the whole period, to arrest it, with the intention of saving
the Union, if it could be done; and, if it could not, to save the
section where it has pleased Providence to cast my lot, and which I
74sincerely believe has justice and the Constitution of its side."
After Calhoun's death, South Carolinians did not provide sig­
nificant leadership in either the House or Senate. Congressional 
leaders from the Palmetto state were chiefly concerned with resisting 
passage of the Omnibus bills and warning their constituents about the 
perils of abolition. The appointment of Robert W. Barnwell to 
Calhoun's seat did not fill the void. Although he and Butler united
with men like Jefferson Davis in the Senate, they did not provide the
75central leadership in the Southern resistance movement in Congress.
Congressman Colcock, in discussing the slavery question in 
early June, was very critical of the false "compromises" which did 
not protect slavery. The peculiar institution, which Northerners 
condemned, was under attack from men who wanted to divide masters from 
the yeoman on the question of black bondage.^ They attacked the South 
which was actually united on the need for Negroes to remain in servi­
tude :
And here, let me say, in passing, that this attempt to create 
hostile relations between our citizens is as wicked as it is
74 Ibid.. 455.
75 This conclusion is baaed on an analysis of extant news­
papers and the debates reported in the Congressiona1 Globe. 31 Cong.
1 Sess., passim.
76 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 684-87.
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futile, for 1 tell you that if it should ever become necessary 
to defend our rights by arms, there is no portion of our 
people who will be found more ready to obey the call than the 
non-slaveholders of our community. They understand this 
question well. They know that the liberation of the slave 
will bring neither honor nor profit to them. They never will 
consent to elevate the negro to an equality with themselves; 
and thus, whilst they reject your sympathies, they know and 
despise your purpose. This sir, is a white man's government 
. . . and all history attests that no son of Ham [blacks] 
ever shook a sceptre over the head of Japheth. 77
Slavery had been a blessing for the South that condemned the Clay 
Compromise which did not protect Southern rights or result in any real 
adjustment of the differences between the sections.78 The South was 
excluded from the West, and Colcock concluded: "We shall never con­
sent that this Government shall destroy our property, and degrade us 
from our equality. . . .  If you are resolved to make this a question 
of subjugation or separation, we will not hesitate which to choose; 
and if our Union shall be dissolved, upon you, not upon us, must 
rest the responsibility."
Colcock's colleague, in South Carolina's first Congressional 
district, Daniel Wallace, was extremely concerned about the problems
caused by the growth of Northern abolitionism which had its origins in 
80England; u the idea of racial equality was dangerous to the white 
South:
The creed of these fanatics involves the distinct proposition,
77 Ibid., 686.
78 Ibid.. 686-87.
79 Ibid.. 687.
80 Charleston Mercury. June 5, 1850.
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that Inasmuch as the black race at the South cannot be raised 
up to the level of the white race, the white race must be 
pulled down to the level of the negro, and that all must stand 
together in the same political and social rank. And instead 
of the negro being subject to the white man, the negro by his 
right of suffrage at the ballot box, must make laws for the 
white man. The progress then which is demanded, is not 
upwards but downwards. At the North, this downwards ten­
dency cannot go lower than the lowest white man; at the 
South, it must go to the level of the lowest negro.
This militant Congressman emphasized that the abolitionists controlled
Congress which was assuming more control over the South's peculiar
institution. Clay's Adjustment bills gave nothing to the South and
the Kentucky Senator admitted that the Mexican cession would enter
the Union as free-soil states. The purchase of land from the state of
Texas would establish a precedent for Federal funds being used to
82"bribe a state to give up the institution, . . . "  Furthermore, he 
emphasized that the Texas debt "is a direct attempt to bribe every 
Texas bondholder in the United States to the whole scheme of adjustment 
as a unit."®® Fugitive Slave bill provided an escaped slave with
protection which he found objectionable and expensive to the master. 
Therefore Wallace wanted strong Southern resistance against the central 
government.®^
In Congress John McQueen denounced the Compromise proposals. 
Abolitionist strength, in his opinion, was increasing in the North and
81 Ibid.
82 Edgefield Advertiser, June 12, 1850.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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endangered black slavery. Presidential candidates had to straddle the
issue, and he had warned that the goal of the entire North was to
abolish slavery even if it harmed Southern whites. This end would be
accomplished by creating "an abolition girdle" around the Southern
states; the plan, which he believed was exposed in abolition literature,
would involve servile insurrection and equality for the black man.
This latter goal was impossible since it was not intended by God and
85was not a reality anywhere on earth--including the North.
Southern "rights" McQueen continued, would be violated in the
proposed plans of adjustment. He opposed the Taylor plan for the
admission of California and strongly denounced the Report of the
Committee of Thirteen:
I am opposed to it, because it proposes to admit California with 
all its enormities. I am opposed to it because it proposes to 
purchase nearly one-third of Texas (acknowledged by Mr. Webster 
himself to be slave territory) with our own money, to become 
ultimately subject to some of the new fangled non-interventions 
or provisos of free-soilism. I am opposed to it, because the 
report expresses the existence of the Mexican [anti-slavery] 
laws in the territories; because it proposes to insert the 
entering wedge in the abolition of slavery in this District; 
because it proposes to legislate in fact for the negro, instead 
of the master, in the States. And above all, I am opposed to 
it, because, in my estimation it would amount to an entire 
surrender of the rights and honor of the South, and instead of 
allaying the aggressions regularly going on against us, it 
would give new zeal and confidence to our enemies, very soon to 
show itself in this District, the dock-yards and arsenals, and 
before many years, in the States.®^
The South was not responsible for the aggressions against her, and she
85 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 735-38.
86 Ibid., 738.
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would have to defend herself in the Union if she was able,"out of it, 
if she must."®^
His colleague James L. Orr had spoken on May 8 about the perils
to the Union. Abolitionism was a significant force in Northern society
as demonstrated by the creation of large numbers of anti-slavery socie-
88ties and by the elevation to Congress of men like William H„ Seward.. 
There were men from the North who wanted to emancipate the Negro and 
give him full equality: "The aim of the Abolitionists looks first to
the emancipation of our slaves throughout the South, and then is to 
follow their elevation to all the social and political privileges of the 
white man. The thick-lipped African is to march up to the same ballot 
box, eat at the same table, and sit in the same parlor with the white 
m a n . "89 orr then turned to the proposed admission of California which 
was pushed by the North because it had a free-soil constitution. How­
ever, if the former Bear Flag Republic had applied for statehood with 
a provision favoring black slavery, her application would have been 
opposed by the states in the North. The majority section, which was
attacking the foundations of slavery, must be defied by the entire South
90which wanted to live in peace with its black bondsmen. If agitation 
against slavery was not ended, both sections would be faced with hard
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.. 543-46.
89 Ibid., 544.
90 Ibid.. 544-45.
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choices: "I tell northern gentlemen to-day, that five years will not
elapse before they will be required to make the choice between non­
intervention and non-agitation through Congress on the one hand, and a 
dissolution of this Government on the other; and I tell the Southern 
people, if this agitation is continued during that time, then peace and 
personal security will require them to choose between secession and 
negro emancipation.”^  Orr therefore supported the Nashville Convention 
which he believed was called to preserve the Union and Constitution 
rather than to plan disunion.^
In these addresses and speeches there is one common thread-- 
concern about emancipation. Each man was worried about the future of 
the peculiar institution, and each one revealed his own fear or those 
of his constituents about a post-abolition period in which white and 
black people would be equal under the law. Their sense of outrage at 
the danger to Carolina's most vital domestic institution increased 
during the rest of the year.
The Nashville Convention provided a forum for Robert Barnwell 
Rhett. This extreme Fire-eater, the principle author of the Conven­
tion's Address, stressed that the South had been under seige from the 
North for sixteen years. Northerners had begun their attack on slavery
by using the right of the people to petition as a first step in
93attacking the institution of slavery in the South. The agitation had
91 Ibid., 545.
92 Ibid., 546.
93 Condensed Statement of the Proceed]ngs of the NashviIle Con­
vention (Jackson: Fall & Marsha 1 I, Printers, 1850), 5-16, passim.
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extended into religious bodies, and "became the grand topic of interest 
and discussion in Congress and out of Congress, and one of the most 
important elements of politics in the U n i o n . " ^  Hostility to black 
bondage in the North had so increased that peace between the sections 
no longer existed. States north of the Mason-Dixon line were prepared 
to gradually abolish slavery by first stopping the expansion of 
slavery into the territories as a step toward ending it in the states. 
The Northern section, which dominated in Washington was thus not
95
sympathetic to the South's interests and treated her as a colony; but 
Rhett stated the South must control her own affairs to prevent aboli­
tion: "they [the North] do not practically recognise [sic] the
inferiority of the African to the Caucasian races. They do not 
realise [sic], because the circumstances of their condition do not 
compel them to realise [sic], the impossibility of an amalgamation 
between the races. Exempt from the institution of slavery, it is not 
surprising that their sympathies should be against us, . . ."96 since 
the North had gained control of the national government, they would 
push to end "African Slavery" in "the broad and fertile South."^7
Rhett continued the denunciation of the North by attacking the 
proposed Compromise in detail. The South was excluded from California
94 Ibid.. 6 .
95 Ibid.. 5-9.
96 Ibid., 9.
97 Ibid.
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by a free-soil constitution, while slave territory was taken from her
98in the Texas boundary settlement. This action would limit the expan­
sion of slavery to the western edges of Missouri and Arkansas: "Thus
the Southern states will be hemmed in by the non-slaveholding states on
their whole western border--a policy which they have declared essential
99to the end of abolishing slavery in the Southern states." Southerners 
had further to suffer from the demand that the slave trade be ended in 
the District of Columbia, and from the proposal that the master would 
be required to prove ownership of the slave in the c o u r t s . R h e t t  
found this provision of the proposed Fugitive Slave bills particularly 
objectionable: "If Congress can legislate at all between the master
and slave in a state, where can its power be stayed? It can abolish 
slavery in the s t a t e s . T h e r e f o r e ,  the fear of abolition ran 
through this analysis of Clay's proposals by this South Carolina Fire- 
eater,
Opinions about the sectional crisis were expressed at public 
meetings and in private correspondence. At the courthouse in Darling­
ton, resolutions were passed which condemned the Omnibus bill while the 
proceedings of the Nashville Convention were approved. These sentiments 
were in accord with the thoughts of Fire-eaters in Edgefield who
98 Ibid., 9-14.
99 Ibid., 14.
100 Ibid., 14-15.
101 Ibid.. 15.
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approved the Nashville proposals and heard John K. Johnson warn that
submission to "wrongs" suffered by the South would only encourage
greater aggression. a  spirit of resistance was expressed in a letter
from one of Congressman Burt's constituents:
Being one of your constituents--. . . it may not be amiss for 
you to know--our opinions as regards the great Southern 
question, but this is scarcely necessary as you well know 
that Carolinians will goe [sic] as far as the farthest in 
establishing our rights . . .103
James Hammond believed that after the Nashville Convention the South
would resist Northern attacks:
But I am also convinced that the struggle to prevent submission 
will be almost as arduous as that in the State from 1828 to 
1832 & probably of longer duration--unless the north assists 
us by increasing and repeated outrages.
Unionist sentiment was expressed in a letter written to 
Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville. Richard Yeadon, a moderate Charles­
tonian stressed his pleasure that Perry was still holding to Unionist 
principles despite the loss of support from many former Union men:
"I am delighted to find you still reasonable 6c firm, patriotic to the 
nation, as well as true to the South--for the two are perfectly com­
patible."^'* However, he could support disunion if a fair adjustment
102 Charleston Mercury, August 29, 1850; Edgefield Advertiser, 
August 12. 1850.
103 Jacob Ginges to Armistead Burt, June 28, 1850, Armistead 
Burt Papers.
104 James Hammond to H. W. Connor, July 11, 1850, James Henry 
Hammond Papers.
105 Richard Yeadon to Benjamin F. Perry, June 4, 1850, Benja­
min F. Perry Papers.
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was not achieved. But Yeadon stated: "I unhesitatingly prefer Clay's
compromise to disunion & will resolutely stand to that mark."*^
On the Congressional level, the entire delegation battled for 
Southern rights. Senator Barnwell, in a short but bitter statement, 
spoke about Southern political equality and slavery. The South was 
being branded as an inferior and had to have the right to take black 
property into the Southwest.Southerners no longer believed that 
slavery was an evil because religious men in the South, driven by 
abolitionist attacks "were compelled to investigate, and have been 
very generally brought to the conclusion that there is nothing in the 
word of God which forbids or condemns this relation but on the con­
trary, much that justifies and sustains it. So that they may with all
good conscience, hold and govern as slaves the people committed to 
108
their charge." Southerners were also convinced that slave labor 
was profitable and that not all men were fit to govern themselves as 
the example of St. Domingo and Jamaica "proved."109 passage of the 
Missouri Compromise line would settle the question of slavery in the 
territories, but Barnwell believed that continued attacks on the South 
would make adjustment impossible.
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107 Congressional Globe, 31 Congress, 1 Sess., Appendix, 990-91.
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During the late summer the entire Congressional delegation 
fought against passage of the Compromise. The two Senators helped 
kill the Compromise as a package on July 31, and then worked against 
Douglas’ efforts to revive the bills. Butler declared that statehood 
for California ensured Northern supremacy in the Federal government 
and gave the North greater control over the extension of slavery. The 
delegation opposed all of the Compromise except for the Fugitive Slave 
Law although Butler voted yes on the question of territorial govern­
ment for U t a h . m
By September 1850 South Carolinians were being prepared for
further resistance by Governor Seabrook. He corresponded with several
Southern executives about the need to resist the growing power of the
112national government; it had degraded the South through such actions 
as the admission of California to the Union; "The aggravating circum­
stances under which California has been admitted into the Union, and 
the certain determination of the North and Congress, the executor of 
its will, practically to change the form of our government, demand of 
the slave-holding states prompt and effective resistance. They now 
occupy a position of degradation and unequality. Submission will con­
stitute them forever mere dependencies of a great Central Head."^^ 
This fear of a strong central government was coupled with his
111 Ibid., 1547; Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict 
(New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1964), 191-200.
112 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 69-72.
113 Confidential letter to Governors of Alabama, Virginia and 
Mississippi, September 20, 1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
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recognition of the realities of Southern Politics. Seabrook realized 
that South Carolina's tradition for radicalism meant that she could 
not effectively lead such a movement. Thus, he stopped efforts to call
the South Carolina legislature into an early session.
South Carolina's elite created organizations to further the
population's "natural" opposition to the North. On September 18 a 
meeting held at the courthouse in Georgetown, established a Southern 
Rights Association. R. A. Allston, the chairman of the meeting, 
appointed a committee which drew up resolutions announcing that viola­
tions of states rights "have dissolved the bonds which held the Con­
federacy together, and that all that remains for the State to do, is 
to resume these powers of government which granted for our benefit, 
have been grossly abused to our manifest injury and wrong."H5 jn 
Richland district W. F. DeSaussure led a meeting which resolved that 
the "opponents of slavery are driving the slaveholding states from 
the protection and sanctuary of the constitution, and fast reducing 
them to a condition of vassalage . . . DeSaussure recognized that
Northern power was expanding rapidly while the South was becoming an 
impotent minority in Congress with "only the privilege of witnessing
114 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 69-72; 
John Quitman to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, September 29, 1850, Whitemarsh 
B. Seabrook Papers; Whitemarsh B. Seabrook to George Towns, October 8 , 
1850, ibid.; Whitemarsh B. Seabrook to John Leland, September 18, 21, 
1850, ibid.
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116 Columbia Tri-weekly South Carolinian. September 7, 1850.
324
the edicts recorded, by which she is immolated ."H? in order
to prevent the South's destruction, he was ready to resist "even
118to a disruption of the Union" if it became necessary. A
meeting in Abbeville, called to form a Southern Rights Association,
was addressed by Drayton Nance, a delegate to the Nashville
Convention, who wanted South Carolina to secede alone if no state
would join her Francis W. Pickens warned about the Northern
desire for black emancipation. Armstead Burt declared that the
Union was already dissolved; South Carolina should secede to
119protect her way of life:
If we remain in the Union we must give up our property . . .
we must choose which we would make our antagonist, the 
white man of the North, or the negro of the South; for one 
he preferred to fight the unnatural monsters who were ready 
to incite our slaves to promiscuous c a r n a g e  . ^ 0
A report drawn up at the meeting stressed that the South had to
choose between seceding from the Union and acquiescing to Northern
oppressors; Southerners were not allowed to expand westward with
slaves and were thus confronted with the problem of a growing
black population. This situation would force white men to engage
1 p 1
in a race war or leave the South.
117 Ibid., September 10, 1350.
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119 Edgefield Advertiser, October 16, 1850 quoting 
Abbeville Banner.
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Speeches, pamphlets and editorials were widely
disseminated before the convening of the legislature in late
November. Christopher Memminger delivered an.emotional speech
at Pendleton on October 1 in which he charged that the Federal
government had become "a mere machine for carrying out the
122fanatic spirit of abolition." The anti-slavery party wanted 
to emancipate all blacks and achieve political supremacy. Wilmot's 
hated Proviso had been applied to former Mexican territory with 
California's admission as a state; the phrase "no law in respect 
to slavery," which was included in the Utah and New Mexico laws, 
was designed to prevent the passage of laws protecting a slave­
holder's black property in the Southwest. The land taken from
Texas would also help stop the expansion of the peculiar 
123institution.
California's admission to the Union, according to
Memminger, was the key to the South's potential racial problems.
If the state had been opened to slavery, the value of slaves in
South Carolina would have increased by five million dollars because
1 o t
black labor could have been used in the gold mines. But a
free California actually secured the political ascendancy of the
122 Charleston Mercury, Oct. 10, 1850.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
326
North which would be able to amend the national constitution
in order to abolish slavery and establish black equality:
. • . with emancipation must come civil rights, and your 
next neighbor in every jury box and every muster field, 
will be a negro. Nay as they are the majority, you may 
think yourselves fortunate if you are permitted the 
privilege of elbowing them in the crowd. Then too, all 
experience has proved that without the control of the 
white man the negro will not work and will relapse into 
semibarbarism. And when the rice fields below, shall 
have become a desolution, like the sugar fields of St.
Domingo, rest assured that the half-starved savages will 
find their way among your farm houses and your granaries, 
and you must exterminate them or abandon the county to 
them.125
Southerners must meet in a "congress" to demand that the national 
government protect their "rights." If certain conditions were not 
met by the Federal government, the South should secede together 
or South Carolina alone.
Francis Pickens delivered a strong defense of the South
which was reprinted in the state newspapers. Pickens believed that
if the South opposed the attacks of slavery--even to the point of
armed resistence--the North would "pause and reconsider the
1 9 7consequences of their mad and fatal policy." Emancipation of 
black people would affect all classes in the South:
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Columbia Tri-weekly South Carolinian, September 12,
1850.
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It is a great mistake to suppose the poor man is not as 
deeply interested as the rich man [in the abolition question]. 
Independent of his honor, his feeling for his State, her 
rights and independence, he would be more deeply prostrated by 
emancipation than any other man. Suppose these 3,000,000 of 
black laborers were thrown free upon society. They would come 
immediately into competition with all white mechanics, artisans 
and laborers, and white labor would have to contend with 
vagrant and vagabond labor which would drag them down also to 
misery and want. Instead of having the proud conscientiousness, 
with the rank of freemen, and an inferior caste beneath them, 
they would then have to struggle with this licentious and 
vagrant mob labor, with no law to control or principle to 
govern it.128
A wealthy man might be able to escape the problem of a
post-emancipation society, but lower class whites would be
directly affected. Therefore, South Carolina should not submit
129to any degradations.
In a private letter to abolitionist Lewis Tappan, James 
Henry Hammond discussed the race problem and secession. The 
letter, apparently written in response to a series of questions
which Tappan had addressed to him, defended slavery on racial
130grounds; black bondage was necessary because distinct racial 
characteristics prevented blacks from living in society as the 
white man's equal:
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 James Henry Hammond to Lewis Tappan, September 1, 
1850, James Henry Hammond Papers.
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"I see and all observant persons well acquainted with 
negroes can see, that in their men tal [sic] structure 
they differ from us almost as much as in color and 
features. Amalgamation or equality of any kind between 
these two races are on account of these circumstances, 
utterly & forever out of the question. They cannot exist 
together on the same soil except as master and slave."131
If abolition ever became a reality in the South Hammond stressed
that "it will only be for a short 6c turbulent period . . . 6e
inevitably [illegible] in the subjugation or extermination of one
132race or the other." The South, however, could support a black
population of one hundred and fifty million bondsmen because their
maintenance was inexpensive. And, in a spirit of bravado, Hammond
claimed that slavery would expand into California within fifty
years and would go with "the Saxon race to Mexico 6c South 
133America." This glowing prediction, was coupled with Hammond's
statement that disunion was inevitable:
"You [Northerners] will dissolve the Union. It will be 
but knocking off a heavy fetter of the system [slavery].
All the discussion of it [emancipation in the Caribbean 
Islands] has served to strengthen it in our opinions, 
while God has taken care to interweave it with our whole 
social, political, industrial, 6c financial organization, 
that we are sure to give up life before we surrender it 
and he [sic] has also taken care to stave off the crisis 
untill [sic] we are strong enough to see the Union severed
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
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without a quivering nerve, & so maintain our institutions 
against the World."134
South Carolinians, in this brooding planter's opinion, would
eventually see the rest of the South sever the bonds of the Union
because white supremacy was threatened by the Northern attacks 
135on slavery.
Pamphleteers were active in the fall of 1850 as the state
was inundated with statements expressing both radical and moderate
viewpoints. One booklet entitled "The Southern States, Their
Present Peril, and Their Certain Remedy" was circulated in
Charleston. The author John Townsend stated that there were two
groups in the South who took positions on the sectional crisis:
one group believed that the Compromise of 1850 was a serious
aggression against the South but held that it could be solved
by compromise "with our enemies. The other class, . . . view
the measures, as part of a regular system of operations, the
object, intention, and inevitable tendency of which, is, to
abolish slavery entirely in the States, and to degrade the South
1into a tribute-paying colony to the rest of the Union." The
134 Ibid- 
133 Ibid-
136 John Townsend, The Southern States, Their Present 
Peril, and Their Certain Remedy: Why do They Not Right Themselves
and So Fulfil Their Glorious Destiny. (Charleston: Printed by
Edward C. Councell 1850) 5.
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dangers of abolition had been present since 1835, and when the 
North had the power to amend the Constitution it would either 
emancipate all slaves or allow the institution to exist "upon the 
condition only, that the South, with her slaves, shall become the
I O 7
slaves of the North, . . If blacks were actually freed
Townsend listed six "terrible" consequences:
First - The elevating of our slaves to a political equality 
with ourselves in the making of our laws, and in the government 
of the country; which will soon be followed by the degradation, 
(as in the British and French West Indies) - of the claims of a 
vulgar and upstart race, to social equality with ourselves, and 
families, in all domestic relations of life. 2d - The over­
running of our country with swarms of an indolent, vicious, and 
unthrifty species of Lazaroni, instead of the best agricultural 
population in the world such as we now have them. 3d - As a 
consequence of their release from the control of their masters, 
the abandonment of the cultivation of all the great agricultural 
staples of the South, . . . 4th - The loss of fifteen hundred 
millions of our capital in the loss of property in our slaves, 
and in the labour which are derived from them. 5th - The 
depreciation of other fifteen hundred millions of our capital in 
land, which would become comparatively valueless after our 
labour capital was destroyed; and 6th - Our political annihila­
tion among the nations of the earth;
After describing the "results" of abolition for white 
Southerners, Townsend outlined a means of defense. There could be 
no political compromises with Northern fanatics who had violated all 
previous attempts at adjustment between the major sections. 
Northerners were not content with adjustments, and there would be
137 Ibid., 8 .
138 Ibid., 10.
331
a battle over who would control the destiny of the black slave--
the white man of the South or of the North. He favored fighting
the "battle" between the sections even if it lead to disunion
or civil war. The South possessed the resources to survive as a
separate nation, and would be able to maintain herself in a war 
139with the North. Disunion would "be followed by infinite
distress and disaster to the North . . . the Union is of vastly
more value to them, than it is to us; and that it is for them,
and not for us, to make sacrifices and concessions to maintain
it "140 Secession was probably the only way of protecting Southern
rights since the North would not "sacrifice" to preserve the
Union unless she was actually "persuaded that disunion will be the
inevitable consequence."141
Unionist sentiment was expressed in a private letter by a
Carolina conservative. James L. Petigru of Charleston concluded
that there was a definite disunion feeling in the Queen City:
"It really does seem that the atmosphere is infested, and reason
driven from men's minds by an epidemic. The readiness to break
up the Confederacy could not have been expected of persons who have
142
practical illustrations of its benefits." However, Petigru
139 Ibid., 11 - 16.
140 Ibid., 27.
141 Ibid., 31.
142 James Petigru to Benjamin F. Perry, November 18, 1850, 
Benjamin F. Perry Papers.
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believed that the populaces' anger against the North would
decline and "that a [conservative] reaction will take place, . .
On November 26, 1850, Governor Seabrook delivered a message
to the South Carolina assembly. He considered the Omnibus bills as
"another triumph over the South by the fell spirit of
abolitionism."^^ The grant of statehood to California was a
violation of constitutional power, and the law abolishing the slave
trade in Washington included provisions for the emancipation of
145Negro slaves which might be expanded. Since the sections were
vastly unequal in power, there could be a final "emancipation of
the negro throughout the region in which he is constitutionally
held as property, although its execution may consign to the same
grave the master and slave, and spread desolation over their
common home."^^ The national government wanted to reduce the
147state "to colonial vassalage" rather than protect her rights. 
Although Seabrook upheld the right of secession and wanted South
143 Ibid.
144 Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, 
at its Annual Session, Commencing November 25, 1850 (Columbia: A, S 
Johnston, Printer to the Senate, 1850), 25 Hereinafter cited as 
Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina (1850).
145 Ibid., 25-27.
146 Ibid., 28.
147 Ibid., 28-30.
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Carolina to cooperate with the entire South, he stated: "I
beseech you to remember, that no conjuncture of events ought to
induce us to abandon the right of deciding ultimately on our own
destiny."^-4® In concluding, the Governor called for a day of
prayer for the security of the state and for the return to
149peaceful relations with the North.
The state assembly engaged in extensive debate in an 
attempt to provide means for redressing Southern grievances. A 
day of prayer was designated for December 6, 1850, but a dispute 
occurred over whether the state should call a separate South 
Carolina convention, provide for a Southern Congress, and elect 
a successor to John C. Calhoun. These issues were debated in both 
legislative houses until a compromise was worked out before 
Christmas. Representative Josiah B. Perry introduced resolutions 
which stated that South Carolina should not fill Calhoun's vacant 
seat and "That our present Senator, The Hon. A. P. Butler be, 
and he is hereby instructed, and our Representatives be and they are 
hereby requested not to reoccupy their seats [in Congress in 
preparation for secession], . . There was also extensive
148 Ibid., 31.
149 lbid-
150 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State 
of South Carolina; Being the Annual Session of 1850 (Columbia: 
Steampower Press of I C Morgan, State Printer, 1850), 51 
Hereinafter cited as Journal of the House of Representatives of the 
State of South Carolina (1850).
334
discussion about the question of the state convention which
produced conflict between secessionists and cooperationists.
Representative James Chesnut of Kershaw spoke in favor of
cooperation while emphasizing that South Carolina did not stand
alone; she should definitely not adopt "the mad policy of separate 
1S1action." The state was not faced with a policy of submission
or secession, and should unite internally along with the rest of
the South: "Let us be prudent--unite our own people--and unite
with our Sister States--prepare for the contest by making
adequate appropriations of money for such objects as will prove
152to them and the North that we are in earnest." Representative
J. A. Dargan favored the calling of a state convention in the
spring of 1851 to consider the action of the Palmetto state in
the slavery crisis, and to provide for the state's attendance
at a Southern Congress. If neither of these two Conventions
secured Southern rights, then "South Carolina would interpose her
153honor to redeem her sovereignity." Representative Lyles stated 
that he was willing to wait a reasonable length of time for 
cooperation but not for another decade: "He was a disunionist per 
se. He would sink it [Union] tomorrow if he could.
151 Columbia Tri-weekly South Carolinian, December 11, 1850.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., December 13, 1850.
154 Ibid.
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Race was recognized as the key issue in the speech of
Assemblyman Lewis M. Ayer. Although Ayer considered himself a
moderate he wanted to hold a convention and favored the calling
home of all South Carolina Congressmen from Washington. The
state convention would consider South Carolina's attendance at a
Southern Congress and act as a medium to educate the non-
slaveholding masses on the advantages of s l a v e r y . S l a v e r y
existed in all parts of the world, but in the Northern section
of the United States an especially odious bondage existed:
"There a portion of the white population, as intelligent and as
virtuous as any, from want and sheer necessity, are compelled
to discharge these menial offices which the negro slaves perform
in the South, . . White men in the South had to be shown
that nowhere else, except in a country holding African 
slaves, is the poor man regarded or treated by the rich 
as a gentleman. For in a county of African slavery, few 
very few, whites need descend so low as to embrace those low and 
menial occupations which in the course of a few generations 
must debase and enslave the mind as well as the b o d y . 1^7
If the abolitionists successfully freed the slaves, lower class
whites would eventually lose their land and be forced to labor for
the rich or migrate westward. Thus the South would suffer the
158same fate as St. Domingo.
155 Ibid., February 5, 1851.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
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A similar recognition of the racial problem emerged in 
the speech of representative Hunt. He believed "that the time had 
come for the States who acknowledged the white man as alone as [sic] 
constituting the body politic, to act in union to protect 
themselves, in all time to come from the unprincipled aggressions
I C Q
of the States north of the Potomac." Hunt held that black
people could not have national citizenship and that there was a
division between "the free white states" [South] and the "free
negro states" [North]. Bondage was the black man's natural
condition and there was nowhere in the world--including the
North--where racial equality existed. Slavery was mandatory
for the South's survival and the white man below the Mason-Dixon
line would fight to maintain it:
Our domestic institutions are our own, . . .  We inherited 
them; we feel they are consistent with the ordinations of 
Providence. We find them essential to our prosperty as a 
people. We will perpetuate them, and we and our children, 
will fight for them. . . . Necessity is admitted by all as 
paramount to all other motives, and we know that unless the 
African laborer is compelled to labor, he will only toil, of 
his own motion, for a bare existence. . . . The soil of the 
South white men cannot till. Our experience is conclusive.
The African race can endure the congenial sun. The union of 
the white man's head and the negro's arm, has reclaimed the 
fens and marches of the South. Without this Union, they must 
return and become the abodes of their aborigines and occupants. 
Who has the authority to require this sacrifice? ^
159 lb id., December 23, 1850.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
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Hunt favored cooperation by the South to preserve the
1 62
white man's land against Northern encroachments.
The major exponent of the Unionist position was Benjamin 
F. Perry. His views, expressed in the assembly during early 
December, represented a call for sanity after the extreme statements 
of radicalism. He emphasized his loyalty to South Carolina, but 
did not want her to adopt any extreme "course which must 
inevitably prove disastrous to her, and ruinous to the cause of
1 z: O
the South." The United States had brought prosperity and
expansion for the slave states from the Louisiana Purchase to the
entrance of Texas into the Union. And, even though the South no
longer controlled the national government, Perry denied that there
164
was sufficient cause to abolish the Union.
Slavery, according to this conservative, was very safe in 
the Union. The peculiar institution had actually been strengthened 
by Northern attacks which had ended the potential spirit of 
emancipation in the border states. There had been no attempts 
to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and secession would
162 Ikisl-
163 Speech of Honorable B. F. Perry of Greenville District, 
Delivered in the House of Representatives of South Carolina on
the 11th December, 1850, on a Number of Propositions Referred to the 
Committee of the Whole on the State and Federal Affairs (Charleston: 
J. B. Nixon Printer, 1851), 5.
164 Ibid., 5-16.
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be extremely dangerous for the institution's survival: "I
regard the dissolution of the Union as the most fatal blow which
slavery could receive. Nothing could gratify the abolitionists
more, or tend more to the accomplishments of their wicked purposes.
We now have the protection of a great and powerful nation. . .
We should then have a weak and petty government, incapable of
defending our rights against foreign aggressions, and the
1 6 5sympathies of the whole civilized world against us." If war
broke out after secession, military forces would have to control
the black population which might be motivated by the revolutionary
potential which was common in armed conflicts.
Perry wanted South Carolina to adopt a conservative
position which involved practical resistance against the North.
If South Carolina seceded, as had been proposed in assembly
debate, she would probably be isolated as in the 1830's. The
Federal government would not allow her to secede peacefully and
Perry called for a meeting of a Southern Congress which could
167
provide for unity within the slave states. Practical 
resistance, which he stressed, included economic retaliation 
against the North: "I am in favor of taxing Northern
165 Ibid., 17.
166 Ibid., 18.
167 Ibid., 19-38.
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goods, . . .  I will go for nonintercourse with those cities
16S
where this abolition movement is kept up, . . . Thus Perry, 
adopting the strategy of John Macpherson Berrien, called for 
economic resistance--rather than secession--as the most effective 
means of preserving Southern rights.
Compromise between the various positions expressed in 
resolutions and debate was finally achieved in late December 1850. 
Congressmen from South Carolina were not directed to stay at 
home, and Robert Barnwell Rhett was sent as the state's champion 
to the United States Senate. After several mishaps a compromise 
[omnibus bill] was reached between the two houses of the 
legislature which provided for both a Southern Congress and a 
state convention. Elections for the state convention were to take 
place in February 1851 with membership equal to the total South 
Carolina Assembly. The legislature also elected radical John 11.
Means as governor to lead the state during the critical years 
1851-52.169
John Means, a Fire-eater, delivered his inaugural address 
in the latter part of December. The United States government which
168 Ibid., 39.
169 Journals of the House of Representatives of the State 
of South Carolina (1850), 216-17, 147, 225; Journal of the Senate 
of the State of South Carolina (1850), 119, 170-1.
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had been created to protect property--including Negro slaves--was
actually threatening to destroy it.^® Emancipation was a
potential terror for all white people in the state:
Who can contemplate without a shudder the consequences of the 
abolition of slavery in the states. Their terrors are not 
alone to be seen in the misery caused to the slaveholder by 
stripping him of his property, bought and honestly paid for by 
a life of industry--not in starvation and the ruin of the 
merchant and mechanic, by the prostration of those who buy his 
merchandise, or pay for his labor--not in deserted fields, and 
decaying towns and villages; but in the still more direful 
consequences, resulting from the commingling of two races so 
entirely distinct in their genius and character. One or the 
other of them must be annihalated [sic], and that amid scenes of 
anarchy and blood, greater than any which history records on 
her darkest and bloodiest page.l^l
There was no constitutional way to stop the attacks by the majority
section. Therefore South Carolina should meet with other Southern
states in a Congress:
But if all our honest exertions to unite the South should 
fail, and South Carolina should stand alone, then, solitary 
and alone, let her throw her banner to the breeze, and leave 
the consequences to God. Common interests and common dangers 
will rally the other Southern states to our s t a n d a r d . 1^2
By the end of 1850 Carolinians stood ready to defend the. 
peculiar institution and preserve a society dominated by white men. 
They had consistently stressed the fact that the key issue in the
170 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian, December 18,
1850.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
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struggle over the Compromise was the threatened abolition of
black people. The horrors of a post-emancipation society
were emphasized in speeches. Public opinion makers appealed to the
base emotions of the white population who felt the neeid for the
peculiar institution as a way to maintain their own psychological
and social status. Secessionists newspapers like the Edgefield
Advertiser even played up the danger of white-black sexual unions
afer emancipation in order to frighten lower-class whites into
adopting a radical position; the paper predicted intermarriage
if the abolitionists were successful in establishing their goals
of freedom and equality; there would be an acceptance of
173miscegenation in the next generation. A lower-class white
should be appalled by the idea of black blood
coursing in the veins of his grand-children--that his grand­
daughter will be the mother, or his grand-son the father of a 
motley group of mulattoes, the offspring of lawful wedlock-- 
lawful according to the laws of the degenerate descendants of 
the present generation, but repugnant, as we believe, to the 
laws of nature; for God never intended that races so dissimilar, 
physically, morally and intellectually, should amalgamate. We 
shudder, our blood all but curdles, at the prospect of any such 
degradation of the white race.^^
All white men had to resist the "horrible" future which was waiting
for the South if anti-slavery egalitarians were successful. Racial
173 Edgefield Advertiser, December 12, 1850.
174 Ibid.
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equality was thus combined with the most base appeal to white men--
175protection of racial and sexual purity.
During the early months of 1851 South Carolina prepared
for the elections to the state convention. There was apparently
little interest in the contest which did not coincide with a
national e l e c t i o n . A  feeling of alienation existed, however,
as one Carolinian noted in a letter from Charleston:
I deeply regret to inform you that it is my thorough [sic] 
conviction that Charleston is wholly alienated from the 
Union & that a long list of Union-regarding citizens 
cannot be found within her limits. I believe that a 
majority of her citizens are at present opposed to separate 
State action, but I equally believe that with a near 
approach to unanimity, she is for a Southern Confederacy 
or disunion per se.
This view was reaffirmed partially by a meeting in South
Carolina's Union district which stated that citizens would require
delegates to the state convention to support secession
"simultaneously with such other states as may express an intention
1 70
to do so, £r alone if the other states refuse to join her.11 
Robert Henry, a candidate for the state convention, wanted to
175 Ibid.
176 Columbia Tri-weekly South Carolinian, February 10, 1851, 
Richard Yeadon to Benjamin F. Perry, January 6, 1851, Benjamin
F. Perry Papers.
177 Richard Yeadon to Benjamin F. Perry January 6, 1851, 
Benjamin F. Perry Papers.
178 Columbia Tri-weekly South Carolinian, February 10, 1851.
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obtain reform within the Union. South Carolina's separate 
secession would leave her isolated with no outlet for her black
17Q
property; after secession was announced the only area open
to slavery "will be the space included between the Savannah and 
180the Atlantic." The people of South Carolina did not understand
the issues or see the need for the convention, however, because
the turnout at the polls was minimal. But an apathetic public
acquiesced to radical action by allowing election of members to a
181convention which could take the state out of the Union.
After the elections discussion on the issues of cooperation,
separate secession and the Union dominated the news. In March 1851
Reverend J. C. Coit of Chesterfield District, spoke about the
sectional problems. The Compromise of 1850 was "a triumph of the
182abolition and free-soil policy, . . in a rambling discourse,
with lengthy digressions on the rights of sovereigns, Coit 
declared that all of California, the Southwest and part of Texas 
had been lost to the North which had not even agreed to the
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 John Russel to James Hammond, February 10, 1851,
James Henry Hammond Papers; Yorkville Miscellany, February 15, 1851; 
Charleston Mercury, February 11, 17, 19, 1851.
182 J. C. Coit. An Address Delivered to the Freemen of 
Chesterfield District on Tues., Second Day of Court Week, March 
1851, (Columbia: Steam Power Press of IC. Morgan, 1851), 2.
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Fugitive Slave Law. There were few friends of the South north 
of the Potomac, and the elite in these areas had not prevented 
attacks upon the South by men who stole Southern slaves, tried to 
foment slave rebellions, and maintain a high protective tariff.
The North's goal was to dominate the institutions and people of the 
South:
The North will never disturb slavery in the states, if she can 
control it. That will neutralize all its moral, social and 
political evils. They can so adjust and compromise tariffs, 
finances and disbursements, as to clip the wings of Southern 
pride, ambition and prosperty; . . . they can so reduce the 
profits of slave labor to the people here, that the Southern 
planter will become a mere negro-driver and overseer for his 
Northern brethren. Between the East and West, the South 
will be crushed.
There must be an immediate declaration of independence by South
Carolina over the issue of equal utilization of the land in the West.
South Carolina would either be conquered with honor or receive the
aid of Southern people who could not "cooly look on and see us
185immolated upon the bloody altar of abolition."
Dr. John H. Blackwell wrote about the question of secession 
and the dangers of emancipation. He believed that the South had the 
resources to sustain herself in a contest with the North. Since 
Blackwell favored secession, he did not believe that cooperation
183 Ibid., 3-33.
184 Ibid., 33.
185 Ibid., 34.
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should be used as an excuse to postpone separate state action.
Separate secession would give impetus to union in the South. His
concern about lower class white devotion to slavery led him to defend
it as a necessity to the yeoman whose taxes were lower since most
government expenses were derived from assessments on black 
186slaves. Furthermore a hardworking member of the lower classes
could acquire slave property, and, as Blackwell stressed in an
impassioned statement, emancipation was a danger to all men:
It is impossible for the two races (the white and the black) to 
live together on terms of equality. Suppose that the thousands 
and tens of thousands of your negroes were turned loose upon 
you without money or credit, and what think you of the security 
of your property? What kind of locks think you would secure 
your barns and smokehouses against these indolent perishing 
creatures? Not only our property but our persons, the persons 
of our wives and children would be insecure. All forms of 
government would be subverted. Riots, thefts, robberies, and 
massacres would be of every day occurrence, . .
This South Carolinian appealed to the American desire for protection
of property as well as security of family from barbarous hordes of
shiftless blacks. Violence would be common in a post-abolition
South and could be prevented by secession which would preserve the
188institution of chattel slavery.
186 The Darlington Flag April 9, 1851.
187 Ibid.
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Unionists forces were active in the spring of 1851 with 
the establishment of a new paper, the Southern Patriot owned by 
Benjamin F. Perry. Richard Yeadon praised it in a letter from 
Charleston:
You richly deserve the thanks of your country for your 
manly & independent efforts to breast the torrents of the 
times. I believe with you that separate secession is 
suicidal folly; and that in the Union of the South will be 
found the safety of the South and very probably that of the 
Union also.189
Perry's newspaper became a forum for Union and cooperation sentiment
as he kept up an editorial barrage against the Fire-eaters. In one
editorial, for example, he discussed the problems of separate state
action by South Carolina:
Every man capable of bearing arms, will have to abandon his 
business and repair to the tented fields. The property of the 
state will have to be consumed in taxes or driven out of the 
state. Thousands and tens of thousands of our citizens would 
leave the state with their families and property. Business 
of every kind would be interrupted. The present high prosperity 
and happy condition of South Carolina would vanish . . . [and]
. . . Instead of exciting the sympathy of the other Southern 
states, we should incur their displeasure and hatred.190
Perry also appealed to the elite while criticizing the yeoman who he
believed were responsible for much of the agitation in 1851. South
Carolinians must instruct their delegates to the state convention
189 Richard Yeadon to B. F. Perry, March 7, 1851, 
Benjamin F. Perry Papers.
190 Greenville Southern Patriot, April 25, 1851.
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against secession and the results of the convention itself should be 
submitted in a referendum to the people.
A meeting of the Southern Rights Association in Charleston 
opened in May with John P. Richardson chosen as its president. It 
was dominated by radicals like Seabrook, who wanted separate state 
secession since there was very little chance of any aid for the
1 Q9
Palmetto state--except from Mississippi. There were dramatic 
speeches from leaders of both parties including A. P. Butler, and 
W. F. Colcock. Butler, who received praise from the Carolina press 
in 1850 for his strong stand in favor of Southern rights, spoke 
for cooperative resistance by the entire South. He believed that 
the purpose of the convention's address "is not only to put the 
state on the track of separate secessions, but by measures
193contemplated to commit the state now to that determination."
He upheld the right of secession but did not believe that a
194separate South Carolina nation was viable. The Federal
government would retaliate against the state "by a war of dollars
191 Ibid., May 9, May 23, 1851.
192 Proceedings of the Meetings of Delegates for the Southern 
Rights Association of South Carolina, Held at Charleston, May, 1851, 
(Columbia: Johnston & Cavis, 1851), 8-17.
193 Speech of the Hon. A. P. Butler, Before the Convention 
of Southern Rights Association, Held in Charleston, May, 1851 
(Charleston: Steam Power Press of Walker and Jones, 1851), 3.
194 Ibid., 1-15.
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and cents~-a war of customs houses, and embargoes or of 
195blockade." Despite having these misgivings, Butler emphasized
that the existing United States could not survive and had to be
either radically reformed or replaced by a new Southern nation.
The views of the separate state secessionists were ably
presented in a speech by W. F. Colcock and in an address issued by
the convention. Colcock believed that Southern cooperation was
impossible because the national government was not likely to
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia or repeal the Fugitive
Slave law. These were the only "aggressions" which might arouse
197the other Southern states from their lethargy. Therefore it
was his judgement that "co-operation is submission to the compromise--
1 98submission to the past with no hope for the future."
Secession would never take place unless it was to preserve slavery, 
and its exercise by a single state would be the first step in
195 Ibid., 15.
196 Ibid.
197 Speech of the Hon. W. F. Colcock Delivered Before the 
Meeting of Delegates from the Southern Rights Association of South 
Carolina at Charleston. May 20, 1851 (Columbia: South Carolinian
Office, 1851), 4-11. Hereinafter cited as Speech of Hon. W. F. 
Colcock.
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the inevitable conflict between the peculiar institution and
199
the anti-slavery goal of emancipation.
South Carolina would be able to sustain herself as a
separate state. She could survive "a war of customs-houses" if
she was willing to create an inexpensive market for the entire
w o r l d . A n d ,  her growing slave population would not present an
insurmountable problem as some cooperationists argued:
Long before the day could come when we would voluntarily 
give up our territory to our slaves, and "runaway" from 
them, or they could conquer it from us, our neighbors would 
find means to relieve us as well as themselves from such 
dire calamities, by giving them much better employment in 
their rice and cotton fields. South Carolina will never be 
permitted to become a St. Domingo in the bosom of the South.^01
Separate secession would therefore prevent gradual abolition in the
202state and degradation of the South's "rights."
The address which the convention adopted was a strong 
statement of Southern "rights" and the need for separate 
secession.^®^ It announced that the South was endangered by 
attacks which would result in black emancipation and decline of 
the South:
199 Ibid., 11-15.
200 Ibid., 15-23.
201 Ibid., 21-22.
202 Ibid., 22-23.
203 Proceedings of the Meetings of Delegates for the 
Southern Rights Association of South Carolina, Held at Charleston,
May, 1851, 13.
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That end is the abolition of negro slavery in the Southern 
states, and the lowering of the white population of the South 
to the same level with that agrarian rabble, which, already 
strong and dangerous, seems destined before very long, to be 
the controlling power in the Northern states. We see no 
remedy and no safety for the South in the present Union.^04
The Palmetto state wanted to have the support of the other states of
the South, but she could no longer wait for them to join her. The
convention members realized that there were dangers in disunion,
and yet they emphasized that the state had a perfect right to 
205secede. They hoped that separate secession would not become 
necessary, but "we have come to the deliberate conclusion, that if 
it be our fate to be left alone in the struggle, alone we must 
vindicate our liberty by secession."206 fhe address and a set of 
resolution which affirmed this position were adopted by the 
convention and became the platform for the secessionists in the 
struggle with the cooperation-Union forces in the summer and fall 
of 1851.207
Following the May convention of the Southern Rights 
Associations in Charleston, there was frantic debate about the 
proper course of action for South Carolina to adopt. She had 
seemingly committed herself to an extreme policy by the election
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 13-17.
206 Ibid., 17.
207 Ibid., 12-17.
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of radicals in the February elections and by the address of the 
convention itself. This apparent militancy was countered by 
several realities which the state's elite had to face.
Mississippi was the only other state which might join rank with 
South Carolina and there was a growing fear among practical 
politicians that their community would be isolated as in 1832.
W. F. Colcock had admitted that South Carolina was in advance of 
other Southern states because of her large black population and 
lack of national party ties.
Discussion by the secessionists began in June 1851 when
state legislators and Congressmen expressed their views on the
crisis. Allen Robertson, a member of the state assembly, declared
that the free-soil states had acquired all of the former Mexican
lands and a portion of Texas.^09 After these "aggressions" they
were prepared to adopt a gradual attack policy against the South
so that she would not unite to demand her rights:
Their policy is now to detach as many of the border states as 
they can from us, and admit new Freesoil states into the Union 
as rapidly as possible, . . . And, as soon as they have 
secured a Constitutional majority, (which may be in from six 
to twelve years) they will alter the Constitution— take away 
the right of representation for slave population, and give 
Congress power to manumit slaves. It will then be too late for 
the South to act, when she is bound in, and surrounded by
208 Speech of W. F. Colcock, passim.
209 Yorkville Miscellany, June 28, 1851.
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Freesoil states governed by unscrupulous fanatics; and has a 
domestic enemy around her own hearths, and in her own bosom, 
ready to re-enact the scenes of St. D o m i n g o . 210
The North would not act until she was ready to complete her plans
so that the South would never act as a resistance unit. The
secession of one state would serve as the catalyst for Southern
211unity which was necessary to prevent abolition.
An emotional appeal was evident in the tone of a meeting
at Edgefield in July which resulted in conflict between several
secessionists and one cooperationist speaker. N. L. Griffin spoke
in favor of separate action but was countered by Captain P. S.
Brooks, a cooperationist who admitted that his opinion was in a
minority at the gathering. Brooks doubted that separate secession
would induce the rest of the Southern states to act with South
Carolina. Francis W. Pickens, who also spoke, emphasized that
there must be unity at home in order to insure preservation of the
212South's domestic institution. He stated emphatically that he 
wanted cooperation with other slave states: "But it may become
our sacred duty to act alone and if so we must walk the plank 
alone like men, although the plank may lead over a gulf of
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Edgefield Advertiser, July 10, 24, 1851.
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21 *1frightful dangers." J Southern property had been excluded 
from the territories, and the final result of the national 
government's action would be to abolish slavery or render it
91 A
financially unprofitable. ^ After tracing the history of
abolition, Pickens cried out:
Mr. Chairman: has any man thought seriously of the terrible
effects of abolition when brought to our homes and to our 
fire-sides. Three millions of black slaves, turned loose 
upon the community, would present such a scene as the world 
has never conceived. They would come directly into conflict 
with the white mechanics, artizans and common laborers of the 
whole county . . . what would become of the free artizans, 
enterprising mechanics, and industrious laborers of our 
county? Brought down to a degraded competition with three 
millions of slaves made free?2!3
Upper-class whites would be able to escape from these problems but
lower-class whites would have to deal with them. The "fanatical"
schemes of the Northern abolitionist would lead to race war and
desolation in the South. There might be a possibility of
cooperation with Georgia and Mississippi, but South Carolina would
21 f%probably have to act alone.
By late August Congressman McQueen admitted that the 
attacks upon the South were partially the result of her refusal 
to be vigilant. Everyone was aware of the "wrongs" that the South
213 Ibid-, July 24, 1851.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid. Lower-class whites in radical literature were 
usually identified by the phrase "poor men."
216 Ibid.
had suffered, and the fact that they could have been prevented
if the South had been unified. However, McQueen believed that
there was little chance that the South would unite with the
Palmetto state to stop the evil of emancipation: "The great and
startling matter which we must meet, is that a sentiment pervades
the North (and they have now all the power of the Government)
that is rapidly progressing to the abolition of slavery, which in
my opinion, will never be checked within the present Union; and
unless we move, and move before long, the institution will be gone
from us forever, and our sunny South will, in a few years, become
a barren waste, and a struggle, the most awful which we can
conceive, will take place between the white man and the black, . . .
Under these circumstances shall we fail to act? Shall we fail
to exercise a clear and unquestionable right, and withdraw ourselves
217
from a Union of death to our every prospect of peace and safety."
And although McQueen still hoped for cooperation, this Fire-eater 
evidently expected that South Carolina would have to separately 
secede from the Union.
Cooperationists and their Union allies prepared 
counterattacks during the summer of 1851. James Orr, in a letter 
to a cooperation meeting in Yorkville, held that separate 
secession could be achieved by patience: "The state is not
217 Charleston Mercury, September 9, 1851.
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pledged to secession, nor have her people ever decided upon
that issue--our allies are bravely meeting and overcoming every
obstacle on their march to Southern independence, they will soon
218be up with us, let us stand upon our arms till they arrive."
Armistead Burt, who had made some fairly radical statements in
1850 opposed separate state secession because it would not provide
protection for Negro slavery. South Carolina would have
difficulty in obtaining the return of fugitive slaves since she
would be id as a foreign nation by the United States. Her
expanding brack population could not be sold to other Southern
states because of the constitutional provision against importing
African slaves; anti-slavery agitation would not be ended. But
Burt summarized his feelings in one brief sentence: "I hold that
the slaves of South Carolina are of infinitely more value to her
219than this Union or any Union."
A more moderate opinion was expressed in the pages of the 
Southern Patriot, which did not believe that cooperationists 
could form an alliance with secessionists. The Union editor 
of the Patriot favored a "Southern Co-operation and a Southern 
Congress; not to dissolve the Union and form a
218 James L. Orr to the Committee of Invitation of the 
Cooperation Meeting held at Yorkville, South Carolina, July 6, 
1851 (Scrapbook) James L. Orr Collection, (Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
219 Edgefield Advertiser, May 29, 1851.
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Southern confederacy, but to defend the constitutional rights
of the South, protect the institution of slavery, and preserve
220the Federal Union." And he emphasized that neither the Union
221nor the peculiar institution would be destroyed.
William Boyce, an opponent of separate state secession, 
wrote to J. P. Richardson, president of the Southern Rights 
meeting held in Charleston. South Carolina's goal of protecting 
black slavery could be accomplished only by creating Southern 
unity. There was no real danger to slavery in postponing a 
confrontation with the free states from twenty-five to fifty
9 0 9
years. The North was not totally unified and "has an
intestine disease preying on its vitals--socialism, that will
prevent it as it becomes densely populated from being very
223dangerous except to itself." State secession would not 
create a Southern nation and would be extremely expensive. There 
would be an out migration of people while property values in land 
and slaves declined. Therefore it was not an effective means of 
resistance to the Compromise of 1850 and merely restricted slavery 
to the boundaries of South Carolina— a de facto accomplishment of 
goal of the Wilmot Proviso.
220 Greenville Southern Patriot, August 15, 1851.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., June 13, 1851.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
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The Charleston Mercury, in an attempt to bolster the
secessionists forces printed a letter from John Cunningham a
delegate to the state convention in mid-August. Cunningham
deplored the factionalism which had emerged in the state, and
declared that disunion was a necessity:
"I am free to admit, my fellow-citizens, that my deep 
conviction is, that if the State does not secede, then 
inclusive of her, the whole South will sink into 
absolute submission to past wrongs and injuries, and 
will become lethargic in that degradation, even under 
all future impositions short of that terrible event, 
which may come upon us as a "thief in the night" - 
emancipation and its desolating horrors: and that
therefore we should reserve to ourselves [a] determination 
or freedom to secede as the final act of the Convention."225
It was mandatory that South Carolina choose between submission in
the Union and possible safety out of it. Separate secession was,
in this Fire-eater's opinion, the only way to bring the entire
South to active resistance.
Cunningham argued that radical action was necessary because 
of the problem of emancipation. He believed that the North would 
gradually abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and the 
border states. The Constitution would be slowly altered until 
Congress would have the power to end the peculiar institution within
225 Charleston Mercury, August 18, 1851.
226 Ibid.
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the states themselves.227 And, he held that if the North stopped 
all further aggressions, the South would still be seriously 
endangered:
"Are you prepared, fellow-citizens, to abide the results 
of our present position? What will they be? That we 
stand insulted, wronged, and degraded; that our 
property has been lessened in value; that our share of 
the territories has been taken from us; and that 
slavery is hemmed in by limits too narrow, and cir­
cumscribed by borders too dangerous, are already fixed 
facts. Experience has taught us that slavery, to be 
prosperous and safe, must have confidence of ownership, 
certainty of subordination, limits to expand in area 
for tilling and production, pari passu with numbers for 
consumption and competition, and an outlet to throw off 
any surplus labor, vicious characters, and starveling 
[sic] masses. These are essential to both races in the 
South, white and black: and are more so from the nature
of their productions, Cotton, Rice, Sugar and Tobacco- 
crops that require extensive ar[ea]s, and that steadily 
exhaust those long occupied. Yet the above fixed 
causes and facts will, with fatal certainty, deprive us 
of these essentials and benefits, and insure [sic] for us 
the consequent disasters, unless slaveholders secure 
the one and avert the other by the most determined 
efforts."228
All segments of the white population would be affected by the 
negative changes in the South; white yeoman would suffer from the 
general decline of the South's most vital institution: "The
general ruin of the South will effect his ruin, and finally leave 
him a poor wretch, engaged in the miserable destiny of struggling 
on a loathsome equality with the very slave race he may now deem
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
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to be in his w a y .  " ^ 9  Secession, which would bring prosperity to 
both rural and urban Carolinians, would prevent the crisis.^30
By the fall of 1851 South Carolinians had been exposed to an 
extended debate over the Compromise of 1850 and the dangers of 
abolition. Her citizens had been treated to long discourses on 
the dangers of emancipation which appealed to a fear which existed 
among all social classes. The elite had tried to exploit the 
yeoman's fear of miscegenation and the dangers of economic 
competition with black labor; both cooperationists and 
secessionists were trying to protect white supremacy, although 
their method of achieving this goal differed.
In September 1851 South Carolina's electorate recognized 
that the elections for the proposed Southern Congress would serve 
as the true test of public opinion. State elections in February 
had resulted in mass apathy which the cooperationists did not 
consider as a valid test of either philosophy. Therefore the 
October elections were decisive in determining South Carolina's 
future.
Governor John Means continued to advocate secession as the 
means of protecting South Carolina. She was threatened by denial 
of her equality in the Union and with the death of her institutions. 
Therefore Means stated:
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
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by this time we must all be convinced that if we wait 
for a simultaneous move on the part of our co-aggrieved 
sister states, we must wait forever. If, therefore, we 
intend to act up to the expectations excited by our oft 
repeated declarations, we must act a l o n e . 231
He did not fear this possibility if the state was united and
2 op
hence he encouraged citizens to work toward internal unity.
Debates occurred in several districts before the October
elections. In Georgetown on October 8, an estimated seven
hundred people attended a mass meeting, chaired by state senator
R. F. W. Alston. They heard an address by H. B. Wilson in favor
233of separate secession; his ideas were countered by M. E.
Waterman who spoke in favor of cooperation and offered a 
resolution declaring "that separate state action is an error, and 
will not be tolerated by this meeting."234 Opposing resolutions 
adopted at the meeting by a vote of 400 to 15 declared that all 
bonds with the North were severed, and that after attempts at 
cooperation were made by the state convention, it should 
"declare South Carolina no longer a member of the Confederacy."235
231 Unionville Journal, August 29, 1851.
232 Ibid.
233 Georgetown Winyah Observer, October 15, 1851.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
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In Cashville on September 20, pre-election tensions were 
demonstrated at an anti-secession rally. General Wallace, a 
secessionist, was not allowed to speak by the meeting's organizers 
who were determined that the crowd would hear James Orr and 
Benjamin F. Perry oppose separate secession. After Orr had 
completed his speech, the secessionists demanded that Wallace be 
allowed to talk to the crowd. Since the Fire-eater's request was 
refused, they left the crowd and placed Wallace in a buggy where 
he and Perry spoke simultaneously.
On election day in October 1851 the cooperationists 
carried six of the state's seven Congressional districts. The 
only areas of the state which remained in the Fire-eater's 
camp were the planter parishes with large concentrations of Negro 
slaves and high property values. These areas had been centers 
of radicalism since the 1820's, and unlike similar areas 
such as in Mississippi, they lacked direct economic ties with 
any part of the North or the conservatism of the Whig party 
with its national political ties. The upcounty areas were 
apparently not sufficiently influenced by the racial rhetoric 
to secede without the support of other Southern states. But it 
must be emphasized that these areas still supported men who would
236 Greenville Southern Patriot, September 26, October 16,
1851.
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have seceded if given a practical alternative. The electorate of
South Carolina had followed the advice of her more realistic
statesmen who did not want to see the state isolated as in 
237
1828-33.
Press reaction around the state varied from deep
discouragement at the cooperationist victory to a mild elation in
Greenville. The editor of the Georgetown Winyah Observer stated:
"Unmoved by the deep degradation heaped upon her, unawed by the
howl of abolition coming from the entire North and East, and
unstirred by the rapid strides of consolidation, South Carolina
238stands calm and firm in the Union, . . ." She would remain 
within the United States, and it was the duty of the 
cooperationist party to see that she did not suffer.  ^ Another 
leading radical paper declared that South Carolina had acquiesced 
to Northern aggression: "The vote of the co-operation party is
to be a demonstration against secession - against action in any 
form by South Carolina. It will be so regarded here, and it 
will be regarded as submission among our co-states and at the
O  / A
North." Benjamin F. Perry, however, was elated by the 
results:
237 Georgetown Winyah Observer, October 27, 1851; Greenville 
Southern Patriot, November 6, 1851; Seventh Census, 334-47.
238 Georgetown Winyah Observer, October 27, 1851.
239 Ibid-
240 Columbia The Dally South Carolinian, October 11, 1851.
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The effort to destroy the Union, and form a Southern 
Confederacy, by appealing to the fears of the slaveholders, 
and telling them that their property is in danger, has 
signally failed, and they never can be excited to the same 
madness a g a i n . ^
After the secessionist defeat in the October elections, 
radicals felt they had to be active in combating a growing sense 
of hopelessness. Fire-eaters were concerned that the state 
legislature might not actually call the South Carolina convention 
into session. The Darlington Flag, a pro-secessionist paper in 
the 1851 campaign, decided to oppose the calling of the state 
convention which would only destroy the Palmetto state's internal 
unity by continuing party strife; the Flag's editor announced his 
submission to the will of the people who had decided against 
seceding from the U n i o n . T h e  editor of the South Carolinian, 
however, favored the holding of the state convention and stated 
in an editorial directed to state legislators: "You are bound to
call the convention; and that convention unless specifically
f) / o
instructed otherwise by the people . . . must secede."
Debate in the state legislature began in early December 
and aroused strong emotions. Representative Wilker, a 
secessionist, was unwilling to call the convention into session
241 Greenville Southern Patriot, October 23, 1851.
242 Darlington Flag, December 18, 1851.
243 Columbia The Daily South Carolinian, December 4, 1851.
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because it was apparently against the will of the people. 
Representative Tucker, who had become a separate state secessionist 
during 1850-51, was also opposed to the bill since the electorate
had not approved that course of action. An impassioned defense
of the state convention came in a speech by James Abney of
Edgefield. Abney could not understand that Christopher Memminger
could argue against holding the convention when he had favored the
omnibus bill during the previous session of the legislature.^^
The convention could produce "sure measures of practical resistance--
2 A* 5and some certain means of preventing future insult and aggression."
Abney used extremely emotional language to urge action: "In the
name of God something must be done; I cannot realize the fact that,
in the face of all our oppressions, . . . wc are tamely preparing
the minds of our people for the humble lot of slavery and 
246infamy." Arguments such as these convinced the legislature to
0 / 7
call for the state convention to meet in April 1852.
Since November 1851 there had been quiet efforts by Maxcy 
Gregg and James Henry Hammond to work out a solution to the problem
244 Ibid., December 8, 27, 29, 1851.
245 Ibid., December 27, 29, 1851.
246 Ibid.
247 Charleston Mercury, December 9, 1851.
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of resistance which would not involve secession. Hammond's plan
called for the end of all political connections with the Federal
government--including a refusal to send men to Congress or select
Presidential elections. Unfortunately for secessionists, it made
little progress with co-operationists who were not interested
248in unity with the Fire-eating faction.
From January to April 1852 there was very little activity
among the political elite of South Carolina. The papers discussed
local events and even the radical Edgefield Advertiser announced
that it submitted to the people's decision not to secede. Leading
Carolinians hoped that the convention would harmonize the state,
249
but there was little apparent public interest.
The convention opened on April 26, 1852, for a brief
four-day session. Governor John H. Means, chosen president of
the convention, emphasized that there were dangers in the internal
party divisions within South Carolina while "the fiendish fanaticism
of an abolition spirit, which tramples all law, both human and
divine under foot, is steadily moving forward toward the
2 SOaccomplishment of its ends." Therefore the convention should 
unite the state so South Carolina would be ready to protect itself
248 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina,
129-140; Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South 
Carolina 1852-1860: A Study of the Movement for Southern Indepen­
dence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), 31-32.
249 Edgefield Advertiser, February 12, April 15, 22, 1852.
250 Journal of the State Convention, together with the 
Resolution and Ordinance (Columbia, 1852), 9-10.
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251against any dangers. After several perfunctory days of debate
the convention adopted a brief statement which declared that the
frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States 
by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the 
reserved rights of the sovereign states of this Union, 
especially in relation to slavery, amply justify this state, 
so fat as any duty or obligation to her Confederates is 
involved, in dissolving at once all political connections 
with her co-states; and that she forbears the exercise of 
this manifest right of self-government from consideration 
of expediency alone.252
This succinct statement of cooperationist principles did not please
253either B. F. Perry or Maxcy Gregg who issued minority protests.
After the convention sectional politics temporarily 
disappeared in South Carolina as Presidential politics emerged. 
James L. Orr delivered a speech in Congress in June 1852 in which 
he discussed the Democratic ticket of Franklin Pierce and William 
R. King. Orr emphasized that the failure of South Carolina to be 
represented at the Baltimore Convention did not mean that she 
would not support Franklin P i e r c e . H e  also had special praise 
for the Democratic nominee who had supposedly supported the South 
against the abolition tendencies which had swept the North:
251 Ibid-* 10.
252 Ibid., 18.
253 Ibid., 23-26.
254 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix,
658-60.
367
"When state after state deserted and embraced abolitionism and 
freesoilism, and madness ruled the hour, he calmly surveyed the 
impending ruin, sounded the alarm, and rallied his native state 
on the side of reason and justice."255 pierce's record of 
fairness to the South and general soundness on the question of 
state's rights would insure his election and support in the home 
of secession.
Unionists, in Benjamin F. Perry's Greenville district, 
were extremely estatic about Pierce's nomination and the
257conservative spirit which was being exhibited nationally. They
instructed their members of the state assembly to pressure the
electors in South Carolina into voting for the Democratic nominee
who had a national orientation: "Resolved that in the election
of General Franklin Pierce to the Presidency . . . the American
people will have the consolation of knowing that the Chief
Magistracy of the Republic is in the Hands of a statesman . . .
devoted to his country, and his whole country, knowing in his own
emphatic language, no North, no South, no East, no West, nothing
258but the Union and the Constitution." These conservative
255 Ibid., 659.
256 Ibid.
257 Charleston Mercury, July 13, 1852.
258 Ibid.
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sentiments also included a clear statement that they 
acquiesced to the Compromise's passage.
In August 1852 Senator Andrew P. Butler wrote a public 
letter which gives insight into the thinking of practical 
Carolinians. He announced his continued opposition to the Compromise 
bills that "afford no security to the South on the slavery 
question. That agitation doing its work every day [sic] . . . not 
only unchecked and uncontrolled, by compromises and platforms, 
but, in every successive state of its aggressions, is ratified
OfLfl
and sanctioned by them [Northern institutions]." Although he 
was not enthusiastic about either of the tickets, Butler believed 
that Pierce was preferable to General Winfield Scott. However, 
he did not want South Carolina to become absorbed in Presidential 
politics: "I do not desire to see South Carolina absorbed in any
organization looking to a Presidential contest. If she cannot 
be the champion of the whole South let her assume the humbler 
and more unpretending office of being sentinel of her own land and
interests, and the firm and consistent friend of her natural
, , . 1,261 allies."
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid., August 13, 1852.
261 Ibid.
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Although the vote of the Palmetto state was cast for
Pierce, radicals were not reconciled to the conservative spirit
which had earlier swept across Georgia and Louisiana. Her
leaders were still concerned about the necessity of maintaining
slavery in order to ensure white supremacy. Governor John Means
expressed the mood of the state in his speech to the legislature
in 1852. He stated that the convention, which had met to provide
protection for South Carolina's institutions had been frustrated
by party conflict: "Thus did our state present the spectacle
of a people, whom common wrongs and common dangers should have
united in closest bonds, completely prostrated and paralyzed,
not by the force and power of the enemy, but by their own
262internal strifes." Means congratulated the convention members 
for reuniting the state, and held that South Carolina's destiny 
was firmly tied with the rest of the South. Thus, the 
Palmetto state, though not seceding in 1851-52, would wait 
for the rest of the South to join her in protecting slavery as 
the best method of preserving white supremacy.
262 Journal of the Senate of South Carolina, Being the 
Extra and Annual Sessions of 1852 (Columbia: Johnston and Cavis,
Printers to the Senate, 1852), 29.
263 Ibid., 29-30.
CONCLUSION
The Compromise of 1850 presented one of the last 
opportunities for conservative politicians in the Deep South to 
control those sectional forces that were threatening the Union. 
Since passage of the Compromise was an important link in the 
chain of events that led eventually to secession in 1860-61, the 
Compromise has been extensively studied by historians. Their 
examination of primary and secondary sources generally convinces 
them that political and economic forces were at the core of the 
conflict between the two sections. Although historians have 
generally--and correctly--concluded that party loyalties and 
the disorganization of the radical forces were important causes 
of the South's moderation, they have not recognized the importance 
of other forces in the tangled situation--the racism of the whites, 
and counteracting this, their love of the Union, nor do we 
have a detailed synthesis of the struggles which engulfed the 
Lower South from 1850 to 1852.
One of the earliest accounts of the sectional conflict 
was James Ford Rhodes' History of the United States (1895-1906) 
which covered the period 1850-1909. Rhodes, unlike other 
nineteenth century historians, did not express animosity toward 
the South in his writings. Even though he condemned slavery on
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moral grounds, this "semi-objective" scholar believed that the 
peculiar institution had been firmly fixed as a Southern 
institution because of the profitability of cotton growing which 
was the result of a fortunate event--Eli Whitney's invention of 
the cotton gin. Although Rhodes recognized that the protection 
of chattel slavery was a goal of the South, he did not discuss 
the underlying racial problems connected with the peculiar 
institution. Calhoun, in his opinion, spoke for Southern Fire- 
eaters in 1850, but the possibility of secession was minimal 
unless Congress had passed the Wilmot Proviso or abolished 
slavery in the District of Columbia. Rhodes held that Unionism 
had emerged as a factor within the South after the introduction 
of the Compromise bills by Henry Clay. A majority of Southerners 
were therefore "satisfied" with the Adjustment bills by the end 
of 1850 - except for the radicals in South Carolina and 
Mississippi. After noting the radicalism in the two states, 
Rhodes failed to alnalyze the causes of extremism or to stress the 
tension between racism and Unionism during the period 1850-1852.* 
Another nineteenth century writer, New Englander James 
Schouler, wrote a detailed account of the slavery controversy.
1 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the 
Compromise of 1850 to the End of the Roosevelt Administration 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 1-99, passim.
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Schouler thought that Southern planters wanted to expand black 
slavery into the West "as a means of strengthening their power 
against Northern encroachments."^ Since he recognized the power 
of the Northern anti-slavery crusade, Schouler stated the dilemma 
of the Southern elite in 1849-50:^ "To free California, what 
was slavery's sure counterpoise? The old equilibrium of sections 
was destroyed; freedom overbalanced the scales of national 
influence; and at no distant day the system which they had pressed 
to extend would be at the mercy of a numerical majority whose 
inner wish was to eradicate it."^ He believed that President 
Taylor's plan for admitting California and New Mexico as states 
would have eliminated sectional tensions, and that the trend 
toward disunion in the South during the latter part of 1850 was 
checked by the failure of the South to unite and by the efforts of 
the Georgia Triumvirate. Moderation was thus the dominant trend 
below the Mason-Dixon line in 1851 except in South Carolina. 
Schouler attributed the conditional Unionism in the cotton states 
to Clay's Compromise which, he believed, gave impetus to 
radicalism. This dubious proposition does not, of course, take
2 James Schouler, History of the United States Under the 
Constitution 1847-1861 (New York: Oodd, Mead and Company,
1904), V, 95.
3 Ibid., 151.
4 Ibid.
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into account the depth of Southern opposition to Taylor's plan 
(which Schouler praised) or the sources of extremism in the South 
that were at the core of the hostility toward the North."*
During the first three decades of the twentieth century 
numerous scholars developed interpretations about the conflict 
between North and South. Among them was Theodore Clarke Smith, 
who authored a volume in the American Nation series entitled 
Parties and Slavery (1906). Smith believed that the sectional 
problem was the direct result of conflict over the expansion of 
slavery. Political parties had to conciliate the South since 
her institutions were the objects of Northern attack. Southern 
radicals were a visible part of the population, and conservatives 
wanted to placate them in order to save the Union.^ Moderates 
in the Deep South had to canvass vigorously against a minority of 
extremists who "repudiated the compromise and refused to acquiese 
without an effort to bring about secession."'7 Smith cited the 
personal efforts of Unionists like Foote and Cobb, and the
g
conditional acceptance of the Compromise in states like Georgia.
5 Ibid., 151-263, passim.
6 Theodore Clarke Smith, Parties and Slavery 1850-1859 
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1906), XVIII, XV-XVI, 1-19.
7 Ibid., 19.
8 Ibid., 19-22.
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Sectional peace was a reality in the South by 1852: "The
Southern people, deeply as they felt the loss to their section of
a share of California, and little as they trusted the goodwill
of the North, were willing to let matters rest, provided nothing
further should rise to disturb the equilibrium. So peace
9reigned once more at Washington, and among the states." Smith 
thus interpreted the conflict as one that involved the question 
of whether slavery would expand rather than as a crisis that 
touched the fundamental fears of white Southerners - abolition.
A transplanted Virginian, Woodrow Wilson, wrote a volume 
entitled Division and Reunion (1910) in which he discussed 
sectional problems. Wilson described the South as extremely 
aristocratic, and stressed that the Southern elite felt isolated 
by the mid-nineteenth century as it tied its future to black 
bondage. He held that the struggle over the status of slavery in 
the West was the first contest between two sections whose way of 
life was based on quite different socio-economic s y s t e m s . T h e  
question in 1850 "was not yet the existence of slavery within 
the States, but the admission of slavery into the territories.
The object of the extreme Southern men was to gain territory for
9 Ibid., 27.
10 Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion 1829-1909 (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1910), 117-180, passim.
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s l a v e r y . W i l s o n  recounted briefly the passage of the
Compromise and stated that "habits of accommodation and the
mercantile spirit, which dreaded any disturbance of the great
prosperity which had already followed on the heels of the
discovery of gold in California, had induced compromise; but other
1 9forces were to render it ineffectual against the coming crisis." 
Although he noted the problems created by the Fugitive Slave Law, 
Wilson did not describe the struggle to gain acceptance of the 
Compromise of 1850 in the Southern states or the fundamental 
problem of preserving white supremacy.
John Back McMaster, in a rambling chapter in his A History 
of the People of the United States (1883-1915), dealt with many 
of the conflicts between 1850-52. He thought that the Union 
was definitely threatened in 1850 and that its fate "hung on the 
action of Congress. . . The key issues, on which all
Southerners were united, were that the North must not pass the
11 Ibid., 167.
12 Ibid., 173.
13 Ibid., 173-180.
14 John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United
States, from the Revolution to the Civil War 1850-1861 (New York:
D. Appleton Century Company, 1936), VIII, 9.
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Wilmot Proviso, must not hinder the return of escaped slaves, 
and must not interfere with the peculiar institution in the 
District of Columbia, demands that were agreed upon by moderates 
during early 1850. However McMaster stressed the "radicalism" 
in the South before the Nashville convention was convened. He 
overestimated the popularity of Calhoun's last speech, but 
correctly stressed the divisions within the South during the 
summer of 1850 between Fire-eaters and Unionists. Southerners 
reacted violently to the passage of the Compromise and demanded 
secession or economic retaliation against the North. McMaster 
described the mood of resistance in the South while attributing 
the Union victory in Georgia to the efforts of the Triumvirate. 
Although he mentioned many ideas which were debated in the South, 
his work is more an ecletic recounting of ideas which were discussed 
rather than a clear analysis of the causes of discontent or political 
conservatism which emerged.^
Another early major writer was Edward Channing. In his 
A History of the United States, (1925) Channing, who was influenced 
by early twentieth century racism, emphasized that slavery was 
considered the normal condition for the inferior black man.^
15 Ibid., 9-55, passim.
16 Edward Channing, A History of the United States: The
War for Southern Independence (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1925), VI, 1-67, passim. Channing himself felt that black people 
were inferior and this fact made him more sympathetic to the South.
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Southerners were also influenced by a weak economic system
during 1848-50 that "caused them to look closely into the relative
positions of themselves and their Northern fellow-countrymen.
It seemed to be the sad fate of the cultivator of the soil to be
unable to match the productions of his fields with the demands of
1 7manufacturer and consumer." The production of large crops did
not bring good prices and the general economic state of the South
did not seem promising. Touching on the subject of racism,
Channing mentioned that the Southern Address contained a reference
to abolition, but he did not develop this point. Enthusiasm for
Southern unity had diminished quickly in 1850 Channing thought,
using as evidence the critical contests in Georgia, Mississippi,
18and South Carolina. He outlined the tactics of the Fire-eaters
and the role economics played in diminishing their influence:
"This party [secessionists] was in a minority in every 
Southern state except South Carolina, but it was active
and energetic and, by means of well-written pamphlets
which were everywhere in circulation, was seeking to 
prove to the Southern people that the Union was an 
injury to all their material interests. Fortunately the 
increase, in prices, which were due largely to the dis­
covery of gold in California, and the consequent 
prosperity that prevailed in the South after 1850 drove 
thoughts of secession away from the Southern mind. . .
17 Ibid., 67.
18 Ibid.. 67-84.
19 Ibid., 84.
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He concluded that the deterioration of sectional unity might have
been prevented if the North had allowed the South concessions
which would have prevented white Southerners from thinking their
way of life was threatened. Unfortunately Channing had failed to
recognize the potency of racism, even though he correctly saw that
love for the Union was still an important factor in the minds of
many Southerners as late as 1850-1851.^®
Avery 0. Craven, a leading Southern historian, believed
that a central cause of the conflict between the sections was
the emotionalism created by sectional politicians. However, he
also concluded that there was tension between the forces of the
modern world represented by the urban industrial North and the
rural agrarian South. In analyzing Calhoun's speech in the spring
of 1850, Craven stressed three features of Southern society which
were outmoded: 1) belief in a rural society; 2) belief in Negro
21inferiority; and 3) belief in a confederate form of government:
"His [Calhoun] South and its values were out of date and he 
did not know it. The industrial Revolution was in the 
ascendancy. The future belonged to the city, to the 
financier and the industrialist. . . . Great technical 
changes in communication and production were cutting 
down space, increasing interdependence and calling for 
an efficiency and uniformity which only strong centralized 
government and dominant nationalism could give.22
20 Ibid., 85.
21 Avery Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), 1-272, passim.
22 Ibid., 254.
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Therefore, this so-called "revisionist" believed that the
conflict over chattel slavery between the North and South was the
result of political maneuverings and the growth of the modern
industrial North which was outstripping the South.
Craven also provided an adequate analysis of Southern
reaction to the Compromise of 1850. He believed that Georgia's
acceptance of the Compromise was important to the reaction of the
entire South. Three key factors that caused Southern acceptance
of the Compromise were the national bonds of party, the prosperity
in Southern cities like Savannah, and the fact that the Southern
masses were not radical. Although Craven mentioned the Southern
concern about abolition, he did not develop it as a central theme
in Southern history from 1850 to 1852 or show that it influenced
the political action of extremists in the South like Robert
Barnwell Rhett. Mississippi and South Carolina, which were the
centers of Southern "ultraism," were finally defeated by the lack
23of support in other Southern communities. The crisis of
1850-52 was finally adjusted because there "was a compromise
0 /
dealing with concrete cases, not with principles or values."
Henry Simms, writing in the early 1940's, stated that 
political problems were at the core of the inter-sectional
23 Craven, The Coming of the Civil War, 241-71; Avery 
Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism (Baton Rouge; Louisiana 
State University Press, 1953), 1-114.
24 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 115.
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struggle: "Despite the admitted complexity of the situation, the
political factors more than any other produced that hostile feeling
25which resulted in the separation of the sections." Simms also 
mentioned the South's belief that the two races could not live on 
a basis of equality but he did not utilize this insight. He 
emphasized that the Nashville Convention's failure signalled 
acceptance of adjustment in 1850 but concluded that "had South 
Carolina seceded, the strong conservative sentiment in the South 
in the early fifties might have found itself put to a severe test."^ 
Simms recognized Georgia as the key to the acceptance of the 
Compromise in the South, but in his treatment there was little 
discussion of the existence of prosperity or the factor of race 
as motivating forces in the politics of the Deep South.
In contrast, Allan Nevins was one of the first historians 
to assert that a key problem of the 1850's was racial adjustment.
In his great work on the Ordeal of the Union, Nevins did not stress 
racism in his chapters on the Compromise itself, but in a separate 
section he stated that Southern whites feared racial violence, 
miscegenation, and black reversion to savagery if the peculiar
25 Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Controversy
1851-1861 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1942), VIII.
26 Ibid., 55.
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27institution was abolished. Southerners "shrank from any
solution of the terrible problem of race relations except that
28offered by slavery."
In a later chapter entitled "Southern Acquiescence--
with Conditions ", Nevins emphasized the problems for "Southern
Rights" men like Yancey who believed that "abandonment of the
Union offered the only safety" for the South. "Closed" societies
such as South Carolina, with its aristocratic heritage and large
black population harbored noticeable disunionist sentiment. The
race problem was mentioned in his discussion about Mississippi,
but Nevins did not integrate this factor into his political
history of the Deep South from 1850 to 1852. Forces which Nevins
saw as critical in the Compromise's acceptance were prosperity,
the power of Whigs to prevent secession, the Southerner's sense
of being an American, and the desire for political unification.
However, he realized that the submission to the Compromise was
conditional because the Whig party began to break up in 1852,
and because there was a "continued recalcitrancy" on the part of
29radical Southerners.
27 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: Fruits of Manifest
Destiny 1847-1852 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947),
I, 412-544.
28 Ibid., 422.
29 Ibid., 346-379
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Discussion of the Compromise in general treatments of
Southern history have provided adequate outlines of the main
issues. One of the first scholarly syntheses of the Old South
was written by R. S. Cotterill. Professor Cotterill interpreted
the crisis over slavery from 1849-52 as mainly the result of
planning by Democrats - including Calhoun and Foote - who wanted
30the South to unite in order to stop Northern aggression. This
action, which gave impetus to Southern radicalism, was opposed
by Whigs who wanted compromise because they were "so thoroughly
convinced--of Southern weakness that they were disposed to accept
practically any terms the North dictated so long as it was called 
*1 1
a Compromise. Prosperity was a key to adjustment and the
"excitement" in 1850 was largely limited to Southern politicians 
rather than a prevailing feeling of the Southern people. 
Radicalism was largely a bluff to obtain concessions from the 
North; the Southern movement increased nationalism in the slave 
states and gave the Democrats the reputation of being the chief 
defenders of the South. One gets the impression that Cotterill
30 R. S. Cotterill, The Old South: The Geographic,
Economic, Social, Political, and Cultural Expansion, Institutions, 
and Nationalism of the Ante-bellum South (Glendale, California:
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1937), 201-207.
31 Ibid., 207.
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believed the conflict was artifically created in Washington to
restrain the North and that the result - Southern radicalism -
was not caused by real fears in the South.^2
Francis Butler Sirakins, one of the greatest historians,
recognized that the South had begun its proslavery defense in the 
331820's. The section's racial theory was based on the idea that 
the black man was only fit for labor, and that "white skin 
protected the white man against social degradation and formed the 
basis of a brotherhood of r a c e . T h e  Wilmot Proviso 
precipitated a crisis over slavery expansion which led to efforts
O C
to form Southern unity. J Adjustment was possible because of
"the realization of a common nationality with Northerners . . . and
. . . because the economic systems of the two sections were in
36many respects complementary; . . There were national
political alliances in 1850 which enabled statesmen to save the
37Union by creating a "permanent accord between the sections."
32 Ibid., 201-14.
33 Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 79-115.
34 Ibid., 109-110.
35 Ibid., 111.
36 Ibid., 112.
37 Ibid., 114.
384
The most recent work on the ante-bellum South, written
by Clement Eaton, contains a cogent account of the Southern
38defense of slavery. Eaton, the chief exponent of the idea that
the South grew progressively more reactionary as the nineteenth
century progressed, held that Fire-eaters like William Lowndes
Yancey had played important roles in the sectional crisis from
1846 to 1852: "It is possible that the Fire-eaters in the South
and the abolitionists in the North emotionalized sectional
controversies so greatly that they prevented the successful
39application of compromise and sanity to the issues." The 
South as a whole, however, was concerned about the issue of slavery 
expansion because of the need to maintain political equilibrium 
with the North. After the Compromise's passage, Eaton believed 
that the successful creation of the Unionist movement in states 
like Georgia led to the isolation of powerful radicals in the 
states of Mississippi and South Carolina. He also stressed that 
prosperity - "cotton selling at 13 cents a pound" - helped 
persuade the South to submit to the Compromise which was a bad 
bargain for the Southern states.^® It was only "a sectional truce
38 Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1966), 337-465, passim.
39 lbid•» 47°*
40 Ibid., 470-78.
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that permitted the Northern adversary to grow stronger
Eaton thus stressed the role of extremists and economics as the
major factors in the sectional crisis.
The major monograph on the passage of the Compromise 
itself was written by Holman Hamilton in the early sixties. In 
Prologue to Conflict, Professor Hamilton critically analyzed the 
political struggle over the Compromise on the national level, 
but did not cover the reactions of particular sections except as 
they related to the Congressional struggle. His cogent work 
included only an overview of the effects of the Compromise in 
the 1850's. Thus, his account does not treat the political events 
in the Deep South from 1850-1852.^
In examining historical writings, it is obvious that the 
problem of race and radicalism has not been adequately recognized 
in the syntheses about Southern and American history. Allan 
Nevins in Ordea1 of the Union discussed the problem of racial 
adjustment but did not develop the connections between this 
factor and the political decisions made during 1850-52 in the 
Deep South. In contrast, historians from James Ford Rhodes to 
Clement Eaton have correctly seen the problem of slavery as the
41 Ibid., 478.
42 Homan Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and
Compromise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1964),
1-190, passim.
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key to sectionalism in 1850 but have not developed the duality 
which existed in the Southern mind between love for the Union 
and fear of racial equality. Historians have also examined the 
reaction of the South at the state level in studies which vary in 
quality. One of the best was by Richard Shryock, who emphasized 
that prosperity was the key factor in the Empire state's submission 
to the Adjustment bills. The detailed works on Alabama by 
Clarence Denman and Lewy Dorman give a good account of the 
political struggle, but they do not relate white fear of abolition 
to the intra-state fight between radicals and moderates. Two good 
studies on Mississippi and South Carolina included material 
on race, but their ideas did not influence major interpretive
/ *3
works. Thus, historical treatises on the Deep South have not 
provided a full picture of the interaction between party 
allegiance, love of the Union, affluence and white supremacy.
43 Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement in 
Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of Archives and
History,1933), 1-64, passim; Lewy Dorman, Party Politics in 
Alabama from 1850 Through 1860 (Wetumpka: Wetumpka Printing
Company, 1935), 43-85, passim; Cleo Hearon, Mississippi and the 
Compromise of 1850, Vol. XIV of the Publications of the Mississippi 
State Historical Society (University, Mississippi: Mississippi
Historical Association, 1913), 1-228, passim; Philip Hamer, The 
Secession Movement in South Carolina, 1847-50 (Allentown, Pa.:
H. R. Haas & Co., 1918), passim.
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The most important works on Southern history have not 
taken into account modern techniques of statistical analysis. 
Historians have generally used more descriptive approaches in 
analyzing the effect of large concentrations of Negro slaves 
in forming white opinion, or the responses of radicals or 
conservatives to political challenges during the sectional crisis. 
However, the statistical formulas which political scientists 
like V. 0. Key have utilized for over twenty years can be applied 
to historical materials. These methods are especially valuable, 
because the white Southern male demonstrated a highly critical 
interest in the sectional issues by his participation in 
elections during 1850-52 in which candidates or parties took more 
or less definite stands. In the gubernatorial race in Mississippi 
during 1851, eighty-four percent of the white male population 
went to the polls, while even in conservative Georgia fifty-nine 
percent of the people voted in the gubernatorial contest. Thus, 
the white yeoman and planters of the Lower South expressed 
substantial concern about the issues which were raised by the 
political elite on the state and national level.^
Voting returns, which were gathered for five of the six 
Deep South states, were correlated with demographic data taken
44 Mississippi House Journal (1852), 253; Milledgeville 
Southern Recorder, October 14, 1851; Seventh Census of the United 
States: 1850 (Washington, 1853), 354, 365, 440, 447. Hereinafter
cited as Seventh Census. Fifty-nine percent of Georgia's 
electorate still voted in the gubernatorial election which was 
based on the Compromise despite the fact that it had been accepted 
by the state in 1850. This is a substantial voter turn out. .
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from the 1850 printed census. This method enabled the author 
to select election returns from the gubernatorial races in 
Mississippi and Georgia, Congressional races in Alabama and 
Florida, and the returns for the contest for seats in the proposed 
Southern convention in South Carolina. Each of these important 
political contests was correlated with the following demographic 
data: 1) white population, 2) slave population, 3) white
illiteracy, 4) cash values of farms, 5) cash value of farm 
implements, 6) value of improved farming land, and 7) agricultural 
production (cotton and rice) . The idea was to test whether the 
actual concentrations of populations had a relationship to the 
voting for either Southern Rights or Unionist candidates.
Economic variables were designed to give a broad idea of a county's 
total wealth and its productive capacity, which was largely in 
cotton but also in rice in South Carolina. The addition of 
illiteracy rates was an effort to determine the influence of 
education on the population's voting response.^
45 Thomas B. Alexander et al., "The Basis of Alabama's 
Ante-Bellum Two-Party System," The Alabama Review XIX (October, 
1966), 243-276, passim; Seventh Census, 334-491, passim. It should 
be emphasized that the statistics in table 1 could be cited as 
correlations in going Unionist merely by reversing the positive 
or negative signs.
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The results of the correlations which are summarized in 
the following table are striking. There was no significant 
relationship between the concentration of the white population 
of the South and the Southern Rights position. However, these 
negative correlations are so low that they do not indicate any 
important relationship between the Union party and the white 
population either. In fact, by examining the table one can 
discover only five relationships which might be statistically 
important. It appears that there were significant invididual 
relationships between the slave population, values of farms and 
the Union party in Georgia. In Mississippi, positive 
correlations also existed with cotton production. Each of these 
five variables can be correlated positively with Unionist vote, 
but the variables in Georgia do not really explain much of the 
Unionist voting. By applying a test of squaring the coefficient 
of correlation "r", it is possible to obtain an idea of the 
actual impact on the phenomena of a particular variable; for 
example, only four percent of the Unionist vote in Georgia can 
be accounted for by the economic factors or slave population.
In contrast, however, this same technique enables the 
historian to sec that each of the variables which have statistical 
value in Mississippi can account for approximately eight to 
fourteen percent of the electoral results. No important 
correlations between Southern Rights or Unionist candidates or 
parties can be discerned from the overall coefficients of
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TAB LI' I
SELECTED CORRELATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND VOTING DATA
IN GOING SOUTHERN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTION
White
Population
Slave
Population
Value of Value of 
farms farm implements
ALABAMA -.1252 +.0932 +.0328 +.1211
GEORGIA -.1383 -.1812 -.2371 -.0599
MISSISSIPPI -.1816 -.2979 , -.3741 -.2424
FLORIDA -.0432 -.1729 -.1397 +.0497
Ove ra11 -.1056 -.0743 -.1588 +.0071
IN GOING SECESSIONIST IN THE ELECTION
White Slave Value o£ Value of
Population Population farms farm implements
SOUTH CAROLINA -.3356 +.4687 +.4159 +.3556
IN GOING SOUTHERN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTION
White
Illiteracy
Value 
per acre
Cotton
Production
ALABAMA -.2377 +.0814 +.0339
GEORGIA -.0935 -.1148 -.1290
MISSISSIPPI +.0748 -.1563 -.3566
FLORIDA +.2743 +.2364 -.0662
Overall -.0831 -.0410 -.0790
IN GOING SECESSIONIST IN THE ELECTION
White
Illiteracy
Value 
per acre
Cotton
Production Rice
SOUTH CAROLINA -.1791 +.3670 -.0665 +.6021
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correlation for the four states (Georgia, Florida, Mississippi,
Alabama) in which Southern Rights and Unionist forces competed.
It is thus apparent that the elections in these states were
largely decided on the basis of non-rational, emotional factors
rather than socio-economics data which can be measured by the
sophisticated techniques of social science. Measurable economic
influence in these states were therefore not the real key to the 
46South's reaction.
South Carolina was the major exception to the "rule" that 
demographic factors were not related to the voting in the Deep 
South. The Palmetto state, the most radical of the Southern 
states, was divided into two factions - cooperative and separate 
state-secessionists who vied for support among the white male 
electorate. Even though she was largely isolated by 1851 from 
most of the other Southern communities, sixty-eight percent of 
her electorate turned out to vote in the mid-October elections. 
Positive coefficients of correlation at significance levels above 
ninety percent exist between the separate state secessionist vote
46 The results which were significant in the table are 
those which met a statistical test of being at least ninety percent 
certain that the relationships between variable were not mere 
chance. All other variables, except ones discussed above did not 
meet this criterion. Seventh Census, 334-491, passim;
Mississippi Mouse Journal (1852), 255; Dorman, Party Politics in 
Alabama, 176-91; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, November 19, 1850. 
Charleston Mercury, October 29, 1851. Louisiana's vote was not 
included in this analysis because there were no real contests 
between opposing parties (Union and Southern Rights) and because' 
the correlations based on economic data were insignificant.
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and the slave population, the cash value of farms and farm 
implements, the value of land per acre, and the production of 
rice. There is thus a strong relationship between economic 
factors in the Palmetto state and a high degree of radicalism in 
politics. These correlations, of course, can be explained by 
the fact that the secessionists drew much of their support from 
the wealthy planter counties.^
An analysis based on voting pattern would thus seem to 
indicate that measurable socio-economic data did not influence 
the elections. Southerners during the first crisis of the 1850's 
were more influenced by the values of their society and the 
action of their political elite in each of these states. If one 
examines the beliefs which were held by individuals in the 
ante-bellum South, one is confronted by a hierarchy of values 
which most members of white society accepted. Love of the Union, 
however a Southerner might interpret it, was important to both 
the political elite and the yeoman farmers. In the many 
editorials, petitions and memorials in which Southerners expressed 
their opinions from 1850-1852 they expressed their devotion to 
the Union and also their commitment to white supremacy. These 
values were intertwined with each other but were apparently
47 Charleston Mercury, October 20, 1851.
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arranged in a hierarchy held by white people. A strong 
nationalist orientation might be rather hard to modify if 
reinforced by the news media or leading individuals within a 
state, but it could not compete with the more basic belief in 
white supremacy and the fear that the white man's domination in 
the South would be ended with a b o l i t i o n . W h i t e  supremacy was 
learned from the individual's "social contacts and identification 
with groups," and it might enter the realm of a primitive belief 
which is closely tied with "personal existence and self-identity."1^^ 
White men by 1850 demanded sectional peace, while believing that 
their way of life would be ended if abolition occurred.
In Louisiana, where the newspapers were largely conservative 
and the political elite were largely economically content, the 
love of the Union and its value in the public mind was constantly 
reinforced. However, in the more radical states the political 
elite, led by a John Quitman or William Lowndes Yancey, drew 
upon their powers of communication to touch the fundamental 
feeling that the South had to remain a white man's country. The
48 One can obtain a good understanding of this duality in 
the Southern mind by examining editorials and petitions which 
appeared in the following newspapers during the period September 
1850 to June 1851: Jackson Flag of the Union; Montgomery Advertiser 
and State Gazette; Milledgeville Federal Union; Tallahassee
Floridian and Journal.
49 David Mortensen, Communication: the Study of Human
Interaction (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), 162.
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degree to which they were successful depended upon whether 
the population would turn toward the Fire-eaters who were 
already concerned that white domination over the Negro was 
threatened.^
The role of the Southern political elite was, therefore, 
critical in determining the position that a state would adopt 
in 1850-52. If several of the other Deep South states had 
joined with South Carolina, the nation might have been confronted 
with a serious threat to its existence. General prosperity, 
which may have influenced conservatism, was not as important in 
arousing the masses as the political skills of many Southern 
politicians. Even though there were no discernible differences 
in the socio-economic background between radicals and Unionists, 
it seems that the Union forces were the beneficiaries of out­
standing political leadership furnished by Robert Toombs, William 
R. King, Henry Stuart Foote, and others. Such politicians had 
had lengthy experience on both the state and national levels, 
and were able to appeal to the latent loyalty of the people to the 
Union while minimizing any possibilities of abolition in the 
Adjustment bills.
The conservative elites in the Deep South were able to 
draw strength from the party system. In all of the states except
50 See chapters four through six for evidence to 
substantiate these points.
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South Carolina a strong two-party system existed. Popular 
attachment to the two major political parties reduced the 
likelihood that the political leadership would unite behind one 
position - defense of "Southern rights" - which John Calhoun had 
been trying to achieve for years. The Southern states were not 
monolithic entities, totally committed to radicalism, but 
exhibited a pluralistic system in which the elites actively 
competed for political advantage out of idealism or drive for 
national office. A man like Howell Cobb, representative of 
many of the Southern leadership deeply loved the Union but was also 
committed to the political fortunes of his wing of the Democratic 
party in Georgia. Pierre Soule of Louisiana, although strongly 
opposed to the. Adjustment bills, was still willing to play a 
political role in the campaign of 1852 rather than to abandon 
the Democratic party as William Lowndes Yancey did.^
Fire-eaters, in contrast, attempted to exploit the basic 
emotion of the Southern population - white supremacy. Although 
an examination of measurable demographic data does not really 
show a significant role for economics in the elections, the South
51 Howell Cobb papers, 1850-52 (University of Georgia 
Libraries, Athens, Georgia); Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, 
The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American
Politics (North Scithuete, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), 1-50,
passim; John Slidell papers, 1850-52 (Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana).
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was undoubtedly prosperous in 1850-51. This fact, recognized by 
radicals like John Anthony Quitman, helped to mute the appeals 
which they made to the white lower classes on the basis of 
possible racial-class strife. Radical editors and politicians 
attempted to frighten the yeoman with the possibility that the 
common man of the South would be directly affected by abolition 
while the affluent planters might be able to escape its dire 
effects. They stressed the features of the Compromise which 
might stop the expansion of slavery and thus cause its eventual 
demise below the Mason-Dixon line. Although these arguments 
were influential with part of the Southern masses, the firebrands 
in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida were not able to exploit these 
racial fears because they did not produce a radical leader like 
Jefferson Davis around whom the deep fear of racial equality 
could be used to focus discontent. Charles McDonald was certainly 
no threat to Howell Cobb's campaign in Georgia, while the 
extremists in Florida and Alabama did not produce candidates who 
could compete with the vacillating Henry Collier or moderate 
Edward Cabell.
The truly committed secessionists like John Quitman or 
William Lowndes Yancey, were also hindered by serious problems. 
They had been unable to defeat the Compromise of 1850 in 
Congress or achieve unity among the radical forces at the 
Nashville Convention. The death of John Calhoun, who had served
as the symbol of Southern resistance for twenty years may have 
also hindered their cause. Southern Rights men were not 
committed to secession as the chief form of resistance, and they 
often refused, as did John Bragg of Mobile or Jefferson Davis of 
Mississippi, to consider disunion except as a final act of 
resistance. Therefore cooperationists in South Carolina were 
correct in believing that the rest of the South would have to 
"catch up" with the Palmetto state.
Louisiana was one of the two exceptions to any 
conclusions which can be made about political reactions to the slave 
crisis. The political elite in Louisiana, of both the Democratic 
and Whig parties, were willing to acquiesce in the Compromise by 
1851. The newspapers, which were largely moderate in 
orientation, constantly editorialized about the benefits of the 
Union, while political realists like John Slidell were concerned 
with maintaining contacts with national political figures like 
Buchanan rather than in defending an extreme position on 
Southern rights. The two-party system, which allowed the 
Democrats to dominate the Congressional races in 1.851, resulted 
in the selection of leaders committed to a path of reconcilation 
with the North. The planters, yeomen, and merchants of Louisiana 
were aware of the need for a protective tariff, and were not
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willing to leave the Union to join the Fire-eating extremists
of South Carolina.^
South Carolina, which often appeared as a united
society, was still divided in 1850. Although her leaders
generally agreed that secession was a necessity, they divided
upon the question of tactics. No member of the state's elite,
except the small Unionist contingent led by Benjamin F. Perry,
questioned the fact that slavery and white dominance in this
aristocratic society were threatened by the Compromise of 1850.
Newspaper editorials and reports of primary meetings indicate that
a fear of abolition was foremost in the minds of both the elite
and the masses. But significant members of this radical
society were also aware that South Carolina had been isolated
during the nullification crisis and that there was little chance
for aid from any other Southern state. Secessionist papers
continually harped on the dangers to their white-dominated
society, but the cooperationists were able to point out the
difficulties which South Carolina would have in surviving as a 
53separate nation.
52 Baton Rouge Gazette, 1852, passim; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune 1850-52; John Sildell Papers 1851-52.
53 James Henry Hammond Papers, 1850-52 (Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress); Columbia Tri-weekly South 
Carolinian 1849-50;Benjamin F. Perry Papers, 1850-51 (Alabama 
State Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama).
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In a final evaluation of the spirit of the South in 
1851-52 two attributes were dominant. One was manifested by 
radical, George W. Towns, who called upon the state legislature 
to substantially increase the strength of the state militia in 
order to protect her against any internal threats or from the 
North. In contrast John D. Freeman, a Mississippi Unionist, 
demanded sectional peace while stating that the peculiar 
institution was beneficial to the South; Freeman also stressed 
that the extremists in the North were being ignored by 
conservatives above the Mason-Dixon line. Radicals like Towns 
were ready to do battle with the North while Unionists like 
Freeman could be gradually moved toward secession if white 
supremacy and slavery were "threatened."'*^ Southerners had 
decided to accept the Compromise of 1850, but only on the basis 
that the existence of white supremacy and slavery were not 
seriously challenged.
54 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 339; 
Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at a Biennial 
Session of the General Assembly Begun and Held at Mi 1ledgevi1le 
1851-52 (Macon: Samuel J. Ray, State Printer, 1852), 32-33.
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